HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME ONE

BY

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PREFACE

I AM happy that the results of my life-long studies in the field of Indian philosophy are seeing the light of day. The task of writing a history of Indian philosophy is not an easy one. It requires maturity of thought, acute intelligence, profound scholarship and, above all, great spiritual equipment. Moreover, a number of excellent works on the subject are already extant. Conscious of the limitations of an ordinary student like me, I therefore, hesitated a great deal before embarking upon such a venture. Eventually, I decided to make an attempt, howsoever imperfect, because I felt that for some time past some important aspects in the study of Indian philosophy have been generally confused or ignored.

In the first place, it seems to have been overlooked that philosophy in India has always been a very comprehensive subject. It covers the entire life of beings as well as the universe beyond it. In other words, there exists nothing in this universe, *jaḍa* or *cetana,* which does not come within its purview. This is the reason why each school of philosophy in India only represents a particular stage in life, from the crudest to the highest.[1] Hence, it is a mistake to regard that philosophy in India is limited to the study of the *Ātman* alone. In the present book I have throughout tried to maintain the view that it is as essential to know and realize the truth of the material world, as that of the Ultimate Reality or the Ātman. In other words, in India, life and philosophy are one—each stage of philosophical study and development has to be related to a stage in life and to be actually realized within one's own self.

Another tendency that has much clouded the study of Indian philosophy in the past has been an eagerness to dispute and criticize one another's viewpoint more than expound one's own stage of development in the path to the truth. In their effort to do so, many Indian thinkers have vitiated by some kind of biassed interpre-

[1] *Vide infra,* pp. 21–29.

tation many of our old philosophical texts. The result has been that the students of Indian philosophy have been much confused as to the real nature and achievement of different philosophical thoughts: they have been frequently engrossed in the study of non-essentials or less essentials at the cost of really essential matters.

I have, therefore, tried in the following pages to keep myself free from all prejudices in the interpretation and exposition of the philosophical texts, neither reading one system into the other nor seeking a confirmation or criticism of the Western thoughts in them. In other words, I have tried to be close to the original texts without being prejudiced one way or the other.

Indeed, it has become a fashion these days to attempt comparative studies in season and out of season. I believe that it is neither fair nor beneficial to undertake a comparative evaluation of the systems at the initial stage, even before understanding their independent angles of vision and stages of achievement. It is, to say the least, a source of great deal of confusion. I have, therefore, purposely abstained from it in this book, and have confined myself to an exposition of the schools within their own individual, limited perspective, so that my readers may not confuse the thoughts of one school with those of others.

Comparative study has its own value—a historical and gradational evaluative value. It should be undertaken, however, only after one has fully studied the systems independently and individually.[2] Of course, I have tried to indicate at the beginning and at the end of each chapter the advance made by the system towards the final goal—the *highest Reality,* without confusing the reader by referring to or instituting comparisions with systems not dealt with so far. All these remarks apply, *mutatis mutandis,* to a comparative study of Indian and Western thoughts.

By comparisons it is sometimes implied that one view-point is better or more commendable than the other. I do not think that it is a right attitude. Each

[2] Accordingly, a separate book is contemplated on Comparative Studies.

system, including Cārvāka, Jainaism and Buddhism, is good and commendable in its place—each system is a stage in the path leading to the realization of the ultimate truth.[3] No two schools propound the same truth—though they may often use the same words and may even meet each other at some point or the other. But, if they are two independent schools, they must not view the truth from the same angle of vision. So they must inevitably differ. They need not be necessarily better or worse for that matter. My conception of finding fault with any system is, therefore, that holding a particular stand-point, if a particular system contradicts itself, in any way, or commits any blunder within the limited scope of its achievements, then alone it should be criticized.

This is the reason why I have not represented the schools of Indian philosophy as so many conflicting *'isms'*, as some seem to think, but only as so many stages on the road to the ultimate truth. Therefore, while in the present work, I have tried to establish a synthetic gradation amongst the major Indian philosophical schools[4]—obviously there is no limit to the stages of realizing the Absolute Truth—there can be many more than the so-called traditional number—*'six'* (*ṣaḍ-darśana*) which is only a misnomer. There can be as many systems, even fresh ones, as there can be stages and angles of realizing the Truth. In this sense, Indian philosophy is not at all static but highly progressive—the end remains eternally the same, viz., absolute cessation of pains by the knowledge and realization of the highest Reality, but the methods and stages of reaching it are innumerable and all equally valuable for persons of corresponding needs and visions. Only each school or system, in order to be recognized as independent, must be arrived at and realized with consistency and with sufficient spiritual vigour and discipline.

In a word, I have tried to present as faithful and complete a picture of Indian philosophy as possible. But the subject is so vast that even a whole volume may

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3 *Vide infra*, p. 21.

4 *Vide infra*, pp. 22–27.

not be quite sufficient to do justice to any single stage of its development. Moreover, due to many personal weaknesses and limitations the book cannot claim to be as exhaustive as it should have been.

The entire work has been planned in three volumes. This is the first volume. The second deals with the systems of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, (Pūrva) Mīmāṁsā, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vedānta (Śaṅkara-school) and Kāśmīra Śaiva-darśana, and the third consists of the more important Vaiṣṇava schools of Vedānta, namely, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Vallabha, Mādhva and Caitanya.

Lastly, it is a matter of great pleasure for me to say that in writing this book, I have received help from several of my friends and students but it is not possible to acknowledge here all of them individually. Words fail me to describe the inspiration I have drawn at every stage from my revered teacher Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopinath Kavīraj, M.A., D. Litt. of Banaras. I must also specifically mention the help I have received from my research students Shri A. S. Nataraja Ayyar, M.A., L.M., U.P. Government Research scholar at the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, who has gone through the manuscripts and proofs and made many valuable suggestions for the improvement of this work, and Shri Kailash Narain, M.A. who has prepared the Index.

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INTRODUCTORY

Darśana—Its Aim and the Means to Realize It

Geographical position of India.

THE geographical position of India, her moderate climate, her thick and shady forests and the beauties of the natural scenery found all over the country, her advantage of being both a *nadīmātṛka* (a country which is profusely watered by rivers) and a *devamātṛka* (a country which gets sufficient water from rains) country, her fertile soil, her copious yield of vegetables, fruits and food-grains without much labour, her pleasant and attractive different natural resources, all combined together have helped the Indians from time immemorial to live a calm and peaceful life and devote their time and energy mainly to the understanding of the various problems of life, of the mysteries of the universe, of the secrets of death, of the powers beyond human control, and so on, in order to realize the ultimate goal of life.

Direct realization possible in calm atmosphere with inner outlook.

Direct realization of the highest truth, of the functioning of the heart, mind (*manas*), intellect (*buddhi*) and *citta,* of the subtle elements of the cosmic world, and above all, of the very empirical self (*jīvātman*) is possible only when the enquirer after truth leads a calm and peaceful life and is less attentive to the external appendage and possesses inner outlook (*āntarika-dṛṣṭi*). The enquirer should remain indifferent to all except the bare necessities of life and be constantly engaged in thinking directly or indirectly of the supreme self, which is the same as the highest truth and the ultimate end of life. He should know and believe in the realization of the ultimate truth in every action of his life. He should live only for the realization of the highest aim of life and should not think of making the knowledge of the ultimate truth a means to prolong the span of his life. In other words, 'Live to acquire knowledge, and do not acquire knowledge to live' should be the guiding maxim of such an enquirer after truth. This has been verily the aim of life of the great thinkers of India. They never forgot that through

simple living and high thinking alone the ultimate end of life could be achieved.

Hindu way of life is a life of philosophical discipline.

Simplicity of life, peace of mind, love of truth, devotion and submission to higher powers, eagerness to unfold the mysteries of life and death and curiosity to arrive at the ultimate truth, all are found to be inseparably connected with the very nature of the Hindus, which subsequently, are manifested in every sphere of their life. Finding themselves more or less free from the worries of life, they have been able to concentrate their mind and study the problems of good and evil in all their aspects. They could freely discuss the questions of like and dislike, and of matter (*Jaḍa*) and spirit (*Cetana*)—both within themselves and outside in the universe. So it can be reasonably assumed that the origin of philosophical ideas amongst the Hindus began with the very dawn of thought at the beginning of creation.

Differences and their causes.

Even though the entire population of the country was under the same natural influences, yet, the fact that the equipment of one individual was entirely different from that of another cannot be denied. One can easily realize that no two persons, even if they be twin brothers, have been found resembling each other *in toto,* both physically and mentally. The differences can be marked in every sphere of their life. Thus some realized happiness, while others experienced misery under the same circumstances. This obvious difference in the nature of people led them to believe in the difference of the factors producing their very nature. To a thoughtful mind 'chance' has no place in life, though it may not be easy and sometimes possible to trace every event to its particular cause. From this difference they were also led to believe in the Law of Causality, in the existence of life prior to the present one and also in the Law of Karman, which is at the root of all the differences. In conformity with these they could not disbelieve in the beginninglessness of the cosmic order. In fact, these were not merely matters of belief but they were facts of direct realization whose influence was found to regulate all the physical and non-physical activities of the world.

Again, it will be clear from the following pages how philosophy in India is intrinsically connected with the very idea of existence. It is perhaps for such reasons that it has outlived all possible changes—social, religious and political, through which the country has passed. The Greeks, the Huns, the Scythians, the Pathans, the Moghuls, the French, and lastly, the British have come to this country, conquered and ruled over it, partly or wholly, for years and have produced a few social and political changes. The advocates of the various later religious sects attempted to reform the social and religious views of the people and were even successful to a certain extent. But none of them could, with all the forces at his command, ever produce any change worth mentioning in the philosophical outlook of the country. The records of the best and mature direct experiences of the great seers and sages of the past, as treasured up in our literature, have proved infallible and unsurmountable so far. In this respect the country has held its head high and has never stooped down before any nation in the world.

Philosophy intrinsically connected with the very idea of existence.

Indian Philosophy is, undoubtedly, the purest and most reliable record of human achievement in the field of mental production. It is indeed 'the nucleus round which all that is best and highest in India has grown'. Hence, if we want to know India in her true and unsophisticated form, we must search for her hidden treasures, that is, the philosophical records, of which we rightly feel proud. Without the study of these records it is not easy to understand properly any branch of Hindu Śāstra. Even for our daily activities its knowledge is most essential. No one can distinguish right from wrong without it. It is this branch of our knowledge which equips us with the faculty of discrimination through which one can achieve success here in this world and also can qualify one's self for the success in the higher world. In fact, the entire life of a Hindu is only a reflection of the Hindu Darśana-śāstra. There is a harmonious synthesis between the thoughts as found in the Darśanas and the actual life led by a sober Hindu. Every activity of his life represents the practical aspect of Hindu Darśanas.

Indian philosophy the most reliable record.

Darśana can be studied by all according to their adhikāra.

People not very well-acquainted with the thoughts contained in Hindu Darśanas wrongly hold that since Darśana is so abstruse and difficult, ordinary people are not at all qualified to understand its contents. This remark though correct to a certain extent is yet based on a very narrow idea of the scope of our Darśanas. We know, there are many schools of Darśana and each one represents only a particular stage in the growth and development of our thought. As our life is only a reflection of these thoughts, each school represents only a stage in the growth of our life. Thus, the crudest stage of our life may be easily said to represent the school of Cārvāka Darśana, while the Advaita-Vedānta of Śaṅkarācārya may be said to be representing a very high stage of the growth of human life. So, if a person is properly taught about the particular system of Darśana, which he may be representing at the time, he will be able to understand the thoughts contained in that system of philosophy very easily. For the clear understanding of philosophical ideas one should first know one's own capacity. Every one is not qualified to understand and realize every philosophical thought. With the gradual unfolding of his own thoughts, he becomes fit to understand by stages the graded schools of Darśana. Thus, the thoughts contained in the particular schools of Darśana should be studied by those persons alone who have attained the stages of those particular thoughts in their actual life. It is because of this close correspondence between the schools of Hindu Darśana and the activities of the life of a man that the Hindu Śāstras have laid so much emphasis on the philosophical discipline (*adhikāra*) for the study of Darśana. This makes it quite clear that any one can study and understand a system of Darśana according to one's own *adhikāra*.

Scope of each school of philosophy.

As every school deals with only a particular aspect of the ultimate truth, each school treats of those means (*pramāṇas*) alone which are required for the clear understanding of that aspect of the truth which it represents. In other words, every system of philosophy in India first lays down its own scope and according to the needs of that scope, in order to understand the categories into which the system divides itself, it has its

own logic, psychology, ethics and metaphysics. The school of the Cārvākas, for instance, which deals with gross (*sthūla*) matter alone, has its own logic, psychology, ethics and even metaphysics which, when understood from the angle of vision represented by the school, enables the enquirer after truth to understand very clearly the categories into which the system is divided. In our ordinary life also, we find that the scope of the world of activities of a child is quite different from that of an adult, which again, is entirely distinct from that of an old man who has wider outlook and maturer experience than either the child or the adult. So the logic, psychology, etc. required for the world of the child will be quite different from those of the other, and so on. Thus, it is clear that along with the graded growth in the schools of Darśana, there is also a graded growth in the conception of logic, psychology, ethics and metaphysics of the various schools of Darśana. The logic, for instance, applied for the clear understanding of the categories of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika will not be at all helpful in realizing the categories of Vedānta. It is, therefore, that the number of the categories (*prameyas*) and that of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) differ from school to school in Indian philosophy.

Meaning of the term Darśana.

It may now be asked—what does 'philosophy' mean in India? The meaning of the term 'philosophy' is quite clear from the very use of the word *Darśana* for it. The term *Darśana* means 'the means of perception', not merely of the physical nature, but also of the non-physical character; for, all the aspects of the truth, dealt with in our philosophy, are not so gross as to be cognized through the means of our physical sense-organs alone.

Aim of Darśana.

The next question which now attracts our attention is—what is that for the realization of which these means of perception (*Darśanas*) stand? It is the Supreme Self (*Ātman*), which is the ultimate truth, for whose true realization all the schools of Darśana have their existence. So says the Śruti: *Ātmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ*, that is, 'O! Ātman is to be seen (realized).[1] The Śrutis and the various schools of

[1] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II. iv. 5.

philosophy all lay stress on the realization of the Ātman; for, it is through the realization of the Ātman that everything else becomes cognized[2] and it is then alone that the true nature of the ultimate truth is known.

Nature of world and experiences of Jīva.

Why the realization of the Ātman is regarded as the highest end of philosophy will be quite clear if we try to know the nature of the world and the feelings of the Jīvas. We know, the world is meant for the experiencing of pleasure and pain (*bhoga*). But it is a fact that there is no pleasure free from pain and it is for this reason that the Nyāya system of philosophy, which mainly represents the gross world, does not recognize '*sukha*' as an independent category but includes it under '*duḥkha*'.[3] So the world is full of miseries. There is no being in the universe who can assert with confidence that there is no pain. Every creature, however small it may be, feels pain. It is an experience of those who study psychology that, since its very appearance in the universe, a creature begins to feel pain. Every object of the universe, whether organic or inorganic, is ultimately made of the primary elements, namely, *sattva, rajas* and *tamas,* of which the *rajas* represents pain; so that it is in the very nature of a being or a thing that it should have or reflect the feelings of pain, although sometimes due to some reason or the other, pain, not being so acute, may not be felt. Let us take the instance of a newly-born babe. After the Jīva enters the womb of the mother, it begins to feel pain which affects its mother and, subsequently, her activities too. We know of cases recorded in the Purāṇas where the child in the womb developed even distinct cognitions, for instance, the knowledge of the *Cakravyūhabhedana* by Abhimanyu, the son of Arjuna. The moment it comes out of the womb of the mother, it weeps. Is there any other cause of its weeping except the feelings of pain it experiences at the presence of something which it dislikes? Weeping is either due to happiness or miseries. Certainly, the babe does not find itself in conditions which may give it happiness. The entire surrounding in which it finds itself appears un-

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2 *Ibid.*

3 *Nyāyasūtra,* I. i. 9.

bearable to it. The currents of the air, the light of the sun, the touch of the bed and of the hands of the nurse and the mother, the sound around itself etc., make the babe quite uneasy, and as it feels pain in the presence of these things, and consequently, wants to get rid of these, which it cannot do itself, it weeps. Even when, in the course of its gradual growth, it adjusts itself to all the surroundings, it does feel pain at the sight of that which it dislikes and cannot remove itself from its presence. Such is also the case of every other being, young or old. It should not be held that there is no pleasure at all in this universe. There is some pleasure, but it is never unalloyed and is always mixed with pain.

All activities are meant to remove pain alone.

Such being the influence of pain on our life, all our activities throughout, are, directly or indirectly, meant to remove pain or its cause. Perhaps there would have been no activity in our life and life would have been not worth living had there been no feeling of pain. These activities continue till the Jīva gets itself radically and permanently freed from miseries and the Highest Bliss is realized, which may be possible in one birth or in many. And the activities stop only when pain is removed for ever. This is true not only of human beings but of all living beings. The difference found in these is that of degree alone.

Thus, it is clear, why the highest aim of life and consequently, of Indian philosophy, which is nothing but the theoretical aspect of life, is the Highest Bliss (*ānanda*) which has been described to be the same as *Ātman* or *Brahman*.[4] So, when a sufferer, being tortured by the miseries of the world, approaches his most reliable authority, he is told that the realization of the true nature of *Ātman* alone will put an end to all his troubles and that he should, therefore, realize the *Ātman*, and that there is no other way to achieve the end. So says the Śruti also: "*Nānyaḥ panthā vidyate'-yanāya.*"[5]

The same authority which teaches this to the enquirer after the highest truth also tells him of the means to realize it. They are: Authority, Reasoning and

4 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II. v. 19; *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II. ix; *Ibid.*, III. vi.

5 *Yajurveda*, I. 18.

Means of realization.

Intuition, called *Śrâ-vaṇa, Manana* and *Nididhyāsana*, respectively. In other words, the enquirer after truth, being himself ignorant of the means of radical cure of his miseries, should approach the teacher *(ācārya)* who has himself realized the truth; or failing him, he should get his teachings from the most authoritative texts which are nothing but the most faithful records of the direct experiences of the seers of the truth. From these authoritative sources, the enquirer should learn of the truth which alone can put an end to his miseries. Now, had the enquirer after truth full faith *(śraddhā)* in the words of his teacher or in those of the *Śruti*, he would have at once got the illumination needed.[6] But as a human being, he is beset with misgivings and false notions which stand in the way of his immediate conviction. He then sets about collecting arguments in support of what he has heard from his most reliable authority. This stage of reasoning, as based upon the premises supplied by the authorities, is known as *manana*.[7] This is what speculative philosophy in India attempts to represent.[8] But mere speculation cannot lead us to the truth. It seems quite possible that the conclusions arrived at through speculation might be overthrown at any moment by counter-reasonings of a stronger nature.[9]

Examples of such supersesssion abound in both science and philosophy. So the enquirer cannot rely upon mere speculation. It is necessary, therefore, to verify the rational conclusion through practical experiments; just as in Geometry, demonstration is supplemented by experimentation. This practical verification is

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[6] *Śraddhāvān labhate jñānaṁ— Bhagavadgītā*, iv. 39; *Śraddhā ca brahmavijñāne paramaṁ sādhanaṁ—Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on *Chāndogya*, II. i. I.

[7] *Śrutasya parīkṣā nyāyenaivāvasthāpanaṁ yāmāhurmananamiti—Tātparyaṭīkā* on *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 2.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Naiṣā tarkeṇa matirāpaneyā.—Kaṭhopaniṣad*, I. ii. 9; *Tārkiko hi anāgamajñaḥ svabuddhiparikalpitaṁ yatkiñcideva kalpayati—Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on *Ibid.; Itaśca nāgamagamye'rthe kevalena tarkeṇa pratyavasthātavyaṁ.. yasmānnirāgamāḥ puruṣotprekṣāmātranibandhanāstarkā apratiṣṭhitā bhavanti. Utprekṣāyā niraṅkuṣatvāt, tathā hi kaiścidabhiyuktairyatnenotprekṣitāstarkā abhiyuktatarairanyairābhāsyamānā dṛśyante. Tairapi utprekṣitāḥ santastato'nyairābhāsyante iti na pratiṣṭhītattvaṁ tarkāṇāṁ śakyamāśrayituṁ puruṣamativairūpyāt.—Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*. II. i. II;

Yatnenānumitopyarthaḥ kuśalairanumātṛbhiḥ/
Abhiyuktatarairanyairanyathaivopapādyate//
—Vākyapadīya, I. 34.

reached through *nididhyāsana*. The conclusions of the previous stage are hereby realized as true and unassailable. These are the steps which are recognized in Indian philosophy for the direct realization of the truth, that is, the *Ātman*.

This makes it quite clear that by philosophy (*Darśana*) in India we understand something more than mere speculation. So though it is not quite correct to use the term 'Philosophy' for 'Darśana', yet for want of a more appropriate word in English we are constrained to retain the term, but we should not lose sight of the distinction noted above.

Ultimate aim of philosophy is the same as the aim of life.

It is clear from the above that the ultimate end of philosophy in India is also the very aim of life, and that every being is directly or indirectly busy realizing that end, of course, within its own limitations. This very aspect of philosophy accounts for its being so very natural and consequently, popular. With the above mentioned ideas in view, if we study the various systems, it would be quite evident that philosophy in India is a complete record of the existence of living beings in all their stages. It is simply impossible even to think of any phase of the life of a being which is not represented by a philosophical system in India. Everyone at every stage of his life can find, if he only takes the trouble of doing so, his own complete and true reflection in this philosophy. It is needless to say that in order to find out the radical remedy of our pain we have also to know the true nature of each and every object of this empirical world as well. So the scope of philosophy in India is not limited to the realization of the Ātman, but has also to be extended to the material world which helps the enquirer to realize the Highest Bliss indirectly.

Refutation of charges against Indian philosophy.

This is all about the nature of philosophy. Next, an effort is made here to clear away the misunderstandings which may be present due to the various charges made against this philosophy:

It is not pessimistic.

1. Some consider that Indian philosophy is *pessimistic*. To this it may be pointed out that it is so, no doubt, if by 'pessimism' we mean a sense of dissatisfaction with what

exists. But if it is held that the ultimate end of philosophy is pessimistic, then the answer is in the negative. No system of Indian thought maintains that its final end is miserable and full of sufferings. It is clearly stated in each and every system that the highest aim of philosophy is blissful. This is why Indians, however wretched and miserable they may be, in their present life, are very hopeful of their bright end, if, of course, they have been leading their lives according to the best advice given by the great seers of the past. In fact, this is the only consolation which helps a ruined man to take courage and pull on even with his miserable life on right lines. This is the reason why an Indian even prefers to embrace the fearful death, full of hopes and rejoicings, only if he has been leading his life on noble and truthful lines. Had Indian philosophy been, in reality, pessimistic in the latter sense, there would have been no moral and religious activities of high order amongst the Indians, and the *law of karman* would have had no place at all.

It is not dogmatic.

2. Likewise, there is no justification for holding Indian philosophy to be purely *dogmatic*. In other words, there are some who think that all the philosophical systems in India accept blindly the truths contained in the Śrutis and do not encourage reasoning. Thereby they seem to think that there is no original contribution to philosophy in India. But this is not at all correct. From our studies of the Upaniṣads and the later literatures, it is clear that full scope is given to reasoning to discuss the nature of the truths taught in them. There is no system of philosophy which discourages such reasoning. But, then, there is one point which should always be borne in mind in this connection. In Indian philosophy mere speculation has no place. It alone cannot prove the validity, or otherwise, of any truth. Every sound reasoning has to be verified with the help of well-guided experiments of gross or subtle nature. The validity and the final acceptance of any truth depend upon the latter's tallying with the reality. If any truth does not correspond with the actual reality, then it is not regarded as truth, and is subsequently, rejected as invalid. Under the circumstances it is not fair to attribute dogmatic nature to Indian philosophy.

It would not be out of place to point out here that the nature of experiments required for the verification of the reasoned truths in Indian philosophy is entirely different from what is found in modern science. The experiments of modern science can help us to know the validity, or otherwise, of the gross material world alone. But the gross aspect is not all in all even in this material world. There are such subtle material elements as *tanmātrā*, sense-organs, *ahaṅkāra, mahat,* and the ultimate elements—*sattva, rajas* and *tamas,* which modern science can never bring within the range of its experiments. There is, besides, the *cetana* aspect of the universe which is far beyond the reach of modern science. But unless all these aspects are completely known, no comprehensive knowledge, and consequently, no final end, can ever be achieved. Modern science, working within its own limitations, fails to enter into the realm of these subtle aspects of the universe. Its researches, some day or other, will stop at a certain stage. It cannot lead us to the final truth. It will have to be satisfied with the knowledge of the relative truths. With the systems of Indian philosophy, however, the case is quite different. According to these systems an enquirer is not only required to know thoroughly each and every material object, gross or subtle, through reasonings and experiments of physical nature, but has also to proceed further into the subtler aspects through the means of knowledge as are taught in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The Yogic training, including the preliminary training of the nature of the so-called philosophical discipline, forms an essential part of all the teachings of every Indian system. No perfect knowledge can ever be attained without having the unbiased and true knowledge of both the aspects of the universe, namely, matter and spirit in all their aspects. A true method of right knowledge can never neglect either aspect. It is through the subtle methods of the yogic practices that one can get right knowledge in such cases. This is the unique peculiarity which alone distinguishes Indian philosophy from the scientific and philosophical achievements of all other countries of the world. This aspect of truth seems to have never been so successfully studied in any other country so far.

Nature of experiments for verification of truths.

It may be further pointed out that all the authoritative statements found in our philosophical systems are, in fact, the mature and valid direct experiences of the great thinkers of the past. These must have been recorded after having been thoroughly examined and verified with the actual reality through the subtle means of right cognition. That these are reliable and valid is proved from the very fact that they have been never contradicted so long. Such being the case, there is no reason why an enquirer should not accept them as valid conclusions for his future reasonings and researches. Is it not wise and proper to take advantage of the valid direct experiences of the great thinkers of the past? Would not such a course of action help the enquirers after truth to realise their end easily? Hence, there seems to be no strength in the view that Indian philosophy is dogmatic.

Philosophical statements are records of mature experiments.

Experience of great thinkers of the past.

3. Similarly, there are some people who hold that philosophy in India sticks to the old views and does not want to make any progress by adding to and improving upon the old antiquated views of the seers of the past. Hence, they consider that it is not a *living philosophy*, and it is, therefore, perhaps quite uninteresting and not worth studying. This charge, I think, certainly, comes from those who have never cared to study Indian philosophy in the right spirit. They should know that *doubt* (*saṁśaya*) and non-fulfilment of one's aim are the two causes of any activity which may be called progress as well. If there be no *doubt*, no mental and subsequently, no physical activity will ever be seen. Likewise, if one's aim has been fully realized, it is certain in that case that there will be no activity of any sort. This is a fact which admits of no denial. Proceeding with this assumption, it may be pointed out that in the case of philosophy in India, the ultimate truth, the supreme aim of human life, having been fully realized by many, there remains no doubt as regards the true nature of anything in this universe. The very nature of the realization of the highest truth is such that it leaves nothing unknown, unrealized, unthought of and unheard under the sun, so says the Śruti—Uta tamādeśamaprākṣ-

Progressive nature of Indian philosophy.

yaḥ yenāśrutaṁ śrutambhavatya matam matamavijñātaṁ vijñātamiti.[10] Thus there remains nothing to be known about which there can be any *doubt*. In the absolute absence of *doubt*, there can be no activity and no so-called progress of any kind. The great thinkers of the past have, after careful consideration, revealed the truth about the nature of the universe, God, transmigration of soul, the law of karman, etc. and there remains nothing fresh to unfold for which there should be any activity. Truths, as they are, must ever remain unchanged. When once a truth is achieved there is no need of making any more effort towards its realization. A truth is truth for all times. Hence, in this sense there is no scope for any progress in Indian philosophy.

Doubt leads to activities.

But in spite of the fact that all the riddles of the universe have been solved for ever, relative and ultimate truths have been realized, and that there remains nothing to be experienced, there have been all along serious activities in the philosophical field also. No doubt, the truths are there, but they should not be accepted blindly. Everyone seeking after truth has to realize these truths for one's own self through reasonings and verifications. Unless this is done, no truth can be called realized. Such efforts are always made and will continue for ever. Under such circumstances no one can say that Indian philosophy is unprogressive.

All the riddles of the universe though solved in the past, yet every seeker after truth has to realize them for himself.

Moreover, there is a distinct advantage for an enquirer in this philosophy. The ultimate goal having been realized and fixed, an enquirer can very easily take account of his efforts towards the goal and can realize for himself at every step what progress he has made and how much more he has to make. This is not possible in the philosophy or science of any other country. Their original authors have not even for themselves realized the ultimate truth. They are always beset with doubts as regards their own conclusions and are not sure whether their view-point will not be upset by some more intelligent thinker in future. Instances are not wanting in their case where old conclusions have been proved unsound by later thinkers. So, they are never sure of

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10 *Chāndogyopaniṣad,* VI. i. 3.

their achievements and are, therefore, unable to leave anything for the guidance of the posteriority.

We may now consider the origin of philosophy in India. It may be mentioned in this connection that Indians have never been keen on keeping any chronological record of their activities in any field. Philosophy is not an exception. And it may also be said that perhaps there was not much need for such a record in philosophy. Philosophers were busy with the problems of the universe, of life and death and never felt any necessity to think of the chronological aspect of knowledge. But this should not prevent us from making an enquiry into it with a view to trace the gradual development of the various problems of thought and also to find out the exact amount of contribution made to philosophy in later centuries by different scholars. We have, however, no evidence as to the exact date of the origin of any one of the philosophical problems in the later Brāhmanic sources. So we depend upon the records of other contemporary schools of thought, such as the Buddhist and the Jain, for the above. Still some of the contemporary authors who have left some information of their own time and belong to a later period can help us only to trace the later development of thoughts. The earliest record of our literary activities, however, exists in the form of Vedic hymns. In some of these hymns there are direct references to such philosopohical ideas as exist even now, in almost the same form. Not only the high speculations about the universe and the creation are found in these hymns, but even the pantheistic idea of the universal soul has found its expression in these hymns for the first time. Moreover, as philosophy cannot be divorced from religion in India, it is not impossible to trace philosophical ideas even in most of the religious hymns of the *Ṛgveda* which are regarded, even by the modern scholars, to be of the earliest period. Then again, as has been made clear before, the very life of a Hindu being a reflection of the philosophical thoughts, how can we consciously neglect to assert with confidence that the origin of philosophy in India can easily be traced to the very beginning of human life here. But anyhow, as

Origin of Darśana.

Philosophy cannot be divorced from religion.

Hindu life is a life of Philosophy.

the latest of these hymns cannot be said to have been composed later than 1500 B.C., as the modern scholars think, it can be held without any hesitation that the origin of philosophy is as old as 1500 B.C. at least. But at the same time we should not overlook the fact that in these Vedic hymns we have definite assertions of fully developed philosophical ideas. Hence, it should be held that these thoughts must have assumed their definite shape long before they came to be expressed through these hymns.

Philosophy in India started with the very creation itself.

This is what can be said on the basis of the earliest records of the literary products of our country. But if we care to think a little deeply, it will be quite evident that philosophy in India began with the very beginning of the creation itself. Before we proceed further, it is essential to consider the aim of the universe itself. Why should there be a creation at all? We know that every action of our life, whether psychic or non-psychic, must bear its requisite fruit. The fructification of the results of the activities performed in one birth may be possible either in one birth or in many. If it is not complete in one life, one has to take as many births as will be required to exhaust the experiences of the past deeds. These experiences may be either pleasing or painful. So it is clear that one has to take birth simply for the sake of experiencing pleasure or pain in accordance with one's good or bad deeds of the past. Thus, we find that pleasure and pain accompany a Jīva from the very moment it comes into this universe, that is, in the womb of its mother. It is also a fact that no one likes pain. So the feelings of pain, pleasure and hatred are almost simultaneous with the creation of the beings in the universe. This itself indicates the presence of discriminative knowledge, however crude it may be, for selecting things of like and dislike. Is this not the very starting point of philosophy? Can we ever think that a being can exist even for a moment without experiencing the feelings of pleasure and pain? If that be so, how far can we justify its creation in this world? Can a being remain for even a moment without the influence of the Law of Karman? No, the Law of Karman never ceases to operate its in-

No being can ever remain without experiencing feelings of pain and pleasure.

fluence in this universe. It continues its influence both here and hereafter; so that, within the limitations of time and space, with which this universe is enveloped, the Law of Karman continues its operation so regularly and comprehensively that not a single event can escape its notice. As the creation has no first beginning, the Law of Karman also has no beginning. This Law of Karman is the very heart of Indian philosophy. Thus, it is clear that philosophy in India must have originated with the very beginning of creation.

Law of Karman is the very heart of Philosophy.

This is about the origin of philosophy in general. But coming to the systematized philosophical schools, we have no hesitation in asserting that the grouping of philosophy into different schools is of a later date. As to the exact time of this grouping, it can be said with confidence that it must have taken place after the main Upaniṣads. In the Upaniṣads we find that all sorts of problems, which were grouped separately later on, exist without any particular order and without being claimed by any one particular class of people. The problems of philosophy are found in the Upaniṣads like the common intellectual property of the entire intelligentsia. But due to the gradual intellectual sophistication of the people and the peculiar circumstances caused by the appearance of Jainas and Buddhists, it was found very necessary to arrange these problems in certain groups, in certain fixed order and within certain limitations. It seems there was hardly any need to organise the thoughts of the Upaniṣads in a certain definite order till we come to the time when the Jainas and the Buddhists flourished. It is but natural that people do not care to gather their entire strength or collect all their fighting instruments unless they find that they need them very badly to meet their opponents on common grounds. Before this, even though they may possess everything, yet they would not care to collect them together in some definite order. But as soon as there appears any serious demand for them, they make a search of their treasures and gather all possible material they have in their possession, loosely scattered, to meet the great demand. Thus, it seems that it is the demand which makes one prepare and arrange things.

Origin of grouping of schools.

This might have exactly happened in the case of the grouping of the various schools of Indian Philosophy. We know for certain that all the main problems of philosophy are found scattered in the Upaniṣads which have been studied from time immemorial for the satisfaction of one's own self. There was never any cause for people's dissatisfaction while studying these thoughts together, nor did they ever express their inability to understand those thoughts in that order. But as soon as the Buddhists and the Jainas appeared in the field, intellectual polemics became very common. The orthodox scholars were very often found discussing with the Buddhists and the Jainas some problem or other of philosophy. Their outlook was not friendly and each party wanted to have victory over the other by any means. Under the circumstances, it became very necessary for each party to gather all its strength and arguments to support its case. As the problems were of different nature, they required arguments of different nature as well. This led the Sanātanists (orthodox Brahmanical scholars) to make exhaustive searches into the Upaniṣads where they could easily find solutions of the various problems. These thoughts, therefore, had to be arranged in some definite order with certain limitations for their easy understanding and use in time of need. So the various thoughts were gleaned out from the Upaniṣads and arranged according to their natural growth and development at their various stages. Thus, for instance, all thoughts connected with the science of reasoning and representing the common-sense view of the earliest stage came to be grouped together with such extra additions and elucidations as were found necessary to complete the system, which later on was given the name of *Nyāya*. As there was a great demand of the science of reasoning to refute the arguments of the opponents and also to protect their own stand-point against the attacks of the opponents, it seems that Nyāya system came to be organised first. Gradually, there was the demand for the grouping of other types of thoughts on different problems which led the scholars to glean other kinds of thoughts and group them under different names. This might have been the reason

Upaniṣad is the source of philosophical thoughts.

Origin of Nyāya System.

of the grouping of the various schools of Indian Philosophy. Hence, it may be suggested that the first grouping of philosophical thoughts in the Sūtra form might have been done during the period when there was a good deal of clash between the Sanātanists and the Buddhists, that is, between the 5th century B.C. and the 1st century B.C.[11] There are, however, other views advanced by other scholars. Thus, for instance, Professor Jacobi thought that the Nyāya and Brahma-Sūtras were composed after the Nihilistic school of Buddhism, meaning, Śūnyavāda, but before the spread of Vijñānavāda, that is, between A.D. 200 and 450. But he thought that the Mīmāṁsā and the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras might have been a little older. The Yoga-Sūtra was assigned by him to the period after the advent of the Vijñānavāda, and the Sāṅkhya-Sūtra to a very late date. But this view is not accepted by all.

After having discussed the origin of the grouping of the systems, it is necessary to know of the number of the systems existing in Indian philosophy. We are aware of the so-called stereotyped expression '*Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* (Ṣaḍdarśana).' It is an expression which has been so very often used in later literature by scholars. But from what is going to be said in the following lines it will be clear that the expression (1) is not old, (2) the idea conveyed by the expression is not at all uniform, and (3) that it is only a misnomer.

Number of schools according to Indian philosophy.

The earliest reference to the number of systems is found in the *Śiva-mahimnaḥstotra* of Puṣpadanta where it is said that there are only four schools of philosophy, namely, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Paśupatimata and Vaiṣṇava.[12] The author of the *Arthaśāstra* includes under philosophical systems—Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata.[13] The *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha* attributed to Śaṅkarācārya enumerates a different classification: Lokāyata, Ārhata, the four Buddhist schools of Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya the two schools of

[11] In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (VII. i. 1) Nārada enumerates *Vākovākya* (Science of Reasoning) as one of the Vidyās. But the nature of that being unknown at present, we confine our treatment here only to the present text of the Science of Reasoning, namely, the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama.

[12] *Vide*, Verse 7.

[13] I. i. 1.; p. 6.

Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā: Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara, Sāṅkhya, Patañjali, Veda-Vyāsa and Vedānta. In the *Hayaśirṣa-Pañcarātra*, a Brāhmanic work, supposed to have been introduced in Bengal by Raja Ballala Sena (about 1158-70 A.D.) as well as in the *Guru Gītā* of the *Viśvasāra-Tantra*, the six systems are: Gautama, Kaṇāda, Kapilā, Patañjali, Vyāsa and Jaimini.[14]

Haribhadra Sūrin, a Jaina writer, of about 1168 A.D. means by six systems—Bauddha, Naiyāyika, Kapila, Jaina, Vaiśeṣika and Jaiminīya.[15] Another Jaina writer, named Jinadatta Sūrin, of about 1220 A.D., includes—Jaina, Mīmāṁsā, Bauddha, Sāṅkhya, Śaiva and Nāstika under six Darśanas.[16] The next Jaina writer, Maladhāri Śri Rājaśekhara Sūrin, of about 1348, enumerates another kind of division, namely, Jaina, Sāṅkhya, Jaiminīya, Yoga,[17] Vaiśeṣika and Saugata.[18] According to the son of Mallinātha, the great commentator of Kāvyas, of the 14th century, Ṣaḍdarśana includes Pāṇini, Jaimini, Vyāsa, Kapila, Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda.[19] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, who must have lived before the 11th century, appears to include under *Ṣaṭtarkī*:[20] Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya including Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Ārhat, Bauddha and Cārvāka. The compiler of the *Sarvamatasaṅgraha* divides the schools of Indian thought under two main heads: *vaidika* and *avaidika*. The former is sub-divided into Mīmāṁsā, Sāṅkhya and Tarka and the latter into Bauddha, Ārhat and Lokāyata.

Mādhavācārya in his *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* enumerates many more, namely, Cārvāka, Bauddha, Ārhata, Rāmānuja, Pūrṇaprajña, Nakulīśa-Pāśupata, Śaiva, Pratyabhijñā, Raseśvara, Aulūkya, Akṣapāda, Jaimini, Pāṇini, Sāṅkhya, Pātañjala and Śaṅkara.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Prasthānabheda*[21] divides Darśana into Āstika and Nāstika. Under the

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[14] *History of Indian Logic*—Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusana, p. 153, Ft. n. 3.

[15] *Saḍdarśanasamuccaya*, Verse 3.

[16] *History of Indian Logic*, p. 152.

[17] The expressions *Yogamata* and *Śaivamata* appear to have been used in old literature for the same school, namely, Nyāya. The use of the term 'Yoga' in this sense is also found in the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, I. i. 29. It appears to have been wrongly interpreted in the sense of *Vaiśesika* by the late Dr. Sir Ganganatha Jha in his *Khadyota* on the above.

[18] *History of Indian Logic*, p. 380.

[19] Umesha Mishra—*Conception of Matter*, p. 5.

[20] *Nyāyamañjarī*, Vol. I, p. 4.

[21] His commentary on the 7th verse of the *Śivamahimnaḥstotra*.

former, he includes Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Karma-Mīmāṁsā, Śārīraka-Mīmāṁsā, Pātañjala, Pañcarātra and Pāśupata, while under the latter, he includes the four main schools of Buddhism, Digambara school of Jaina and the school of Cārvāka. But in his *Siddhāntabindu* he speaks of the schools of Cārvāka namely, Dehātmavāda, Pratyeka-Indriyātmavāda, Militendriyātmavāda, Ātmamanovāda and Prāṇātmavāda, the schools of Saugata, namely, Vijñānavāda and Mādhyamika; Digambara, Vaiśeiṣika, Tārkika, Prābhākara, Bhāṭṭa, Sāṅkhya, Patañjali and Aupaniṣad (Śaṅkara-Vedānta).[22]

Gauḍa-Brahmānanda, while commenting on the *Siddhāntabindu*, includes Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika under the schools of Saugata and says that the six Nāstika Darśanas are: Cārvāka, the four schools of Buddhism and the Digambara school of Jaina, while Vaiśeṣika and others represent the six Āstika Darśanas. But this is possible only when the two schools of Mīmāṁsā are not taken separately.

The author of the *Nyāyakośa* is of opinion that there are only six Darśanas, namely, two Yogas, meaning Sāṅkhya and Pātañjala, two Mīmāṁsās, meaning Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṁsās, and two Tarkas, that is, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. This also is, undoubtedly, said regarding the Āstikadarśanas alone.

These are some of the references about the number of Darśanas we have. From the above, it seems that there can be many more Darśanas only if one can think of a system with consistent thoughts leading to some definite goal representing a stage in the development of thought towards the achievement of the Final Aim.

Before we take up the order of the grouping of these systems, it is desirable to know the ultimate aim of these systems and their method of realizing it. It has already been said above that the highest aim of philosophy is the perfect realization of the Supreme Soul (*Ātman*). It is this realization which alone will finally put an end to pain which is the underlying common factor of the entire creation. There is only one method for the realization of this aim and no other, as is said in

Ultimate aim of schools and their methods of approach.

[22] Vide—*Siddhāntabindu*, pp. 107–113, Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares Edition, 1985 Samvat.

the Śruti[23] " nānyaḥ panthā vidyate'yanāya ". In other words, there is only one ultimate aim for all and only one method to realize that aim. Hence, all the different schools of thought are so harmoniously arranged in a progressive or ascending order that they collectively help an enquirer to realize that aim. In other words, the different schools of thought separately are not self-sufficient to realize the final aim. What each school does towards the realization of this aim is to help an enquirer to achieve only the relative truth. Hence, the view that each and every school of thought independently and directly leads to the ultimate goal does not seem to be quite convincing. Now, it may be asked here: if each system only achieves the relative truth, then what is the necessity of having so many different schools? In answer to this, it may be pointed out that these different systems are meant for representing the different stages towards the realizaion of the highest aim, according to the difference in the intellectual equipments of the enquirer, what is generally known as ' *adhikārabheda* '. In fact, as already said above, there is only one end and only one path to reach that goal, but due to the difference in the intellectual capacities of the enquirers which is the same as " Philosophical Discipline ", the single path appears as so many different paths to them.

Each school aims at the relative truth.

Philosophical discipline is no other than the discipline of body and mind which is acquired by the observance of what may be called *Sādhāraṇa-dharma* and *Varṇāśrama-dharma.* The former comprises the acts indicative of virtues of kindness, truthfulness, non-stealing, bodily purification, restraint of senses, deeds of charitable gifts, self-restraint, compassion and tranquillity of mind.[24] The latter, on the other hand, includes the nitya (disinterested daily activities, like the performance of ' Sandhyopāsana ') and the naimittika karmans (activities performed with certain definite purpose and on certain special occasions, like the performance of the sacrifice for getting a son), that is, the observance of the rules in accordance with one's place in society and the specific stage one has attained in

Philosophical discipline.

23 *Śukla-Yajurveda-Saṁhitā,* I. 18.

24 Cf. *Yājñavalkya-Smṛti,* I. iv. 122.

self-discipline. This may be said to be the ethical training of the enquirer after truth. Besides, there is another course of training which one has to undergo for qualifying one-self for being admitted as a student of Darśana and it includes the observance of yama (external restraint), niyama (internal restraint), āsana (posture), prāṇāyāma (breath-control), pratyāhāra (abstraction), dhāraṇā (concentration), dhyāna (meditation) and samādhi (spiritual absorption).[25] All these ethical and intellectual courses of training must be preceded by Śraddhā (faith) in the teachings to be imparted. The ultimate end of all these courses of physical and mental training is to purify the inner-self (*antaḥkaraṇa*) of the enquirer which alone can make the path of liberation smooth.

Physical and mental training are meant for purification of the innerself.

This fact is generally explained with the help of several analogies taken from everyday experience. In order to make this subtle point easily intelligible, some of those analogies are given here. The highest aim of philosophy is like the subtle star called 'Arundhatī'. When a very young boy wants to know that star, he asks his mother about it. But the mother, knowing the subtle nature of the star, and also being fully aware of the incapacity of the boy to find it out at once in the sky, does not tell him at once the exact situation of the star, but gradually. Again, all these different systems are so many artificial stages of the manifestation of the Ātman, like the assuming of the various roles by a single actor till the end of the play. Or again, we may liken it to the reaching of the mountain top with a certain number of minor ranges which must be crossed before the highest peak is reached.

Certain analogies to explain the approach to the highest aim.

It should be clear from what has been said above that there exists a sort of natural harmony between the various schools of thought. Besides, when we study each and every problem of philosophy, as given in each school of thought, we find that there is a gradation in ascending order among the various systems. For example, let us take the conception of

Natural harmony among the various schools of Indian philosophy in order of gradation.

[25] *Yogadarśana,* II. 29.

the Ātman itself. We find that the Materialists (Cārvākas) deny its independent existence and identify it with physical organism, or with sense-organs, or with vital-airs, or with *Manas,* one after another. If we consider the nature of these forms of matter, we shall see that the Materialists start with the grossest form of matter—*bhūta,* namely, the physical organism, and gradually go to the subtle forms till they stop with the subtlest form of *bhautika* matter called '*Manas*'. Even here there is a clear case of gradual gradation towards the subtleties. Beyond *Manas,* the Materialists cannot go. Hence, they stop with it. Thus, according to the Materialists, Ātman is a form of matter and not an independent and separate entity.

Next, we should see that the Ātman is proved to be quite distinct from matter (*bhūta*), and that its independent existence is asserted for ever. This aspect is found in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. According to this joint system, Ātman is considered to be distinct from matter. Its qualities also are different. For instance, consciousness (*jñāna*), which is believed to be a quality found in the peculiar collocation of matter by the Materialists, has come to be attributed to non-matter (non-*bhūta*) in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Again, if we consider it a bit carefully, we shall see that although the separate and independent existence of the Ātman has been proved by the joint system, yet Ātman is essentially '*jaḍa*' (unconscious), in which aspect it is not very much different from any form of matter or its product; and consciousness is a quality which comes to it from without. Consciousness is not eternal like the Ātman itself; so that when there is the contact of Manas with the Ātman and consciousness is produced in the Ātman, then only the latter is conscious, and not otherwise. It is simply because of this that the Ātman does not possess any quality even including consciousness, during the state of liberation (*mokṣa*). It is this very aspect that led Śrīharṣa to remark in his *Naiṣadhacarita,*[26] about its being an atheistic doctrine—

Muktaye yaḥ śilātvāya Śāstramūce sacetasām/
Gotamaṁ tamavetaiva yathā vittha tathaiva saḥ//

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[26] XVII. 74.

Translation—He, who propounded the system (*Śāstra*) for the salvation of conscious beings, which is really to reduce them to a slab of stone, is exactly as you know him to be, the best ox (*gotama*).

Such is also the case with the conception of the Self according to Vaiśeṣika, as is clear from the following lines—

Varaṁ vṛndāvane ramye Śṛgālatvaṁ vṛṇomyahaṁ/
Na ca vaiśeṣikīṁ muktiṁ prārthayāmi kadācana//

Translation—I prefer to become a jackal in the charming forest of Vṛndā, (says a seeker after mokṣa) but not to have a desire for the mokṣa as taught by the Vaiśeṣikas for ever.

This shows that there is clearly an improvement in the joint system upon the view of the Materialists, but then it is not all that is desired. After this we come to Sāṅkhya where we find that the consciousness is no longer a quality of the self, but that it is the very nature of it. The Puruṣa in Sāṅkhya becomes consciousness (*Cit*) itself. It is again, a clear case of gradual unfolding of the nature of the self. But here also, the seeker after truth does not achieve the highest aim. A still higher manifestation of the nature of the Ātman is found in the Śaṅkara-Vedānta. According to this school of thought the Ātman is not only *sat* (having an independent existence) and *cit* (consciousness itself), but is also *bliss* (ānanda). Here, we find that the Self is said to have manifested its real *akhaṇḍa* nature. This is '*in a way*' the highest aim which Indian philosophy has achieved. Here is a clear instance which shows how there is a harmonious gradation in ascending order in the different systems or schools of Indian philosophy.

We may take one more instance before passing on to another topic. We find that the Materialists believe that there are only four kinds of primary gross matter, namely, earth, air, *tejas* and water, and the whole universe is produced out of the collocations of these. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, reduces the entire universe consisting of the above mentioned four gross forms of matter of the Materialist, to the ultimate forms of matter, called 'paramāṇus' and stops at this stage as they cannot split the 'paramāṇus' into still subtler forms of matter. But when we come to Sāṅkhya, we

find that the system starts with that type of matter (*bhūta*) which is almost identical with the 'paramāṇus' of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and carries its divisions gradually to various subtleties till the system comes to the Primordial cause, called 'Prakṛti'. This Primordial cause also during the state of liberation, remains simply as the 'Śuddha-Sattva', the other two guṇas, namely, Rajas and Tamas being suppressed for ever. In other words, the various eternal substances of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika have been reduced to 'Prakṛti', or 'Śuddha-Sattva' alone. The consciousness which was an attribute of the Ātman becomes an independent entity, called 'Puruṣa' in Sāṅkhya. Here, the system stops. Now, comes the Vedānta, particularly, the Śaṅkara school, which begins with the Māyā, which is something like the 'Śuddha-Sattva' of the Sāṅkhya,[27] and finally, ends with the highest entity, called Brahman.

It has been said above that with the system of Śaṅkara-Vedānta the 'Bliss' is realized and the highest aim of Indian philosophy is '*in a way*' achieved. This needs further elucidation. We know that though the ultimate entity according to Śaṅkara-Vedānta is said to be 'Brahman' alone, yet it cannot exclusively claim to be advaitic on account of 'Māyā'. The latter is not '*Sat*' like Brahman, but is also not '*asat*' like the horns of a hare. Hence, it is called '*anirvacanīya*'. It accompanies Brahman from time immemorial. Now, what happens to this 'Māyā' when final emancipation (*mukti*) is achieved according to Śaṅkara Vedānta? Does it merge into Brahman? If so, why is it so different from Brahman? If not, does it then disappear like any notion of error, such as, the notion of snake in a piece of rope and is treated as '*tuccha*' like the horns of a hare? And then there is no sense in calling it 'anirvacanīya'. But we know that Māyā is not regarded as 'asat' in Śaṅkara Vedānta. This shows that even according to Śaṅkara Vedānta a seeker after the Truth cannot find himself entirely free from this Māyā. In other words, we do not quite understand the peculiar nature of this Māyā

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27 Though the Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya is Triguṇātmikā and so is the Māyā of Śaṅkara Vedānta, yet there is a difference between the two. The Prakṛti is the stage of equilibrium of the three guṇas, while the 'Māyā' is the state wherein Sattva predominates, and the other two guṇas are suppressed.

at this stage. No doubt, it is purer (*śuddha*) than the 'triguṇātmikā' *Prakṛti* of Sāṅkhya, but there remains a good deal to be unfolded of this Māyā in Vedānta [28]

But this is beyond the scope of Śaṅkara Vedānta. So we have to make further enquiries into the nature of *Māyā*. We find from our studies of the Kashmir Śaivaism that this Māyā is enveloped one after another by the five under-garments, known as *Kañcukas,* namely, Kalā, Vidyā, Rāga, Kāla, and Niyati. After these five limitations are cast off the conscious entity which remains behind becomes manifested and is called 'Śuddhavidyā'. At this stage the conscious entity begins to feel itself identical with the subtle prapañca, as '*I am this*'. Here, both '*I* (conscious entity)' and '*this* (subtle prapañca)' are of equal status. But then dualism is still persisting. When the enquirer into the ultimate truth goes deeper, he finds that this identity is expressed in such a way that the importance is shifted from '*I*' to

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[28] In other words, according to Śaṅkara, Māyā is distinct from both 'Sat' and 'Asat'. It is neither real like Brahman, nor is it unreal, like the horn of a hare. It is hence 'anirvacanīya'. It is the 'ajñānatattva'. It is beginningless (*anādi*). Brahman, on the other hand, is the only reality and is the "*jñānatattva*'.

Now a question is raised here: There being only one Reality and that being also the primordial advaya jñānatattva, how could the notions of ajñāna or Māyā, or Jīva, or even Īśvara, come to exist? How did the advaitic Brahman come to be associated with ajñāna or Māyā? What is the cause of the coming into existence of ajñāna or Māyā? Again, what is the āśraya of ajñāna? and which is its draṣṭā? Brahman cannot be the āśraya, it is only the adhiṣṭhāna or the adhikaraṇa of the entire prapañca, which again, is nothing but the vivartarūpa, which is imposed upon Brahman. The kartṛtva and svātantrya found in Brahman are only *kalpita* and not real. So there being only one reality, who is the kalpanā-kartā?

There is no cause of Jñāna assuming the form of Jīva or Īśvara at any time. The Vedāntins give only one answer to all these that it is all anādi. But then this does not remove our doubts and make the position of Śaṅkara-Vedānta quite clear, nor does it strengthen the advaitic position of Śaṅkara. The analogy of 'Megha' and 'Sūrya' here does not seem to be quite correct; for, we know that 'Megha' is the Sun's own creation. It is not quite apart from the Sun; while the Śaṅkara-Vedānta does not hold Māyā to be the product of Brahman. These are two opposites, like Tamas and Prakāśa, as Śaṅkara himself puts it.

From all these it becomes difficult to support the absolute advaitic nature of Śaṅkara-Vedānta. The possibility of the dualism does not disappear from this stage.

This is the real difference between the Brahmādvaitavāda of Śaṅkara and the Īśvarādvaitavāda represented by the Kashmir Śaivaism. There is no doubt ajñāna, or Māyā in Kashmir Śaivaism, but the relation between ajñāna or Māyā and jñāna or Ātman is quite different. In this school the Māyā is a form of the Ātman itself, which the latter has assumed by its very independent nature—svātantrya-Mūlaka or Swecchā-parigṛhīta-rūpa. The Lord is Svatantra and He does assume any form He likes. He manifests Himself and also envelops His form with His Māyā-Śakti

this.' and the notion is expressed as '*This* is *I*'. This is what is known as '*Īśvara-tattva.*' Gradually, '*this*' merges into '*I*' and the Jīva realizes within himself the notion of '*I am*'. Thus, the Jīva reaches the stage of '*Sadāśivatattva*'. Even at this stage duality does exist. But a true enquirer is not yet satisfied and he wants to get rid of this '*am*' as well. After going still deeper he realizes for the first time the nature of *I-ness.* This is the stage where for the first time the ultimate Truth appears in its manifested form, and it is called the '*Śaktitattva*'. In fact, this is the stage where the Jīva realizes within himself *Pure Bliss* which is nothing but Jīva himself. Though it is difficult to say whether Pure Monism has been achieved or Dualism is still present in some form or the other at this stage, yet we know that even this *I-ness* cannot be our highest end and in fact, the enquirer after the Truth finds ultimately that even this *I-ness* merges into the Ultimate Truth, called '*Parama Śiva.*' This ends the enquiry and the highest Truth is finally achieved. In fact, this is the real Advaita stage which is all Conscious-Bliss and nothing else. Here is also found the absolute identity between Jñāna and Bhakti represented by consciousness and bliss respectively. It is not possible at this stage even to say anything about this Bliss. But here alone we find the realization of *Sat, Cit* and *Ānanda* and also the equilibrium of Karma, Jñāna and Bhakti. This is what Indian philosophy aims at. Here is the end of our progress. The enquirer finds his aim fully realized. It is here that both cetana and so-called acetana become one and the highest ideal preached in the Upaniṣads '*Sarvaṁ Khalvidaṁ Brahma,*'* becomes finally realized.

This is how from the grossest form of matter we come to the subtlest form of elements; and how from the diversity we arrive at the unity, the aim of all the sciences. Thus, it is clear how there is a gradation in all the systems of philosophy. Those systems which have not been represented in the above illustration can be

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* While commenting on this Śruti, Śaṅkara identifies '*idaṁ*', meaning 'the whole of this world, differentiated in name and form, as realized through pratyakṣa etc.,' with 'Brahman', as it originates, becomes absorbed and lives in Brahman. Thus, it remains undifferentiated with Brahman and is never realized apart from Brahman. If this is the position of Śaṅkara, the nature of his Māyā becomes quite intelligible—*Chāndogya,* III. xiv. 1.

easily placed somewhere in between those very schools to which reference has been made above.

From the above it is quite evident that each of the different schools of Hindu Darśana defines its field of enquiry and puts limitations to that scope; so that, no system of thought would go beyond it and deal with something else not coming within the scope of that particular school. Again, within that self-imposed limitation every system claims to realize the highest truth taught by that system. Thus, for instance, the Cārvāka school believes only in that which is cognised through external senses. Hence, its entire philosophy is confined to the treatment of things perceptible. The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, have limited the scope of their investigation to the treatment of the sixteen categories, namely, pramāṇa (means of right cognition), prameya (objects of right cognition), saṁśaya (doubt), prayojana (motive), dṛṣṭānta (example), siddhānta (theory), avayava (factors of a syllogism), tarka (cognition), nirṇaya (demonstrated truth), vāda (discussion), jalpa (disputation), vitaṇḍā (wrangling), hetvābhāsa (fallacious reasoning), chala (casuistry), jāti (futile rejoinder) and nigrahasthāna[29] (clinchers) and particularly, to the twelve objects of cognition, namely, Ātman, physical organism, sense-organs, objects, apprehension, manas, activity, defect, re-birth, fruition, pain and beatitude.[30] The Vaiśeṣikas, however, confine their system to the treatment of the seven categories, namely, substance, quality, action, generality, viśeṣa, inherence and negation.[31]

Scope and synthesis in the schools.

The Sāṅkhya has laid down that the highest aim of philosophy and life as taught by the system is achieved from the true knowledge of vyakta (modifications, namely, buddhi, ahaṅkāra, the eleven sense organs including manas, the five tanmātrās and five bhūtas), avyakta (the primordial cause) and jña (consciousness). The Rāmānuja school of Vedānta confines its treatment to the three tattvas, namely, cit (consciousness), acit (jaḍa) and Īśvara (the Supreme God). So the Śaṅkara school has also defined its scope and limited itself to

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29 *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 1.
30 *Ibid.*, I. i. 9.
31 *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, I. i. 4.

the treatment of Brahman, the only real entity. The treatment of Māyā found in the Śaṅkara Vedānta is only to elucidate the nature of Brahman which is otherwise beyond the reach of both the external and the internal means of knowledge.

This makes it clear how the different systems of our Darśana deal with the various aspects of the Truth. No two systems claim to deal with the same categories in the same manner. Every system is quite distinct from the other and is entirely consistent within its own limitations in spite of the fact that there exists a continuous link in all these systems from the lowest to the highest.

Limitations of each school and their mutual relation.

Now, a question may be asked: if all the systems are equally true, of course, within their own individual limitations, how is it that the propounders of a particular system repudiate the validity of another system? Even believing in the synthetic view, it may be urged, it would have been plausible for the topmost school of thought alone to reject the validity of other schools, as we find in the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara or in the Kashmir Śaivaism.[32] But, as a matter of fact, it is not so. We find that almost all the systems speak against one another.

In reply to this, it may be pointed out that as each system wants to keep its own enquirer (adhikārī) firm in its respective position (adhikāra), it criticises all other systems which may be quite correct from their own angle of vision; else the enquirer is likely to be carried away and be entangled in a maze and be thrown off the right path. Moreover, if we closely follow the texts, we find that the higher systems do not really deny the *relative* position of the schools representing the lower stages. For instance, the Advaita Vedānta holds that though the highest truth is not found in Sāṅkhya, Yoga, or in any other school of thought, yet it does not deny that each of the systems has its own independent position and contributes something or the other to the realm of Indian thought.[33]

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32 *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya,* II. i. 11.

33 Cf. *Śrī-Bhāṣya,* II. ii. 42; Vijñāna-Bhikṣu's Introduction to the *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, p. 3; Rāmatīrtha in his commentary on the *Saṅkṣepta-Śārīraka,* II. 50.

Systematisation of schools might have taken place side by side.

Such being the relation between these various systems, it seems quite difficult to say anything definitely about the order and the time of the grouping of the systems. But having in mind all these facts, this much can be said at present that the systematization of these schools must have been done more or less about the same time.

Ultimate aim of all the schools is the same.

It has been made clear above that misery can be eradicated and eternal happiness can be achieved through the realization of the Ultimate Truth, namely, Paramaśiva or Paramātman, or Brahman. We know from our studies of the later philosophical literature that there are several independent views regarding the nature of the Truth. Thus, some regard it to be Qualified Monism, while others think it to be Pure or Unqualified Monism. Some again, think it to be Absolute Monism, while others consider it to be Monistic Dualism and so on. But whatever may be conceived to be the nature of that Reality, it is a fact that all of these different schools refer to the same Ultimate Truth It is needless to say that there being people of divergent tastes, it is but natural that there should be so many different views. Verily, has been said by Puṣpadanta—"The three Vedas, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Paśupatimata and Vaiṣṇava, being the various lines of thinking people, due to their divergent taste, consider one or the other to be the best; and consequently, take to the path of their own choice whether the path be straight or winding, direct or indirect, for their approach. But O Śiva! You alone are to be approached by all, like the Ocean in case of waters."[34]

But in spite of all these differences, it is again to be kept in mind that every one has to realize for himself the true nature of the Reality, for there is no other way to achieve Final Emancipation. So says the Vedic text —"One goes beyond the reach of Death (or Avidyā) by the knowledge of that Reality alone. There is no other Path to follow."[35]

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[34] *Mahimnaḥstotra*, Verse 8.

[35] *Yajurveda*, XXXI. 20.

Then comes the question how to realize it. Here again, we have several views. There are those who consider that the performance of one's own Duty, that is, the pursuit of the Path of Action alone directly leads to the achievement of that Ultimate Reality. Then again, there are others according to whom it is to be realized through *Bhakti* (Devotion) alone, while some emphasise that Knowledge (*Jñāna*) alone can directly bring about the realization of the Reality. Then there is another school which advocates the combination of Knowledge and Action as the direct cause of Final Emancipation.

Means to realize the nature of the Absolute Truth—different views.

No doubt, it is quite difficult to state clearly the relative merit and importance of these various views and propound an all-acceptable theory. But this much we can easily say that the Highest Aim of philosophy, that is, Absolute Monism which alone aims at Perfect Unity amidst diversity cannot be achieved through either Bhakti alone or Karman alone. Both these cannot get rid of Dualism, while we know that no scientific enquiry, be it in the field of Philosophy or Religion or Material Science, can rest with diversity or dualism. Bhakti, either in the form of a Kriyā or a bhāva, of the antaḥkaraṇa can lead to knowledge but not to the Ultimate Reality, the Final Goal of life and philosophy. Bhakti only qualifies the devotee to stick to the object of devotion and makes him fit for the realization of the Truth. A true devotee may even find the Paramātman within his reach, but he will fail to realize the ultimate end without knowledge. To surrender one's self to the Lord is the highest type of Bhakti[36] and a true Bhakta is one who has no other shelter than the Lord.[37] But under all the circumstances Bhakti does retain the element of dualism within itself. This can be well illustrated from the *Bhagavadgītā* itself. We know that though living together for long prior to their appearance in the battle-field, Lord Kṛṣṇa never

Bhakti or Karman alone cannot get rid of Dualism.

Achievements of Bhakti and a Bhakta.

Highest type of Bhakti.

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36 Mayī samarpitāntarātma—Śaṅkara on the *Gītā*, IX. 31.

37 Ananyaśaraṇa—*Ibid.* XII. 1.

told Arjuna the secrets of the Truth, never taught him the Eternal Knowledge and never expounded to him the true Path of Duty, and so Arjuna found himself in utter confusion as to the Path of his Action in the battlefield. He was entirely ignorant of the Truth.[38] Had he known it before, he would have at once himself decided his Path of Duty. But when Arjuna found that his own *pauruṣa* has failed to lead him on, he had to crush his egoism and surrender himself to the Lord whom he could then, through the very mystic grace of the Lord Himself, see as all-powerful and all-knowing and as the only shelter under the circumstances. So he said: "With my very nature tainted by the defects of imbecility (kārpaṇya which itself is a step leading towards surrendering) and my mind puzzled with regard to Duty, I am asking you. Tell me that which is decidedly good for me. I am your disciple. I have surrendered myself to you. Pray instruct me."[39]

To surrender one's self to the Highest Power and seek His shelter is the highest type of Bhakti. It makes the disciple entirely inactive as it is in the Bhāva form of antaḥkaraṇa. But it was with the torch of knowledge alone which the world Teacher imparted to Arjuna that his Path of Duty became illuminated which he decided to follow. From this we learn that true Bhakti can make the disciple fit for the acquisition of knowledge which leads him to realize the Ultimate Truth, which is Satya (truth), Jñāna (knowledge), Ananta (Infinite), Brahman. It is then alone that the teacher imparts true knowledge to the enquirer which leads him to the Reality. So says the *Gītā*—Realize it by surrendering yourself.[40] Moreover, Bhakti, as propounded in the Vaiṣṇava schools, is aimed at the experiencing of Joy and Love of the Lord, and in so doing though the devotee may apparently even become lost in the ecstasy, yet the fact that he retains his individuality cannot be denied. Bhakti has no meaning if the devotee loses his separate individuality and becomes one with the Lord, for in that case, there can be no experiencing of the Joy

Bhakti makes an enquirer fit to receive knowledge.

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38 *Ibid.*, II. 6-7.

39 *Ibid.*, II. 7.

40 *Ibid.*, IV. 34.

and Love of the Lord. It is clear from all these that Dualism cannot be removed and Absolute Monism is never possible with Bhakti as the direct means of realizing the Ultimate Reality, which is " Only One without a second."[41] and where " There is no diversity whatsoever in It."[42]

Through Bhakti Dualism cannot be removed.

As for Karman (Action), we know that some people refer to it as the direct means of realizing the Truth and quote the line of the *Bhagavadgītā*—" It is through Action alone that Janaka and others attained perfection,"[43] in support of their view. It should be kept in mind here that what the line quoted above means is that the agency of Action is most essential for attaining the Highest Truth. It does not mean, however, that there is no intermediary stage between Action and the achievement of the Highest Truth. It is through Action that inner-sense-organs become purified whereafter Knowledge manifests itself which then leads to the Reality. It is in this very sense that the utility of Action has been accepted by Śaṅkarācārya, who only refutes the *simultaniety* of Action and Knowledge for a *Sādhaka* in his *Gītā Bhāṣya.*[44] Action should always precede Knowledge. Moreover, Action must have some result, good or bad. But we know from the *Chāndogya*—" When one is without the body, pleasure and pain do not touch him."[45] This cannot be the result of Action alone. Besides, the result of Action cannot be eternal. It will also lead to Dualism. So it has been said by Maṇḍana Miśra, an old advocate of *Jñānakarma-samuccaya-vāda* — " All karma is intended to purify the mind and make the enquirer fit for Ātmajñāna."[46] " Each action is conducive to its own fruit and also qualifies the man for self-

Result of Action.

Action purifies inner sense-organs.

Action precedes knowledge.

Maṇḍana Miśra's view on Action.

41 *Chandogya,* VI, ii. 1.

42 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* IV, iv. 19.

43 III. 20.

44 II. 2.

45 VIII. xii. 1.

46 *Brahmasiddhi,* p. 27.

knowledge."[47] Again, the Śruti—"He should perform sacrifices" enjoins that the performance of sacrifices may gradually lead through stages to the direct realization of the Ātman.[48]

From all this, it is clear that the performance of Action is most essential. Action, in the form of sacrifices, meditation, worship, etc. does continue till knowledge becomes manifested and which in its turn, leads to the realization of the Final Aim. After the manifestation of knowledge action ceases to function, so says the *Gītā* "O Pārtha! All actions culminate in knowledge."[49] No doubt, as long as the upāsanā of 'Saguṇa-Brahman' exists, so long Action continues. But the realization of the Nirguṇa-Brahman is directly through knowledge. And as both the two forms of Brahman have to be maintained for the well-being of the devotees, it is but essential that both Action and Knowledge, one after the other, should be regarded as means of achieving the highest aim of life and philosophy in India. Throughout the Upaniṣads, *Gītā* and other similar texts, we see that Action has been regarded as most essential for the purification of the inner-sense-organs and only after that the Sacred Knowledge, the Ultimate Truth, manifests itself. This is the Indian outlook of life, philosophy and religion. It is this very view-point of the graded *Combination of Action and Knowledge* related as cause and effect, which is maintained throughout the present book.

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47 *Ibid.*

48 *Ibid.*, p. 154.

49 IV. 33.

CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHY OF THE VEDIC SAMHITĀS

1. *Veda—Its nature and importance*

Saṁhitās are the earliest documents of human thought in India.

As indicated above, the origin of Darśana in India can easily be traced to the very beginning of creation and consequently, it should find a place in the earliest records of our thought. It is admitted by all that the *Saṁhitās* of the Vedas are the earliest and most authentic documents of Indian thought and culture. These *Saṁhitās* are the collections of mantras and are generally known as the *Veda*. The term 'Veda' is derived from the root 'vid', meaning 'to know' and is formed with the suffix 'ghañ' (vidanti anena). It is the very source of all our worldly and non-worldly knowledge. It has been called 'Divine Revelation' or 'Divya-cakṣuḥ'.[1] The great seers (ṛṣis) of the past have found it as 'citsvarūpa' and have had direct visualization (sākṣātkāra) of this *cinmaya* Veda. Hence, it is ever infallible and imperishable.

Veda is Divine revelation and is called Divyacakṣu. It is cit.

The great seers of the past had actually visualized the Divine knowledge as the result of their austere penances performed for the realization of the Ultimate Reality. In fact, they are called ṛṣis simply because they have visualized the Veda-mantras (ṛṣayo mantradraṣṭāraḥ). Knowledge in the form of Veda is not at all realized simply by hearing or reciting words. So says the Śruti itself—' One does not see the Veda even though he perceives it; he does not hear it even though he may hear it.

Ṛṣis have seen the Veda-mantras with their Divine eyes.

Veda is not mere words. It is jñāna and it reveals itself to a jñānin.

1 Trivedī—Divya-cakṣuṣe '—*Ślokavārtika,* Benedictory verse.

Veda reveals itself only to one who has realized its true nature just as a wife reveals her body to her husband.'[2]

From Śabda-Brahman the universe springs up.

It is that eternal light which illumines the path of action and knowledge. It has been identified with the Supreme Truth, that is, the Brahman in the form of words wherefrom all the activities of the universe spring up.[3] In other words, the Veda-mantras are the very Divine form of the Eternal Light

Veda is apauruṣeya.

(nityam jyotiḥ). It is not the composition of any human being, hence it is known as 'apauruṣeya.' It has revealed itself to the ṛṣis of the past. The great thinkers of the country who have had inner outlook (antardṛṣṭi) have been quite successful in preserving the exact form

Mantras have come down without any change.

which the ṛṣis of the past gave to the Revelations which they had of the Truth. So the mantras have come down from age to age in the same form without the slightest possible change in their contents, or words, or even syllables. Thus, 'Agnimīḷe purohitaṁ' has not changed into 'Vahnimīḷe purohitaṁ'. The Eternal Light which was revealed to Viśvāmitra and was expressed through the term 'Agni', would not be the same, if the same is expressed through its substitute, namely, 'Vahni'. It is so simply because the two expressions are quite different from each other.

Veda is identical with the revealed truth.

It is also because of this that the words of the Veda are regarded as identical with the very Eternal Light which the ṛṣis had seen as the result of their austere penance in order to have the visualization of the

Means for the preservation of the correct version.

Ātman. Great efforts have been made to preserve the words of the Veda through the methods of Pada-pāṭha, Krama-pāṭha, Jaṭā-pāṭha, Ghana-pāṭha, etc. along with the correctness of the svara.

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[2] Uta tvaḥ paśyanna dadarśa vācamuta tvaḥ śṛṇvanna śṛṇotyenām.

Uto tvasmai tanvaṁ vi sasre jāyeva patya uśatī suvāsāḥ—*Ṛgveda,* X. 71. 4.

[3] Anādinidhanam Brahma śabdatattvam yadakṣaram/
Vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ//—*Vākyapadīya,* I. 1.

Brahman in the form of Śabda is absolutely identical with the Veda. So Veda has been identified with the *Parā-Vāk* during the state of its unmanifestation and with *Paśyantī-Vāk* when it is manifest. Such being the case, it is impossible for ordinary persons like us to realize the true meaning of the Vedic mantras. We know from our studies of the *Nirukta* and the commentaries of Rāvaṇa, Harisvāmin, Skandasvāmin and others on the *Ṛgveda* that even in their own days grave doubts were felt regarding the true interpretation of the mantras of the Veda. The Vedic Saṁhitās, present before us, are all available to us in the *Vaikharī* form of Vāk, and through *Vaikharī* it is entirely impossible to understand the real significance of the Vedic-mantras. It is too well known to all that the Śruti promises that through the correct knowledge and use of a single word anything and everything can be achieved both here and hereafter.[4] The correct knowledge of the mantras is something like the knowledge of the yogins during the state of their nirvitarka and nirvicāra samādhi which is free from all the vikalpas.[5] This is possible only through the kind teachings of the *Guru* or through the saṁskāra of the previous life. With such a knowledge of the śabda alone one can understand the correct meaning of the Vedic mantras and then alone one can achieve the highest aim of life. Without this, simply through the laukika knowledge of the *Vaikhari* form of the mantras, one can never realize the truth contained in the mantras.[6]

Veda is identical with Parā and Paśyantī vāk.

Vedic Saṁhitās available to us are in Vaikharī which is incapable of revealing the true meaning of Veda.

As to the importance and utility of the *Vaikharī* form of the mantras which alone is available to us, besides what is said below, it may be said here that just as there is no difference between the ultimate Truth called Para-Brahman and the Veda in the form of Śabda-Brahman, so the *Vaikharī* form of the Veda is also essentially the same. The only point to be always

Importance and utility of the Vaikharī form of Veda.

[4] Ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyajjñātaḥ svarge loke ca kāmadhugbhavati.

[5] *Yogasūtra,* I. 43; 44.

[6] Uta tvaḥ paśyanna dadarśa vācamuta tvaḥ śṛṇvanna śṛṇoyenām—*Ṛgveda,* X. 71. 4.

kept in mind is that as one realizes the Para-Brahman only after he has realized the Śabda-Brahman, so the Veda in the form of Para-Brahman is realized only after the realization of the *Vaikharī* form of the Veda. This may be supported by other instances from Vedic literature itself. So says the Śruti-'Anṛtāt satyam upaimi '[7]—from unreality, I realize the Reality. Even the Bauddhas believe in this. They hold that it is through the *Saṁvṛti-satya* that one realizes the *Paramārtha-satya.*[8] Similarly, it may be said that the Ultimate Truth of Vedānta can be realized through Māyā. *Vaikharī* is connotative of the *cinmaya* Veda-mantras, as Praṇava is of Īśvara.[9] Hence, we have to confine our treatment of the Veda-mantras to their *Vaikharī* form alone which the ṛṣis have preserved for the general good of the universe. The *Cinmaya* form of the Veda being of little use for the world, *Vaikharī* remains to be the only guide of worldly people. But we should not forget that all that is said of the *Cinmaya-Veda* is true of the *Vaikharī* form of the Veda as well. Moreover, as the Śruti says—" This Ultimate Truth, called Ātman, is to be realized by him alone whom the Ātman chooses for itself. To such a person alone the Ātman reveals itself."[10] Similarly, unless the *Cinmaya-Veda* reveals itself to any one, he cannot ever realize it through either the visual or the auditory sense organ.[11] It is in this *Vaikharī* form that the Veda has been preserved up to this date and that it has been verbally transmitted from generation to generation through teachers and pupils and therefore, it is called Śruti, that is, it has been only heard and not composed. *Vaikharī*

Ultimate Truth can be realized through non-truth.

Veda is called Śruti because it has been only heard and not composed.

[7] *Yajurveda,* I. 5.

[8] (i) Anakṣarasya dharmasya śrutiḥ kā deśanā ca kā/
Śrūyate deśyate cārthaḥ samāropādanakṣaraḥ//—Quoted in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā,* p. 365.
(ii) *Prajñāpāramitā-Bodhicaryāvatāra,* IX, pp. 241, 365.

[9] *Yogasūtra,* I. 27.

[10] Yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyastasyaiṣa ātmā vivṛṇute tanūṁ svām.—*Kaṭhopaniṣad,* I. 23.

[11] Ṛco akṣare parame vyoman yasmin devā adhiviśve niṣeduḥ/
yastanna veda kimṛcā kariṣyati ya ittadvidusta ime samasate//—*Ṛgveda,* I. 164. 39.

has been described as the Pāśa, while the Parā and *Cinmaya* form of the Veda is the Parama Śiva.

Originally Veda was without any succession and was free from vikāras.

Veda which is the same as Brahman in the form of Śabda is originally without any *krama* (succession) and is free from all possible *vikāras* (modifications). This form of the Original Speech, called Veda, is also known as Śuddha-prajñā, Tāraka-jñāna,[12] Primordial Cause of all Śabda and artha, and is the Praṇava itself. This is also called Tāriṇī-Vidyā. It has been described in the following Śrutis—"One who does not realize the Veda does not at all realize Brahman."[13] "All the Vedas praise that very Goal (pada)";[14] "I am alone to be realized through all the Vedas";[15] etc. This is also known as the Paramā Kalā and is Cidrūpa.

Veda is Paramā Kalā and is Cidrūpa.

A true Brāhmaṇa is one who has the knowledge of the Cinmaya Veda.

It is the knowledge of this very Cinmaya form of the Veda which makes one a real Brāhmaṇa. So it has been said that one who has realized Śabda-Brahman can also realize Para-Brahman.[16] For the realization of the Śabda-Brahman one has to undergo austere penance which again, is possible only through a pure organism (Śuddha deha). Hence, for the achievement of this highest knowledge, Veda, penance and birth in good and pure family—all the three are essential. So has said Patañjali in his *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*.[17] In other words, in order to realize the true nature of the Veda, one should have birth in a family which is of pure blood, say, the family of a Brāhmaṇa, so that he should have such a pure body by which he may be able to perform austere penance and the true nature of the innerself may become manifest. After this

Veda, penance and good birth are essential for the visualization of the highest knowledge.

[12] Tārakaṁ sarvaviṣayaṁ sarvathā viṣayamakramaṁ ceti vivekajaṁ jñānaṁ—*Yogasūtra,* III. 54.

[13] Nāvedavinmanute Brahma kiñcit—Quoted by Harivṛṣabha (Puṇyarāja) in his commentary on the *Vākyapadīya,* I. 10.

[14] *Kaṭhopaniṣad,* I. ii. 15.

[15] *Bhagavadgītā,* XV. 15.

[16] Śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ Parambrahmādhigacchati—*Brahmabindūpaniṣad,* 17.

[17] Tapaḥ śrutañca yoniśca trayaṁ brāhmaṇakārakaṁ/
Tapaḥśrutābhyāṁ yo hīno jātibrāhmaṇa eva saḥ// II. ii. 6.

that organism should undergo the prescribed Saṁskāras through which cit-śakti becomes *ūrdhvagatika* and the Jīva enters into the Jñānamārga, also called the Vedamārga. Gradually, the Jīva goes up and up and comes to realize the true nature of the Veda, that is, it comes to identify itself with the Paśyantī form of the Cinmaya-Veda and thereafter casts off all the limitations (āvaraṇa). Then alone he is called a *Ṛṣi* (derived from the root 'Ṛṣi' to go) that is, one who goes (upward in the Veda or Jñāna Mārga). Unless one has become a Ṛṣi, he cannot visually realize the true nature of the Veda.[18]

When a Jīva enters into the Vedamārga then alone it is called a ṛṣi.

Without being a ṛṣi one cannot realize the true nature of Veda.

From the above it is clear that one can realize the Ultimate Truth, alternatively called Veda-sākṣātkāra or Jñānasākṣātkāra, only after having the correct knowledge of the Veda-mantras and not otherwise. If that be so, what is the use of mere reciting the *Vaikharī* form of the Veda is a possible question which may be raised here. To this it may be said that no doubt the direct realization or the visualization of the Veda is possible through Jñāna, but this does not reject the utility of the recitation of the Veda with proper accent (Sasvara Veda-Pāṭha). Through constant re-

Ultimate truth can be realized only through the correct knowledge of the Veda.

Utility and importance of the Vaikharī form of the Veda.

[18] The word *Ṛṣi* is derived from the root 'Ṛṣi' meaning to go. This may be just explained in the following manner. The human organism is a product of six elements coming from the father and the mother through their sperm and ovum. Thus such an organism is called 'Ṣāṭkauśika'. This is, in other words, a modification of the Bindu (which itself is a modification of the Īśvaratattva) which is of various kinds according to its location either above the navel or below the navel. This Bindu has to be raised up in order that the cit-śakti inherent in it should become *ūrdhvagatika*. It is only then that the cit enters into the Jñānamārga, also called Vedamārga. This is possible through Saṁskāras. The cit-śakti, which is the Bindu itself, gradually merges itself into the Paśyantī and becomes manifest in the form of Ātmasākṣātkāra. All the limitations of the Jīva are cast off at this stage and the Jīva realizes the true nature of the cidrūpa Brahman. It is only then that the Jīva is really called a Brāhmaṇa. It is again, at this very stage that the Jīva realizes the true nature of the Veda and then alone that Jīva is called a *Ṛṣi*. So the Parā form of the Veda is not revealed to one who is not a *Ṛṣi*. Unless the Jīva visualizes the true nature of the cid-Veda, it is not called a *Ṛṣi* and is regarded not to have performed any tapas. So says the *Niruktapariśiṣṭa*—No hyeṣu pratyakṣamastyanṛṣeratapaso vā—XIII. 12. Thus, it becomes clear how there is a kind of *gati*—an upward motion, for becoming a '*ṛṣi*', in the primary sense of the root 'Ṛṣi'.

citation in the proper order the Prāṇa and the Apāna, the two forms of vital airs, come to stay in equality (sāmya). Gradually the grosser form of the Vāyu becomes comparatively subtle and then it enters into the Suṣumnā. The manas after this also leaves its contact with the grosser elements and follows the path of the subtle Vāyu. Thus moving in the Suṣumnā-nāḍī the manas and the vital airs both become almost identical with the Nāda form of the eternal non-physical sound. Gradually, this leads the manas and the prāṇa upward and ultimately, they merge into the *Paśyantī* form of the Vāk and thereafter, the Jīva realizes the identity between mantra and Devatā, citta and Devatā and the direct realization of the Veda becomes achieved. In this way the mere recitation of the *Vaikharī* form of the Veda in its proper form is also helpful for the realization of the Ultimate Truth in the form of Veda. It is therefore, that in India, Sasvara-Veda-Pāṭha has been kept continued from time immemorial.

Veda originally was one only.

Such a Veda cannot but be originally only one. It is, by its very nature without any part. At this stage it remains naturally unmanifest. But when it becomes manifest, succession (krama) is found in it. This is just like the creation from the Secondless Brahman. It is said that the Ṛṣis themselves, for the good of the people of the lower grade, made divisions of the single Veda. But it should be kept in mind that all these various divisions of the Veda are not independent and real and that they tend towards only one goal.[19]

Ṛṣis divided the single Veda into four Vedas for the good of the people.

19 (i) Ekasya vedasyājñānād vedāste bahavaḥ kṛtāḥ—*Sanatsujātavacanam.*
(ii) Vyasyate hyekavidhaṁ taddvāpareṣu punaḥ punaḥ/
Brahmā caitaduvācādau tasmin vaivasvate'ntare//
Āvartamānā ṛṣayo yugākhyātāsu punaḥ punaḥ/
Kurvanti saṁhitā hyete jāyamānāḥ parasparam//—*Vāyupurāṇa,* ....61; 104.
(iii) Anādinidhanā nityā vāgutsṛṣṭā svayambhuvā/
Ādau vedamayī vidyā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravṛttayaḥ//—*Mahābhārata.* Śāntiparva, 231/56–58.
(iv) Prāptyupāyo'nukāraśca tasya vedo maharṣibhiḥ/
Ekopyanekavartmeva samāmnātaḥ pṛthak pṛthak//—*Vākyapadīya,* I. 5.
(v) Sa veda ekopi maharṣibhiranekavartmeva samāmnātaḥ. Ekasya vedasya svarūpeṇa bhedābhāvādabhivyaktilakṣaṇaśabdakramarūpaṁ vāgātmattvaṁ prāpayya adhyetṛṇāmadhyayananimittaṁ caraṇasamākhyāvyavasthā ṛṣibhiḥ kṛtā—Harivṛṣabha (Puṇyarāja on *Vākyapadīya,* I. 5.

Broad divisions of Vedic Literature.

The entire Vedic literature may be roughly divided into two broad heads—*Karmakāṇḍa* including the *Upāsanākāṇḍa* and the *Jñānakāṇḍa*. The former deals with worship, meditation, performance of sacrificial rituals, or any other kind of action done for pleasing higher powers to acquire happiness, while the latter, that is, Jñānakāṇḍa, confines itself to the *ādhyātmika* teachings for attaining perfect Knowledge leading to the ultimate Reality.

Four main divisions of Śruti.

Again, the generally known main divisions, however, are: (1) *Saṁhitā,* that is, collection of hymns, prayers, incantations, sacrificial formulas, charms, etc. both in prose and metrical forms; (2) *Brāhmaṇa,* which mainly deals with sacrificial rites and ceremonies; (3) *Āraṇyaka,* which is mostly like an appendix to the Brāhmaṇa and contains everything which is regarded as secret, of a mysterious nature and is dangerous to the uninitiated, and for which, for that very reason, is meant only to be taught and learnt in the forest; ' The main contents of these are no longer rules for the performance of the sacrificial rites and the explanation of ceremonies, but the mysticism and symbolism of sacrifices, and priestly philosophy ";[20] (4) and *Upaniṣad,* which deals with the philosophy of the Absolute and the Upāsanā of the Saguṇa-Brahman as well. Though these are the four clear divisions of the Veda, yet there is some overlapping of subjects in each division.

The four main divisions of Veda form the background of the four Āśramas.

It must be kept in mind that these four main divisions may be said to be the basis of the four *Āśramas*. Thus, the *Saṁhitā* stands for *Brahmacārī,* the *Brāhmaṇa* for the *Gṛhastha,* the *Āraṇyaka* for *Vānaprastha* and the *Upaniṣad* for the *Sannyāsin*.

Divisions of Saṁhitā.

The Veda is again, divided into four different *Saṁhitās* according to the nature of the mode of the treatment of the subjects dealt with therein—(1) *Ṛk-Saṁhitā,* (2) *Sāma-Saṁhitā,* (3) *Yajus-Saṁhitā, and* (4) *Atharvaṇa-Saṁhitā.* The *Ṛk-Saṁhitā,* popularly known as the *Ṛgveda,* contains mantras, called *ṛks* (ṛcyante stūyante devā anayā) which are in the form of pray-

[20] Winternitz—*History of Indian Literature,* Vol. I, page 233

ers and praises of gods. The *Sāma-Saṁhitā,* or the *Sāma-veda,* contains mantras meant for the melodious chanting of the ṛks[21] of the powers of gods. The *Yajus-Saṁhitā,* called the *Yajurveda,* mainly deals with the sacrifices and sacrificial formulas. The *Atharvaṇa-Saṁhitā,* known as the *Atharva-veda,* contains prayers, charms, various arts and sciences even including magic and witch-craft. It is believed by some that originally there was only one Saṁhitā of which some portion is lost and the rest are found in all the four Vedic Saṁhitās. Winternitz is of opinion that " Many of these collections (Saṁhitās) were nothing but slightly diverging recensions—Śākhās, " branches ", as the Indians say—of one and the same Saṁhitā."[22] Most of the Mantras of the last three *Vedas* are common with those of the *Ṛgveda.*[23]

No chronological order is possible on the basis of language, metre, style or reference to certain words or names.

It is very difficult to put these *Saṁhitās* in any definite chronological order on the basis of their contents, thoughts, language, style, etc. These facts have no stability in Indian literature. A single scholar can at his sweet will write even to day in the style of the Vedas or that of the Sūtras without ever giving any clue to differentiate between the two sorts of composition. Orthodox scholars have so much control over language and thoughts that no priority and posteriority can be determined in their composition. In the same work they may talk of high philosophy and at the same time discuss the problems of mundane world. So to establish any chronological order amongst these ancient works on the basis of the above mentioned data alone will not be at all fruitful. So also the view that certain names or facts do not occur in certain portions, hence these portions are of earlier date, does not appeal. Mentioning or not mentioning of certain facts or of names depends upon the circumstances. It is, however, just possible that these various *Saṁhitās* might have been put down in black and white in different periods. But logically as well as traditionally it appears, as has been said before, that there was originally only *one*

Originally there was only one Veda.

21 Gāyatraṁ tvo gāyati śakkarīṣu—*Ṛgveda,* X. 71. 11.
22 *History of Indian Literature,* Vol. I. p. 53.
23 *Ibid.,* pp. 121, 164, 177.

Veda and that it contained all the knowledge, both relating to this world and to the world hereafter. This was spread over the four *Saṁhitās*. The details found in these *Saṁhitās* are mainly meant for pleasing the higher powers for the attainment of happiness after the purification of one's inner-sense-organs (antaḥkaraṇa) through the instrumentality of prayers, charms, meditation, worship, sacrifices, offerings, etc. etc. All this the seers could achieve simply through a well-disciplined life. Harmony between theory and practice, philosophy and life, and dharma (religion) and philosophy (darśana) is but natural and should not appear strange to any body. The first step towards the achievement of the Highest Aim is to remove all the evil thoughts from the mind and purify the inner-sense-organs, namely, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, Citta and Manas. All these need gradual purification, but it is most essential to crush the Ahaṅkāra (egoism) for ever, and unless it is done, no true knowledge can dawn upon the devotee. It is only then that the devotee can realize his own limitations and weaknesses and have faith in the powers of higher beings. For the attainment of Truth the first and the most important step should be to realize one's limitations, crush egoism and have faith in higher powers. It is then necessary to direct one's thoughts to them exclusively through devotion, prayers, worship, meditation, sacrifices, charms, etc. For all this it is very helpful to have some sort of object as the *ālambana* which may be a form of the Brahman who has infinite forms. The obvious result of this sort of training will be the purification of the self, crushing of the egoism leading finally to the absolute merging of one's lower self into the Universal self, namely, the Paramātman. After this, there will follow the realization of the Highest aim of philosophy, religion and life.

Harmony between philosophy and life is but natural in India.

Purification of lower self leads to the highest aim.

It has already been said that the world is full of miseries and that every one is afflicted with them. The devotees of the *Ṛgveda* did realize that their own powers were wholly incapable of bringing to them permament peace and happiness. So they devoted all their thoughts to the

World is full of miseries which alone lead people to seek after happiness.

powers of higher beings and tried to please them with prayers.[24] Such simple prayers came to be collected and the collection was called the *Ṛgveda*.[25] But soon it might have been realized that the prayers would be much more beneficial if those very prayers or similar others were chanted in different melodious tunes to suit different occasions of worship. Such melodious prayers came to be collected and were called the *Sāmaveda*. Again, the devotees might have felt that if the gods were actually invited to certain sacrifices and were worshipped with offerings of food etc., their devotion would easily bring them favour of the gods and that they would gradually merge into the spirit of the gods and would directly have talks with one another[26] and finally achieve their aim easily. So they performed sacrificial rites in all their details and gods were invited and were offered food and other offerings. Thereby the devotees found their prayers fruitful.[27] So the gods began to be invited to the sacrifices even for ordinary purposes. This led them to formulate details of sacrifices on definite lines for different relative purposes. The section dealing with these came to be named the *Yajurveda*. These three different aspects of the manner of invoking the favour of higher powers centred round one single idea of carrying one-self nearer the spiritual powers and communing oneself with them to gain happiness, a step sufficiently higher towards the realization of the Supreme God-head, called Paramātman.[28] All these three Vedas are called by one word *Trayī*.

Probable purpose of dividing the Veda into four main groups.

But then there is the fourth section of the Veda which is called the *Atharva-veda*. It should be kept in mind that during all these various forms of devotional worship and sacrifices the aim before the mind of the devotees was to gain strength, acquire worldly prosperity and communion with higher powers, defeat their ene-

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24 Mā pṛṇanto duritamena āran mā jāriṣuḥ Sūrayaḥ Suvratāsaḥ—*Ṛgveda*, I. 125. 7.

25 The very word 'Ṛk' (ṛcyante stūyante devā-anayā) denotes the above sense.

26 Saṁ nu vocāvahai punaryato me madhvābhṛtaṁ/ Hoteva kṣadase priyaṁ—*Ṛgveda*, I. 25. 17.

27 *Vide Ṛgveda*, I. 10. 2.

28 *Vide Manusmṛti*, XII. 88—90.

mies and become happy which is the ultimate end of life. That they had a large number of enemies cannot be denied, for otherwise, they themselves would have had never prayed against them. The enemies were also always keen to take revenge upon their rivals, namely, the gods and their devotees. So it was very necessary for the devotees to guard themselves against the disturbances of these evil spirits during their prayers, sacrifices, etc. The importance of guarding themselves against these evil doers even during ordinary prayers can be easily judged from the significant action of protecting one's own organism with water just before the performance of *Prāṇāyāma* in our every day *Sandhyopāsana*. In other words, one must take every care for the protection of one's own physical body, particularly when one is expected to be engrossed in meditation. In order to do so, it is also very essential to know all possible ways and means through which one's enemies may create troubles.[29] So it was necessary for the devotees of the Vedas to know all the mundane means of protecting themselves including the various arts and sciences of the world. With the knowledge of these, the devotees could easily guard themselves and their activities against the treacherous, deceitful and evil activities of their enemies, who were bent upon destroying the sacrificial rites. All these things are found in the *Atharvaveda* besides the prayers. This is also clear from the fact that the *ṛtvik* of the *Atharvaveda*, called Brahmā, is said to be 'Sarvavidyaḥ' (knowing all the arts-vidyās) and 'Sarvavijñānaḥ' (knowing all the sciences) and it is therefore that he advises all the other priests of the other Vedas to do their duties.[30] Winternitz holds that—"the great importance of the Atharva-Veda Saṃhitā lies in the very fact that it is an invaluable source of knowledge of the real popular belief."[31] So the fourth

Protecting of physical organism very essential for the achievement of one's aim in life.

Atharva-Veda is essentially that section of the Veda which deals mainly with ways and means of protecting the sacrifices.

[29] Ye rūpāṇi pratimuñcamānā asurāḥ santaḥ svadhayā caranti/ Parāpuro nipuro ye bharantyagniṣṭāñllokātpraṇudātyasmāt— *Yajurveda*, II. 30; also cf. I. 7-8.

[30] Yāska in the *Nirukta*, I. viii. I. on the *Ṛgveda*, X. 71. 11.

[31] *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I, p. 129.

Veda also came to exist in the same period with the other three. That the *Ṛgveda* itself mentions the names of the four main priests, namely *Hotṛ* belonging to the *Ṛgveda*, *Udgātṛ* to the *Sāmaveda*, *Adhvaryu* to the *Yajurveda* and *Brahman* to the *Atharvaveda*, supports that all the Vedas did exist simultaneously.[32] In fact, the *Atharvaveda* is the most important of all the four Vedas.[33] Thus, it seems that all the four *Saṁhitās* are not four independent works of different periods, but that they really are the four different aspects of one and the same Veda. It has been therefore, said that in the beginning of the creation there was the manifestation of the single Veda which due to the ignorance of the knower appeared to be many.[34]

Ṛgveda itself mentions priests of all the four Vedas.

Four Saṁhitās are the four aspects of one and the same Veda.

2. *Philosophical Ideas in the Veda*

Trying to find out the details of the growth of the Philosophical ideas in the *Saṁhitās*, we should always keep in mind that these are not the works of Philosophy where ādhyātmika teachings alone can be found. They contain all that contributes to the achievement of jñāna—mainly devotional prayers, incantations, sacrificial formulas, etc., which help jñāna. Philosophical thoughts, dealing directly with the Supreme Self are found only occasionally scattered here and there. In fact, more of Philosophical ideas[35] are found either in works containing mainly teachings of a higher personality or of a *Guru* meant for an enquirer into the nature of the Truth, or in a work which happens to be exclusively a philosophical one. Here the case is quite different. We do not generally find hymns in the *Saṁhitās* wherein Indra, Varuṇa, Mitra,

Direct teachings of *ādhyātmika* nature are not the proper subject of the Saṁhitās.

Teachings come from higher powers.

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32 *Ṛgveda*, II. 1. 2; X. 91. 10.

33 Yāska in the *Nirukta*, I. viii. 1.

34 Ekasya Vedasyājñānād Vedāste bahavaḥ kṛtāḥ-*Sanatsujātavacanam*. Also refer to the *Mahābhārata Śāntiparva*, XXXI. 56—58; *Vāyu-Purāṇa*, Adhyāyas, 64, 104; Vedaṁ tāvadekaṁ santamatimahattvād duradhyeyamanekaśākhābhedena, samāsiṣuḥ—Durgācārya's Com. on the *Nirukta*, I. 20. 2.

35 By 'Philosophical ideas' we should understand 'the ādhyātmika teachings.'

Rudra, or any other God is found giving his teachings to his devotees. Instances can be quoted from later literature in support of the above. Thus, we find in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* that all the Philosophical thoughts proceed from the mouth of *Yamarāja*, and nothing from Naciketas who is a duly qualified pupil to receive the teachings on subtler problems. So in the *Bhagavad-gītā* all the higher thoughts have been given out by Lord Kṛṣṇa Himself, while Arjuna, a true disciple, is a silent recipient of those teachings. This is generally the case in the mundane world. Sometimes, philosophical ideas are also found in the prayers of gods themselves when those prayers are addressed to some higher God. For instance, we find in later literature that the prayers of Brahmā, Śiva, and others directed towards Viṣṇu or Ādyā-Bhagavatī indirectly do contain some philosophical thoughts. Here, in the Vedas, the case is not similar. There are mainly two classes of beings: Gods (immortals) including personified ones, belonging to higher planes and devotees (mortals) invoking their favour through prayers from lower planes.[36] No doubt, there are certain hymns[37] where the various deities amongst themselves talk on different questions in a dialogue form where we do find some philosophical ideas. But ordinarily, in prayers addressed to higher deities by devotees of the lower planes we do not find any philosophy in the true sense of the term. Hence, we have only to glean out such philosophical thoughts from these prayers.

Being unable to get themselves any remedy for their miseries, the devotees surrendered themselves to higher powers.

Necessity has been, verily, said to be the mother of invention. Having assumed the physical body, the devotees could not escape from the miseries of the world. Since the very day they came to this world, they began to feel pains and sufferings from different sources. Naturally, being pricked hard, they tried to find out remedy to get rid of their troubles. They failed themselves to obtain peace through their own *Pauruṣa*. Their own physical means being limited could not help them much. Distressed as they were, they sought for the aim of their life here and there on the physical plane, but

[36] *Ṛgveda* I. 10–11; I. 164. 38; VIII. 19. 25.

[37] *Ṛgveda*, I. 165.

again, failed to achieve their desired end. Being extremely confused and almost lost to themselves, not knowing what to do and what not,[38] they had no other alternative except to surrender themselves entirely to the care of higher powers.[39] It is also but natural that in such critical moments alone ordinary people think of higher powers. Belief, Faith, Devotion, all come together to help a true devotee in distress. In fact, it may be said that with His natural *anugraha* the Great Almighty God, in His various abstract forms, enters into the heart of devotees and makes them realize their own limitations and helps them to work out for themselves the true path to happiness. Through these abstract, though most effective, means, these sufferers begin to seek help of the higher powers. No true and permanent happiness can ever be achieved through half-hearted attempts. Entire dedication of life, body and mind is necessary for the achievement of true Peace. Egoism must be rooted out from the heart in order that jñāna may take its seat in the place of ahaṅkāra. These devotees of the Vedas appear to have done the same. We find in a hymn addressed to the Ādityas, the devotee saying—" O Āditya! Neither I know the right, nor left do I distinguish; neither the East, nor the West do I cognize. My knowledge is not at all mature and I am entirely disappointed and confused. If you guide me, I shall attain the Light that brings no danger."[40] Further on, he says—" O Aditi, Mitra, Varuṇa, and Indra! forgive me however I have erred and committed sins against you. May I obtain the Light free from peril (*abhayaṁ jyotiḥ*) and let not the darkness (i.e. nescience) seize me."[41]

Total surrender to Higher Powers alone brings True Light.

Anugraha of the Lord alone helps the distressed to work out for themselves the path to happiness.

Complete surrender of ownself to higher powers alone brings the Light.

38 Na dakṣiṇā vi cikite na savyā na prācīnamādityā nota paścā/
Pākyā cid vasavo dhīryā cid yuṣmānīto abhayaṁ jyotiraśyām//
—*Ṛgveda,* II. 27, 11.

39 *Ṛgveda,* II. 27. 11.

40 *Ṛgveda,* II. 27. 11.

41 Adite mitra varuṇota mṛḍa yad vo vayam cakṛmā kaccidāgaḥ/
Urvaśyāmabhayaṁ jyotirindra mā no dīrghā abhi naśantamisrāḥ//
—*Ṛgveda,* II. 27. 14.

After reading such passages one is at once reminded of Arjuna in the battle-field with Kṛṣṇa as his charioteer. We know that Arjuna's own efforts had proved futile in removing the confusing ignorance from his mind, the feelings of his miseries, and his entire inactiveness even when his activity was most needed. No other alternative was left with him except to surrender himself completely to the Great World Teacher—Lord Kṛṣṇa. He prayed and expressed the cause of his sufferings, the confused state of his mind, his utter failure to find out the right path to Duty and his entire ignorance of the Truth. He surrendered his body, mind and thoughts to the Lord and said—"With my very nature tainted with the vice of faint-heartedness and my mind bewildered about Duty, I ask you to tell me that which is decidedly good for me. I am your disciple, please instruct me who has surrendered to you and has sought refuge in you."[42] Here is the complete surrender of a devotee. Arjuna himself failed to find out the Path of Light which is free from miseries, and so with full faith and *Parābhakti* (Prapatti), like the Devotee of the *Ṛgveda,* he threw himself to the entire care of the Lord. Thereupon, the Lord did convince him of the Truth, the Path of Duty, through philosophical—both spiritual and practical—ideas. The Lord removed the ignorance of Arjuna and made him forget his miseries. The right course of Action was shown to the Devotee. Then only he got consolation, solace, and in course of time, might have even realized the Highest Truth, the radical cure of all his sufferings. This is possible only when philosophical teachings relating to the Inner-Self, the Ātman, are expounded. Here is the triumph of Philosophy and Religion.

Similar instance from the *Bhagavad-Gītā.*

From the study of the *Saṁhitās* we find that the society of the age was fully developed. People lived worldly life with their different needs. They had to deal with all sorts of people and all sorts of relations. They had friends and foes alike. They required earth for cultivation and their dwellings, water for maintaining

Society was fully developed.

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[42] *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 7.

Condition of people in the society.

their life, physical purification and growing food. For spiritual and physical purification and acquiring strength they needed light (tejas). They required strength to fight against their enemies. They were aware of the fact that air was not only needed for the preservation of life, but that it was the very vital element without which life would be simply impossible. It brought them strength. Life was as much dear to them as it is to any one of us. They feared death[43] and eagerly desired for long life.[44] They had feelings of love, fear and hatred. For all these they had to struggle hard. They realized that their own physical efforts were not enough to help them to live a happy and peaceful life. They were fully aware of their own limitations.

Remedies of miseries are to be found in securing assistance of higher powers through prayers.

They were not ignorant of the fact that permanent remedy, under the circumstances, was to be found in securing assistance of higher powers. They also knew how to secure their help. It was not unknown to them that prayers, worship, meditation, etc. (*upāsanā*) alone were the most efficacious means to achieve such results which were as good as Liberation itself. They had complete Faith (śraddhā) in the effectiveness of prayers, incantations, worship, etc., in the strength of supernatural or higher powers, and also in their own force of genuine devotion (bhakti). They knew how through suitable prayers and worship alone they could link themselves to higher powers. They had not the least doubt that prayers wrought wonders. Indeed it has been said by Tennyson—" More things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of." They had full faith in prayers which they regarded as a force, as certain to bring about the fruition of desires in due time, as the seed of a tree to make its branches grow in due season.[45] They never forgot that prayers alone were the most practical means of communing with gods which would help them gradually to merge themselves into the Highest God, that is, the Paramātman, in order to realize the highest aim of Philosophy and Life.

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43 *Ṛgveda,* I. 5. 10.
44 *Ṛgveda*, X. 161. 4; *Atharvaveda,* III. 11. 4; XX. 96. 9.
45 *Ṛgveda,* VIII. 13. 6.

Scope of knowledge of devotees.

Having closely marked all these aspects of the devotees and after knowing from the following pages more about their having knowledge of the world in detail, of the world hereafter, of the existence of life after death, of heaven and hell, of the rules of high morality, of the universality of the Reality, of unity amongst diversity,[46] and above all, of the universal character of the Supreme self,[47] and so on, we can easily hold that the devotees had ordinary knowledge of all these. But it should be kept in mind that all this knowledge was merely worldly (vyāvahārika) and was not capable of radically removing their sufferings for ever. It has been pointed out before how the devotees had expressed their longing for the true knowledge of the 'Fearless Light' (*abhayaṁ jyotiḥ*). No one can doubt after going through these *Saṁhitās* that the devotees had sufficient knowledge of the various capacities of the different higher powers and also of the ways and means of gaining their favour. They have shown how through the various modes of worship the spiritual beings can be made accessible to the mortal beings and become their friends.[48] It is also clear from the attitude of the devotees of the *Saṁhitās* that through dint of prayers and worship the great gulf between the two sorts of beings, namely, mortal and immortal, can be easily bridged over and even the mortals can become immortals. In fact, one has to think of oneself as immortal while entering into the performance of the various modes of worship. So we find the *Saṁhitās* telling us repeatedly, "Herewith I, the Yajamāna, transfer myself from the mortal form to the immortal form."[49] Again, "Herewith I carry the desired offerings to you, O Agni! with the arms of the Aświns and the hands of Pūṣan."[50]

Knowledge of devotees was only vyāvahārika.

Through prayers and other modes of worship mortals can become immortals.

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[46] *Yajurveda,* XVI.

[47] *Yajurveda,* XVI.

[48] cf. *Ṛgveda,* I. 25. 17.

[49] Idamahaṁ anṛtāt satyamupaimi.—*Yajurveda,* I. 5.

[50] Aśvinorbāhubhyāṁ pūṣṇo hastābhyāṁ
Agnaye juṣṭaṁ gṛhṇāmī—*Ibid.,* I. 10.

All that the devotees knew and could do to achieve the favour of the higher beings through the various modes of worship represented mainly one aspect of our philosophy, namely, *Action* (Karman). So has been said by Jaimini.[51] Thereby they could only purify their antaḥkaraṇa and make themselves fit to receive the True Knowledge which could illumine their hearts, remove their miseries and lead them to the highest aim of philosophy and life. Then alone the highest teaching of Indian Philosophy (darśana), Religion and Life can be completely realized. It is in this graded combination of Action and Knowledge that the true synthesis of Religion, Life and Philosophy in India becomes quite visible. This is the genuine teaching of Hindu thought. The *Saṁhitās* teach the Action aspect, as it is the most important side of the Truth. Manifestation of Knowledge does not require any extra preparation for it. This is the only Path which the devotees of the *Saṁhitās* had followed and had left a lesson for the future.

All the teachings of the *Saṁhitās* represent mainly one aspect of our philosophy, namely, Action (karma).

Both Philosophy and Religion, as has been said before, have found their practical aspect manifest in the very life of a Hindu. Hindus can never divorce one from the other, nor can both of these be ever separated from their common life and dealings. Even in their ordinary talks and mutual dealings they cannot help thinking of Higher Powers, Supreme Authority of One Universal God, devotion, prayers, meditations, worship of Saguṇa-Brahman, love for truth, hatred towards evil and sins, discipline of body and mind and universal Brotherhood. These ideas were so much through and through interwoven in the life and dealings of the devotees of the *Saṁhitās*, as they are even now in ours, that ordinarily they did not find any opportunity to think of the abstract Philosophy independently. They perhaps knew that if they could make themselves fit through the performance of right Action, knowledge was sure to

Both Philosophy and Religion are found manifest in the very life of a Hindu.

Devotees of the *Saṁhitās* remain busy for preparing the background in the form of the performance of Action to receive Jñāna.

51 Āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt—*Mīmāṁsā Sūtra,* I. ii. 1.

dawn upon them. But even then a good deal of information can be gleaned out from their activities as found in the *Saṁhitās*. All these things are given below.

3. *Cosmology*

Elements—Earth.

The devotees of the *Saṁhitās* knew that the world was governed by natural laws; there was no chaos and that it contained elements like earth, water, air, fire, a space between heaven and earth.[52] The earth had seven regions.[53] It was regarded as a solid substance upon which *sthāvara* (immovable) and *jaṅgama* (movable) objects flourished. It had Altar (vedī) as its central point, the centre of the world.[54] This very idea is found in the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*[55] where Altar has been regarded as the purest of the earth which gods received as a gift from the Asuras and which they placed in the Moon.[56] Earth was known as the mother.[56a] It was ploughed for growing various corns[57] and trees, flowers, etc. It was known as having come out of the feet of the Universal Puruṣa and hence, it was called *Padyā*.[58] It assumed various forms.[59] It produced medicines.[60] It was kept fixed.

Water.

Similarly, something about water also can be given here. It is pure.[61] It flows down from heaven to earth that is, it always moves towards slope and helps the growth of food-grains, trees, etc. They thought that water contained fire (agni), named Viśvaśaṁ, which gave happiness to all.[62] It has

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52 *Ṛgveda*, I. 6. 10.

53 *Ibid.*, I. 22. 16.

54 *Ibid.*, I. 143. 4.

55 I. 2. 5. 3. 18.

56 *Ṛgveda*, V. 43. 2.

56a It should be remembered that even today for every religious function a *vedī* of earth is made upon the earth itself. This vedī is the symbol of the same small piece of pure earth which the gods got from the Asuras and kept it unpolluted.

57 *Ṛgveda*, I. 23. 15.

58 *Ibid.*, III. 55. 14.

59 *Ibid.*

60 *Ibid.*, I. 89. 4.

61 *Ibid.*, II. 27. 2.

62 That water is regarded as a means of purification is perhaps due to this very fact that it contains Agni, because Agni is recognized in Hindu literature as a purifier.

nectar and is used as a medicine. It removes our sins and ill-behaviour. It also removes the effect of speaking lies.[63] Waters go up in the sky and come down in the form of rains.[64] It has *vega*[65] (velocity). Because it contains medicines and nectar, it is called the very *life* and it is because of this that water is to be taken in every state of our health to maintain strength. So says the Hymn—" O Waters! teem with medicines to keep my body safe from harm."[66]

Velocity.

Clouds are formed in the sky. Combination of water and *jyotis* forms rains.[67] These waters give life to earth and all living beings.[68]

Clouds and rains.

The notion of the various divisions and sub-divisions of time (Kāla) is found in several hymns. References to days and nights are found in many places. There are six *ṛtus* each of two months' duration, or only five by joining Hemanta and Śiśira together so as to form one *ṛtu*.[69] The three ordinary divisions of time, namely, present, past and future are also found mentioned in the *Ṛgveda*.[70] Besides, time is identified with the Sun and Viṣṇu and is divided into another 90 divisions: year, two solstices, five seasons; 12 months, 24 half-months, 30 days, eight watches, and 12 Zodiacal signs. This whole forms a circle which like a wheel remains constantly moving.

Various divisions of time.

Sāyaṇa holds that Viṣṇu in His Universal form identifies Himself with the Sun and does all these movements. When the Sun retires to one side of the hemisphere, he is called the giver of water and remains there for six months and then retires to the other half side for another six months.[71] This naturally refers to the two solstices, the Uttarāyaṇa and the Dakṣiṇāyana. The Sun keeps on moving round the heaven constantly and repeatedly and forms 720 days

Sun.

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63 *Ṛgveda*, I. 23. 19-20.
64 *Ibid.*, I. 23. 17.
65 *Ibid.*, I. 24. 6.
66 *Ibid.*, I. 23. 21.
67 *Nirukta*, pp. 144-45, Venkateshwar Press, Bombay edition.
68 *Ṛgveda*, I. 164. 51.
69 *Ibid.*, III. 55. 18.
70 *Ibid.*, II. 28. 8.
71 *Ṛgveda*, I. 164. 13.

and nights.[72] This wheel (movement) of the Sun never grows old.[73] There is besides, the seventh section of the ṛtu, which may be called adhikamāsa.[74] The Sun illumines the three lokas: Pṛthvī[75] etc. He is regarded as antaryāmī and looks within the *antaḥkaraṇa* of all.[76] He knows the good and evil deeds of every person. He protects all beings, both sthāvara and jaṅgama.[77] It is the sun which gives light to the moon.[78] The Sun is looked upon as an eternally fixed star (nakṣatra).[79]

Dik.

Dik was regarded as that which gave knowledge of relation in space. Its divisions—East, West, North, South, above and below were all recognized[80] along with the notions of far and near.[81]

Sound—its four stages.

The *Ṛgveda* mentions the four stages of the manifestation of sound (words): (1) *Parā,* the all-pervading transcendent sound which is the same as Śabda-Brahman (eternal verbum) and is the immediate cause of the Universe; (2) *Paśyantī,* the first manifestation of the eternal sound, is very subtle and is known in later literature as *Daivī-vāk* (the Divine speech); (3) *Madhyamā,* the next manifestation of the eternal intra-organic sound which is a subtler form of *Praṇava* and is identified in later literature with the conscious aspect of the Supreme Power (jñāna-śakti) and is the last stage of the subtle sound; and (4) *Vaikharī,* the last manifestation of sound, is the same as the speech of a human being. So says the text—"There are four kinds of speech, and these are known to those Brāhmaṇas alone who are learned; of these, three are very subtle and hence are not used by ordinary people who speak only the fourth."[82]

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72 *Ṛgveda,* I. 164. 11.
73 *Ibid.,* 11. 13.
74 *Ibid.,* II. 15.
75 *Ibid.,* II. 10.
76 *Ibid.,* II. 27. 3.
77 *Ibid.,* II. 27. 4.
78 *Yajurveda,* XVIII. 40; *Nirukta,* p. 120, Bombay edition.
79 *Ṛgveda,* VI. 67. 6; VII. 81. 2; VII. 86. 1; X. 88. 13.
80 *Ibid.,* I. 31. 4; II. 27. 11; X. 82. 4.
81 *Ibid.,* I. 30. 21; VII. 67. 2.
82 *Ṛgveda,* I. 164. 45.

Origin and nature of the world.

As to the theory of the origin and nature of the world we cannot find any fully developed theory in any one place. Sometimes, Agni is regarded as the creator of the entire world even including the heavens.[83] Again, Soma is said to have created the earth along with the other five elements, namely, heaven, day, night, water and herbs.[84] It is this very Soma which has created the expansion of this earth and the heavens high above.[85] Tvaṣṭṛ is the Omniform creator of all living creatures.[86] Indra is again, regarded as the creator of the earth and heaven.[87] He is said to be the maker of these worlds and creatures and all things that after him sprang into being.[88] Similarly Viśvakarman, Varuṇa and several others also are said to have created this earth along with its other elements.[89]

Here it may be said that whomsoever a devotee approaches with prayers, him he considers to be the greatest of the gods and as such the creator of the Universe. This is but natural. So sometimes, Agni is adored as the creator, while at another time Viṣṇu is respected as the Creator. Keeping in mind the notion of unity amidst diversity, the above mentioned views seem to be quite consistent also. This notion of unity is quite clear in the *Ṛgveda* itself.[90]

Material cause of the universe.

As regards the material cause of the universe, it is found that the creation took place out of *asat*. So says the Mantra. "....the Brahmaṇaspati, Aditi, in the beginning of the creation, created out of non-existent (*asat*), devoid of name and form, the *sat*, the existent. Then came the various regions of space (*Āśāḥ*), followed by earth and other objects of the world."[91] While discussing the nature of the material cause, the Mantra says that the Creator Viśvakarman did not take help of either

83 *Ṛgveda*, VI. 7. 6-7.
84 *Ibid.*, VI. 42. 3.
85 *Ibid.*, VI. 42. 4.
86 *Ibid.*, III. 55. 19.
87 *Ibid.*, VIII. 36. 4.
88 *Ibid.*, VIII. 85. 6.
89 *Ibid.*, X. 81. 1–3; VIII. 41. 4.
90 *Ṛgveda*, I. 7.
91 *Ibid.*, X. 72. 2-3-4.

the earth or heaven or any other reality apart from himself to create the universe. He, being the Universal being (sarvātmaka), who has eyes on all sides, a mouth on all sides, arms and feet on all sides, the only One Shining Being (Eka-Devaḥ), has created out of His own powers all the things.[92] In fact, as Sāyaṇa has said, Brahman is the tree and wood out of which He Himself has created everything, an idea which is found in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* also.[93] Again, as interpreted by Sāyaṇa, Paramātman, in the beginning of the creation, under the influence of Māyā, manifested Himself as Hiraṇyagarbha, the first created being, who in his turn, created the rest of the universe.[94]

Use of the term 'Māyā' in the sense of 'Karman (powers).

That the notion of Māyā was present even then is clear from the fact, that the word has been used in the sense of *karman* which may be interpreted as the '*Śakti*'. The same idea is found in the Mantra, "Varuṇa, the Īśvara,[95] sustains the entire universe with his Māyā" (powers).[96] Again, we find the Mantras, addressed to Viśvakarman,[97] say that—"The Waters, they received that germ primeval wherein the Gods were gathered all together. It rested upon the Unborn's navel, that One wherein abide all things existing."

Then we have the well-known hymn, called the *Nāsadīya* hymn, which gives us a complete idea of the theory of creation, though modern scholars consider this hymn to be of later origin. I give here the translation of the whole hymn from Max Muller:—

Nāsadīya hymn.

"There was then neither what is, nor what is not, there was no sky, nor the heaven which is beyond. What covered? Where was it, and in whose shelter? Was the water the deep abyss (in which it lay)?

There was no death, hence was there nothing immortal. There was no light (distinction) between night and day. That One breathed by itself without breath, other than it there has been nothing.

[92] *Ṛgveda,* X. 81.
[93] *Ṛgveda,* II. 8. 9.
[94] *Ibid.,* X. 121.
[95] *Ibid.,* VIII. 41. 4.
[96] *Ṛgveda,* VIII. 41. 3.
[97] *Ṛgveda,* X. 82. 5-6.

Darkness there was, in the beginning all this was a sea without light; the germ that lay covered by the husk, that One was born by the power of heat (*tapas*). Love overcame it in the beginning which was the seed springing from mind, poets having searched in their heart found by wisdom the bond of what is in what is not.

Their ray which was stretched across, was it below or was it above? There were seed-bearers, there were powers, self-power below, and *will* above.

Who then knows, who has declared it here, from whence was born this creation? The gods came later than this creation, who then knows whence it arose?

He from whom this creation arose, whether he made it or did not make it, the highest seer in the highest heaven, he forsooth knows or does even he not know? "

It may be pointed out here that the hymn refuses to say anything about what existed prior to creation.

There was the unmanifest state of Universal Consciousness before creation.

It is clear from the above that there was something, no doubt, but as that thing had not manifested itself, nothing can be said of it. That thing must have been some unmanifest state of the Universal Consciousness which, in course of time, manifested itself into so many aspects of the universe. That Consciousness was the *Tejas,* called *Tapas,* the Universal Light, the Energy, which alone could make that Unmanifest manifest. Then there was the *Will.*

Background of all creation.

Here lies the background of all creation, the *Jñāna-śakti,* the *Icchā-śakti* and the *Kriyā-śakti* in the form of the Universal Consciousness, the Will-Power and then the Creation itself. They thought that there was a Universal Consciousness which pervaded all (dhiyāvasuḥ),[98] an idea found in the Purāṇas later on.[99]

4. *The Idea of a Universal Being*

This very hymn brings to us the idea of the existence of a Universal Being who is above all, Transcendent though Immanent. The universe is within Him and

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98 *Ṛgveda,* I. 3. 10, 12.

99 Yā devī sarvabhūteṣu buddhirūpeṇa saṁsthitā,—*Mārkaṇḍeyā-Purāṇa—Durgāsaptaśatī,* V.

there is nothing beyond Him. He pervades the whole creation. The same idea is found in the well-known *Puruṣa-sūkta* of the Vedas and in similar other Mantras.[100] Indra is recognised as One Great God who appears to us in the forms of the Sun, the Agni, and the Vāyu, as interpreted by Sāyaṇā.[101] All the Nakṣatras in the heaven are His forms. It is He with whom the entire *manuṣyaloka* is ever in contact.[102] Again, in another hymn, it is said that Indra is the very form of Āditya and he gives prajñāna to those who are in dark and manifests rūpa to those who are without it.[103] Again, the *Ṛgveda*,[104] says that the various prayers addressed to the various gods are really the prayers addressed to Indra, an idea similar to that which is found in the *Bhagvadgītā*[105].—" Those devotees who, endowed with faith worship other gods (with some interested motive), they too worship me alone, though not in accordance with rules, that is, without proper knowledge," says Lord Kṛṣṇa. That the devotees of the *Saṁhitās* had a clear idea of one universal being, without a second, who could have control over the entire universe by punishing the wicked and protecting the good, is further supported by the mantra—" Eko viśvasya bhuvanasya rājā sa yodhayā ca kṣayayā ca janān "—meaning, you are the only ruler of the entire universe, you destroy the wicked enemies and protect the good.[106] This is the idea which we find in the *Bhagavadgītā* later on.[107]

Various forms of Indra.

From the above references it may be conjectured that the devotees of the *Saṁhitās* had been quite familiar with the notion of One Supreme God, called Paramātman, who pervaded all the things of the world. And it is Indra who is said to be that God, the Supreme Self. So

Notion of One Supreme God-head.

100 *Yajurveda*, Chapter XVI.

101 *Ṛgveda*, I. 6. 1.

102 *Ibid.*

103 *Ṛgveda*, I. 6. 3.

104 *Ṛgveda*, I. 7.

105 *Ṛgveda*, IX. 23.

106 *Ṛgveda*, III. 46. 2.

107 IV. 8.

it is said that Indra with His Māyā[108] (powers) assumes various forms.[109]

The same idea appears to have been fully developed in later literature also. It is because of this very idea of identity that we find in another Mantra of the *Ṛgveda*[110] the statement that Viśvakarman, as Parameśvara, merged within Himself the entire universe and remained alone (before creation), and again, for the good of people, concealed His own natural form and manifested Himself through the created beings in the form of so many Jīvas.

Nature of the Supreme Self explained.

The nature of the Supreme Self has been variously stated. It has been called the Fearless Light,[111] the Highest Vyoma,[112] the Highest *Pada* (Paramapada),[113] the Unmanifest, and so on, besides what has been said above. In the *Ṛgveda,*[114] again, it has been clearly pointed out that there is only one *Sat* which the wise explain in different ways (Ekaṁ sat viprā bahudhā vadanti). That they had clear distinctive knowledge of the Paramātman and the Jīvātman is clear from the well-known mantras—" Dvā suparṇā[115] etc. meaning ' Two birds with fair wings, knit with bonds of friendship, in the same sheltering tree, have found a refuge. One of the twain eats the sweet Figtree's fruitage; the other eating not regardeth only.'

The idea of the Paramātman and the Jivātman.

The Mantra refers to two Conscious Beings dwelling in one body. One as *Bhoktā* (experiencer) of the fruits of one's own deeds, while the other as the Uninterested Spectator (draṣṭā) only. These two are no other than the Jīvātman and the Paramātman. The attainment of the knowledge of this Paramātman has

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108 That the word ' Māyā ' has been used in the sense of illusion is clear from the *Ṛgveda* (X. 54. 2) itself where it is said that " O Indra! that, you have battles, is only an illusion, for you have had never an enemy before, nor even today—Māyet sā te yāni yuddhānyāhurnādya śatruṁ nanu purā vivitse "—Śaṅkara may owe his idea of Māyā to this.

109 '*Indro* Māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate'—*Ṛgveda,* VI. 47. 18.

110 X. 81. 1.

111 *Ṛgveda,* II. 27. 11.

112 *Ibid.,* I. 143. 2.

113 *Ibid.,* I. 22. 20-21.

114 I. 164. 46.

115 *Ibid.,* I. 164. 20 and 22. 30. (Griffith's translation).

been emphasised throughout the Vedas. So says the *Yajurveda,*[116] "*Tameva viditvā'timṛtyumeti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate'yanāya'*", meaning, that by the knowledge of Him alone one goes beyond the death, there is no other path to go. Again, it is said, "He who knows that Brahman, keeps gods under his control."[117] There are several mantras in the *Yajurveda* which clearly maintain the idea of One Supreme God who manifests Himself in infinite forms and whose knowledge alone makes a devotee achieve the Highest goal of life. It is because of this knowledge that one perceives all wonders,[118] an idea which has been developed later on in the Upaniṣads:—"Ekena vijñānena sarvaṁ vijñātam bhavati", etc.

5. *Moral Teachings Found in the Saṁhitās*

Coming to the moral teachings found in the *Saṁhitās,* we can say without any hesitation that the standard laid by the people of the period was very high and harmonising. There was no conflict among those who followed the path of righteousness. They all joined together and sought the help of gods to punish the wicked. They had faith in collective prayers.[119] They sought strength and wealth from the gods not for giving troubles to the good, but for fighting against the evil doers and doing good to themselves and to others as well. They emphasised truth (ṛta, satya)—which is called 'jyotiṣaspati'[120] and even prayed for forgiveness of their own sins. Speaking lie was a great crime. They spoke 'sūnṛta' speech, that is, palatable truth.[121] To be true to their words and promises was the ideal of their life. From the Mantra—"O Water! wash away all the sins that are in me, whatever act of cursing and hatred I have done and also falsehood present in me," it is clear that the devotees hated sins, cursing, hatred and falsehood.[122]

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116 XXXI. 18.
117 *Yajurveda,* XXXI. 21.
118 *Ṛgveda,* I. 25. 11.
119 *Ṛgveda,* I. 17. 9.
120 *Ṛgveda,* I. 23. 5.
121 *Ṛgveda,* I. 8. 8.
122 *Ṛgveda,* I. 23. 22.

They hated the use of harsh words.[123] They were very much afraid of sins and always prayed to gods to make them free from sins. They knew that sins and sinners could be removed through the intervention of higher powers.[124] They prayed for protection against the sinners.[125] The evil doers were hated because they spoke lies and ill of others and killed human beings.[126] They also hated covetousness, deceitfulness, pride, harsh words, censurable actions, creators of obstacles, wickedness, abusers of divine beings, thieves, anger, jealousy, enemies of Brāhmaṇa, miserliness, etc. etc.[127] Even gods who maintained such standard of morality were honoured by such expressions, as *dhṛtavrata* (one who never alters his ways), *Nāsatyā* (a very common expression for speaking the truth). Sins committed in secrecy by wicked persons were condemned. Agni was called *satya-parāyaṇa* (devoted to truth) and *satyadharmā*.[128] Varuṇa, Mitra and Āditya were called *dhṛtavrata*.[129] Indra has been addressed as *satkarma-pālaka* (protector of good deeds),[130] *Surūpa kṛtnu* (doer of good deeds). Maruts are called *alātṛṇāsaḥ* (free from jealousies)[132] and Viṣṇu is called *adābhyaḥ* (free from deception).[133] They always liked to do good to people and for that they prayed to the gods.[134] They liked good deeds to be maintained.[135] They loved the gods because they were devoid of *hiṁsā*, dveṣa, etc.[136] They did not like the *Rākṣasas* because of their evil and sinful deeds.[137] They hated them even

[123] *Ṛgveda,* I. 23. 9.

[124] *Ṛgveda,* I. 24. 9; I. 24. 11;I. 18. 5; I. 43. 4; I. 48. 1, 8; I. 91. 16; I. 97. 2–8; II. 23. 17; VI. 2. 11; VI. 51. 10; VI. 74. 3; VII. 15. 3, 15; VII. 16. 10; VII. 20. 1; VII. 23. 2; VII. 34. 13.

[125] *Ṛgveda,* I. 27. 3; I. 91. 8; I. 115. 6; VII. 104. 13.

[126] *Ṛgveda,* I. 125; VI. 61. 11; VI. 62. 10; VII. 16. 8; VII. 104. 7–10.

[127] *Ṛgveda,* I. 15. 6; I. 90. 2; I. 94. 9; I. 115. 6; I. 128. 5; I. 152. 2; I. 157. 4; II. 23. 16; VI. 48. 10; VI. 52. 2-3; VI. 53. 8; VII. 104. 20; VIII. 18. 14-15.

[128] *Ṛgveda,* I. 1. 5; I. 12. 7.

[129] *Ibid.,* I. 15. 6; II. 29. 1.

[130] *Ibid.,* I. 4. 10.

[131] *Ibid.,* I. 4. 1.

[132] *Ibid.,* I. 166. 7.

[133] *Ibid.,* I. 22. 1.

[134] *Ibid.,* I. 2. 9.

[135] *Ibid.,* I. 3. 1.

[136] *Ibid.,* I. 4. 4; I. 18. 3.

[137] *Ibid.,* I. 22. 5.

for their harsh and cruel speech (ghoracakṣase).[138] They felt compassion for lower creatures, like horse, cow, etc.[139] They prayed to gods for doing good to all the beings.[140] They condemned sorcery, witchcraft, seduction, adultery,[141] and believed that those who practised all these went to hell.[142] Besides, they prescribed all the rules of discipline for the performance of sacrifices which brought to them the highest pleasure, that is, the *svarga*.

6. *Law of Karman*

Belief in the Law of Karman.

Coming to the Law of Karman we should keep in mind that its existence is to be proved on the basis of the following grounds: Falling into the bondage of the world and experiencing pleasure and pain as the result of one's deeds of the past; existence of Jīvātman before and after the present birth; passing of the Jīva to the other lokas through the Devayāna and the Pitṛyāna paths and the references to the resultant of the past deeds.

References to the Law of Karman in the *Saṁhitā*.

Starting with these premises, we find that the references to the good deeds either done in the past and appearing as the resultant in the present ready to yield fruits, or sticking to the body for yielding fruits hereafter are found in the words like '*śubhaspatī* (meaning—guardians of good deeds, used for the two Aśvins);[143] *Dhiyaspatī* (in the same sense, used for Indra and Marut);[144] *Vicarṣaṇiḥ* (meaning—'special seer of the meritorious and demeritorious deeds,' used for Indra;[145] 'seers of Karman[146]'); *Viśvacarṣaṇiḥ* (in the same sense,[147] used for Agni); *Pitā Kuṭasya Carṣaṇiḥ* (meaning—a guardian and a seer of the deeds done);[148] *Viśvasya Karmaṇo*

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138 *Ṛgveda,* VII, 104.

139 *Ibid.*

140 *Ibid.*

141 *Ibid.,* II. 29. I; VII. 76. 3.

142 *Ibid.,* IV. 5. 5.

143 *Ṛgveda,* I. 3. 1; I. 47. 5.

144 *Ibid.,* I. 23. 3.

145 *Sāyaṇabhāṣya* on *Ṛgveda,* II. 22. 3.

146 *Nirukta,* III. 13. 20 on *Ṛgveda,* II. 22. 3.

147 *Ṛgveda,* V. 6. 3.

148 *Nirukta,* V. 24. 1. on *Ṛgveda,* I. 46. 4.

dharta (meaning—a supporter of all the deeds, or of the deeds of the entire universe, used for Indra).[149]

Higher Powers were addressed in the above mentioned manner, simply because the devotees desired that the resultants of their good deeds might stay and not be destroyed without yielding their results. They believed like common people that the divine beings had enough powers to control their fortune.

References to Higher Powers in order that the resultants of good deeds may not be lost, because they control fortunes of people.

Performance of sacrifices was one of the aspects of the Upāsanā of the mortals to please the immortals and secure happiness for themselves. Like all other deeds performance of sacrifices also yielded results which were *Dṛṣṭa-phalaka,* that is, the results whereof were either seen, or *adṛṣṭa-phalaka,* —unseen. In the case of the latter types of sacrifices, existence of a continuous permanent entity, called Jīvātman, had to be accepted even after the present body. It is the Jīvātman which assumes another fresh body after death and reaps the fruits of its past deeds, including the sacrifices performed in the previous life or lives, in the Svargaloka.[150] Similarly, the Mantras—

Upāsanā to please immortals.

Sacrifices are either dṛṣṭaphalaka or adṛṣṭaphalaka.

Existence of a continuous and permanent entity after death.

'Ā ye viśvā svapatyāni tasthuḥ kṛṇvānāso amṛtatvāya gātum,'[151]

'Viṣṭvī śamī taraṇitvena vāghato martāsaḥ santo amṛtatvamānaśuḥ.'[152]

tell us that through the performance of good deeds people achieve immortality. Again, in the Mantra—'*Antarhyagna īyase vidvān janmobhayā kave,*'[153] meaning "O Agni! You know the *births* of both mortals and immortals," there is a reference to several births of a being which proves the existence of a persisting eternal entity even after death.

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149 *Ṛgveda,* I. 11. 4.

150 *Ṛgveda,* I. 27. 5; I. 45. 7; I. 52, 9; I. 70. 4.

151 *Ibid.,* I. 72. 9.

152 *Ibid.,* I. 110. 4.

153 *Ṛgveda,* II. 6. 7.

Again, from the following Mantras—

Ṛṣi Vāmadeva's experiences of his various births.

'Ahaṁ manurabhavaṁ sūryaścāhaṁ
Kakṣīvāṁ ṛṣirasmi viprah/
'Ahaṁ Kutsamārjuneyaṁ nyṛñjehaṁ
Kaviruśanā paśyatā mā"//1

'Ahaṁ bhūmimadadāmāryāyāhaṁ
Vṛṣṭiṁ dāśuṣe martyāya/
'Ahamapo anayaṁ vāvaśānā
Mama devāso anu ketamāyan//2

'Ahaṁ puro mandasāno vyairaṁ
Nava sākaṁ navatīḥ śambarasya/
'Śatatamaṁ veśyaṁ sarvatātā
Divodāsamatithigvaṁ yadāvam."//3[154]

Translation.—I have been Manu and the Sūrya. I am the seer Kakṣivān, the intelligent. I favoured Kutsa, the son of Arjunī. I am the wise Uśanā, behold me. I have presented the earth to the Ārya and showered rains to the mortal who offers oblations. I brought fōrth the soaring waters. Gods moved according to my will. Under the influence of extreme joy of Soma-drinking I destroyed ninety and nine fortifications of Śambara at one time and presented hundred villages to Divodāsa for habitation.

Idea of Universality in the *Saṁhitās*.

Sāyaṇa remarks on these three Mantras—" Paramārtha-dṛṣṭyā kṛtsnamapi ahamevāsmi/ He janā māṁ sarvātmakaṁ paśyata/ Yūyamapyevameva svasvarūpamanubhavatetyuktambhavati/" That is, " from the point of reality I (Vāmadeva) am everything. O men! know me all-pervasive. You people also should, in the same way, realize your own nature. This is what has been said (by Vāmadeva)."

" Garbhe nu sannanveṣāmavedamahaṁ
devānāṁ janimāni viśvā/
Śataṁ mā pura āyasīrarakṣannadha
Śyeno javasā niradīyam."//[155]

Translation.—While yet in embryo, I (Vāmadeva) knew all the generations of these gods, Indra and others,

154 *Ṛgveda,* IV. 26. 1–3.
155 *Ṛgveda,* IV. 27. 1.

in regular order. (That is, I knew that all these gods came out of the Paramātman.) (Before this) a hundred iron fortresses had confined me. (As I did not know Ātman to be different from body, so they protected me). But now with the speed of falcon I have come out of the body. (That is, knowing that Ātman cannot be confined within, I have come out, as if I am free).[156] Again, the Mantra—

> *Na ghā sa māmapa joṣaṁ jabhārā—*
> *'bhīmāsa tvakṣasā vīryeṇa/*
> *Īrmā purandhirajahādarātīruta*
> *vātāṁ ataracchūśuvānaḥ//*[157]

Translation.—That is, my embryo existence, says Vāmadeva, did not entirely capture me. In other words, I was not overpowered by *Moha* even while I was in the womb of my mother. I subdued the miseries of the embryo existence with the strength of knowledge. The wise one slew the enemies of the embryo existence and had allowed the wind troubling the existence to pass away as he grew yet more powerful.

And from similar others we conclude that the devotees of the *Saṁhitā* were quite aware of the eternity of the *Ātman* existing independently apart from non-Ātman. They also knew that a single Jīvātman could assume various forms in different periods and that the impressions of one life could easily be carried over to another. They also realized fully that the same single Jīvātman had hundreds of past and future births, before all the future births were stopped through the manifestation of knowledge. This gives a clear evidence of their knowledge of the functioning of the Law of Karman.

Devotees of the *Saṁhitā* were fully aware of the existence of the eternal Ātman.

Impressions of one life are carried over to another life.

Further, while explaining the Mantra—

> .....*dviṣo aṁhāṁsi duritā tarema tā tarema tavāvasā tarema*'[158]

Sāyaṇa explains 'Tā tarema' as 'Tāni vyavahitāni

[156] A similar idea is found in the *Dhammapada*, XI. 8-9.

[157] *Ṛgveda,* IV. 27. 2.

[158] *Ṛgveda,* VI. 2. 11.

Janmāntarakṛtāni ca pāpādīni tarema', that is, we may overcome the sins acquired in previous births. This also makes it clear that it is the Law of Karman under whose influence the sins acquired in previous births have to be exhausted in subsequent births.

Sins to be exhausted under the influence of the Law of Karman.

Similarly, the Mantra—

Ava syataṁ muñcataṁ yanno asti
tanūṣu baddhaṁ kṛtameno asmat'/[159]

Meaning.—"Remove and loosen the sin committed and inherent in our persons," supports the above assertion that the sin committed before, leaves behind an impression in our persons which is to be exhausted at a later period, may be in the same birth or in another.

Then the Mantra—

Na tamaṁho na duritāni martya—
mindrāvaruṇā na tapaḥ kutaścana/[160]

Meaning.—"No sin, no resultants of sins and no miseries befall a mortal being from any source, O Mitra and Varuṇa....", shows that they knew that sins and woes were the results of some (wrong) deeds done previously and that they became inherent in mortal beings.

Sins and woes are results of previous deeds.

Again, the Mantra—

"*Pṛcche tadeno*[161] *varuṇa didṛkṣūpo*
Emi cikituṣo vipṛcchaṁ/"[162]

Meaning.—"O Varuṇa! I ask of you about the sin which had led me to be fettered by your noose, for I want to know it", refers to the functioning of the Law of Karman.

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159 *Ṛgveda*, VI. 74. 3.

160 *Ibid.*, VII. 82. 7.

161 The term '*Enas*' means that which necessarily comes from something else (Ena eteḥ—*Nirukta*, XI. 24. 1.), which shows that a sin is a necessary result of some past deed.

162 *Ṛgveda*, VII. 86. 3.

Further on, again, we find that the Mantra—

" *Na sa svo dakṣo varuṇa dhrutiḥ sā*
Surā manyurvibhīdako acittiḥ/
Asti jyāyān kanīyasa upāre
Svapnascanedanṛtasya prayotā "//[163]

Meaning—"O Varuṇa! his own strength and capacity are not the causes of making a man inclined towards sinful deeds. (Then what is that which is the cause of it?). It is the *dhruti,* that is, the *devagati* produced at the time of birth (a settled course of fate) which is the cause. The *dhruti* is explained as—the intoxicating wine, dice, or anger, or inattentiveness, or nescience, and fate, which unknown forces (daiva-kṛpti) are the causes on one's being led to evil deeds. Sometimes, senior persons or even higher powers lead ignorant youngsters to evil deeds. Even the state of sleeping leads one to sinful deeds. So it is the unseen force, the settled course of fate, the resultant of the past deeds which is the cause of one's being led to sinful deeds."

Sometimes senior persons or higher powers also lead ignorant youngsters to evil deeds.

All these give us a detailed information about the knowledge of the functions of the Law of Karman possessed by the devotees of the *Saṁhitās.*

We may also refer to the Mantra—

" *Pra te pūrvāṇi karaṇāni viprāvidvāṁ*
āha viduṣe karāṁsi/
Yathā yathā vṛṣṇyāni svagūrtāpāṁsi
rājan naryāviveṣīḥ "//[164]

where Vāmadeva is said to be familiar with the previous deeds of Indra. The previous deeds known to Vāmadeva may refer to the deeds of the previous births.

Again, in the Mantra—

" *Tve hi kaṁ parvate na śritānya-*
pracyutāni dūḍabha vratāni "[165]

[163] *Ibid.,* VII. 86. 6.
[164] *Ṛgveda,* IV. 19. 10.
[165] *Ṛgveda,* II. 28. 8.

Reference to Sañcita and Prārabdha Karman in the Saṁhitās.

the terms 'Apracyutāni vratāni' may refer to the inexhausted accumulated deeds of the past, that is, the *Sañcita-Karman.*

Similarly, the Mantra—

" *Inota pṛccha janimā kavīnām*
manodhṛtaḥ sukṛtastakṣata dyāṁ "/[166]

Meaning.—" O Indra! ask of the births of the divine seers. What led their taking birth and going to the heavens? . . . . ", refers to the past deeds which led to the births of ṛṣis and their going to the heavens. In other words, here is an enquiry into the *Prārabdha-Karman.*

Then, the well-known Mantra—

" *Dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā*
Samānaṁ vṛkṣaṁ pariṣasvajāte/
Tayoranyaḥ pippalaṁ svādvattya-
naśnannanyo abhi cākaśīti "//[167]

Meaning.—" Two birds with fair wings, knit with bonds of friendship in the same sheltering tree have found a refuge. One of the twain eats the sweet fig-tree's fruitage, the other eating not regardeth only "[168]—distinctly refers to the experiencing of the results of the *Prārabdha-Karman* by the Jīvātman.

Besides, though there is no direct mention of the Jīvātman passing through the Divine Path, yet in the following Mantras there seems to be a reference to the *Devayāna-Mārga* and the *Pitṛyāna-Mārga*:—

References to Devayāna and Pitṛyāna Paths.

" *Pade iva nihite dasme antastayo-*
ranyadguhyamāviranyat/
Sadhrīcīnā pathyā sā viṣūcī
mahaddevānāmasuratvamekaṁ "//[169]

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[166] *Ṛgveda,* III. 38. 2.
[167] *Ṛgveda,* I. 164. 20.
[168] Griffith's translation.
[169] *Ṛgveda,* III. 55. 15.

Meaning.—" Within a wondrous place the Twain are treasured: the one is manifest, the other hidden. One common path-way leads in two directions."[170] The Mantra seems to refer to the two paths—*Devayāna* and *Pitṛyāna,* the former is unmanifest—hidden and is meant only for those who are to go to the Brahmaloka, while the other is manifest through which every person has to go to the region of the Moon in accordance with the result of his past deeds.

Characteristics of the two Paths.

" *Asya madhvaḥ pibata mādayadhvaṁ*
tṛptā yāta pathibhirdevayānaiḥ "//[171]

Meaning.—" You drink this sweet Soma and be joyful and remain satisfied and then go through the Paths which gods are habituated to travel." This mantra seems to indicate that those who are happy after doing good deeds proceed through the path of the gods to higher place.

Again, the mantras—

" *Pra me panthā devayānā adṛśnannamardhanto*
vasubhiriṣkṛtāsaḥ." /[172]

Meaning—" The paths, leading to the gods (devaprāpakāḥ panthānaḥ-Sāyaṇa), which are purified by lustre and are innocuous, have been seen by me."

" *Abhi kranda stanaya garbhamā dhā.*"[173]

Meaning.—Thunder and roar, the germ of life deposit in plants and herbs;

" *apāṁ garbhaḥ prasva ā viveśa.*"[174]

Meaning.—Entered into the small plants and herbs as an Embryo of waters;

" *Sa retodhā vṛṣabhaḥ śaśvatīnāṁ tasminnātmā*
jagatastasthuṣaśca."[175]

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170 Griffith's translation.
171 *Ṛgveda,* VII. 38. 8.
172 *Ṛgveda,* VII. 76. 2.
173 *Ṛgveda,* V. 83. 7.
174 *Ṛgveda,* VII. 9. 3.
175 *Ṛgveda,* VII. 101. 6.

Meaning.—Like a bull Parjanya (cloud) is the impregner of all plants and herbs, so the life of all things both sthāvara (fixed) and jaṅgama (moving), is inherent in Parjanya; and

> " *Yo garbhamoṣadhīnāṁ gavāṁ kṛṇotyarvatāṁ/ Parjanyaḥ puruṣīṇāṁ.*"//[176]

Meaning.—Parjanya is the god who produces the germ of life in plants, herbs, kine, mares and women.

Jīvas come down to the earth through rains and enter into various yonis.

All these seem to refer to the fact that the Jīvas after having exhausted their experience in the Candraloka come down to the earth in the form of rains and enter into the various objects of the world and again, spring up as several kinds of beings. This is exactly what has been mentioned in the *Chāndogya* Upaniṣad—

> " *Yathā pañcamyāmāhutāvāpaḥ puruṣavacaso bhavantīti.*"[177]

Meaning.—" Just as at the fifth libation the water comes to be called Man ";

We may also refer to the Mantras—

> " *Mā va eno anyakṛtaṁ bhujema.*"[178]

Evil deeds done by one may be transferred to others for exhaustion.

Meaning.—" Let us not suffer the results of the evil deeds done by others "; and

> " *Mā vo bhujemānyajātameno.*[179]

Meaning.—" May we not suffer the results of the evil deeds produced in others."

All clearly refer to the Law of Karman. It is a peculiarity of the Law that through some forcible agency the results of the deeds done by one may be transferred to others for their being exhausted.

No result of an action can ever remain without being experienced.

It is a fact that under this Law no result of an action can remain without being experienced, which may be in the same life, or in another birth

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176 *Ṛgveda,* VII. 102. 2.

177 V. iii. 3. Also see *Chandogya Upaniṣad,* V. iii. to ix.

178 *Ṛgveda,* VI. 51. 7.

179 *Rgveda,* VII. 52. 2.

or births, by the same Jīvātman in the normal course; but sometimes through the intervention of some higher powers the *bhoga* becomes transferred from the original doer to some one else. All this is found in the Vedic *Saṁhitās* as indicated above.

Stronger force may transfer the bhoga of one to another.

These various references from the *Saṁhitās* make it quite clear that the Vedic seers were fully aware of the Law of Karman and its mysterious functioning.

They experienced pain and pleasure and sought for higher happiness in svarga and above all, they prayed for the Fearless Light. All these were in accordance with their own deeds. That they believed in the existence of distinction between one man and the other on the ground of their merits and demerits is clear from the various hymns of the *Ṛgveda* and the *Yajurveda.*

Merits and demerits distinguish one man from the other.

The treatment of the philosophy of the *Saṁhitās* given here does not claim to be exhaustive in any way. It is only a brief reference to the topics we have directly on Philosophy in the *Saṁhitās* which can be further developed with the abundant material found in the texts. The references given above have been taken mostly from the *Ṛgveda,* but it does not mean thereby that there is not enough material in the *Saṁhitās* of the rest of the Vedas. In fact, the *Yajurveda* gives us more details of all the above topics. I have reserved a more detailed and fuller treatment of all these for a future attempt.

CHAPTER III

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANIṢADS

1. *From Saṁhitās to Upaniṣads*

WE have seen before that being very much tortured by the miseries of the mundane world, the mortal beings began to search after their radical and permanent cure. Having found themselves unable to get them removed, they sought the help of their preceptors (Ācāryas) and other trustworthy teachers. The preceptors told them that the realization of the Ātman[1] alone is capable of removing their miseries for ever. Hence, an enquiry into the nature of the Ātman begins.

Enquiry into the radical cure of miseries.

Realization of Ātman removes miseries.

During the earliest stage of the gradual unfolding of their knowledge, people could not exactly realize the true nature of the Ātman at once. The process of realization was gradual. In course of their search after the Ātman, they found that prayers (Upāsanā)[2] to the higher powers, namely, immortal beings, like Indra, Varuṇa, Pūṣan, etc. were capable of bringing happiness to them. So they began to pray to these immortal beings. The manner of praying was varied. They found that their prayers were very effective and they could experience happiness through prayers in this world and also in the next after death. Thus, they were satisfied and as their miseries were removed through the favour of the gods, they regarded them as the Ātman. This is what we find in the Saṁhitās.

Prayers to gods bring happiness.

Gods were regarded as Ātman.

After the Saṁhitās we come to the Brāhmaṇas. Traditionally, these also constitute the Vedas them-

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[1] Ātmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ—*Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* II. iv. 5.

[2] By 'Upāsanā' we understand all the forms of worship including the performance of sacrifices. In other words, it stands for all the activities as prescribed in the karmakāṇḍa.

selves. The Brāhmaṇas mainly explain the ritualistic principles as are required to explain the details of the various sacrifices. The Mīmāṁsā-Vṛttikāra has given, as quoted in the *Śabarabhāṣya*,[3] the main characteristics of the Brāhmaṇa as a work which (1) abounds in the particle 'iti', (2) contains the phrase 'so they say', (3) is anecdotal, (4) states a reason, (5) is explanatory, (6) is deprecatory, (7) is eulogistic, (8) is doubtful, (9) is injunctive, (10) is something done by another, (11) is ancient history, and (12) is assumption of transposition. These are the twelve forms of the Brāhmaṇas.

Chief characteristics of the Brāhmaṇas.

From the above mentioned features it is clear that the Brāhmaṇas directly do not deal with any philosophical problems. Hence, they are not of much interest to the students of philosophy. But as it is not possible to divorce philosophy from rituals and sacrifices, the performance of which makes the inner sense pure and subsequently, fit to obtain knowledge, we do find philosophical ideas here and there expressed in various contexts. Therefore, the enquiry into the nature of the Ātman continued even in the Brāhmaṇas. It is for this reason that a brief survey of such thoughts in these texts is made here.

Inquiry into the nature of the Ātman continues in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas.

The Brāhmaṇas are individually attached to the four Vedic Saṁhitās. The more important ones may be mentioned here. To the *Ṛgveda* belongs the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*. To the *Sāmaveda* belongs the *Tāṇḍya-Mahābrāhmaṇa,* also called *Pañcaviṁśa* and the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*. *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* is nothing but a continuation of the *Kṛṣṇa-Yajurveda-Saṁhitā*. To the *Śukla-Yajurveda Saṁhitā* belongs the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa,* so called, because it consists of hundred chapters. This is the best known, the most extensive and also the most important of all the Brāhmaṇas. And to the *Atharva-Veda-Saṁhitā* belongs the *Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa*.

Individual Brāhmaṇas attached to the Saṁhitās.

After the Brāhmaṇas we have the Āraṇyakas which are also attached to different Saṁhitās like the Brāh-

[3] II. i. 33.

maṇas. These Āraṇyakas are like appendices to the Brāhmaṇas, dealing with the mysterious nature of the sacrifices. Philosophical thoughts are more vividly discussed in these texts. From a close study of these texts it becomes clear that the enquirers after the truth gradually proceed towards more critical reasoning. It is therefore, that we find the Āraṇyakas discussing philosophical problems in greater detail. Moreover, some of the most important and oldest Upaniṣads are in part included in these texts, and they are so closely mixed with the texts of the Āraṇyakas that sometimes it becomes quite difficult to distinguish the thoughts of the Upaniṣads from those of the Āraṇyakas. For instance, the *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* includes the *Aitareya-Upaniṣad.* The *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* includes the *Mahānārāyaṇa-Upaniṣad.* The *Kauṣītaki-Āraṇyaka,* similarly, includes the *Kauṣītaki-Upaniṣad.* Of the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa,* the first-third of Kāṇda IV is an Āraṇyaka of which the last six chapters form the biggest and the most important of the Upaniṣads, called the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad.* Then there is the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad,* the first section of which is nothing but an Āraṇyaka. Thus, it seems that the importance of the Āraṇyaka texts for the students of philosophy is more due to the presence of the Upaniṣadic thoughts in them, wherein the problems of the universe, theories of creation, nature of the Ātman from different angles of vision, nature of the universal being and similar other problems are critically discussed.

Nature of the Āraṇyakas.

Admixture of Upaniṣads with Āraṇyakas.

The seekers after the permanent remedy of their miseries, no doubt, were to a certain extent satisfied with the results of their prayers to the immortal beings, but there are mantras in the Saṁhitās which show that there did exist some doubts in the minds of the enquirers as to their having thus been able to realize the final aim of life, and therefore, they were not fully satisfied with mere prayers and their results. A devotee says: 'O Āditya, neither I know the right, nor the left; neither the east, nor the west. My knowledge is not at all mature and I am entirely disappointed and confused. If you guide me, I shall

Seekers after the radical remedy of their miseries were not wholly satisfied with prayers.

attain the Light that brings no danger.'[4] Again, in another mantra we find a devotee praying: 'O Aditi, Mitra, Varuṇa, and Indra, forgive me, however I have erred and committed sins against you. May I obtain the Light free from peril (abhayaṁ jyotiḥ) and let not the darkness (i.e. nescience) seize me.'[5] These are also prayers, no doubt, but it is obvious that the aim of the devotee in these prayers is not to attain any worldly prosperity but something beyond it. Again, in the Saṁhitās there are several gods who are equally worshipped and are equally regarded as the highest powers capable of bestowing happiness to the devotees. But even there some doubts in the minds of the devotees as to who was really the highest of all the divinities to whom prayers may be offered, seem to have cropped up.[6] Then, we find that yajña (sacrifice) became a very popular form of worship and was regarded as the most effective means to get rid of miseries. There were many forms of yajña. But all these forms were reduced to one universal form, which was called 'Viṣṇu'[7] (yajño vai Viṣṇuḥ[8]), meaning one who pervades and holds up the entire universe.[9] It is because of this that the *Yajurveda-Saṁhitā* says: 'The wise always perceive that all-pervasive highest position of Viṣṇu.'[10] In other words, the idea of a universal, all-pervasive and imperishable (akṣara)[11] entity came to be realized by the devotees of the Saṁhitās, the Gods became its (Akṣara's) helpers (parāyaṇa).[12] That the gods no longer were regarded as the highest entities and were regarded as different from the Ātman is further proved by the story of the gods and the Yakṣa in the *Kenopaniṣad*.[13] It may also be pointed out here that Indra was regarded as the highest

Idea of a universal entity in the form of yajña and Viṣṇu.

That the gods were different from the Ātman is supported by the Upaniṣad.

[4] *Ṛgveda*, II. 27. 11. [5] *Ibid.*, II. 27. 14.

[6] *Ibid.*, X. 121. 1-9. This mantra may also be explained as 'whom else the offerings can be made?' In this sense, there is no doubt in the mind of the devotees, rather it shows the faith of the devotees in one universal god.

[7] *Nirukta*, III. xix. 17. [8] *Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa*, II. 68.

[9] *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka*, I. 8; *Nirukta*, XII. xviii. 2.

[10] *Yajurveda Saṁhitā*, VI. 5.

[11] *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka*, I. 8., p. 33, Anandashrama, Pooṇa, Ed.

[12] *Ibid*, I. 8., p. 34, Śaṅkarācārya explains 'parāyaṇaṁ' as 'paramayanaṁ ... pratiṣṭhā triṣvapi kāleṣu', Cf. *Chāndo. Upa.*, I. ix. 1.

[13] III.

entity simply because it was he who first realized the nature of the Brahman,[14] the highest philosophical entity. The powers of the Vedic gods were all due to this Brahman.[15] With the gradual growth of their critical faculty the devotees realized all this and continued to make enquiries into the real nature of the Ātman. It was perhaps, therefore, that the *Kenopaniṣad* says—'He, whom you pray, is not this!'[16]

Gradual development of the conception of Brahman in the Brāhmaṇas.

The efforts of the devotees of the Saṁhitās to achieve their final aim continued even in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas. The form of upāsanā, however, became subtler and subtler in these later texts. The conception of the Brahman in the form of a universal entity found its way into the Brāhmaṇas. First of all, it seems that the Brahman came to be identified with the various gods, such as, Mitra, Bṛhaspati, Vāyu and also with Yajña itself.[17] The next step, as it may appear, was to hold that the Brahman created all the gods in the beginning of the creation and distributed the three regions of earth (bhū), atmosphere (antarikṣa) and heaven (dyuḥ) to the three gods, namely, Agni, Vāyu and Sūrya, respectively.[18] In this way, an entity called Brahman came to exist. First it became identified with gods who were regarded as the custodian of happiness, then it became identified with Yajña which, in its turn, had been identified with Viṣṇu, the all-pervasive entity. This made Brahman also an all-pervasive entity. Lastly, the Brahman became the creator of the gods. This is an account which is found in the Brāhmaṇas.

Gradual development of the conception of Brahman in the Āraṇyakas.

In the Āraṇyakas, however, we are told that the Brahman is found in three different forms: sthūla (gross) with the limitations of pṛthivī (earth), etc., sūkṣma (subtle) with the limitations of manas, etc. and śuddha (pure, free from all limitations) in the form of Praṇava, as taught later on,

14 *Kenopaniṣad,* IV. 3.

15 *Ibid.,* III-IV.

16 *Ibid.,* I. 5-9.

17 *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa,* IX. 3. 2. 4.

18 *Ibid.,* XI. 2, 3, 1.

in the Vedānta.[19] The *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* also tells us that the Brahman is both *asat* (for those whose knowledge is limited to the worldly objects) and *sat* (for those who believe in the existence of a reality beyond this perceptible world).[20] Then it is found that the Praṇava is identified with Brahman wherein the entire universe is merged.[21] It is defined in the Āraṇyakas as that wherefrom all the beings and inanimate objects have come out, through whom these exist and wherein they merge after they are destroyed.[22] Further, it is described as satya (truth), jñāna (knowledge) and ananta (beginningless and endless).[23] The Āraṇyaka adds that one who realizes it, becomes emancipated (mukta) and ultimately merges into it.[24] Its permanent abode is in the Parama-Ākāśa (vyoman).[25]

Brahman is both *sat* and *asat*.

Conception of Brahman in the Āraṇyakas explained.

From the above it is clear that in the Āraṇyakas the conception of the Brahman has become more or less metaphysical. It was no longer connected with any divinity which was quite obvious in the Brāhmaṇas. There is a gradual development in the conception of the metaphysical Brahman from the stage of the highest divinity to the Brahman, as found, later on, in the Vedānta, as the highest metaphysical entity.

Now, coming to the conception of the term 'Ātman', it may be pointed out in the very beginning that it has been regarded as quite distinct from the conception of the Brahman in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas. The term 'Ātman' was never associated with any idea of god. From the very beginning it seems to have been used in the sense of the Self; of course, the very conception of the Self differed from stage to stage according to the gradual development of human knowledge. Thus, in the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, Ātman has been used for the middle portion of the

Conception of the Ātman in the Brāhmaṇas.

19 *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka,* VII. 6-8.

20 *Ibid.,* VII. 8.

21 *Ibid.,* VIII. 6., p. 616.

22 *Ibid.,* IX. 1., p. 662.

23 *Ibid.,* VIII. 2., p. 553.

24 *Ibid.,* VIII. 2., p. 620.

25 *Ibid.,* I. 9., p. 40; and also VIII. 2., p. 553.

physical organism[26] and also for such parts of the organism, as tvak (skin), asṛk (blood), māṁsa (flesh), and asthi (bone).[27] Ātman was also used for head in the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa.*[28] Evidently, such a conception of the Ātman is the grossest one associated with the Dehātmavāda of the later Cārvākas. Then again, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* identifies it with manas (inner-sense-organ), Buddhi (intellect), ahaṅkāra (egoism) and citta (one of the psychic faculties).[29] At this stage we find the Ātman being used for psychic faculties which are really subtler than the physical organism, or for various other parts of the human organism, all in their external aspects.

Again, we find the Ātman being used for the four states of human consciousness, namely, waking (jāgrat), dreaming (svapna), dreamless sleep (suṣupti) and the fourth stage wherein one becomes absolutely one with the Absolute (turīya).[30] Here we find that the conception of the Ātman has been further developed to still subtler and subtler elements until it has been ultimately merged into the turīya. Further, Ātman is identified with Ākāśa and is regarded as an independent entity.[31]

Conception of the Ātman in the Āraṇyakas.

In the Āraṇyakas also, it has passed through various stages. First of all the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* identifies it with an organism which is the product of 'food' (anna)[32] which certainly refers to the grossest materialistic view of the Cārvākas at a later stage. It has been also used in the sense of the middle portion of a human organism, and the organism itself.[33] Then it has been identified with 'Prāṇa',[34] that is, the vital air which pervades the entire organism. Next, it has been called identical with 'Manas'[35] which is certainly

26 VII. i. i. 18.

27 *Ibid.*

28 II. 16.

29 *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa,* VII. 1. 1. 18.

30 *Ibid.*

31 *Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa,* II. 54.

32 *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka,* VIII. 2., p. 590 ; IX. 1., p. 685.

33 *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka,* pp. 9, 18, 29, 99.

34 *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka,* pp. 593-94 ; IX. I., p. 685

35 *Ibid.,* p. 599 ; IX. 1., p. 685.

subtler than the Prāṇa. Again, the Ātman is called 'Vijñānamaya',[36] that is, it is identical with intellect. Later, it is called 'Ānandamaya',[37] that is, it is of the very nature of ānanda. But, as if, not being fully satisfied with the above, the Āraṇyaka makes it clear that it is nothing but ānanda (highest happiness).[38] The *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* says that the Ātman is as extensive as the space between dyāvā and pṛthvī.[39] From the above mentioned various views it becomes quite evident that there has been a gradual development in the conception of the Ātman from its grossest nature up to the subtlest, in accordance with the growth of human consciousness from the crudest to the subtlest. The *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* gives a fully developed idea of the conception of the Ātman. It says that there is nothing but Ātman in the beginning.[40] This is undoubtedly the conception of the Ātman which is free from all limitations. But soon after the above, the *Āraṇyaka* says that the Ātman desired to create the lokas.[41] This is the conception of the Ātman with upādhis. Gradually, out of the Ātman qualified with upādhis the whole universe is created. This is what we may call the *adhyāropa.* Just after the same *Āraṇyaka* describes the process of *apavāda* and says that the same Ātman realizes later on, that all that has been created is nothing but Brahman, and ultimately comes to the conclusion that he who has created all this is the same conscious (cidrūpa) Puruṣa which again, is identical with the all-pervasive Brahman.[42]

Gradual development of the conception of the Ātman.

The *Āraṇyaka* further makes it clear that the Ātman through which one sees, one hears, one smells, one speaks, one tastes, that which is the heart, the manas, the saṁjñāna (determinate cognition—samyagidaṁ vastu iti jñaptiḥ), the ājñāna (sense of lordship), the vijñāna (discrimination), the prajñāna (brilliancy), the medhā (power of retention in memory), the dṛṣṭi (the movement of manas towards the knowledge of an

36 *Ibid.,* p. 604; IX. 1., p. 685.
37 *Ibid.,* p. 611; IX. 1., p. 685.
38 *Ibid.,* p. 615; IX. 1, pp. 677, 685.
39 I. iii. 8 (16), pp. 55-56.
40 *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka,* II. iv. 1., p. 157.
41 *Ibid.*
42 *Ibid.,* II, iv. 3.

object through the sense-organ of perception), the dhṛti (courage), the mati (speculation), the manīṣā (freedom in speculation), the jūti (confusion of mind), the smṛti (rememberance), the sasaṅkalpa (the act of forming a correct idea of anything), the kratu (determination), the asu (mode of life), the kāma (desire for things not in possession), the vaśa (strong desire for worldly object), and so on, is nothing but pure consciousness (śuddha caitanya) to which all the above mentioned faculties or activities are attributed.[43] Again, this very unqualified Ātman appears in the form of all gods and objects of the universe, animate or inanimate. The whole universe comes out of the Ātman, has its existence in the Ātman, and merges into the Ātman. It is thus, how the *Āraṇyaka* says—'*Prajñānam Brahma*'.[44]

A complete picture of the nature of the Ātman.

The *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* and the *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* present a complete idea of the true nature of the Ātman as found later on, in the Vedāntic system. It is said to be all in all.[45] It is all-pervasive (vibhu).[46] It is described at the same time as male, female, and also as neither male, nor female.[47] It is identical with both movable and immovable objects.[48] It is present in all beings.[49] In fact, all that exists is the very form of the Ātman, of course, with all its limitations (upādhis).[50] It is also said that one who realizes this Ātman never enters into the physical organism again. If, however, one does ever enter into an organism, then it is obvious that he does so, knowingly that the Ātman is entirely different from the body and that he enters into it again, simply for the sake of experiencing the remnants of his prārabdhakarman.[51] Ātman manifets itself in organisms having both citta and blood (rasa). In human

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43 *Ibid.*, II. vi. 1.

44 *Ibid.*, II. vi. In this connection it is to be mentioned that the term 'Brahma' has been used in the metaphysical sense of the term 'Ātman', after the equation between Brahman and the Ātman has been accepted, as will be later on made clear in the second section of the present chapter.

45 *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka*, I. 11., p. 56.

46 *Ibid.*, I. 11 ; *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka*, pp. 54, 177-182.

47 *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka*, I. 11., p. 53.

48 *Ibid.*, I. 11., p. 53.

49 *Ibid.*, I. 11., p. 54.

50 *Ibid.*, I. 11., p. 54 ; VIII. 2., pp. 643-46.

51 *Ibid.*, I. 11., 57-58.

being alone Ātman manifests itself fully. So it is not apparently found in the herbs and vegetables.[52]

Theories of creation in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas.

We proceed to another problem of philosophy and it is the theory of creation as found in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas. There are several theories of creation mentioned in these texts. In the majority of cases, Prajāpati, a Universal form of being, is regarded as the creator from whom the entire world and all the beings have come out. Describing the very constitution of the Prajāpati, it is said that he constitutes sixteen parts (kalāḥ, avayavāḥ), namely, eight Prāṇas and an equal number of other limbs.[53] Sāyaṇa, while enumerating these parts, holds that these constitute the five sense-organs of cognition, the five organs of action, the five elements, called bhūtas, or the five vital-airs and the manas.[54] This Prajāpati is the grossest manifestation of the organic creation. He is identified with Agni,[55] which pervades all the three worlds.[56] It is said that Prajāpati, after having created the universe, became so tired that all his limbs became loosened. From the middle portion of his body came out the five prāṇas and the vital energy (vīrya). Thereafter, he fell down as dead and from his fallen body was produced anna (food).[57]

Creation from Ṛta which created Prajāpati.

Elsewhere, however, it is said that Prajāpati is the first creation of Ṛta,[58] which has been explained by Yāska as satya or yajña,[59] both of these have been later on, identified with Brahman.[60]

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52 *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka,* p. 130.

53 *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa,* IX, 1. 4.

54 *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa,* VII. 1. 4. 17. The *Brāhmaṇa* text here referred to is—Prajāpatiḥ agniḥ *ātmasammitameva* asminnetadannam dadhāti yadu vā *ātmasammita-mannam* tadavati'. In this we find a term *ātmasammita,* meaning 'of the size of the Ātman' that is, the physical organism. According to the context the word 'Ātman' has been used here in the sense of a physical organism.

Should we say, then, that the origin of the Jaina theory of the Ātman that it is of the size of a physical organism (dehaparimāṇa) is to be found in this *Brāhmaṇa*?

55 *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa,* VIII. I. 1. 23.

56 *Ibid.,* VII. 1. 2. 1 ; VII. 1. 2. 6.

57 *Ibid.,* VII. 1. 2. 6 ; VII. 1. 4. 17.

58 *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka,* I. 23.

59 *Nirukta,* IV. 19. 9.

60 *Sāyaṇabhāṣya* on the *Taittirīya-Āraṇyakā,* I. 23., p ; 90.

We also find here the well-known theory of creation, according to which there was only *'asat'* (non-existence or non-being) and the whole universe came out of it.[61] Then again, we find the view that there was only the Brahman in the beginning which created all the gods.[62] According to another theory, there existed nothing but water in the beginning and out of it came a golden egg. And after a year Prajāpati came out of that egg and gradually created the universe.[63]

Creation out of *asat*

Creation out of water.

The *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* tells us how there was 'asat' (non-being) first, from which 'sat' (being) came out. The Ātman created the whole universe itself without any other help.[64] It also describes the creation from the Ātman out of which came out Ākāśa, which produced Vāyu, from which was produced Agni. Water was produced by Agni. Pṛthivī came out of water. From earth was produced herbs which produced anna (food) and out of this was produced a human being.[65]

Philosophical theory of creation.

About the process of creation the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* says—Prajāpati desired to become many. He performed penance and created earth, antarikṣa, and heavens (divam). From these three lokas came out three lustrous elements—agni from earth, vāyu from antarikṣa, and āditya from heavens. From these again, came out the three Vedas—*Ṛgveda* from fire, *Yajurveda* from vāyu and *Sāmaveda* from Āditya. From these three, there were produced bhūḥ, bhuvaḥ, and svaḥ respectively. After these, came out the three syllables —*a*, *u*, and *ma* which mingled into one is called *'Om'*.[66] This *Om* is regarded as identical with the Ātman or Brahman later on.[67]

Creation theory.

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61 *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa,* VI. 1. I.

62 *Ibid.,* XI. 2. 3. 1.

63 *Ibid.,* XI. 1. 6. 1-11 ; *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa,* I. 23., p. 86.

64 *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa,* p. 157.

65 *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka,* VIII. 2., pp. 563, 642.

66 *Ibid.,* pp. 195-97.

67 *Kaṭhopaniṣad,* I. ii. 16.

Of the thousands of the created elements, from the lowest to the highest, fifteen are regarded as the best. They are: the eyes, ears, manas, organ of speech, and prāṇa from the father and the mother together and earth, water, tejas, air, and Ākāśa separately from the father and also from the mother. These fifteen are the best products of creation.[68]

Amongst the created beings, a human being alone is capable of having full manifestation of the Ātman. So it alone can possess knowledge in all its aspects. It knows future as well as the events of the heaven and the hell.[69] The human organism consists of five elements: tejas or jyoti, ākāśa, water, earth, and air.[70]

Human organism.

About the gradual process of creation the *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* says that the Ātman alone existed first. It created various regions and their presiding deities (lokapālas). It also created the various sense-organs along with their presiding deities. The feelings of thirst and hunger were also produced. Food was produced after that. All the states of existenc, such as, waking, dreaming and suṣupti, were also brought into existence.[71]

Giving in detail the process of creation of a human body, the *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* says that the would-be child remains in the body of the father in the form of semen. This is the very essence of that father which pervades his entire body. It becomes collected in the heart of the man at the time he wants to place it in the womb of his wife. When it is so placed, in fact, the father gets his first birth in the womb of his own wife. She protects him for nine or ten months and so she deserves every protection from the father after she has given birth to the child which is the second birth of the father. After the birth of the child all that the father does for the child, in the form of Saṁskāras, etc., is really what he does for himself. After having produced the child and having placed him in his own place to continue the duties of his father, the old father retires

68 *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka,* pp. 55-56.

69 *Ibid.,* pp. 130-31.

70 *Ibid.,* p. 132.

71 *Ibid.,* pp. 157-69.

and subsequently, goes to the other world and takes birth there. This is, in fact, the birth of the father for the third time.[72]

The order of the created objects given by the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* is that Prajāpati produced gods, then came varṣa (year—the movements of the sun; the idea of time), herbs and vegetables, food, retas, prajāḥ, heart, manas, organ of speech, karman and organism.[73]

While describing the process of creation, the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* gives the following details:

He who is to come into existence turns towards the breaths (Prāṇāḥ), which in the macrocosm, are identical with the ethereal spaces; that is, when a human being is about to take birth, the prāṇāḥ of the would-be being enter the womb of the mother first, before the seed is emitted into it. It is towards these prāṇāḥ, which in the microcosm correspond to the inner Ākāśa, that the future being turns; and thus, it comes to pass that the character and the nature of the future being do not depend upon the seed but on the character and nature of the prāṇāḥ. The seed in every case is uniform in character and subsequently, for all beings it is of one and the same nature. So the difference in the character and nature of all beings is due to the difference in the nature of the prāṇāḥ which enter into the womb of the mother before the seed is cast and with which the would-be being has united itself.

The human form is made up of hair, skin, flesh, bone, and marrow.[74]

Certain forms of psychic faculties.

The *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* has very clearly mentioned the various psychic faculties involved in the process of thinking and giving expression to our thoughts. They are *citti*, *citta*, *ādhītam*, *ketaḥ*, *vijñātam*, and manas. The word *citti* is derived from the root 'citī', meaning definite knowledge (saṁjñāna). That mode of the manas which helps one to determine the exact nature of an object, in the form that it is of this nature and not otherwise, is denoted by the word '*citti*'. It has no

[72] *Ibid.*, II. v. 1., pp. 170-76.

[73] *Ibid.*, pp. 96-98.

[74] *Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa*, II. 17; *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa*, p. 372. Satyadeva Sāmāśramī's Ed.

form. *Citta*, on the other hand, is the substratum of the *citti*.[75] It is found only in beings having prāṇa.[76] *Ādhītam* means that which has been well thought of. *Keta* means ordinary knowledge. *Vijñātam* means that which has been definitely determined. Manas is also a psychic element which retains its own form without having any vṛtti, that is, mode of functioning. In the case of 'citta', it may be said that it is ordinarily used for the antaḥkaraṇa like the manas, but there is a difference between citta and manas. The former stands for that which gives rise to citti, keta, etc. while the manas retains its own form (svarūpa) without having any vṛtti.[77]

Theory of chemical action (pāka-prakriyā).

The *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* also refers to the theory of chemical action (*pākaviśeṣa*)[78] which became so developed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems later on. It is said that the sun spreads its rays over the entire universe. Chemical action caused by these rays produces changes in the objects of the world.[79] Sāyaṇa explains it thus: First of all the seed sown in the ground, through some chemical action caused by the rays of the sun, changes into sprout which then, through a chemical action becomes a stem. This stem again, through a chemical action comes to bear leaves, flowers and fruits.[80] All this is due to the successive changes of time which is identified with the sun.[81]

Universe is perishable.

It is further said that the universe which is created out of water is perishable.[82] By the way, the *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* says that there are four forms of water which become available to us and these are cloud

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75 *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa*, pp. 153-57, S. Sāmāśramī's Ed.

76 *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka*, p. 130.

77 *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa*, pp. 153-57.

78 *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka*, I. 2., p. 6. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series Ed.

79 *Ibid.* 80 *Sāyaṇabhāṣya* on *Ibid.*

81 *Ibid.* It may be pointed out here that the chemical action is due to heat contact which is obtained from the sun whose rays always remain in contact with the objects of the universe, so that the successive changes which are observed in the objects of the world are all due to the movements of the sun. This theory of the chemical action has been developed by the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems later on. But as evident here it is as old as the *Āraṇyakas*.

82 *Taittirīya-Āraṇayaka*, I. 23. 7., p. 90.

(megha,), electricity (vidyut), that type of water which is stagnant, and lastly, that which is flowing. Of these, the second type of water is brilliant (tejasvinī).[83] It is clear from the above that that water is capable of producing electricity was known to the Āraṇyaka age.

Forms of water, cause of electricity.

As regards the means of cognition the *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* holds that they are four in number, namely, memory (smṛti), direct perception (pratyakṣa), tradition (aitihya) and inference (anumāna). These pramāṇas are required to know the Āditya-maṇḍala.[84]

Means of cognition.

While describing the nature of death the *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* says that there are four types of death associated with the sun, the Vāyu, the Agni and the moon. Those who are sinful and experience no pleasure in life achieve *Parama-mṛtyu* which is due to the movements of the sun. Those who experience all bhogas achieve that type of death which is associated with the moon and they go to those regions where meritorious people go after death. The third type of death is of those who do not come under the above-mentioned two types and experience both pleasure and pain and they are associated with Vāyu. Lastly, the fourth type of death is called *avama* (mean) and is associated with Agni.[85] The *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* describes in detail some twenty-five events which predict death in the near future.[86]

Forms of death.

Events predicting death.

Ethical problems are also not wanting in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas. Stress has been laid on speaking the truth. Generally human beings speak lie, and the gods alone speak the truth. But every human being must speak the truth in order to realize the highest end.[87] It is said that those who speak the truth may suffer in the beginning, but in the long run

Ethical problems in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas.

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83 *Ibid.*, I. 24. 1., pp. 91-92.

84 *Ibid.*, I. 2., p. 6.

85 *Ibid.*, I. 8., pp. 34-35.

86 *Ibid.*, pp. 216-220.

87 *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa*, pp. 30-31., Ṛta is the subject while Satya is the objective truth—Sāyaṇa on the *Aitareya-Brā*, I. 1. 6.

they will be happy. Liars are condemned.[88] Liars destroy themselves.[89] The *Śatapatha* clearly says that the truth (satya) is the means to attain godhood.[90] Various were the ways to be good and godly. One who pays off the three debts viz. to gods by the performance of yajña, to ṛṣis by observing Brahmacarya, and to pitṛs by begetting a son, is considered fit for attaining emancipation. No one was allowed to take meals without first offering it to gods. Adultery was regarded as a great sin. Confession of crime was considered to mitigate the offence.[91] People approached ṛṣis to prove their purity through swearing.[92] The duties of Varṇa and Āśrama were binding on all.[93] Confidence in the gods was regarded as a sign of a good man. To speak ill of other was a sin and it destroyed the sinner.[94] Theft,[95] murder, hatred were considered great crimes. Complete faith in the achievement of heaven through yajña was found in every qualified person. Discipline of mind and body was rigidly observed by all. In these ways the devotees observed very rigidly the various rules of morality.

Distinction of castes amongst the gods.

The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* uses the term 'devaviśaḥ' which has been interpreted by Sāyaṇa as 'Vaiśyas' amongst gods, and he adds that Agni and Bṛhaspati are Brāhmaṇas; Indra, Varuṇa, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mṛtyu and Īśāna are Kṣattriyas; Vasus, Rudras, Ādityas, Viśvedevāḥ and Maruts are Vaiśyas and Pūṣan is Śūdra.[96]

Categories.

Vāyu is ever in motion.[97] Prāṇavāyu is essentially immortal, but as it is associated with organism, it becomes mortal together with the organism which falls as dead.[98] The *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* mentions all the five vāyus.[99]

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88 *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa,* p. 192.
89 *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka,* p. 144.
90 *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa,* II. 5. 2. 20; IX. 5. 1. 16.
91 *Ibid.,* II. 5. 2. 20.
92 *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa,* pp. 183-88.
93 *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa,* III. xii. 3.
94 *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka,* p. 146.
95 *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa,* pp. 182-88.
96 *Ibid.,* p. 41.
97 *Ibid.,* p. 154.
98 *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka,* pp. 114-15.
99 *Ibid.,* pp. 132-33.

Prāṇa used in the sense of organs.

The *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* mentions ten prāṇas. The word 'prāṇa' is used in the sense of 'organs'— the five organs of sense and the five organs of action,[100] as is quite clear from the line—te ha prāṇāḥ Prajāpatim pitaram etya ūcuḥ.[101]

Dik.

The *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* mentions five directions—four representing the four sides, while the fifth is represented by the *ūrdhvaloka*.[102]

Functions of sense-organs.

The Brāhmaṇas, while describing the functions of the sense-organs, say that there is the organ of speech through which words are expressed, there is the tongue which gives us an idea of good and bad tastes, the nose through which one knows odour, the pupil through which one sees and the ear through which one hears. About the sense-organ of smell, it is said that between the two nostrils there lies a hole which is really the sense-organ of smell. Similarly, in the case of the sense-organ of perception, it is said that the eye-ball consists of three parts—white, black and the pupil. The sense-organ of perception is located in the pupil.[103] Whatever is perceived through the sense-organ of perception, is taken to be very correct and beyond any doubt.[104] About the manas it is said that its movement is very swift.[105] Manas is the first to go to the object of cognition.[106] All the desires are centred in the manas.[107]

Gradual manifestation of knowledge explained.

From the above it is clear that the philosophical thoughts which began with the Saṁhitās continued through the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas. All the thoughts are stored in the Saṁhitās, or in the mind of such teachers as are Brahmajñānins. For them, therefore, the question of gradual development of philosophical thoughts does not at all arise; it is meant, in reality for those enquirers after the truth only who are quite

100 *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa,* p. 318.

101 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad,* V. i. 7.

102 *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa,* p. 392.

103 *Ibid.,* p. 139.

104 *Ibid.,* pp. 31-32.

105 *Ibid.,* p. 12.

106 *Ibid.,* p. 154.

107 *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka,* I, iii. 3; p. 38.

ignorant, or know little of the true nature of the Ātman. The teachings about the nature of the Ātman are very much restricted and are imparted to those disciples alone who are found fully qualified to receive the truth.[107a] The teacher, who has himself realized the true nature of the Ātman, very strictly tests the merit of the disciple, as we find in the case of Yamarāja and Naciketas in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad;* and for their benefit, he discloses to his disciples only so much of the secret of the Ātman as they are fit to grasp and retain. In India, the question of *adhikārabheda* is of the foremost importance, particularly, in the case of disclosing subtle knowledge. The seekers after the truth according to their growth of knowledge gradually realize the true nature of the Ātman. Hence, it is for these disciples that we speak of the gradual manifestation of the truth and not for the teachers to whom the truth has revealed itself, nor for the Veda which is the very revelation of the truth. Then this is also to be made clear that every time the disciple wants to get some knowledge, he will have to make fresh request to his teacher.[108]

Knowledge is imparted according to the adhikāra of the disciples.

2. *From Upāsanā to Reason*

It has been said above that philosophical thoughts scattered in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas are, in fact, not the main topics of these texts, but they really belong to the Upaniṣads and that they are found in these texts only because of the admixture of the Upaniṣadic elements with them. Similarly, sections dealing with the upāsanās found in the Upaniṣads, do not belong to the Upaniṣad proper. They are the topics of karmakāṇḍa and hence, they really belong to the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas. As to the question why there is such an admixture of the Upaniṣadic elements with the Brāhma-

Elements of jñāna found in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas belong to the Upaniṣads.

Elements of upāsanā found in the Upaniṣads belong to the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas.

107a *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* III. xi. 5-6, *Muṇḍaka,* I. ii. 13.

108 *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad,* IV. ix. 3; *Muṇḍaka,* I. ii. 12; Śaṅkara on *Kena,* I. i.

ṇas and the Āraṇyakas and those of the last two with the Upaniṣads, it may be said that the performance of the upāsanā is most essential for the realization of the ultimate truth. Knowledge manifests itself in the antaḥkaraṇa only when the latter is absolutely purified through upāsanā. Along with the gradual success attained in the sphere of upāsanā by the seekers after the truth, there appears the manifestation of knowledge in the same order. Hence, both karman and jñāna go together, and one cannot be separated from the other. No progress is possible without having attained success in both. It is therefore that these are so interwoven amongst themselves.

Causes of admixture.

The only point to note in this connection is that the forms of upāsanā become subtler and subtler in the Upaniṣads. The upāsanā found mixed with the Upaniṣads is no longer directed towards the gods of the Saṁhitās, or towards those of the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas, but it leads the devotees directly towards the highest philosophical entity, called Ātman. Similarly, there are teachings in the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas which are meant to initiate the enquirers after the truth merely into the knowledge of the verbal text. In the Upaniṣads, on the other hand, the teachings lead the enquirers into the actual realization of the ultimate truth underlying those teachings. This is clear from the dialogues of Āruṇeya Śvetaketu[109] and his father, and of Nārada and Sanatkumāra.[110]

Nature of upāsanā in the Upaniṣads

Difference in the teachings of the two kinds of texts-Upaniṣads and the Brāhmaṇs and the Āraṇyakas.

It is, therefore, said that tapas leads to śraddhā which produces sharp memory, which, in its turn, brings peace to the citta. It then becomes firm and then the knowledge becomes manifest and then alone one realizes the Ātman.[111] Again, it is said that tapas removes the dirt from the sense, while vidyā brings immortality'.[112] Ātman should be rea-

Importance of upāsanā for the realization of the Ātman.

109 *Ibid.*, vi. i. 1-3.
110 *Ibid.*, VII. i. 1-3.
111 *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, VII. i.
112 Tapasā kilviṣaṁ hanti vidyayā'mṛtamaśnute.

lized through tapas.'[113] Brahman is the tapas itself.[114] So the enquirers, after getting their inner-sense purified through upāsanā, become eager to know the secrets of life and death. They are very keen to rise to the top of reason and thought and attain direct experience (sākṣātkāra) of the truth, which alone can lead them to the desired aim. They have fully realized that the various kinds of upāsanā represent the objective side only and that they cannot directly lead them to the hightest truth.[115] The ultimate truth is something beyond the reach of upāsanā. Upāsanā only shows the way to the highest truth. So says the Upaniṣad—'It is not that upon which they are meditating'.[116] The highest truth is realized through nididhyāsana (intuition), or through the grace of that very Ātman, or through the initiation of a true preceptor.

Upāsanā purific inner-sense.

It may be made clear here that when we talk of the grace of the Ātman we do not mean that the Ātman referred to here is the Saguṇa-Ātman. It has been shown before that the conception of the Brahman has evolved out of the divine aspects of all the divinities. In other words, the Brahman is the highest divine form which has become unified with the Ātman which is, on the other hand, the highest metaphysical and spiritual entity. Thus this Ātman, we know, is all in all and there is nothing which is beyond this and is not the very form of this Ātman. After the Brahman and the Ātman equation has become established beyond doubt, we can very well say that the equated entity represents both the highest divine element and the metaphysical and spiritual elements. So when the antaḥkaraṇa of the seekers after the truth becomes completely freed from all sorts of dirt, the Ātman manifests itself in it without any further effort of the seekers after the truth for any kind of activity. The Ātman is thus realized by the seekers. It is at this stage that we speak of the grace of the Ātman. This grace is not, it may be suggested, truly speaking the grace of the metaphysical Ātman, but that of the divine

Grace of the Ātman.

113 *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* III. ii.

114 *Ibid.*

115 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Śaṅkarabhāṣya,* II. v. 1.

116 *Kena,* I. 5-9.

Brahman which has now become identical with the Ātman. The metaphysical Ātman is free from such notions. Hence, it is the divine nature of the highest entity which may be said to be bestowing the grace upon its devotees. It is that through which 'the unheard becomes heard, the unthought of becomes thought of, and the unknown becomes known'.[117] This is what the devotees now want to realize. The longing for the Knowledge, the only means of radically removing the miseries for ever, cannot be fulfilled unless the devotees have become one with the Knowledge (pramātṛ) and the object of the knowledge (prameya). In other words, the inquisitive mind of the seeker after the truth can realize its end only when it has merged itself into the ultimate reality and has thus lost its own separate independent existence. Finding that the divine forces are not able to quench their (enquirers') genuine thirst for the ultimate knowldge, they again, approach their preceptors to get their difficulties solved. These preceptors are the teachers of the Upaniṣads. They have themselves realized the true nature of the Ātman and are ready to guide the seekers after the truth according to their fitness for the realization of their aim. They solve all the riddles of the universe with reasons and convince the disciples of the truth. It may be said that it is due to the influence of the upāsanās alone that these devotees attain critical outlook and turn to the teachings of the Upaniṣads. The antaḥkaraṇa becomes purified which improves the critical outlook of the disciples.

Devotees approach the teachers of the Upaniṣads for the knowledge of the Ātman.

3. *Nature of Śruti*

The entire literature beginning from the Saṁhitās down to the Upaniṣads is called 'Śruti' and is regarded as most authentic and authoritative. According to the orthodox opinion no one is to question the authenticity and the authority of these śrutis. No differentiation whatsoever, as regards their revelation is ever made bet-

Authority of the Śrutis is never questioned.

[117] *Chāndogya Upaniṣad,* VI. i. 3.

ween a text of the Saṁhitās and that of the Upaniṣads. From the beginning of the Saṁhitās down to the Upaniṣads there is a sort of gradation in ascending order towards the realization of the Highest Truth and one without the other is incapable of presenting the Truth in its entirety. All taken together represent the complete survey of the life and philosophy of India.

Points of difference between the Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads.

No doubt, the essence of Bhāratīya Darśana realized through the graded *Combination of Action and Knowledge* is achieved through Veda and Vedānta (Upaniṣad) taken together as one whole, but there are certain points of difference between the two: (1) The Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas contain mainly the various forms of upāsanā for communing with higher powers, while in the Upaniṣads the devotee is directed towards the realization of the Highest Power within one's own self and communion with gods is looked upon as an ordinary achievement. But thereby it should not be understood that there is no upāsanā at all in the Upaniṣads. They also contain upāsanās of a special type and of objects directly connected with the Ultimate Reality, though these upāsanās also, in reality, form part and parcel of the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas. For instance, the *Chāndogya* deals with the upāsanā of the *Oṁ*, the Udgītha, Sāma, Gāyatrī, etc. Similarly, there is upāsanā of Aditi, *Oṁ*, Fires, etc. in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. (2) The devotees of the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas pray for their well-being and also for attainment of Knowledge, but no teaching of a teacher, or of any higher power is found therein, while in the Upaniṣads the teachers who have themselves realized the Highest Truth, preach the means of realizing the Ultimate Reality. (3) The devotees of the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas find the Brahman and the Ātman as two distinct entities, while in the Upaniṣads both these entities merge into one, representing the highest entity of philosophy, indeed the greatest achievement of the Upaniṣads! (4) The higher powers in the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, and the Āraṇyakas are represented by the various gods, while in the Upaniṣads there is only one and it is the very Self of the devotees, and to which all the gods are dependent. (5) The devotees

of the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas are only aware of the unity amidst diversity, while they are actually taught to realize the same within themselves in the Upaniṣads. (6) Through upāsanā, body, mind and intellect become well-disciplined, while in the Upaniṣads, because of the influence of the previous discipline, the devotees easily realize the Highest Aim. (7) The Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas provide the means to achieve the end, while in the Upaniṣads the end itself is provided. (8) Mainly injunctions, and no reasons, have found place in the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas, while flawless reasonings and arguments for direct realization, called Intuition, find place in the Upaniṣads. (9) The devotees of the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas through their prayers, meditations, sacrifices, etc. find consolation and happiness, but all this is only temporary and not permanent, while through the teachings of the Upaniṣads a devotee comes to realize the Ultimate Truth and gets all his miseries removed finally and realizes eternal happiness, so much so that he loses his own separate existence and becomes one with the Highest Bliss.[118] (10) In the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas the devotees do feel the existence of one single Reality to which all other powers are subordinate and they pray for that Eternal Light, but no power leads them to that Reality. It is in the Upaniṣads alone that the Eternal Light is shown and described to which everything is dependent. (11) It is for the first time that the devotees are told in the Upaniṣads that through the worship of the One alone all are worshipped.[119] (12) It is again, for the first time that the devotees are told in the Upaniṣads that the object of their worship and sacrifice is not to be sought somewhere outside and is not something different from them, but that it is to be found within themselves and that it is that which is the dearest and most loving to them, that is, their own Self.[120]

In spite of all this, as told before, the Saṁhitās, etc.

118 Ānandamevāpyeti ya ānandamevāstameti, turīyamevāpyeti—*Subālopaniṣad,* IX, i. 13; Ānandaṁ prayāntyabhisamvis'antīti—*Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, III. 6.

119 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad,* VI. i. 4-6.

120 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* II. iv. 5.

and the Upaniṣads supplementing one another, are all essential for the realization of the Highest Truth. Thus, through gradual manifestation of the Ultimate Reality, both the Saṁhitās and the Upaniṣads help a disciple to arrive at the most desired end, the goal of Life and Philosophy, and ultimately, to become One with Sat (existence), Cit (consciousness), Ānanda (bliss), Satya (truth), Jñāna (knowledge), Ananta (Infinite), Brahman.[121]

Saṁhitās, etc., and Upaniṣads supplement one another.

4. *Meaning, Scope and Nature of the Upaniṣads*

The term 'Upaniṣad' is formed by adding the suffix *kvip* and the prefixes *upa* and *ni* to the root *ṣad*, meaning (1) to shatter or kill, (2) to attain, and (3) to loosen. The knowledge taught in the Upaniṣad shatters or destroys the seed of saṁsāra, such as, ignorance and the rest, present in the mind of those who aspire to emancipation, and who, when devoid of all desires for objects seen and heard of, acquire the knowledge. Again, it helps the enquirer to attain the knowledge of Brahman, and thus, loosens or enfeebles the miseries caused by births and rebirths.[122]

Meaning of the term Upaniṣad.

The Upaniṣads form the last section of the Veda and hence, are rightly called the *'Vedānta'*—the end of the Veda. They consist of discussions and teachings on almost every topic of philosophy. All the teachings found here are based on personal experience of the teachers who propounded them for the benefit of the enquirers. The reasons and the ways in which the truth is explained solve the difficulties of the seekers after the truth with full satisfaction. There are two kinds of persons found in these works—one an enquirer after the truth and the other a teacher who has realized the true nature of the truth and is capable of

Scope of the Upaniṣads.

Type of persons fit for the Upaniṣadic teachings.

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121 Saccidānandapūrṇātmā sarvapremāspado 'smyaham—*Brahmavidyopaniṣad*, 108; Satyam jñānamanantaṁ yatparam Brahmāhameva tat,—*Varāhopaniṣad*, III. 8.

122 Śaṅkarācārya's Introduction to his *Bhāṣya* on the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*.

propounding it with full confidence to a qualified disciple (adhikārī).

Now, before proceeding with the contents of the Upaniṣads out of which one derives the essence of their teachings or philosophy, it seems necessary to make a few remarks about the general nature of the Upaniṣads and make their position quite clear.

Nature of the teaching of the Upaniṣads.

It is not easy to find out what actually the Upaniṣads teach apart from what we find in all the later philosophical texts in detail about the highest truth. They do not represent any particular school of thought, and so we should not expect any systematized view on any problem of life, or philosophy in these texts. They do not ever put forth any philosophy of their own, though there is no principal thought of any philosophical school which the Upaniṣads cannot claim to possess originally as their own. We know how every system of Hindu Philosophy, including the Materialistic and the Buddhistic, supports all its statements by referring to a passage, or a sentence of the Upaniṣads. The Materialists, for instance, while propounding the view that the physical organism is the Supreme Self, quote the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* 'That, indeed, is the Puruṣa which is the product of the essence of food'.[123] Again, while propounding the theory that the external sense-organs represent the Supreme Self, they quote the *Chāndogya,* 'Those sense-organs having approached Prajāpati, their father, spoke to him.'[124] Or when the Materialists hold that there is nothing after death, they quote the śruti,—'Nāyamasti',[125] or 'Na pretya saṁjñāstīti'.[126] Then again, there are references to Kālavāda, Svabhāvavāda, Niyativāda, Yadṛcchāvāda in the Upaniṣads which are all associated with the later Indian Materialistic views.[127] Again, when the Materialists hold that the consciousness is produced out of the peculiar collocation of the four elements, namely, earth, water, air, and tejas, and is destroyed

Every school of Darśana supports its view by referring to the Upaniṣads.

123 II. i. 1.

124 V. i. 7.

125 *Kaṭhopaniṣad,* I. i. 10.

126 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* IV. v. 13.

127 *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad,* I. 2.

along with the destruction of that collocation and that there exists no consciousness after death, they quote a line, from the Upaniṣad, 'Etebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānyevānu vinaśyati na pretya saṁjñāstīti.'[128]

The Buddhists of the Śūnyavāda school, for instance, speaking about the cosmogony, quote from the *Taittirīya,*—'It was 'Asat' (Non-Being) first'.[129] Again, the Vijñānavādins quote from the same Upaniṣad—'Another and yet subtler, Ātman is nothing but mere ideas'.[130]

As for the orthodox schools, it is needless to quote any instance, because they are too well-known. Nevertheless, one or two illustrations are given below: the theory of the existence of the effect prior to the operation of the cause, in the cause itself, in an unmanifest condition and which is associated with Sāṅkhya, is based on the śruti: 'This was 'Sat' (Being) in the beginning',[131] or on the śruti,—'That it does not see in that state is because, although seeing them, it does not see; for the vision of the spectator (draṣṭā) can never be lost, because it is immortal',[132] etc. Again, the three elements of Sāṅkhya, namely, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are found in the śruti,—'In fire, the *red* colour is the colour of fire, the *white* colour is that of water and the *black* colour is that of food',[133] or in the well-known line of the *Śvetāśvatara,—'Ajāmekāṁ lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām',*[134] etc.

In this way, we can see that all sorts of views are found in the Upaniṣads regarding the main topics of our philosophy, so that anybody may seek in them what he wants and find what he seeks; and it is because of this that every teacher of Vedānta (which is entirely based on the Upaniṣads, and is rightly described as 'Vedānta') has referred to the Upaniṣads in support of his own angle of vision. It is needless to say that every philosopher in India derives his inspiration from the Upaniṣads to evolve a system of consistent thought to explain his own

Philosophers derive inspiration from the Upaniṣads.

128 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* II. iv. 12.
129 II. 7.
130 II. 4.
131 *Chāndogya,* VI. ii. 1-2.
132 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* IV. iii. 2.
133 *Chāndogya,* VI. iv. 1.
134 IV. 5.

stand-point. Verily, Upaniṣads are a mine of thoughts, high and ordinary, orthodox and heterodox. Hardly there is a literature which is so rich in imagination and deep in thoughts. But all these are not necessarily found in any one particular section of an Upaniṣad. If a thought is found, for instance, which may be construed as belonging to the later Vedānta, it may well be followed by another, which may be attributed to later Buddhist or Sāṅkhya train of reasoning. This is a speciality of the Upaniṣads. Hence, it is hardly justified to speak of the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads as a single school of thought. Nowhere in the Upaniṣads it is found that the śruti, which may be attributed to the Materialists, or to the Buddhists, or to the Sāṅkhya, has been criticised or proved to be of secondary importance in another place in the same Upaniṣad or in another. Even the śruti—'*Na pretya saṁjñāstīti*',[135] which means that there is no consciousness after death, is as much valid and authoritative as any other, like '*Aham Brahmāsmi*',[136] or '*Tattvamasi*',[137] and so on. A śruti is a śruti. No differentiation on grounds of authority, is ever made between one śruti and the other. All the śrutis are of equal validity.[138] The Veda is entirely reliable and authoritative.[139] The authority of the Vedic texts as they are revelations, is direct and self-sufficient.[140]

No differentiation between one śruti and another exists on grounds of authority.

The reason for all this seems to be that the Upaniṣads represent the jñāna aspect of, or are identical with, the Ultimate Truth which, like any material object, does not possess any concrete form, nor is it of any one particular type. Knowledge is a term which can be associated with anything and everything. But then we should not forget that there are grades in knowledge which terminate only in that Ultimate Knowledge—'Through which the unheard becomes heard, the unthought of becomes thought of, and the unknown be-

There are grades in knowledge.

[135] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* II. iv. 12; IV. v. 13.

[136] *Ibid.,* I. iv. 10.

[137] *Chāndogya,* VI. viii. 7.

[138] *Śāstradīpikā* on the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra,* I. i. 8.

[139] *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in its Sources* by Dr. Ganganatha Jha, p. 178.

[140] *Ibid.,* p. 221.

comes known'.[141] Thus, when the Materialists hold that matter develops life and consciousness, or that the Supreme Self is nothing but the physical organism, they propound a piece of knowledge which is a thought of the crudest form. So, when the Upaniṣads propound that the Ātman has a separate independent reality apart from matter or its product,[142] indeed a piece of knowledge is taught which is certainly higher than the previous one. Again, when the Upaniṣads preach that the Ātman is conscious,[143] we do acquire another piece of knowledge which is still subtler. But when we learn that the Ātman is Sat, Cit and Ānanda (Bliss),[144] we do acquire that Knowledge which is the highest and the subtlest.[145] In other words, the Upaniṣads represent that eternal, unfathomable and imperishable Fountain of Knowledge wherefrom every thirsty intelligent thinker has evolved a system of thought which has quenched the cravings of various seekers after the truth at different stages of evolution. The entire teachings of the Upaniṣads can be easily found spread over the various schools of Bhāratīya-darśana, specially, the schools of Vedānta which have truly retained the same nomenclature.

Main teaching of the Upaniṣads.

It has been already pointed out that the Upaniṣads have no philosophy of their own apart from what we find in the various systems of Indian Philosophy. Though they contain thoughts on various aspects of philosophy, yet their main teaching seems to favour the Advaitic thought as found in the Śaṅkara school of Vedānta, or in the Kashmir Śaivaism. They preach unity amidst diversity which is clear from the śrutis like 'Ekamevādvitīyaṁ',[146] 'Neha nānāsti kiñcana',[147] and also from the dialogue of Śvetaketu and his father Āruṇi,[148] where it is made clear that the father wants his son to acquire that *teaching* alone which when realized will leave nothing else to be known. The illus-

141 *Chāndogya,* VI. i. 3; *Muṇḍaka,* I. i. 3.

142 *Kaṭha,* I. 10.

143 Sat-cid-ānandamātro'ham svaprakāśo'smi cidghanaḥ—*Brahmabindūpaniṣad,* 109. *Chāndogya,* VIII. xii. 5.

144 *Ibid.*

145 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* III. ix. 28; *Chāndogya,* VIII. xxiii. 1.

146 *Chāndogya,* VI. ii. 1-2; *Adhyātmopaniṣad,* 63.

147 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* IV. iv. 19.

148 *Chāndgoya,* VI. i. 1-7.

tration of a clod of clay,[149] which alone is said to be *real*, supports the Upaniṣads which aim at the only Ultimate Truth which is the Highest aim of philosophy. This attitude of the Upaniṣads is further strengthened when the *Chāndogya* says, 'in the beginning, my dear, this was Being only, *One without a second*';[150] and this *One without a second* is variously called '*Brahman*', '*Ātman*', etc.

Some of the more important Upaniṣads.

The Upaniṣads are generally described as 108 in number, of which *Īśa, Kena, Kaṭha, Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍūkya, Taittirīya, Aitareya, Chāndogya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Brahmabindu, Jābāla, Kaivalya, Śvetāśvatara, Haṁsa, Āruṇi, Kauśītaki, Maitrāyaṇi, Bṛhajjābāla, Mahānārāyaṇa, Nṛsiṁhatāpinī* are the more important ones. Again, of these, the first ten Upaniṣads are very important and have been commented upon by Śaṅkara and other Ācāryas of Vedānta.

Upaniṣads classified according to the Vedas.

These Upaniṣads are individually attached to the Vedas. For instance, *Aitareya*. and *Kauśītáki* are attached to the *Ṛgveda;* the *Talavakāra*, later on, known as *Kena* and *Chāndogya*, belong to the *Sāmaveda;* the *Saṁhitī, Vāruṇī, Mahānāryaṇa, Kaṭha, Śvetāśvatara* and *Maitrāyaṇi* belong to the *Kṛṣṇa-Yajurveda;* the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Īśāvāsya* are attached to the *Śukla-Yajurveda*. There are about twenty-seven *Upaniṣads* which belong to the *Atharvaveda* of which the *Muṇḍaka, Praśna, Māṇḍūkya,* and *Jābāla* are the more important ones.

Date and chronology of the Upaniṣads.

About the date and chronology of these Upaniṣads it is extremely difficult to say anything definitely. The orthodox view does not make any distinction between the Upaniṣads and other sections of the Veda, such as the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas, and it is therefore, that all these are called by one common name—'Śruti'; and hence, the Upaniṣads are regarded as old as the other Śrutis. The truths contained therein are, no doubt, eternal, but they have been propounded by the great thinkers of the hoary past to whom the

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149 *Ibid.*, VI. i. 4.
150 *Ibid.*, VI. ii. I.

eternal light revealed itself but their dates are really very difficult to ascertain. No external and internal evidences are found. But it is certain that there are some Upaniṣads which are definitely of later origin. The earliest of the Upaniṣads are pre-Buddhistic according to the Buddhist records, and can easily be placed before the sixth century B. C. believing in the age of the Buddha fixed by the modern scholars. Amongst the pre-Buddhistic Upaniṣads, we have the *Chāndogya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Kena, Aitareya, Taittirīya, Kauśītaki* and *Kaṭha.* As regards others some are post-Buddhistic, while others are again, still later. But it should be kept in mind that even the post-Buddhistic ones are not later than the third century before Christ. It may further be kept in mind that the thoughts contained in these Upaniṣads being revelations, it does not matter much if they are pre-Buddhistic or post-Buddhistic as far as their validity is concerned. They are truths and are valid for all times.

Jñānakāṇḍa forms the background of all later philosophical literature.

Such portions of the Upaniṣads and the Āraṇyakas as deal with the Jñānakāṇḍa form the very background of all the later philosophical literature. The various main philosophical problems which came to be associated with the different schools of Darśana in later periods, are found scattered here and there in these Upaniṣads. It is from these works that the various philosophical Sūtras of different systems appear to have been formulated. Before a few illustrations from the Vedānta Sūtras alone are taken to verify the statements made above for the present, it seems necessary to point out that the only object of knowledge (Jñeya), according to the Vedānta, as interpreted by Śaṅkara and others, is Brahman. Hence, all the efforts made in the *Vedānta-Sūtras* are directed towards the exposition of the Brahman, directly or indirectly, which alone justifies the title *Brahma-Sūtra* given to the *Bādarāyaṇasūtra.* Now, as true knowledge of the Brahman can be had through the three different processes, namely, uddeśa, lakṣaṇa and parīkṣā (statement, definition and critical examination of the definition), the author has arranged the Sūtras in the same order and with the same aim in view.

Philosophical Sūtras are formulated from the Upaniṣads.

Illustration of the above from the *Bādarāyaṇa-Sūtras*.

Having all these things in mind we now proceed to examine the first aphorism of the *Brahmasūtra,* namely, *'Athāto Brahmajijñāsā'* in order to show that the *Vedānta-Sūtras* are based on the Upaniṣads. This sūtra may be split up into three parts—*atha, ataḥ* and *Brahmajijñāsā.* The first word shows that the enquirer after the truth has finished his preliminary training by the study of the Vedas and the practice of Upāsanā through the right discipline of body and mind as stated above. This may refer to the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad.*[151] Then comes the word *'ataḥ',* which justifies the enquiry into the nature of the Brahman, and this may also be traced to the same Upaniṣad.[152] This being done the uddeśa of the object of knowledge, namely, Brahman, is complete. This finishes the first Sūtra. After this comes the definition which is found in the second sūtra—*'Janmādyasya yataḥ'.* This again, may be said to be based on the first anuvāka of the Bhṛguvallī of the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad.*

Then begins the verification (parīkṣā). The statements made in the course of defining the problems will have to be examined and verified from all possible angles of vision. This is the most important part of the study of any problem in Indian thought. Without this no argument can be taken to be finally valid. In so doing, the expounder of the school has to make his own position clear in the light of all possible objections which may be adduced against the view-point of the expounder. This has been done by Bādarāyaṇa in the remaining aphorisms. Now, the very third sūtra *'Śāstrayonitvāt',* adduced as a further support of the second sūtra, may be easily traced to the Śrutis 'Asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitametadyadṛgvedo Yajurvedaḥ',[153] etc., or 'Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante',[154] etc. In this way, the entire philosophical literature, from the sūtra-period down to the present day may be traced to these Upaniṣads. Amidst all the problems expressed in these works, in howsoever dis-connected a form, it is to be

151 Vallī, I. 11.

152 Anuvāka, 12.

153 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* II. iv. 10; IV. v. 11.

154 *Taittirīya,* III. 1.

kept in mind that the main theme, namely, Brahman, along with all its allied topics, such as, the individual self, the universe, life and death, the law of Karman, etc., always remains prominent.

5. *Some of Their More Important Teachings*

Enquiry into the nature of the Ātman started from Saṁhitās continued through all other Śrutis.

Now, proceeding with some of the more important teachings of the Upaniṣads, it may be said in the very beginning that from a study of the Upaniṣads it becomes evident that the enquiry into the nature of the Ātman starting from the days of the Saṁhitās continued through these texts as well. The main topic of enquiry in the Upaniṣads is the nature of the Ātman. None of the Upaniṣads seem to discuss independently any other problem, Every other thing has been brought in only to elucidate or to throw some light on the Ātman which is the same as the Brahman in the Upaniṣads. This is clear from the Śruti—'when there is duality, then one smells something, one perceives something, one hears something, one speaks something, one thinks something and one knows something. But when to the enquirer of the Ātman, everything has become the same Ātman, then what should one smell and through what, what should one perceive and through what, what should one hear and through what, what should one speak and through what, what should one think and through what, and what should one know and through what? Through what should one realize That owing to which all this is known—through what, O Maitreyī, should one know the Knower (Vijñātā)'?[155]

Advaitic stand-point.

From the above it is clear that according to the monistic stand-point there is nothing except the Ātman in this universe, which can in any way be the object of one's enquiry. So, whatever is said in the Upaniṣads is only in connection with the nature of the Ātman. Another point which is to be mentioned here is that the Upaniṣads pre-suppose that enquirers after the Ātman

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155 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV. v. 15.

are fully acquainted with the various objects of the world and also with the nature of the relations existing among those objects. For instance, the various categories, like ākāśa, vāyu, water, fire, directions (dik), manas, various limbs of human organism, animals and trees, etc., gods, heaven, merit and demerit, pleasure, pain and bliss, death, castes, the idea of universality, of immanence and of transcendence, the states of consciousness, fear, immortality and intelligence, ignorance and knowledge, life after death, the two paths of Devayāna and Pitṛyāna, birth and rebirth, unity amidst diversity, liberation, and so on, all are presupposed to be the facts of common experience and that the enquirers after the Ātman are also aware of these. No proof is ever adduced in the Śrutis to prove any of the above mentioned objects. What the Upaniṣads want to teach is that the Ātman is all pervasive and that everything is found within the Ātman, and that the enquirer after the true nature of the Ātman should realize all this in order to achieve the highest aim of his life.

Enquireres know of the world.

Upaniṣads teach the true nature of the Ātman and show the means to realize it.

Another point to note is that the teachers of the Upaniṣads have fully realized the true nature of the Ātman and that they are well-versed in the method of reasoning and argumentation. They know how to convince an enquirer about the subtleties of the topics according to the adhikāra of the disciples.

Upaniṣadic teachers have realized the nature of the Ātman and can convince others.

Hence, it may be said with certainty that the only object of knowledge in the Upaniṣads is the Ātman, and that so much importance has been given to this single category in the entire literature because there is nothing so dear (priya) as the Ātman in this universe.[156] All the rest which appears to be dear is so, simply for the sake of the Ātman itself. Again, the Ātman is so dear, because the realization of this alone is capable of removing all the miseries of the enquirers.

Ātman is the dearest of all things.

Before we proceed to deal with the nature of the

[156] *Ibid.*, IV. v. 6.

Ātman, it is essential to mention that the two concepts of the Brahman and the Ātman which were distinct in the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas have become merged into one in the Upaniṣads.[157] By this act of merging, both the highest divine entity and the metaphysical entity have become united in such a way that nothing else exists beyond this universal and self-sufficient entity. Here is the synthesis of divine and metaphysical aspects of life. This entity now comprehends the essence of all that exists in the universe. It has now become *Pūrṇa.* This alone makes possible all that has been said about the nature of the Ātman, as sat and asat, light and darkness, aṇu and mahat, and so on. So says the Upaniṣad—'The Ātman which is the same as the Brahman is identified with intellect, manas, prāṇa, organs of perception and hearing, with earth, water, air and ākāśa, tejas and non-tejas, with desire and absence of desire, with anger and other than anger, with righteousness and unrighteousness, with everything identified, as is well-known, with this (what is perceived) and with that (what is not perceived). As it does and acts so it becomes; by doing good it becomes good, and by doing evil it becomes evil—it becomes virtuous through good acts and vicious through evil acts. Some, however, hold that it is identified with desire alone. For whatever it desires, it resolves, what it resolves it works out; and what it works out it attains'.[158] This is the greatest contribution of the Upaniṣads to the thought of the world.

Merging of the Brahman and the Ātman into one universal entity.

Consequently, we may trace how all the categories, like earth, water, air, ākāśa, fire, etc. as a matter of fact, everything of the universe have been unified together as the forms of the Ātman.[159] This further leads us to regard this Ātman as an all-pervasive entity which is present in everything and also wherein everything is found present. In other words, we find that the Ātman has become the very essence of all that exists in the universe.[160] The next step that is found in the

Things of the world are the forms of the Ātman.

The Brahman or the Ātman has infinite forms.

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157 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* II. v. 19.
158 *Ibid.,* IV. iv. 5.
159 *Ibid.*
160 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* III. iv. vii. 2-7.

Upaniṣads is that there exists nothing but the Brahman and that all that we see around us is its very form. In this way, this Brahman comes to be regarded as having infinite (ananta) forms.

The Brahman is undefinable.

Though the Brahman is immediate and is within all, yet it cannot be defined directly. Yājñavalkya, being asked by Uṣasta and Kahoḷa, says, by way of giving an exact idea of the Brahman, that which breathes through the Prāṇa, that which moves downwards through the Apāna, that which pervades through the Vyāna and that which goes out through the Udāna, is the Ātman, which is within all.[161] Again, Yājñavalkya continues, that which transcends hunger, thirst, grief, delusion, old age and death is the Ātman. He further adds that it is that, the realization of which makes one renounce the desire for a son, for wealth, and for the attainment of heavenly regions and makes him lead a life of a mendicant.[162] Speaking indirectly, Yājñavalkya again says, one cannot see that which is the witness of vision, one cannot hear that which is the hearer of hearing, one cannot think of that which is the thinker of the thought, and one cannot know that which is the knower of the knowledge.[163]

Yājñavalkya explains the Brahman.

Ātman can be realized from its external characteristics.

Such being the nature of the Ātman, it is not at all possible to define it like any material object. Therefore, one can realize it from the various external attributes and characteristics which are found associated with it and which cannot be otherwise explained.

Nature of the Ātman.

This great, endless and infinite reality is but pure intelligence (*vijñānaghana eva*).[164] It can be described negatively only; because there is no other and more appropriate description, for giving a correct idea of the Ātman.[165] Śaṅkara makes it very

161 *Ibid.*, III. iv.
162 *Ibid.*, III. v.
163 *Ibid.*, III. iv. 2.
164 *Ibid.*, II. iv. 12.
165 *Ibid.* II. iii. 6.

clear when he adds that by the elimination of all differences due to limiting adjuncts, the words refer to something that has no distinguishing feature, such as, name, or form, or action, or heterogeneity, or species, or qualities. Words denote objects through one or the other of the above-mentioned features. But none of these can be attributed to the Brahman. It is the truth of truth.[166]

Words cannot denote Brahman.

The immutable Brahman pervades Ākāśa which itself is pervasive. It is, neither gross nor atomic, neither short nor long, neither red nor has viscidity, neither light nor darkness, neither air nor Ākāśa, unattached, neither savour nor odour, without eyes or ears, without the organs of speech and manas, has no tejas, or prāṇa or mouth, not a measure, without interior and exterior. It does not eat anything, nor is it eaten by any one.[167]

It is further described as that under whose command the sun and the moon are held in their positions, heaven and earth maintain their positions, the various forms of time, namely, moments, muhūrtas, days and nights, fortnights, months, seasons and years, are held in their respective places. It is under the orders of this immutable Brahman that the rivers flow in different directions and the gods obtain their sacrifices and the Pitṛs offerings. In other words, all the natural forces and higher beings who belong to different regions are controlled by the Brahman. There is no other witness, no other hearer, no other thinker, and no other knower than this Brahman.[168]

Everything is controlled by Brahman.

This Brahman is imperceptible, undecaying, and unfettered. It never feels pain and never suffers. It is to be known only through the Upaniṣads. It manifests all beings and draws them within itself and is at the same time transcendent. It is that entity which is identified with the intellect (vijñāna), is present in all the senses, is the self-effulgent light within

Other characteristics of Brahman.

166 *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on *Ibid.*

167 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* III. viii. 8.

168 *Ibid.,* III. viii. 9.

the heart.[169] It moves everywhere. Being identified with dreams, it transcends this world[170] and subsequently, the forms of death, such as, ignorance and deeds (karman).[171] It is one without a second. It is the draṣṭṛ (seer). It is bliss. All the beings of the universe, who are under the influence of nescience, live because they derive happiness from this bliss.

This Ātman is undecaying (ajara), immortal and undying (amṛta) and fearless (abhaya).[172] It is satya. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* adds that the Ātman is unborn. It is identical with vijñāna (intellect) and lives within the inner heart. It is the controller of all, the lord and the ruler of all. It does not become better through good work, nor worse through bad deeds. It is the protector of all beings. It is the bank which serves as the boundary to keep the different worlds apart. It is known through the study of the Vedas, sacrifices, charity and austerity free from all attachments. Knowing it alone one becomes a muni (sage). For the sake of its realization alone the mendicants renounce homes.[173]

The Brahman is an entity which is beyond the reach of all our sense-organs, even including the manas. It is all Bliss.[174] All the forces of nature, namely, vāyu, agni, sūrya, Indra, god of death, do their function being afraid of this Brahman.[145] The Brahman is beyond dharma and adharma, and is capable of being known through Veda alone. It is that for the realization of which the rules of Brahmacarya are obeyed and practised.[176] The very word "Brahman" indicates that the entity denoted by it is the highest and whosoever knows it, obtains whatever he desires. In fact, there remains nothing to be achieved after one has realized it. It is soundless, tasteless, touchless, scentless, formless, undecaying, eternal, and beginningless, endless, beyond the antaḥkaraṇa, and constant. If one knows it, he escapes the jaws of death.[177]

169 *Ibid.*, IV. iv. 22.
170 *Ibid.*, IV. iii. 7.
171 *Ibid.*, IV. iii. 8.
172 *Ibid.*, IV. iv. 25.
173 *Ibid.*, IV. iv. 22.
174 *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II. 4.
175 *Ibid.*, II. 8.
176 *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, I. ii. 14-15.
177 *Ibid.*, I. iii. 15.

The nature of the Brahman as described above has come down to us traditionally through the teachers named below. It must be pointed out here that according to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* the knowledge of the Brahman was possessed by the Kṣattriyas alone and later on, it was imparted to the Brāhmaṇas. This shows that the realization of the nature of the Brahman did not rest with any particular caste. In fact, the Ātman reveals itself to those who are qualified and are really fit to receive it and to whomsoever it chooses.[178] The teachers in order of the guruparamparā (tradition) are: Brahmā, Prajāpati, Manu, the father of Uddālaka Āruṇi, and Āruṇi. The *Muṇḍaka* gives another guruparamparā: Brahmā, Atharvan, Aṅgīḥ, Bhāradvāja Satyavaha, Aṅgiras and Kāpeya-Śaunaka. Then we have also Sanatkumāra, Yājñavalkya, Indra, Nārada, Mahīdāsa, Raikva, Uṣasta, Śāṇḍilya, Satyakāma Jāvāli, Jaivali, Śvetaketu, Āruṇeya, Uddālaka, Bālāki, Gārgī, Maitreyī and Uṣasti Cākrāyaṇa.[179]

The guruparamparā of the teachers of Brahma-jñāna.

The abode of this Brahman is everywhere as it is all-pervasive. But even then, it is said that it is manifest in the antarhṛdaya.

As to the means of its realization the Upaniṣads say that it is through the very grace of the Ātman itself that one can realize it. But even then one can know it after having weaned his manas from all the external objects and then concentrating his attention on it. In other words, the Ātman can be realized through the process of samādhi as taught in the Yogaśastra.

Ātman is realized through the grace of the Ātman.

In connection with the realization of the Ātman it may also be pointed out that it is the manas itself through which one can realize the Brahman.[180] This manas must be purified through tapas and should be diverted in accordance with the instructions of the teacher. It may be further stated that the manas, being itself a limited product of nescience, is totally incapable of leading the

Realization of Ātman through samādhi.

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178 *Ibid.,* I. ii. 23.

179 *Muṇḍaka,* I. i. 1-3; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya.*

180 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* IV. iv. 19.

Jīva to the Brahman itself. What the manas does in this state is to point out the path which alone leads the Jiva to the Brahman. The final realization of the Brahman is possible only when the avidyā is cast off, and the manas itself does not remain to realize the Brahman.

Manas as the means for the realization of the Ātman.

The Brahman manifests itself into two forms: limited (mūrta) and unlimited (*amūrta*), mortal and immortal, static (sthita) and dynamic (yat), sat (having particular characteristics that distinguish it from others) and tyat (which can be distinctly referred to, as something we know not what).[181]

Forms for the manifestation of Brahman.

The Jivātman is identical with the Brahman. While in bondage it experiences pleasure and pain and gets reward of its karmaphala. After the realization of the Ātman it realizes its own nature and thus becomes the same as the Ātman. The individual self (Jivātman), when it is born, attains an organism and becomes connected with evils in the form of body and sense-organs. When it dies, it leaves its organism and becomes free from those evils.[182] It has two abodes: this world and the next. It is said that the dreaming state is the third abode wherefrom it has the vision of both the abodes. It gets both joy and sufferings from this third place. When it enters the dreaming state, it carries impressions of this world as it perceives it during the waking hours and keeps its body aside and creates a new dreaming body for itself, revealing its own lustre by its own light and then perceives dreams. It is then that the individual self creates its own new world.[183] So says the Upaniṣad: 'There are no chariots, nor animals to be yoked to them, nor roads; but it creates the chariots, animals and roads. There are no pleasures, joys or delights there, but it creates pleasures, joys and delights. There are no pools, tanks or rivers there, but it creates the pools, tanks or rivers there.

Identity of Jīva with Brahman.

Nature of Jīva.

Abode of Jīva.

Jīva in the dreaming state.

181 *Ibid.*, II. iii. 1-5.
182 *Ibid.*, IV. iii. 8.
183 *Ibid.*, IV. iii. 9.

For it is the agent'.[184] Again, it returns to the waking state due to nescience (avidyā).

Brahman ultimately responsible for dream-creations.

But as the Jīvātman is identical with the universal Brahman all the creations, even of the dreaming state, are due to the Brahman alone. In fact, it is through the light of the Ātman that the Jīva sits, goes out, works and returns.

Passing of Jīva from one body to another is called 'death.'

Just as the Jīva passes from the waking state to the dreaming state and comes back due to the effects of avidyā, so does the Jīva also pass from one body to the other, which is called 'death'. At the time of death breathing becomes difficult and the body becomes thin and emaciated through old age or disease. Then the Jīva detaches itself from the old body and enters into another body that has been made for him,[185] in the manner it had entered into it before, in order to experience the results of its past deeds through the help of its vital energy. In the next body, the Jīva again becomes associated with all that is necessary to reap the fruits of the past deeds.[186]

Assuming of organism for experiencing pleasure and pain.

Description of the manner of 'death.'

While describing the manner of death, the Upaniṣad says: 'When the Jīva becomes weak and senseless, as it were, the organs completely withdrawing all the light that they have in the form of knowledge, it comes to the heart. Then it fails to notice colour'.[187] All the other sense-organs along with the antaḥkaraṇa likewise, fail to function. Then the top of the heart brightens. Through that brightened top the Jīva departs, either through the eyes, or through the head,[188] or through any other part of the body. The vital force and all the sense-organs follow it. The Jīva at that moment has a consciousness which consists of vāsanās (impressions) that are induced by the deeds of its past births, in the form of particular modifications of its antaḥkaraṇa,

184 *Ibid.*, IV. iii. 10-33.

185 Kṛtaṁ lokaṁ puruṣo'bhijāyate—*Śatapatha*, VI. ii. 2-27 quoted by Śaṅkara under *Bṛha.*, IV. iii. 37.

186 *Bṛha.*, IV. iii. 34-36.

187 *Ibid.*, IV. iv. 1.

188 Those Jīvas who depart through the eyes, or through the hole in the head (Brahmarandhra) go direct to the Sūryaloka, while others go to the Candraloka.

regarding the next birth. Then, it passes on to that body which is revealed by the particular consciousness. It is followed by knowledge, work and past experiences.[189]

Śaṅkarācārya, while commenting upon the above movements of the Jīva, adds—'In order to have freedom of action at the time of death, those aspirants after the future life who have faith should be alert in the practice of Yoga and right knowledge, and in the acquisition of particular merit by doing good deeds'. All the sacred scriptures also carefully seek to dissuade men from doing evil; for nothing can be done at the dying moment, as there is no independence for the man, who is carried away by the deeds of his past births. It has been said in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*[190] itself that 'one indeed becomes good through good work and sinful through sinful deeds'. The aim of the Upaniṣads is to prescribe remedies for this undersiable results (anartha). There is no other way to eradicate this evil completely except by following the course laid down by them. Therefore, all should try to practise the remedies prescribed by the Upaniṣads.[191]

Preparation for death.

The Upaniṣad also says that the new body which the Jīva assumes is a better one, suited to the manas, or the celestial gandharvas, or the devas, or other beings.[192]

Jīva gets a better body after death.

Being attached, the Jīva attains that result to which its subtle body (liṅga-śarīra), or manas is attached. After having experienced the results of whatever work it did in this life, it returns from that world to this again, to do fresh deeds. This is all about the transmigration of the Jīva. But there are some Jīvas who do not transmigrate because of having exhausted all the bhogas in the same birth. These have no vāsanās left for any future birth. The only desire in their mind is to realize the Ātman. So their organs do not depart as is generally the case at the time of death.

Transmigration of Jīva.

Jīva attains immortality in this very body and becomes Jīvanmukta.

189 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV. iv. 2.
190 III, ii. 13.
191 *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on Bṛha. IV. iv. 2.
192 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV. iv. 4.

Then the Jīva attains Brahmahood. It becomes immortal in this very body.[193] This is the state of Jīvanmukti. Just as the lifeless slough of a snake is cast off and lies in the ant-hill, so does this body of the Jīvanmukta Jīva lie. Then the Jīva becomes disembodied and immortal and its Prāṇa becomes the Brahman which is light and light alone.[194]

Journey of Jīva to the other world.

After the Jīva departs from this world on death, it reaches the air which makes a hole there within itself. The Jīva passes through that hole and reaches the sun who also, as before, makes a passage for it to go further in its journey, and the Jīva passes through that hole and goes up to the moon. Again, the Jīva goes up through another opening which the moon makes there for its passage. Then the Jīva comes to a region which is free from physical and mental troubles. This is the region of Hiraṇyagarbha. Here, the Jīva lives for many years.[195]

Theories of creation.

So far as the creation of the universe is concerned, we find that there was nothing whatsoever in the beginning. It was covered by Death, which means hunger, simply because one killed an animal when he felt hungry. Manas was created next. After this was produced water. This water was identified with 'arka', which was the same as fire. Upon water there appeared a substance which was solidified and became earth. The Death after this became tired and from his body came out tejas or essence which was fire, also called 'Virāja', or 'Prajāpati'. He split up himself into three. Prajāpati had two classes of sons: gods and asuras.[196]

In another place it is said that the creation began with a male human form, who was alone in the beginning. He created a female form and thence came out the universe.[197]

Again, it is held that all the bhūtas have come out of Ākāśa and they merge into it at the time of dissolution.[198]

193 *Ibid.*, IV. iv. 6.
194 *Ibid.*, IV. iv. 7.
195 *Ibid.*, I. ii. 1 ; V. x. 1.
196 *Ibid.*, I. iii. 1 ; *Chāndogya*, II. i. 1-9.
197 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, I. iv. 1.
198 *Chāndogya*, I. ix. 1.

Elsewhere it is said that there was only Being (sat) in the beginning. Others, however, hold that there was non-Being in the beginning, and from non-being came out Being. Of course, non-Being means unmanifest, while the former refers to the manifest form which created the whole universe. That Being desired: "May I become many, may I grow forth!" and then came out tejas, which in its turn, produced water, out of which was produced anna (food). Then came out the rest of the universe.[199]

These three forms of the first creation were looked upon with as much reverence as is shown towards gods.

The proress of triplication.

From these three products, separately, came out the entire creation through the process of triplication (trivṛtkaraṇa). In other words, the next product which was tejas possessed half of the tejas element and one-fourth of each of the two elements namely, water and earth (food). Similarly, the second product was water which had half pure water and one fourth of each of the other two elements. Likewise, the food also consisted of half food and one-fourth of each of the two other elements. Every object which was produced had three aspects. The red colour in fire, for instance, is the colour of fire, its white colour is the colour of water and the black colour found in fire is the colour of food. Such is the case with every other object.[200] Thus, in fact, there are only three colours and all the rest are mere modifications of these three.

In each of the above-mentioned three elements there are three aspects: the grossest, the subtlest and the middle one.

Production of Manas and Prāṇa.

Thus, out of the subtlest part of tejas, comes out the organ of speech, out of the grossest come out bones, while the middle part produces marrow. Of the subtlest part of water is made Prāṇa, of the grossest comes out urine and of the middle part, is produced blood. Again, of the food, the subtlest part is manas, the grossest is excrement and the middle part is flesh.[201]

199 *Chāndogya,* VI. ii. 1 ; *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* II. 2.

200 *Chāndogya,* VI. iii-iv.

201 *Ibid.,* VI. v. 1-4.

According to another Upaniṣad, there was the Ātman alone which existed in the beginning and nothing else. It conceived: 'May I create products!' Then were created lokas and lokapālas. Next, came out a male form out of the five bhūtas with all its senses.[202]

Lastly, we are also told that creation took place from the Ātman itself. Ākāśa was the first product out of which was produced vāyu. From vāyu came out agni, from which was produced water. Earth came out of water. Next were produced herbs and then came out food. Out of food was produced a male form (puruṣa).[203]

From all these above-mentioned views it seems that there was an entity which was undefined and unmanifested in the beginning. It then became manifest and a universal male form came out which created the natural forces, like Ākāśa, etc. out of which the gross elements, such as, earth, water, air and the rest have been produced. As the entire universe is nothing but the forms of the Brahman, all exist because the Brahman is eternal; and they, again, dissolve into that very Brahman. It is, therefore, that the Upaniṣad says that there was only one entity without a second, and all the rest are its own forms.[204]

The process of dissolution.

After the creation, there comes the process of dissolution. Things of the universe all dissolve into their respective causes in the same order in which they had been produced. When all of them merge back into the Brahman, there exists among them no distinction of any kind. This shows that nothing perishes, in the true sense of the term.[205]

The two paths—Devayāna and Pitṛyāna.

The Upaniṣad also refers to the two well-known paths namely, the Pitṛyāna and the Devayāna through which every Jīva has to pass after death. Those who realize the Brahman go through the devayāna, passing through all white passages, to that region wherefrom they never return to the earth. Those, on the

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202 *Aitareya-Upaniṣad,* I. 1.

203 *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad,* II. 1.

204 Sarvaṁ Khalvidam Brahma tajjalāniti—*Chāndogya,* III. xiv. 1.

205 *Chāndogya,* VI. ix-x.

other hand, who have done good and bad deeds and have not yet exhausted all the results of their past deeds go to the lunar region and after having experienced bhoga there come down to the earth in the form of rains to take birth in different yonis according to the residue of their deeds.[206] It is, therefore, that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* says that through knowledge one goes to the regions of gods, while through the performance of various deeds, such as, sacrifices, prayers, etc. one goes to the manes.[207]

It may be also pointed out that in order to realize the nature of the Ātman one has to lead a well-disciplined life. One has to follow the path of truth, and observe all the rules of morality. One should not be covetous to get others' wealth.[208] Attachment towards women is very harmful for attainment of the knowledge of the Ātman.[209] The worldly objects of enjoyment are also obstacles in the way of the realization of the Ātman.[210] One has to speak the truth and obey his father and mother and teacher as gods.[211] He has to worship the guests and give charity. He should not perform any deed which is censured.[212] It goes without saying that unless a man is fully qualified and has purified his inner-sense through the strict observance of the rules of good conduct and has performed tapas, he has no right to enter into the portals of the Tattvajñāna. Both external and internal purifications are most essential for being an adhikārī for receiving the knowledge of the Ātman.

For the realization of the highest aim, rules of morality have to be strictly adhered to.

From all that has been said above it is clear that there is only one Supreme Entity which is eternal and all-pervasive. All the rest that appear before our eyes are the very manifestations of the said Supreme. It is within us and also around us. It is the nearest and the ever referred to entity expressed as '*Ahaṁ*'. Whe-

206 *Chāndogya*, V. x. 1-2, 8 ; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, VI. ii. 14-16.

207 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, I. v. 16.

208 *Īśāvāraṇyaka*, I. 1.

209 *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, I.

210 *Ibid.*

211 *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad*, I. xi.

212 *Ibid.*

ther he is a mortal being, or an immortal one, no one is ever dissociated with this notion of egoism. This egoistic notion undoubtedly, refers to this all-pervasive and ever present Entity. It is this very notion which has to be realized in its true and unsophisticated form. This is the all in all for every one. No being is ever ready to sacrifice and know this in its true form. In fact, it is for the satisfaction of this and this alone that every action in life is done, every relation is established and the ideas of like and dislike, which represent the very foundation of philosophy, are cherished.

But the most surprising fact is that even this 'Aham' remains quite in the dark, may be, for infinite number of years. Every one talks of it but it is very difficult to know it. All our efforts, directly or indirectly are meant to realize this very 'aham'. It is to be sought within one's ownself. Any clue towards its realization comes from our own efforts, may be in the form of teachings of our guru, or in that of knowledge dervied from the Yogic practices, or from the study of the śrutis. For all this a regular training of body and mind is most essential . Various means have been prescribed in our Śāstras to acquire such training. A brief survey of them is given below.

First of all there must be complete śraddhā in the mind of the sādhaka (seeker after the Truth). It is this which alone can guide the sādhaka towards the right path. This will lead him to surrender himself to the cause of the Truth, may be to the guru. The ahambhāva has to be brought down from its egoistic position, which prevents him to acquire true knowledge, to the position of a defeated being. Unless he admits his defeat before the guru, no veil of ignorance can be cast off, and the Eternal Light be allowed to reveal itself to him.

After one has fully qualified himself in the above mentioned manner, then he receives the teachings of the guru. The teachings imparted on this occasion are to be heard, thought of and realized in order to become one with the teachings themselves. The first and the last teaching which a sādhaka receives from his teacher is the idea contained in the Mahāvākya—'Tat tvam asi'. Now, there are three elements in this statement of the guru. 'Tat' refers to the indescribable and unthink-

able Absolute which cannot be expressed either through physical or non-physical sound and is also beyond the reach of inner-sense. 'Tvam' stands for the sādhaka who has qualified himself for realizing the Truth. The third element is 'Asi', the time factor, which differentiates the first element from the second. Besides, there is the fourth factor in the form of the 'Teacher' who, after having placed the sādhaka on the right path, leaves him for the time being to reappear and be realized as the very Self of the sādhaka later on.

First of all the time factor has to be removed in order that the two elements may get an oportunity to come gradually in close proximity of each other. Through the constant practice of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana, the sādhaka will realize that the time factor has merged itself into 'tvam' and that he feels within himself that the element 'tvam' which appeared somewhat beyond him has changed into 'aham' and is now within him. This makes him realize within himself that 'that' ('tat') is the same as 'aham'. This may be indicated by the Mahāvākya—'So'ham'. But even then the duality does persist. Then that 'tat', which was unthinkable and quite aloof from him gradually assumes a closer relation with him and becomes more or less comprehensive for the purpose of being realized, which may be denoted by the Mahāvākya—'aham Brahmāsmi'. This also may be pointed out here that though the time factor—'asi' has practically merged into 'tvam' and later on into 'aham', yet its vāsanā has not absolutely disappeared. So it sometimes appears even at the stage when the sādhaka is engaged in the realization of the Truth within himself. It is therefore, that there is the śruti—'aham Brahmāsmi'.

At the next stage the sādhaka may have the realization of the nature of 'aham' as 'all-consciousness (prajñānaṁ)' and express the same 'aham Brahma' as 'Prajñānam Brahma'. This appears to be so because he has come to know his 'ahambhāva' gradually. After he has realized himself and the egoistic notion is cast off, the ahambhāva disappears for ever and he becomes free from the notion of arrogance accompanying the 'Aham'. Thereafter the sādhaka becomes qualified to realize within himself the idea contained in the Mahāvākya—

'Ayam ātmā Brahma'. This Mahāvākya, besides what it denotes about the state of the realization of the sādhaka, also tells us how the two different notions of the Ātman and the Brahman which were unified in the Upaniṣad are also realized as such by the sādhaka within himself. It is here that the various notions of the sādhaka, namely, tat, tvam, aham, ayam, Ātman and Brahman all become one and one alone. There remains nothing apart from and beyond what the sādhaka himself is. It is here that the third person, the second person and the first person all merge into one without the second.

This being achieved and the absolute nature of the truth and subsequently, that of the human being, who is alone qualified to realize the Absolute, the highest aim in life and philosophy being realized, there remains nothing beyond this to be achieved. If one realizes oneself, no wonder that the entire universe becomes simultaneously realized. It is this which seems to be indicated by the śruti—'Sarvaṁ khalvidam Brahma'.

From all that has been said above it becomes quite clear that there is a harmonious synthesis not only in all the elements of the universe, howsoever small and big they may be, but also in life, religion and philosophy in India. This is the highest achievement which brings consolation to all beings of the universe and restores peace to the disturbed forces of the universe and helps the sādhakas to proceed in the achievement of their ultimate end.

CHAPTER IV

PHILOSOPHY OF THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

1. *Introductory*

ALTHOUGH the Upaniṣads teach us Knowledge which leads to the realization of the Ultimate Truth, yet it is not found there in greater detail nor are all persons qualified to study and understand the śrutis. But Truth being universal should be conveyed to all. Therefore, the essence of the teachings of the Upaniṣads has been made available to the jijñāsu in the *Bhagavadgītā*. It has, therefore, been rightly said that all the Upaniṣads are like cows, Lord Kṛṣṇa is the person who milks them, the son of Pṛthu, that is, Arjuna, is the calf, (to draw out the milk from the cow), the wise are the experiencers (that is, those who enjoy the fruit by way of drinking milk), and the nectar-like milk is the *Gītā* itself. So the main spirit and teachings of the *Bhagavadgītā* are those of the Upaniṣads. In fact, it itself is called an Upaniṣad owing to the similarity of teachings.[1]

Bhagavadgītā imparts the essence of the teachings of the Upaniṣads.

The only obvious difference between the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavadgītā* is that both Action, of course without any desire for its fruit, and Knowledge have been much more emphasised in the latter work and the element of Bhakti has been introduced in it to show that without true Bhakti knowledge is not possible. All this has been explained and illustrated in greater detail in the *Bhagavadgītā*. All sorts of enquirers irrespective of caste, creed, sex and age can easily understand the highest teachings of Hindu philosophy and religion with the help of the *Gītā* alone. This is a single text which is self-sufficient to lead us to the right path and guide us in all our walks of life in a sweet and appealing manner.

Difference in the teachings of the Upaniṣads and those of the *Gītā*.

While describing the greatness of the *Gītā*, the Lord Himself has said: "He who, having shown the highest

[1] Vide the colophon of each chapter.

devotion to Me, shall impart this most secret teachings of the *Gītā*— (the song of the Lord) to My devotees, shall attain Me. There is no doubt about this. Among men there is no one who is dearer to Me than he (who imparts the teachings of the *Gītā* to My devotees), nor shall any one be dearer to Me than he on this earth. He who shall study this righteous dialogue of Ours, by him shall I be worshipped through the sacrifice of Knowledge. This is My opinion. The man who even listens to it, full of faith and free from ill-will towards any one, becomes free from sin and attains the holy regions of the virtuous."[2] The only condition that one should keep in mind while imparting this teaching to others is that "it should never be imparted to one who is without austerity, who is not a devotee, who is not desirous to hear, and who finds fault with Me."[3]

Greatness of the *Gītā*.

2. *Bhagavadgītā and the Mahābhārata*

The *Bhagavadgītā,* ordinarily called the *Gītā,* forms part of the *Bhīṣmaparva* of the *Mahābhārata.*[4] Though the *Mahābhārata* is regarded as the "fifth" Veda, yet in fact, its importance is greater and its teachings are much more popular than those of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. The Vedas and the Upaniṣads are meant for the restricted few and can be utilized with still greater difficulty even by them, while no such restrictions are laid on the *Mahābhārata,* which is consequently easily accessible to all, men and women, young and old, high and low. Again, of the *Mahābhārata* itself, the *Bhagavadgītā* is the most popular section and its teachings, being the very words of the Lord Himself, are regarded no less authoritative than the Śrutis themselves. The only qualification needed for the true understanding of this, unlike the Śrutis, is that the enquirer should be a true believer in God and have faith in and devotion to His Powers, Grace and Mercy. He should also

Gītā is a part of the *Mahābhārata.*

Nature of the teachings of the *Mahābhārata.*

Qualifications for understanding the spirit of the *Gītā.*

2 *Bhagavadgītā,* XVIII. 68–71.
3 *Bhagavadgītā,* Verse 67. 4 Adhyāyas 25–42.

possess full control over his sense-organs. So says the Lord: "He who has fully controlled his senses, is exclusively devoted to spiritual practice and is full of faith attains the Knowledge."[5]

The *Mahābhārata* is a treasure of all knowledge and consists of information on all aspects of our life. In fact, there is nothing in the later literature of India which is not found in it. Again, of all the sections of the *Mahābhārata* no one has attained such popularity and fame as the *Bhagavadgītā*. It is a compendium of religion and philosophy, the two aspects of Hindu life. People ignorant of its spirit wrongly think that the book teaches only 'Vairāgya' (renunciation) and so it is meant for the Vairāgins and the Sannyāsins alone. There is perhaps hardly a book in Sanskrit, as a matter of fact, in any language of the world, which is so widely read and so highly esteemed as the *Bhagavadgītā*. There is no language in India and one hardly outside India into which it has not been translated. The message of the *Gīta* is universal in nature. Its teachings are meant for all irrespective of caste, creed, sex and age. Its teachings appeal to all and more particularly, to the Hindus, because their life is rigidly regulated on the lines taught in the *Gītā*. It is only in India that one can easily find a harmonious synthesis between life and philosophy, and Religion and Philosophy. Religion in India is nothing but the actual life, unmixed with foreign traditions, which a true Hindu leads. Thus both Philosophy and Religion represented by the teachings of the Śāstras, including the *Gītā*, and the pure and simple life of a Hindu, all aim at the same highest goal, the True Knowledge of the Ultimate, called the Absolute or the Bliss. The teachings of the Śāstras, including those of the *Gītā*, are found reflected in the very life and thought of a Hindu proceeding on regular and natural lines. The teachings of the *Gitā* appeal to the inner-sense and are in tune with the natural devotional feelings of Hindus in all the aspects of their life—Action, Devotion and Knowledge. No conflict of any nature is found in this book. In fact, its teachings are really

Popularity and importance of the *Gītā*.

Harmonious synthesis between Life, Philosophy and Religion.

[5] *Gītā*. IV. 39.

meant to remove all conflicts which overpower one who is ignorant of the Truth and is beset with the defect of imbecility (kārpaṇya) like Arjuna.

Teachings of the *Gītā* are meant to remove conflicts found in one's life.

3. *Genuineness of the Text and the Teachings of the Gītā*

The question of the text of the *Gītā* is linked with that of the *Mahābhārata,* as the former forms part of the latter. But that the *Gītā* forms a genuine part of the *Mahābhārata* is itself questioned. There are critics who feel grave doubts as to the possibility of Arjuna's and Kṛṣṇa's entering into a very long and not easy, philosophical dialogue, regarding the theories of Action, Devotion and Knowledge, etc., leading to the Final Emancipation of the Jīvātman from bondage, at a crucial moment when the two armies were drawn out in array to fight to the end. This they feel to be quite unnatural. They also say that the whole episode seems to be quite queer and fantastic at such a juncture. Both Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa lived together since their very childhood and had enough opportunities in their life prior to their appearance in the battle-field to discuss such difficult topics in calm and cool atmosphere. But they never did that. So the whole of the *Gītā* seems to be only an interpolation.

Genuine character of the text of the *Gītā* discussed.

Objection—Teachings of the Gītā not possible to be imparted in the battle-field.

In answer to the above it may be said that prior to their appearance in the battle-field Arjuna had never been put in such serious circumstances. So he never felt the necessity of putting such questions to Kṛṣṇa, nor had the latter any opportunity or reason to tell the former all that has been said in the *Gītā* at such a juncture. The reason for this is quite simple. As long as a man is confident of his own *pauruṣa* and has full faith in his own strength and capacities to guide himself in all his activities, he does not, and should not, beg for the mercy of others, may he be the Lord Himself. This may be possible for an idler, and for most inactive persons who in spite of their own capacities

Position of Arjuna in the *Gītā*.

Reasons why the teachings of the *Gītā* could not be given before.

would like to be served and helped by others in every activity of their life. But Arjuṇa was not a person of that type. Again, as long as a person wholly relies upon himself, he retains his egoistic feelings and would not like to admit his inferiority and submit himself even to a higher power. But unless a man admits his weaknesses, crushes his egoism and surrenders himself to the right person, there is no possibility of getting any mercy even from any disinterested person or higher power, and consequently, no teaching of Knowledge is ever possible to be acquired. Arjuna was, undoubtedly, a very great warrior and had performed several austere penances to win the sympathy of superior Powers and had also acquired invincible weapons and was over-confident of his victory through his own *pauruṣa*. So he had no occasion ever before to feel that he had so much weakness. He had never thought that his limbs would give way, mouth would be dried up and hairs would stand on their ends due to his imbecility. He had never dreamt even that his invincible bow, namely *Gāṇḍīva,* would slip away from his hand and that his skin would burn (at the sight of his enemies). He had never thought that his mind would ever reel and that he would not be able even to stand on his legs in the battle-field.

Proper moment to receive higher teachings (upadeśa).

Arjuna's miserable condition at the time when the teachings of the *Gītā* were imparted.

But we know from the *Gītā* itself that the circumstances changed and that all these things did actually happen and Arjuna had to admit his weaknesses and inability to know the Path of Duty. He himself says : " O Kṛṣṇa! I do not desire victory, nor kingdom, nor pleasure . . . I do not want to kill these relations of ours though they may kill me, even for the sovereignty of the three worlds . . . . Alas! we have decided to commit a great sin in that due to lust for throne and enjoyment we are bent upon killing our own kinsmen . . . We do not know which is better for us—to fight or not to fight, nor do we know whether we shall win, nor do we know whether they will conquer us."[6] So "with my very nature tainted

Arjuna's admission of his weakness.

[6] *Bhagavadgītā*, I. 32–35 ; 45 ; II. 6.

by the defect of imbecility and my mind puzzled with regard to Duty, I am asking you (O Lord). Tell me that which is decidedly proper (for me). I am your disciple. Pray instruct me who has surrendered unto you".[7] "Having said so, with his mind confused with grief in the battle-field, and having laid down his bow and arrows, Arjuna sank into the hinder part of his chariot".[8]

Arjuna's admission of his ignorance of the true nature of Kṛṣṇa, prior to this moment due to his egoistic embecility.

It may also be mentioned here that Arjuna due to his over-confidence in himself, did not realize the greatness of Kṛṣṇa before they went to the battle-field, otherwise, most probably Arjuna would have tried to know the Truth from the Lord even before. So says Arjuna, " Under the impression that you are my friend, whatever words, such as, O Kṛṣṇa, O Yādava, O Friend, I happened to say rashly were due to my ignorance of this greatness of Yours. This fact, indeed, was due to my carelessness or affection. Whatever offence was done to You by way of cutting jokes with You while playing, reposing in bed, sitting and eating either alone or before friends, O Acyuta! I beg You, the Boundless One, to forgive me for all that".[9] "Hence with my body prostrate, I propitiate You, the Lord, worthy of praise. O Lord, it behoves You not to mind my faults as a father does for his son, a friend for his friend, or a husband for his wife".[10]

Arjuna surrenders himself to the Lord and prays for being excused.

Arjuna at the mercy of the Lord.

But through the Grace and Mercy of that very Lord, or due to his own Karmic force of the past, or that of all the Pāṇḍavas, Arjuna did not run away from the battle-field and the fate of the great Kuru War did not take altogether a different turn. A sudden ray of hope entered into the mind of Arjuna and he at once threw himself at the mercy of the Lord who was also very closely watching the changes taking place in Arjuna's mind. Arjuna prayed to Him, as mentioned earlier, for showing him the Path of Duty. Thereupon the World-Teacher saw the defeat of Egoism and realized the

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7 *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 7.

8 *Bhagavadgītā,* I. 47.

9 *Bhagavadgītā,* XI. 41—42.

10 *Bhagavadgītā,* XI. 44.

sincerity of Arjuna's desires and finding him fully qualified (adhikārī) for receiving the Secret Knowledge, and feeling compassion for His old and most devoted and loving friend, came at once to his help and taught him the secrets of that Knowledge which alone can lead one to the right path.

Arjuna, a distressed person and a sincere seeker after the Truth.

The world-Teacher atonce condescends to Arjuna and imparts him the best teachings.

Arjuna was at this crucial moment really a distressed person and a sincere seeker after the Truth and so he took refuge in the Lord. It is under such circumstances alone that a man remembers God and seeks His mercy and help. The Lord, as promised before says, "Give up all other duties, take refuge in Me alone. I shall make you free from all sins, do not grieve,"[11] and at once without any delay appears before the devotee and protects him. It should never be overlooked that the Lord, the World-Teacher, though always very eager to impart His best teachings to His disciple, is at the same time very keen to test the fitness of the devotee (adhikāritva) to receive the Secret Knowledge. The rigidity of the test is in accordance with the spiritul grades of the realization. He wants to see the crushing defeat of Egoism which alone can make the teachings of the *Guru* most effective. He also marks very carefully the sincerity, faith, undivided devotion and eagerness of the disciple to learn the Truth. We know the test which Naciketas was put to by the God of Death before the Secret Knowledge of the Ātman was imparted to him.[12] Arjuna, likewise satisfied all the conditions for being a true disciple and then there was no delay for the Knowledge to manifest.

The World Teacher is eager to test the *adhikāritva* of his disciple.

Knowledge dawns upon the right disciple without any delay after he has passed through the rigid test.

Thus, this was a unique opportunity for the Lord to preach His *Gītā*. He could not postpone it. He decided to strike while the iron was hot. An opportunity missed never comes back. We must not forget that just as it is difficult to get the favour of a

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11 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVII. 66.

12 *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, I

teacher like the Lord, so it is also to get a disciple like Arjuna.[13] It is through the most qualified disciple alone that the true merit of the teacher becomes known.

Both a proper teacher and a proper disciple are rare.

Knowledge also thrives fully only when it is imparted to a really qualified pupil and not otherwise. So there was no reason why the Lord should delay any more and accordingly, He told Arjuna then and there all about the Highest Truth, the aim of life and philosophy. And He says, "This Knowledge more secret than the secrecy itself, has been imparted to you (O Arjuna) by Me. Having reflected upon it fully do as you like. Hear, again, My supreme word, the most secret of all. You are very dear to Me, so I shall tell you for your well-being. Have your mind quite absorbed in Me, be devoted to Me, do sacrifice to Me, and bow down to Me; so shall you without doubt attain Me. This I truly promise to you as you are dear to Me. Give up all other duties, take refuge in Me alone. I shall make you free from all sins, do not grieve".[14]

The Lord became satisfied with Arjuna and taught him the Truth.

The Lord wants to assure and reassure repeatedly Arjuna that when the latter had taken refuge in Him, he should not ever cherish the least doubt about what the Lord had told him and that all his responsibilities would rest thereafter in the Lord Himself. Having done His own duty, the Lord also, like all other teachers, wants to be assured by His disciple that he has attentively followed all that has been taught and that he has been benefitted by His teachings and has really achieved the Highest End.

The Lord takes the entire responsibility of the disciple upon Himself.

The Teacher wants to be assured that the disciples have followed his teachings correctly and have been benefitted by them.

Arjuna, in reply to this says: "O Acyuta! my delusion has been destroyed and Knowledge has been obtained by me through Your Grace. I stand firm, my doubt is dispelled and I shall carry out Your Orders."[15]

Arjuna becomes free from delusion.

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13 Vide *Kaṭhopaniṣad* for similar ideas, I. i. 22; I. ii. 7–9.

14 *Bhagavadgītā,* XVII. 63–66.

15 *Bhagavadgītā,* XVIII. 73.

Then again, we should not forget what has been repeatedly told in the *Gītā* itself by the Lord Himself, and as we also realize within ourselves through the Grace of that very Lord, that Kṛṣṇa is the Paramātman Himself, otherwise there could not have been such bold assertions from Kṛṣṇa Himself about Himself and His own Powers. Thus, there should be no doubt that the whole of the *Bhagavadgītā* was actually taught in the battle-field. We may also note what can the Omniscient Lord not achieve? Time and space are His own creations and they move through the influence of His Māyā which is so mysterious that even the great ṛṣis and the gods could not know her unfathomable secrets. He can easily, at His sweet will, turn a very long duration of time into a moment, and a moment into thousand years. He could preach the whole of the *Gītā* in a moment, or even in less than a moment. The fact is that all His deeds are Divine and are beyond the influence of time and space and it was possible to preach the whole of the *Gītā,* as it is, and demonstrate His *Viśvarūpa* in Divine manner alone. Not only this, even Arjuna had to be given the divine sight to see the *Viśvarūpa.*[16] So we should not think of the deeds of the Lord in the manner we think of the deeds of human beings. Otherwise, everything will be confused and no useful purpose will be ever served, so there should not be the least doubt as to the possibility of the teaching of the entire *Bhagavadgītā* on that very crucial occasion. Hence, it is not an interpolation in the *Mahābhārata*. It is a genuine piece of Divine teachings.

Kṛṣṇa is the Paramātman Himself.

The *whole* of the *Gītā* was taught actually in the battle-field.

Time and space are the creations of the Lord and are controlled by Him.

The deeds of the Lord are divine.

Several theories have been advanced from time to time about the date of the *Mahābhārata* ranging from the second century before Christ to 3018 B.C. Indian scholars like C. V. Vaidya, Karandikar and others are of opinion that the war commenced in December on the 11th or the 13th day of the white part of the month of Mārgaśīrṣa, 3102 B.C. and that the *Bhagavadgītā* was preached on the

Date of the Mahābhārata War.

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16 *Bhagavadgītā,* XI. 8.

morning of that very day. Prof. V. B. Athavale of Nasika has recently fixed 3018 B.C. as the year when the Kuru war commenced. Professor Tarkeshwara Bhattacharya has, however, shown that the Mahābhārata war must have begun in 1432-31 B.C. But then it may not be possible to hold that the *Gītā*, as it is today with all its 18 chapters, was recited on that very day. The presence of Sañjaya in different chapters clearly shows that much was added to the main teachings afterwards. We know that Vyāsa is its author who wrote the whole of the *Mahābhārata*. This must have taken place some time later than the war. There being no reference to Buddhism anywhere, it is presumed that the *Bhagavadgītā* must have been written before the 5th century B.C. Some critics however, on the basis of certain non-Pāṇinian expressions found in the text of the *Gītā*, like to place its composition even before the 6th century B.C., the date of Pāṇini. Indeed, on the basis of certain references to the calculation of the beginning of the year from the month of Mārgaśīrṣa, they like to place the date of its composition earlier than 1900 B.C. Prof. V. B. Athavale, however, holds that the *Gītā* was composed in 3018 B.C.[17] This is only a probable date.

The date of the composition of the *Mahābhārata* and consequently, that of the *Gītā*, is much later.

In spite of all this and what the modern critics have said regarding the genuineness of the *Gītā*, it should be kept in our mind that the text as it is before us today in 18 chapters consisting of 700 verses is the genuine text as fixed by Vyāsa, the original author of the book.

The extent of the *Gītā*.

4. *The Highest Goal of Life*

The highest goal shown by the *Gītā* has been described as 'Anāmayaṁ Padaṁ[18]—state of existence which is free from pain and sorrow,[19] 'Paraṁ' — the Highest Reality,[20] 'Brahmanirvāṇa'—Absorption in Brhaman,[21] 'Sanā-

Nature of the highest goal.

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17 *Vide*, J. G. R. I., Vol. IV, Pt. 2, p. 157.

18 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 51.

19 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 51.

20 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 59.

21 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 72.

tanaṁ Brahma'—Eternal Brahman,[22] 'Parā śānti'—Supreme Peace,[23] 'Naiṣṭhikī Śānti'—Peace born of purity and devotion,[24]—'Tatparamaṁ'—That Highest Truth,[25] 'Akṣayaṁ Sukhaṁ'—Eternal Bliss,[26] 'Nirvāṇa Paramā śānti'—Peace which culminates in Nirvāṇa,[27] Ātyantikaṁ Sukhaṁ—Absolute happiness,[28] 'Parāṁ gatiṁ'—Supreme Goal,[29] 'Anuttamā gati'—Highest goal,[30] 'Paraṁ Bhāvaṁ'—Supreme state of Existence.[31] Besides, it is that in which the 'citta', being restrained by the practice of yoga, ceases and that in which one becomes satisfied within his own Ātman by seeing his own Ātman through the help of his own Ātman; and again, that in which one realizes absolute happiness which is to be grasped through purified subtle intellect. It is beyond the reach of sense-organs, and wherefrom one, being once established, does not move. It is that after attaining which, one does not consider any other gain greater, and being established in which one is not moved even by a great calamity.[32] This the Lord calls His own 'Paramaṁ Dhāma',[33] and one who goes there, reaches the highest goal and does not return from there.[34]

Means to achieve the highest goal.

With a strong desire to achieve the above mentioned goal a person should completely give up all the desires produced out of saṅkalpa and should have control over all the sense - organs from all sides through manas. He should then gradually attain tranquillity with the help of buddhi (intellect) which is well-fixed in resoluteness. He should not think of anything else after having focussed well his manas in the Ātman.[35]

Besides, he should do his duty free from attachment, passion, aversion and never with a desire to experience the result of his action. He should realize the nature of the Lord and be exclusively devoted to Him. He should leave everything else and surrender

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22 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 31.
23 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 39.
24 *Bhagavadgītā,* V. 12.
25 *Bhagavadgītā,* V. 16.
26 *Bhagavadgītā,* V. 21.
27 *Bhagavadgītā,* VI. 15.
28 *Bhagavadgītā,* VI. 21.
29 *Bhagavadgītā,* VI. 45.
30 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 18.
31 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 24.
32 *Bhagavadgītā,* VI. 20—22.
33 *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 21.
34 *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 21.
35 *Bhagavadgītā,* VI. 24—45.

himself to the Lord. Whatever he does, he should do it for the sake of the Lord. The manas can be brought under control only by constant practice (abhyāsa) of the above.

While describing the various means to be followed for the attainment of the Knowledge, and which may be called the very forms of it, the Lord says—"Absence of self-estimation, absence of deceitfulness, forgiveness, simplicity, devotional service to the Ācārya, physical and mental purity, steadiness of citta, self-control, absence of passion towards the objects of senses and also the absence of egoism, realization of the defects arising from the pain of birth, death, old age and disease, absence of attachment (towards the objects of the world), absence of self-identification with son, wife, home etc., state of the equilibrium of citta for all time on obtaining things liked and disliked, unwavering spiritual devotion to the Lord with the help of regular yogic practices, resort to solitude, absence of attachment to the society of people, constant steadiness in the knowledge of the Ātman, and the realization of the Highest Truth, all this is said to be the Knowledge and that which is opposed to this, is ignorance.[36]

Manifestation of jñāna and its effects.

Through the constant practice of action without any desire for its fruit, with the sense-organs fully subdued, a seeker after the truth will acquire knowledge by 'praṇipāta' (surrendering one's self to the teacher), paripraśna (enquiries) and sevā (devotional service). Such a Knowledge will prevent infatuation, like that of Arjuna, and will help the devotee to realize the universality of the Ātman within himself and also the identity between the Jīva and the Brahman.

All sins and wrongs disappear at the dawn of the Knowledge.

All sins and wrongs will disappear when the Knowledge manifests itself. This will make the fruits of all the actions ineffective. Such a Knowledge is the purest and is attained by one who is fit for Mukti through the Yogic practices. This again, is possible only when the person is full of Faith with conviction and has subdued all his senses. After this the Knowledge thus acquired will bring to him the 'Supreme Peace' which is the highest

36 *Bhagavadgītā*, XII. 7–11.

goal of life, dharma and philosophy[37] wherefrom one does not fall down.

5. *The Teachings of the Gītā*

Before we deal with some other teachings of the *Gītā* it is most essential to keep in mind that the Lord has taught Arjuna the Truth from the Pāramārthika, wordly (vyāvahārika) and social (sāmājika) standpoints. So according to the highest standard of judgment the Lord says that the Universal soul is eternal, death is only a stage or an occasion to change the perishable and imposed garb of the Soul for a new one.[38] Nothing under heavens is ever destroyed, not to speak of that which is eternal and unchanging.[39] The physical organism is perishable and not the Ātman.[40] The soul never dies and it is never drenched or dried up.[41] It is omnipresent, immovable, constant and everlasting.[42] "So, O Arjuna!" says the Lord, "You need not be grieved if their (Kauravas') physical organisms are destroyed by you."[43]

Conception of the Universal Soul from the *Pāramārthika* point of view.

Looking at the same question from different angle of vision, that is, the worldly point of view, the Lord says, "O Arjuna! if you regard this Ātman constantly born and constantly dead even then these persons are bound to die, as both death and birth of one who is born are inevitable. So you need not feel at all grieved if they are killed."[44]

Nature of the Ātman from the worldly point of view.

Again, the Lord says, " O Arjuna; you are a Kṣattriya. It is your duty to fight in the battlefield. There is no higher virtue for a Kṣattriya than a righteous war. It is only the lucky amongst the Kṣattriyas who get such an unsolicited opportunity for war. If you do not fight in this righteous war, you shall not only fall from your duty and lose honour, but also shall incur sin. People will only lightly think of you and they will

Nature of the Ātman from the social standard of judgment.

37 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 34–39.
38 *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 13, 22.
39 *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 16, 17, 20.
40 *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 18, 20.
41 *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 23–25.
42 *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 24.
43 *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 27.
44 *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 26–27.

defame you, and you know that dishonour for one who enjoys popular esteem is worse than death. And suppose for a moment that you are yourself killed, you shall go to heaven, and if you be victorious, you shall enjoy the earth. Hence, treating alike pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat, get ready for the battle. You will not incur any sin."[45]

This is the teaching which was imparted to Arjuna by the Lord. He has tried to convince Arjuna from different angles of vision and from different stand-points and He has been quite successful in His effort. The same He emphasises through the teachings of the performance of action without any desire for its fruit.

Main outlook of the entire teaching of the *Gītā* is Perfect Knowledge.

We must remember that though Action without any desire for its fruit and undivided Devotion towards the Lord have been given prominent place in the *Gītā,* yet the main emphasis of the entire teaching is on Perfect Knowledge. Both Action and Devotion terminate in Knowledge.[46] It is very difficult to state clearly the reciprocal relations among these three. It may, however, be said that Knowledge is at the root of both Action and Devotion. Without Knowledge neither can there be any Action, nor can there be any Devotion. But this Knowledge should not be confounded with the Highest Knowledge which is the direct means of Final liberation or which may be said to be identical with the very Truth, Brahman itself, who is described as Satya, Jñāna, Ananta, etc.[47] This Highest Knowledge is certainly brought about by the highest Devotion. It is the most indispensable cause for that Knowledge. It is only when the enquirer surrenders himself to the Mercy of the Knower, then alone True Knowledge manifests itself and not before. Arjuna did possess all the ordinary knowledge, but that did not help him in the battle-field. The Lord told him all about the True Knowledge which alone could remove his by

Both Action and Devotion terminate in Knowledge.

Relation between jñāna, bhakti and karman.

Highest type of devotion alone leads to the Truth, that is, Perfect Knowledge.

45 *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 31–38.
46 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 33.
47 *Nārāyaṇottaratāpinyupaniṣad,* I. 5.

delusion only when he showed his highest type of Devotion, called, *prapatti* or *ātmanivedana* and thereby proved his entire fitness for receiving the sacred Secret Knowledge. Though the highest Devotion becomes manifest through Action, meaning upāsanā, etc. alone, yet it does not stop at that. The external and grosser action may gradually stop after the highest Devotion has become manifest, but the subtler forms of Action, such as, the psychic activities, do continue even after that and they may stop, or even continue after the Highest Knowledge manifests itself. So it has been said, "All action comes to an end in Knowledge".[48] Thus, we see that even after *prapatti* Arjuna did continue Action and was also taught to continue the same though without any idea of reaping any fruit of it. This sort of Action continues even when the True Knowledge has become manifest as we find in the case of *sthitaprajña* or *jīvanmukta*.

Grosser action stops but its subtler aspect continues even after Knowledge manifests itself.

Devotion and devotee have been very much praised in the *Gītā*. The Lord says, "That Supreme Puruṣa in Whom all beings reside and by Whom all this is pervaded is attainable only through exclusive Devotion."[49] "Those who devoutly worship Me, abide in Me and I also manifest Myself in them."[50] It was only because of exclusive Devotion towards the Lord that Arjuna could get a vision of the Viśvarūpa.[51] Again, the Lord says, "He who constantly worships Me through the yoga of exclusive devotion, goes beyond the influence of the three elements–sattva, rajas and tamas, and becomes eligible for attaining Brahman."[52] Again, He says, "Those who devoutly worship Me and abide in Me, I stand by them."[53] Thus, it is clear from the above that Bhakti, meaning exclusive Devotion with a mind not devoted to anything else, is most essential for attaining Supreme Knowledge.

Place of Devotion and devotee in the *Gītā*.

Exclusive Devotion is most essential for attaining Supreme Knowledge.

For a true devotee, it is not only necessary to have *śraddhā* or faith but also to be equipped with all

48 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 33.
49 *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 22.
50 *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 29.
51 *Bhagavadgītā,* XI. 54.
52 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIV. 26.
53 *Bhagavadgītā,* XI. 29.

physical and mental discipline. All this leads to Yoga, meaning, 'communion with higher power.' The word 'Yoga' has been explained in three different ways in the *Gītā*: First, 'Yoga' has been defined as *'Samatvam yoga ucyate'*,[54] that is, the state of equanimity in regard to success and failure is called 'Yoga'. The next definition is *'Yogaḥ karmasu kauśalaṁ'*,[55] that is, the skill which through the state of equanimity in regard to success and failure, turns actions into means of achieving the highest end, is called 'Yoga'. There is practically no difference between these two explanations. What we mean by 'the State of equanimity' is practically the same as 'the skill in action'. It is the state of equanimity which alone turns all our actions into the means of achieving the highest end. Then, there is the third definition: *'Duḥkhasaṁyoga-viyoga'*,[56] meaning, 'Yoga' is the dissociation with the contact of pain', which is possible only through the state of equanimty in regard to pain and pleasure, success and failure, etc. So practically, all these mean the same.

Meaning of the word 'Yoga' in the *Gītā*.

In order to achieve the state of equanimity it is necessary that one should practise and observe the discipline of body and mind sitting on a comfortable seat in a neat, pure and lonely place, having subdued all his sense-organs and observing celebacy and fearlessly directing the attention of the mind towards the Lord.[57] Constant practice of this without too much food, or exclusively abstaining from food, and without too much sleep, or exclusively without sleep, a man can become successful in his efforts to become a Yogin. He should be free from all desires and attachments towards any wordly object. Then alone he achieves peace of mind and absolute happiness; and firmness in these will take him to the highest aim. One should proceed gradually in this practice with great firmness and should not allow his mind to be restless. Then alone he can be a *samadarśī* and acquire an outlook of universal equanimity. He will then see the Universal Self present in all beings and will also see all beings present in the Lord. This is the Highest End

Discipline of body and mind is most essential for the realization of the Truth.

54 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 48.
55 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 50.
56 *Bhagavadgītā*, VI. 23.
57 *Bhagavadgītā*, VI. 11–14.

which through 'Yoga' one can achieve. Nothing remains to be acquired after this.

Achievements of yogic practices are never lost.

Although one who practises 'Yoga' may not fully succeed in it in one life, yet his labour will not be lost even in death. After death such a person either takes birth in the family of a yogin or that of a rich man and acquires a natural instinct for the yogic practices and begins them actually where he had left them in the previous birth and then he succeeds in achieving the Highest Aim of life and philosophy in due course.

Gītā lays much stress on the discipline of body and mind.

For the achievement of the Highest Aim the *Gītā* lays much stress on the discipline of body and mind. Efforts should be made to purify the inner-sense-organs; then alone he can bring about the realization of the Truth. This is possible through the predomination of Sāttvika element in every activity of our life. Without it no purification of the inner-sense-organs is ever possible.

Sāttvika element should be made prominent in one's own life.

Gītā teaches synthesis of Life, Philosophy and Religion.

The *Gītā* teaches a synthesis between life, philosophy and religion. There is no antagonism among Action, Devotion and Knowledge. A true jñānin must have been a true devotee and a 'karmayogin'. It is, therefore, that the Lord has said, "It is the ignorant, not the wise, who say that Sāṅkhya (Knowledge) and (Karma)yoga (Action, without the desire for fruits thereof) are productive of divergent results. For one, who is firmly established in either, gets the fruit of both (that is, the realization of the Supreme Truth). The supreme state which is reached by the 'Sāṅkhya-yogin' is attained also by the 'Karmayogin.' Therefore, he who sees them as one, really sees."[58] In reality, Dualism is not the ultimate aim of the *Gītā*. Through all the means it teaches us to realize the Absolute Monistic reality which is the highest aim to be achieved from the Pāramārthika point of view. But this Absolute Monism of the *Gītā* is quite different from that of the Śaṅkara Vedānta.

Absolute Monism is the Highest teaching of the *Gītā*.

[58] *Bhagavadgītā*, V. 4–5.

6. *The Need of These Teachings*

Control of sense-organs essential for happiness.

There are temptations in the world. The sense-organs being the evolutes of the rajas are by nature restless and are capable of forcibly carrying away the manas towards the objects of worldly pleasure.[59] Musing upon those objects a man becomes attached to them and a strong blind desire is born in him which leads to anger when his desire is opposed. Anger, in its turn, causes infatuation which leads to the confusion of memory. The faculty of understanding becomes destroyed due to the confusion of memory, which leads a man to ruin.[60] Such being the danger ahead, one should have full control over one's sense-organs by which alone a man becomes completely happy.[61]

Aim of the teachings of the *Gītā*.

The highest aim of life and philosophy and also that of dharma according to the *Gītā*, and as a matter of fact, according to all the Śāstras, is to remove infatuation (moha) and grief (śoka) which make the mind of a man bewildered about the performance of his Duty (dharma). In fact, when a man is made imbecile by grief and infatuation, he fails to attend to his righteous duties and engages himself in doing things not conducive to the welfare of any one. Even if perchance he attends to his own duty, he does so with attachment and egoism. All this causes pain and one has to take birth repeatedly in order to get rid of it. It is, therefore, necessary to put an end to the very root cause of this painful existence.

Teachings of the *Gītā* begins with the infatuation of Arjuna and ends with the removal of it.

The entire teaching of the *Gīta* is meant for this. The teachings of the Lord begin with the infatuation of Arjuna[62] and so after having expounded His teachings, the Lord asked Arjuna, "O Pārtha! have you heard with your undivided mind all that I have said and has your infatuation, due to nescience, been removed by it?" To this Arjuna says in reply, "O Acyuta! my infatuation has been destroyed and memory has been restored through Your Grace. I am now firm, my doubt is gone and I shall carry out Your orders."[63]

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59 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 60.

60 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 62–63.

61 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 64.

62 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 7

63 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 72–73.

7. *The Teachings Summed up*

It must be made clear here that the functioning of the manas and that of the Prāṇa, both are required to be inter-related for achieving the highest end. So says the *Gītā,* "At the time of death, one who remembers the Omniscient, Ancient (puruṣa), Enjoiner (anuśāsitā), the Subtlest of the subtle, the Supporter of all, the Unimaginable, One Who shines like the sun and Who is above the tamas, having firmly placed his Prāṇa in between the eye-brows with firm manas and yogic powers and devotion, attains the Divine Highest Puruṣa."[64] Again, the *Gītā* says, "Having controlled all the doors of the body (the nine dvāras), having restrained the manas in the heart, and with his Prāna firmly fixed in the mūrdhan (sensory), with the help of *'Yoga-dhāraṇa',* one who, while uttering the single syllable—*Om* which is the same as Brahman, and remembering Me, leaves this body and goes out, he attains the highest goal (paramā gati).[65]

Functions of Manas and Prāṇa at the time of the realisation of the highest goal.

In other words, (1) closing of all the nine doors of the body, through any one of which alone the Jīva goes out at the time of death (namely, the two ears, one mouth, two nostrils, two eyes, one organ of generation and one anus), (2) restraining the manas in the heart, (3) and firmly fixing the Prāṇas in between the two eyebrows and in the sensory—all this precedes (4) the remembering of the Lord, (5) and the utterance of the single syllable *Om.* All the nine doors having been closed the Jīva moving upwards must find out some other door to go out of this body. Such an outlet is the tenth door, called *'Brahmarandhra.'* This is directly connected with the *'Suṣumnā-nāḍī'* and the Jīva which goes out through this gate, never returns to this world again.

The means or the sādhana for the attainment of the highest goal, prescribed in the *Gītā,* may be thus finally summed up:

Means of attaining the highest goal summed up.

(1) The seeker after the highest goal should never desire to reap the fruit of his actions.[66]

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64 *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 9–10. 65 *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 12–13.
66 *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 51 ; XII. 12.

(2) He should always perform his action, of course, without any attachment towards its fruits.[67]

(3) He should be free from kāma, krodha, lobha and moha.[68]

(4) He should be above the influence of *dvandvas* and be pleased with whatever he gets. That is, he should not be moved either by pain, or by pleasure.[69]

(5) He should have full control over his external sense-organs and antaḥkaraṇas.[70]

(6) He should have unwavering faith (śraddhā) in the Lord.[71]

(7) He should be exclusively devoted to the Lord and every action of his should be for the sake of the Lord.[72]

(8) He should surrender himself to Lord with devotion and faith.[73]

(9) He should acquire jñāna and realize the true nature of the Lord.[74]

(10) He should be happy within himself, and feel the identity of his empirical self with the Lord.[75]

(11) He should be pure; live in a solitary place; take light food, restrain his speech, body and manas; be constantly engaged in meditation; and be fully devoted to non-attachment.[76]

(12) He should try to acquire the discipline of mind and body in such a way that he should definitely remember Him alone at the time of his death.[77] This is the most important

67 *Bhagavadgītā,* III. 19.
68 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 10, V. 26, XVIII. 53.
69 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 22.
70 *Bhagavadgītā,* II. 60–61, III. 41, V. 28, VI. 24, XII. 4.
71 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 39, VI. 47; XII. 8–10 and 20.
72 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 10; V. 17; VIII, 8; VIIII 22; IX. 27; XII. 6.
73 *Bhagavadgītā,* XVIII. 55, 66.
74 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 10. VII. 17–18.
75 *Bhagavadgītā,* V. 24, VII. 5.
76 *Bhagavadgītā,* XVIII. 52.
77 *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 5, 13.

of all the teachings. It is for this that one has to train himself throughout his life.

These are some of the main teachings of the *Gītā* which equip a seeker after the truth to realize the highest goal of life from where he never comes back to this world again.

8. *Place of Karman in the Gītā*

Action aspect of philosophy aims at worldly or heavenly pleasures.

WE have seen in the previous chapters that the *Saṁhitās,* the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas and portions of the Upaniṣads deal with the various aspects of Upāsanā, such as prayers, meditations, sacrifices and other forms of worship, and all aim at either worldly prosperity or heavenly pleasures. These actions merely purify the internal sense organs of the devotees and make them fit for receiving the teachings of the secret knowledge as taught in the Upaniṣads and similar other works and do not directly lead them to the highest aim. Action alone does not satisfy the cravings of the heart of devotees. Temporary peace of mind and happiness they do acquire through upāsanā, but the unsteady nature of the results of upāsanā mixed with the rational instincts and cravings of human heart goad them to go ahead and find out the ultimate means to the Highest Bliss and Happiness which having been once realized leave nothing else to be achieved. So says the Lord in the *Bhagavadgītā*: "I will expound to you, in its entirety, the knowledge and the realization (vijñāna), after (knowing) which there remains nothing else to be known again in the world".[78] For this, the devotees have not only to perform upāsanā but also to crush their egoistic feelings and to surrender themselves to That Highest Power with full faith and belief in His Mercy and Grace which will then only lead them to the Path of Eternal Light and Bliss. So says the Lord, "You should attain that knowledge through surrendering (literally, prostrat-

Action does not directly lead the devotees to the highest aim.

When the Highest Truth is realized nothing else remains to be achieved.

Highest knowledge is to be acquired through complete surrender to the Highest Power.

[78] VIII. 2.

ing) yourself at the feet of the Knower of the Truth etc.;"[79] again, "Surrendering all duties to me take shelter in me alone. I shall make you free from all sins, do not grieve."[80] All their longings for the Truth are satisfied when they hear the teachings of the great seers of the Upaniṣads about the secret knowledge. This knowledge is achieved through Action in the form of Upāsanā. Here ends the first stage of Action. So says the Lord: "O Son of Pṛthu! all action culminates entirely in knowledge".[81] This is well illustrated in the *Bhagavadgītā* itself. The Lord discloses the secret knowledge to Arjuna, when the latter, having failed to achieve the End through his own actions, surrendered himself to Him. Arjuna was never taught that Supreme Knowledge before, though he lived together with the Lord so intimately even prior to their appearance in the battle-field.

Highest knowledge is acquired through Upāsanā.

Now a question may be asked: Do all our actions simultaneously stop the moment the Highest Knowledge is imparted to us, or they cease to function gradually and thus continue even after one has achieved the Knowledge?

Does action continue even after the manifestation of the Knowledge?

We know from the details of the Law of Karman that every action, nay even a desire for action, performed with some aim or other, must bear its corresponding result. This, again, may be possible in this very life or in future lives.[82] It is for experiencing the fruits of such actions that we have to take births and rebirths and as there is no beginning of the creation and of births, no one can say what amount of past actions (sañcita-karman) is lying hoarded in the hidden treasures for the fructification of which one has to take births and rebirths; so in the ordinary course the chain of births and rebirths may never come to an end and final emancipation may be simply impossible. Hence, in order to realize the Highest Bliss, it is

Every action, nay even a desire, must bear its fruit.

79 *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 34.

80 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII, 66.

81 *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 33.

82 *Vijñānadīpikā* of Padmapādācārya, verse 10. Edited by Mm. Dr. Umesha Mishra, Allahabad.

necessary that all future births and rebirths, which are at the root of all the miseries, should be stopped. And again, for putting an end to this cycle of births and rebirths, it is most essential to crush the very seed of all these. That is, before the Highest Aim is achieved one should not only stop all the desires to reap the fruits of one's actions but also should crush the very dispositions (vāsanās) of such desires.[83] So says Śaṅkarācārya : "Whenever any one performs an action moved by the desire to reap the fruit of one's own action, the very result of that action becomes the cause of his next birth."[84] In other words, it is most essential for the seekers after the Truth to be free from all desires of experiencing the fruits of action.[85]

All desires and Saṁskāras should be crushed and future births should be stopped.

This will certainly cut short our future births and rebirths. But what of those actions which have accumulated in the infinite past? Unless they also become ineffective and stop to yield fruits, there can be no Final Emancipation. It is in the Jñāna-kāṇḍa of our Upaniṣads that solution is found for this. We find that the above mentioned aim can be finally achieved through Jñāna as taught in the Upaniṣads. When the perfect knowledge is achieved, then alone all the wrong notions are dispelled, Truth is manifested, Ātman is dissociated with all that is non-Ātman and assumes its own *Svarūpa;* so that not only the Jīvātman is cut off from the present body and its activities but also from those actions and their results which were acquired in its previous births. So says the Lord : "As the blazing fire reduces the fuel to ashes, O Arjuna, even the Fire of Knowledge reduces all actions to ashes.[86]

Accumulated actions of the past should also be made ineffective.

Then again, it should be kept in mind that freedom from the desire of experiencing the fruits of one's actions also does not come by itself. It is Knowledge alone which crushes those desires and stops the accruing of fruits from any action in future.

Knowledge makes all past deeds ineffective.

83 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIV. 7.
84 *Bhagavadgītā-Bhāṣya,* II. 47.
85 *Bhagavadgītā,* III. 7, 9, 19.
86 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 37.

Thus, Knowledge crushes the desires and stops the fructification of actions in the present life (kriyamāṇa) being done and makes the whole store of actions of the past (sañcita) ineffective, so that no more birth and re-birth beyond the present one will ever take place. As for the present existing physical organism it is to be kept in mind that it is the result of some past action itself which has begun to yield its fruit, hence it becomes Prārabdha. At the very outset, that is, just at the time when the body (Jīva) started its fresh existence in this world, it had with it certain forces according to which all that it consists of, physical or psychical, came to be moulded according to the needs of that Jīva. In other words, these very forces appear in this world in the form of a fresh body and its accessories. Hence, the momentum of the body will continue according to the strength it had at the very start.

Present body is the result of some past action and will continue as long as the force of the past action will continue.

It is to be noted here that the *Bhagavadgītā* uses the words—'Edhāṁsi' and 'Karmāṇi' in plural,[87] thereby it means that all the three divisions of Karman become ineffective simultaneously as a result of the realization of 'Jñāna'. If it be so, then simultaneously with the realization of the 'Knowledge', the present body which is the result of the 'Prārabdha-Karma' must also fall down as dead. It will be then very difficult to explain the states of 'Jīvanmukti' and 'Sthitaprajña' in which the Jīva retains its physical body even after the achievement of the *tattvajñāna*.[88] It is perhaps because of this difficulty that almost all the commentators of the *Bhagavadgītā* exclude *'Prārabdha-Karma'*, and explain the word 'Karmāṇi' as referring to two Karmans only.

No Jīvanmukti is possible, if the knowledge makes all the forms of Karman ineffective simultaneously.

Now, in order to reconcile the above, it may be suggested that though the physical organism, which is the result of the accumulated actions which have

Reconciliation of the above difficulty.

87 *Yathaidhāṁsi* samiddhognirbhasmasātkurute'rjuna /

Jñānāgniḥ *sarvakarmāṇi* bhasmasātkurute tathā // —*Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 37.

88 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 54—55.

begun to yield fruits (Prārabdha-Karma), is maintained even after the realization of Jñāna, yet the 'Prārabdha-Karma-Phala' in the forms of pleasure and pain becomes ineffective after the Jñāna has manifested itself, that is, the person who has realized the 'Jñāna' remains unaffected by the feelings of pleasure and pain which he thinks to be the intrinsic qualities of the body and not the qualities of the Ātman. So all the *three Karmans* become ineffective as the words of the *Bhagavadgītā* indicate.[89] Then it may also be pointed out that the text uses the word *'Samiddhognih'* (inflamed fire). That is, when the *Jñāna,* like the inflamed fire, manifests in its complete effulgence, then only it makes all the three Karmans ineffective, otherwise, it affects only two and not the 'Prārabdha.'

The attainment of Jñāna makes the Prārabdhakarmaphala also ineffective and thus the plural number is quite justified.

When Jñāna manifests in all its effulgence then alone all the three karmans become ineffective, otherwise only two.

In its usual course the physical organism will go on and will stop functioning only when it exhausts all its strength without being ever interrupted by external forces. But it is also possible to see its normal course changed when some stronger force collides with it or tries to check the smooth working of it. In either case there is a danger of its being totally annihilated and assuming some such form in its place as may be most terrible. But if the progress of that is checked carefully or with some higher purpose in view, it is just possible that the movements of that body may take a different turn and appear in some other useful form. But even in this case it is to be kept in mind that the natural functioning, unless it has come to an end in its natural course, may appear in the same form somewhere else. Just as the current of a river, if carefully turned, may do some good in the changed form, but if it is handled carelessly or blocked, the result will be devastating flood all over the locality. From this it appears that the force of the Karman which has begun to fructify

Normal course of *Karmagati* changes by the interference of some stronger force and then it may assume any terrible form.

Proper handling may lead the Karman to some useful end.

89 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 37.

will come to an end in its natural course only when it exhausts itself. So they say that '*Prārabdhakarmaṇāṁ bhogādeva kṣayaḥ.*'

'Prārabdha-karma' becomes exhausted by *bhoga* alone.

Thus, it is clear that Knowledge makes the present (Kriyamāṇa) and the store of the past actions (Sañcita) ineffective, while the fructifying action (Prārabdhakarman) will exhaust itself through experiencing (bhoga) only. After this there being no cause to produce any more birth, the Final Emancipation is achieved.[90]

It will not be out of place here to refer to what the *Bhagavadgītā* has said regarding the performance of actions without any desire and also of actions with desire.

Fate of actions performed with desires and without desires.

"When one abandons all cravings of the mind and is satisfied within one's own self through one's own self, he is said to be possessed of the unwavering intellective vision (sthitaprajña)."[91]

"He who gives up all desires and performs action free from desires, egoism and thirst for enjoymnt, attains Peace."[92]

"He who realizes the unwavering steadiness in the Brahman does not get bewildered. He who acquires it even at the time of death attains absorption in the Supreme Self."[93]

"Therefore, without any attachment (for the result) perform your action (duty). By performing action without attachment man attains Supreme Bliss."[94]

"He whose undertakings are all free from desires and thoughts of the world, and whose actions are burnt up by the fire of Wisdom, him the wise call a 'Paṇḍita' ".[95]

"He who having given up attachment to action and its fruits, is ever satisfied and has got over the dependence, does nothing at all though he may be ever engaged in action."[96]

"He who is free from all cravings, has restrained his senses and mind and is free from all other concerns, even performing bodily action, does not incur any sin."[97]

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90 *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 39.
91 II. 55.
92 II. 71.
93 II. 72.
94 III. 19.
95 IV. 19.
96 IV. 20.
97 IV. 21.

"He whose attachment has gone, whose mind is firmly fixed in Knowledge and who acts for the sake of sacrifice, all actions of that liberated man melt away."[98]

"He who dedicates all his actions to the Supreme Self and shakes off all attachments, is not tinged by sins as a lotus-leaf remains untouched by water."[99]

"Yogins having shaken off attachments perform action for the purification of their inner-sense."[100]

"He who is in communion with God having abandoned the fruition of action, attains permanent Supreme Peace; whereas, he who is not in communion with God and being strained in desire is attached to fruition becomes bound (to this world)."[101]

"When a man ceases to have any attachment either for the objects of senses or for actions and has renounced all thoughts of the world, he is said to have attained Yoga."[102]

"If taking recourse to the yoga of realization you are unable to do this even, then subduing your mind, senses, etc., abandon the fruit of all actions."[103]

"From the renunciation of the fruit of actions immediately follows Peace."[104]

"He is said to be Sāttvika who is given to the practice of yoga and is free from the desire to reap the fruit of his action."[105]

"Seekers after Liberation perform the various acts of penance, sacrifice and give away gifts without having any desire for the fruit of their action."[106]

"Therefore, O Son of Pṛthu! my considered and best opinion is that these acts of sacrifice, penance, and gifts and all other duties, must be performed having shaken off the attachment and fruit (of those actions)."[107]

"O Arjuna! if the Obligatory Action is performed in the sense that it is but a Duty to be done, by casting off attachment and fruit, then that is regarded as a Sāttvika form of relinquishment."[108]

"Since it is not possible for embodied beings to renounce all actions completely, hence it is said that he

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98 IV. 23.
99 V. 10.
100 V. 11.
101 V. 12.
102 VI. 4.
103 XII. 11.
104 XII. 12.
105 XVII. 17.
106 XVII. 25.
107 XVIII. 6.
108 XVIII. 8.

who renounces the fruit of action has really renounced."[109]

"That action which is performed without passion or hatred and is free from attachment by one who does not seek its fruit is said to be Sāttvika.[110]

"He is said to be a Rājasika doer who is passionate, greedy and seeks the fruit of his actions."[34]

"The Firmness (dhṛti) by which the man who seeks the fruit of actions, sticks to dharma, artha and kāma, is called Rājasika."[112]

Thus from the above quotations it is clear that the desire to reap the fruit of action, which is the cause of future births and re-births and all miseries, should be crushed by those who seek after Eternal Bliss, the highest aim of life and philosophy. It has been also made clear above that the only most effective means to achieve this end is to acquire Perfect Knowledge.

Seekers after Eternal Bliss should never desire to reap the fruit of their action.

Eternal Bliss is to be achieved through Perfect Knowledge.

It will not be irrelevant to point out here that a man can never reach the state of *naiṣkarmya* without performing action, nor can he attain the highest goal simply by renouncing action.[113] In fact, nobody can remain inactive even for a moment; as all men are helplessly compelled to perform action by the force of guṇas (Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) of the Prakṛti.[114] We know that our physical organism along with its attributes is produced out of the modifications of Prakṛti,[115] and so, as long as a man retains an organism, he cannot be inactive.[116] It is also true that action is a means to achieve the highest aim[117] and when that aim is realized then only action ceases and not before.[118] So adds Śaṅkara to his *Gītā-Bhāṣya*:[119] "Ataḥ karmāṇyavidyāvasthāyāmeva codyante na vidyāvasthāyām. Vidyāyāṁ hi satyāmudite savitari śārvaramiva tamaḥ praṇāśamupaga-

State of naiṣkaramya cannot be achieved either without doing action or by renouncing action.

Action is a means to achieve the highest aim and it ceases after the aim is achieved.

109 XVIII. 11. 110 XVIII. 23. 111 XVIII. 27. 112 XVIII. 34.
113 III. 4. 114 III. 5. 115 XIII. 3–6. 116 XVIII. 11.
117 III. 20; VI. 3. 118 III. 17–18. 119 II. 69.

cchatyavidyā....Na ātmavidaḥ karmaṇyadhikāraḥ."

One who has realized Ātman should not perform action.

Hence, one should perform action. The only point which a doer of action should constantly keep in mind is that all his actions should be performed without any desire to reap their fruit and that all the actions should be done for the sake of the Lord.[120] There should be no kārma, nor any saṅkalpa in performing an action.[121]

All actions should be done without any desire for their fruit; and they should be done for the Lord.

9. *The Law of Karman*

As we have referred to the functioning of the Law of Karman above, it is necessary to describe it in some detail even by going beyond what is said about it in the *Gītā*. No one can deny the existence of avidyā or ajñāna (nescience) in this world. This has no beginning like the beginningless saṁsāra.[122] The law of Karman is the manifestation of this very avidyā. Under its influence the Jīvātman passing through various births and deaths imposes upon itself the idea of *kartṛttva* and *bhoktṛttva,* which continues as long as the avidyā lasts. Hence, action, that is, the performance of physical or mental activities, becomes invariably associated with the Jīvātman, so that the cycle of births and deaths for reaping the fruits of those actions also continues. Thus, when a man performs any deed, though it comes to an end just thereafter, yet it produces a sort of impression, called merit or demerit, according to the nature of good or bad deeds; also called Apūrva (meaning, which did not exist before); or Adṛṣṭa (that is, unseen force), which sticks to the Jīvātman (that is, subtle body) and remains with it till it becomes exhausted after yielding good or bad results in this very life or in lives after death. So, when a man performs virtuous deeds, he goes to the

Jīvātman through avidyā becomes *kartā* and *bhoktā*.

Every action leaves behind it an impression which sticks to the Jīvātman.

120 III. 9; 30.

121 V. 12.

122 XIII. 19; XIV. 16.

celestial regions, generally to the Lunar region, after his death, for experiencing the good results of those deeds.[123] There he assumes a celestial body (body mainly made of water in the case of Lunar regions) and remains there till the fruits of the good deeds which took him to those regions are gradually exhausted. But due to the remnant of other Karmic forces to be exhausted, he comes down to this earth through rains in the form of water and enters into the earth and is born in the form of rice, barley, herbs and trees, sesamum and beans etc. etc.[124] Under the influence of the Karmic residue, if it happens to be the result of good deeds, those corns will be eaten up by good parents of good family and they will produce good meritorious children. If the Karmic residue, on the other hand, happens to be the result of bad deeds, those corns will directly or indirectly enter into the body of lower creatures, such as dogs, hogs, or even a Cāṇḍāla. These will produce similar creatures of lower births.

After death Jīva goes to Lunar region to reap fruits of good deeds.

Births according to the nature of Karmic residue.

Now a question may be asked : When one has reached the Lunar region, or any other celestial region, as a result of his Karmic force and descends therefrom, does this descent take place after the total exhaustion of that force or, while there is still some remnant of it to be exhausted? In reply to this it may be said that the entire Karmic force which took him to that region is no doubt exhausted, but remnants of other Karmic force do remain; if the entire Karmic force is exhausted, then, in the first place, liberation should follow immediately while the man is still in the Lunar region, for then nothing would remain to prevent him from attaining liberation; secondly, it would not be possible for the man, on his return from those regions, to have any fresh physical organism and experience pleasure and pain, the results of the force of Karmic residue alone which in this case is taken to have been exhausted; and thirdly, it would also be

Descent of Jīvas takes place when some remnants of other karmic force still remain to be exhausted.

123 VIII. 23–27.

124 *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on *Bhagavadgītā*, VIII. 3.

contrary to what is said in such early authentic works as Smṛtis regarding man being reborn due to the force of his Karmic residue.

The facts then may be thus stated. A man reaches the Lunar or any other celestial region as a result of his Karmic force set up by his good deeds which may be completely exhausted there. But he may have done many more acts apart from those which led him to those regions, the Karmic force whereof would give him again a physical organism and experience of pleasures and pains on rebirths. In this sense we have to admit that all the Karmic forces are not exhausted when a man comes down from some celestial region for rebirth.

The results of his Karmic force which led the Jīva to higher regions become fully exhausted. But the results of the Karmic force of other deeds still remain to be exhausted and they cause the Jīva's descent.

It is said that whenever a person is born in this world such birth may be the result of any one of his numerous acts, or a set of acts, which may have to be fructified through several mutually incompatible bodies. That is to say, the man may have done acts one of which would lead to such experiences as are to be had only in a human organism, while there may be another act which would lead to the experiences possible only in an equine organism; and both these sets of experiences could not be exhausted in the course of a single birth. It is, therefore, not possible for the whole set of Karmic residue of a man to be exhausted in the course of a single birth. Further, it has been declared that there are many acts, such as the murder of a Brāhmaṇa and other similar heinous crimes, which lead to the person's birth several times. Again, Jīvas born as inanimate objects, as a result of serious wrong deeds, are entirely dull and non-intelligent. There is no possibility of their doing any such act of superior merit as would lead to an improvement in their position. And again, for those who are in the embryo-stage, there would be no possibility to be born into this world, as there would be no fresh Karmic residue between the time of their entering into the embryo and its coming out of the womb. All this shows that the experiences resulting from one's

The whole set of Karmic residue of a man cannot be exhausted in a single birth.

all past acts accumulated from previous births cannot be exhausted in normal course, in any single birth.[125]

Similarly, he who has done demeritorious deeds has to go to such regions where sufferings prevail and assume such organisms with which he can bear the results of his sufferings caused by his past evil deeds. When the result of this Karmic force becomes almost exhausted and only a very small portion remains, he has to come to this earth again, and take birth in some very low 'yoni', where again, he continues to perform similar evil deeds under the influence of his Tāmasika life due to which he has to go again and again to those regions of sufferings.[126] Thus, both for those who have done good deeds and those who have done evil deeds, the process of birth and rebirth continues alike.

A Jīva has to assume such organisms which may enable him to bear the results of his evil deeds.

Process of birth and re-birth is the same for both the evil doers and the doers of right deeds.

The three constituents of Avidyā, namely, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are at the root of all the differences in the performance of actions and consequently, in their results. Thus, the Jīvātman (that is, the liṅga-śarīra, the subtle body) under the influence of Tamas enters into the organisms of lower creatures, such as, birds, deer, elephants, etc., who are regarded as *adhovṛtti* (that is, having the tendency to move towards lower regions), and acts according to the nature of the organism into which it manifests itself, and finally attains those regions where suffering alone prevails. Under the influence of Rajas the Jīvātman (that is, the subtle body) enters into such organisms as occupy the intermediate stage (madhyavṛtti), namely, the organisms of Vidyādhara, Yakṣa, Rākṣas, Manuṣya, etc., and after death retires to such regions where both pleasure and pain are found in equal proportion. If, however, Sattva predominates, then the Jīva (that is, the subtle body) enters into the organisms of ṛṣis, gods, etc., who are all

Under the influence of Avidyā, the liṅga-śarīra enters into the organism of various beings.

125 *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, V. X. 4—8.

126 *Bhagavadgītā*, XIV. 18.

Ūrdhvavṛtti (having tendency to move upwards) and thereby attains the svarga and mahar-lokas.[127]

Three divisions of karman.

Although there is only one kind of Karman, yet due to the difference of the time of its existence and experience it is divided into sañcita, sañcīyamāna and prārabdha. By *'sañcita'* we mean that kind of Karman which remains accumulated and has not begun to yield any result. By *'sañcīyamāna,'* also known as *'kriyamāṇa'*, we understand that kind of Karman which is being done every day along with the experiencing of the *prārabdhakarman* and which is to produce an accumulated force for future experiences (bhoga). *Prārabdha,* on the other hand, means that part of the accumulated Karman which has begun to fructify and according to the nature of which the particular organism has come to be assumed.

The three divisions of karman can be illustrated by an instance of grains.

All these can be very well explained by an instance of grains. Those grains which are still growing in the fields resemble the *sañcīyamāna-karman,* those which have been removed from the fields and locked in the granary for future consumption are like the *sañcita-karman,* while the grains which have been released for being used as food and have actually entered our stomachs and are in the course of being digested (exhausted), may easily be compared to the *prārabdha-karman.* Of these, the grains growing in the field and also those accumulated in the granary can be exhausted at any moment by giving away to others as gifts, or by being burnt through fire and becoming worthless for any future use, but those which have entered into the stomach and are in the course of being exhausted cannot be entirely annihilated except by their complete digestion, that is, bhoga.

For achieving Final Emancipation, it is necessary to exhaust the bhoga of all these karmans.

It is necessary in order to get final emancipation from births and rebirths to exhaust the results of all these three varieties of Karman. Only then one can attain the highest aim of philosophy and life. As for the order in which Karman is experienced, it is said that the experiencing of the *sañcita-karman*

127 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIV. 5–18.

takes place in the same order in which it has begun, or in which each action has taken place, or according to the strength or force of each action. In other words, that which is *'kriyamāṇa'* today will become *'sañcita'* tomorrow and may become *'prārabdha'* day after tomorrow. This is ordinarily the order amongst these three varieties of Karman and their bhoga can also be possible in the same order. All the experiences of these Karmans are possible in one or in more than one birth. Sometimes, the same *'prārabdha'* continues beyond one birth. But in normal course the order of the bhoga should follow the order of the accumulated Karmans. It is, however, possible that the order of the accumulated actions may be interrupted either by another set of more forcible accumulated deeds or even by the wilful or otherwise intervention of some external agency, such as the good wishes (āśīrvāda), or the curse (abhiśāpa) of some ṛṣi or yogin. That is to say, the more forcible deeds will result first, followed by the less forcible ones. This sort of interruption is possible even in the case of *'prārabdha-karmans.'* Whatever may be the order, each and every act has to yield some fruit or other which has to be experienced by the performer and sometimes by others also due to the transference of the results (bhoga) to themselves, and has to be subsequently annihilated.

Order of the experiencing of karmans.

Interruption in the order of experiencing.

Transference of bhoga to other than the doer.

Now, as regards the duration of the bhoga, meaning the experiencing of pleasure and pain, in accordance with the good and the bad character of each action, it may be said that there is always a reciprocal relation between an act and its result accruing in the form of pleasure and pain, like cause and effect. So the amount or the degree of pleasure and pain should always correspond to the amount or the weight of the action performed which yields that pleasure and pain. Then again, in order to have an accurate idea of the amount and the degree of the resultant pleasure and pain, we should take note of the intensity and the duration, that is, the

Duration of experiencing.

Reciprocal relation between an act and its result.

The intensity and the duration of the bhoga should always be strictly in proportion to the weight of the action.

period of time covered to exhaust it. That is, the sum total of effect in all its aspects should always be in strict adherence to the act which is assumed to be its cause. Hence, the duration or the degree of the bhoga should be measured by the amount and the force of the deed itself. It may here be pointed out that as ultimately both the degree and the period covered by the bhoga are to be judged by the effect produced on, or the suffering caused to, the Jīva, it is possible to increase the intensity of bhoga and cut short the duration of it, or similarly, to prolong the period of bhoga and lessen its intensity proportionately, so that the bhoga which in its usual course would have lasted for several years, may be exhausted within a very short time, or the bhoga which would have been unbearable in its natural course may, similarly, become bearable, and continue for many more years. This latter fact may be the reason why a certain type of continuous sufferings or the performance of certain fresh evil deeds, such as, speaking lies or that which is not meant for being uttered due to its vulgarity, speaking ill of others, taking food from those who speak ill of the Śāstras, accepting food belonging to the lower castes, or sub-castes, or out-castes, disregarding one's elders, acceptance of gifts in some holy place, acceptance of money from one's own *guru,* selling of Vedic texts, teaching of the Vedas to unqualified persons and earning money therefrom, giving away of a girl as bride on being paid for it, giving away of a daughter of a maid-servant as bride without giving anything to the bridegroom by way of her maintenance, desecration of the temples, old wells, tanks, gardens etc., etc., appear to prolong the bhoga of the *prārabdhakarman* and consequently, the span of life itself.[128] But it is a fact that not even the smallest aspect of either the act performed or the consequent result in the form

Intensity and duraion of the bhoga are interchangeable.

Enumeration of a few acts which may prolong the bhoga of the *prārabdhakarman* and consequently, the span of life itself.

128 Vide *Vijñānadīpikā* by Padmapādācārya, verses 50-51. Edited by Mm. Umesha Mishra.

of bhoga can ever be lost or remain un-exhausted. Perfect balance is ever maintained between the two. The change in the duration and in the intensity of the bhoga as explained above may be caused by the force of the Karmic energy according to one's own will or by any external agency.

No part of an act can ever remain without giving its results and be lost.

As regards the prolonging of bhoga and consequently, the span of life itself, it may be said that the life and the maintaining of the physical organism are nothing but the results of a set of deeds done in the past and are chiefly meant for experiencing sufferings; for true happiness or pure pleasure is not possible to be found in this world; besides, even the so-called happiness experienced in this world is never free from some tinge of pain. The evil acts, like those mentioned above, cause sufferings. There being some sort of attachment and affinity between these and the *prārabdha-karman;* and the fructification of these fresh deeds also becomes possible in the same life in continuation of the bhoga of the *prārabdha-karman* and which would prolong the span of life as well.

Possible cause of the prolonging of bhoga and the span of life.

The *prārabdha-karman* can be exhausted through experiencing alone. The inner-sense-organ may be purified through the various means mentioned below, and the manifestation of true Knowledge may take place even before the organism falls as dead. The action does not stop with the attainment of Knowledge but continues even after it, though such acts are not regarded to have produced any fresh result (bhoga) as far as the doer himself is concerned. Such acts pertain to the organism one possesses and are considered by the particular doer as a part of his automatic actions. The Lord, therefore, has said: "He does nothing, even though he is engaged in action."[129] Or any action performed at that stage may just be for the sake of the guidance of the masses, as the Lord has said of Himself, "O Arjuna! there is nothing

Action continues even after acquiring True Knowledge.

129 (i) *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 20. (ii) 'Sacakṣuracaksuriva etc.—*Vedāntasāra,* Vanivilas, Press; p.106; 'Kurvannapi niṣkriyśca yaḥ'—Upadeśa-Sāhasrī, X. 13; 'Ayatnato bhavantyasya na tu sādhanarūpiṇaḥ—*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi,* IV. 69; p. 109.

in the three worlds for Me to achieve, nor is there anything worth attaining unattained by Me, yet I continue to work. Should I not engage in action, unwearied, at any time, great harm will come to the world, for O son of Pṛthu! people follow My example in all matters. If I do not perform action, these worlds will perish. Besides, I shall become an agent responsible for the miserable mess, and (owing to the faulty example) lead these created beings astray (to ruin). So a wise man desirous to show the right path to the masses should continue action without any attachment"[130] (even after the realization of the highest Knowledge).

Knowledge makes present and past accumulated actions ineffective.

It has been said above that the Fire of Knowledge reduces to ashes the *sañcita* and the *sañcīyamāna* Karmans. It is to be kept in mind here that what the manifestation of Knowledge does is to cast off the veils of ajñāna (nescience) from the jijñāsu, after which he becomes detached from the world (virakta) and realizes the true nature of the Self (ātman). Thus perfect Jñāna is a means to make the Karman ineffective. But all are not gifted with this Jñāna, nor does it appear to any one all of a sudden. It requires a good deal of preparation by the regular observance of physical and mental discipline, purity of action and thought. We know that the last thought of a person determines his future after death, as the Lord has Himself said, "O Son of Kuntī! thinking of whatever object one leaves this body at the time of death, that and that alone he attains, being ever absorbed in its thought."[131] It seems that the mind of a person at the time of his death generally, remains occupied with thoughts which have mostly kept it engaged during his life-time; for ordinarily, it is not possible for any foreign or strange thought to come up before the mind all of a sudden at the time of death. A Hindu, therefore, makes efforts to do good deeds throughout his life with a hope that the

Manifestation of true Knowledge casts off ajñāna.

Action affects the last thoughts of a man which determine his next birth.

Ordinarily, strange and fresh thoughts are not possible at the time of death.

130 *Bhagavadgītā,* III. 22–25.

131 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 6.

performance of good and meritorious deeds may become part and parcel of his very existence, so that he may have good thoughts, particularly, thoughts relating to the Lord just at the time of his death. Again, when a man is on his death-bed, his relations and friends recite the Veda, the Purāṇas, etc., to the dying man so as to arouse devotional feelings in him, so that he may think of the Lord in his last moments and get a very bright future after death. This is the reason why Hindus like to name their children after the name of some god or goddess or some holy place, so that at the time of death perchance he happens to utter the name of his son, the name of the Lord will be uttered which may bring to his mind the thoughts about the Lord which will ultimately lead him to the highest aim of life. So has said the Lord: "Therefore, think of me at all times and fight. With your mind and intellect having thus surrendered to Me, you will doubtless come to Me."[132] Constant practice of good deeds and thoughts and feelings of renunciation in every sphere of life are most essential for the achievement of the highest goal.

Hindus do good deeds throughout their life in order that they may remember the Lord at their death-bed.

Justification for religious activities by others at the time of the death of a man.

Justification for naming one's children after the names of the Lord.

Purification of antaḥkaraṇa (inner-sense-organ) is possible through the following means, holds Padmapādācārya. He says that performing of sacrifices, doing acts of charity, worshipping, going on pilgrimages, observance of celebacy, repeating of sacred mantras, prayers, meditation, performance of nitya-karman, such as evening and morning prayers (sandhyopāsana), observance of fasts and silence, keeping good company (satsaṅga) and similar other religious deeds all lead to the purification of one's inner-sense-organ which, in its turn, leads to the realization of the highest aim of life and philosophy. But it should never be overlooked that all physical and mental actions should be performed without any desire to reap the fruits of these.[133]

Means of purifying Antaḥkaraṇa.

132 *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 7.

133 *Vijñānadīpikā,* verses 53—70.

This is just an indication of how the Law of Karman functions. It has been a mystery for even the great ṛṣis and gods; for none of them can escape from the influence of its unfathomable and unimaginable working. It is really the very Māyā of the Lord Himself of which He Himself says: "This Divine Māyā of Mine consisting of the three elements—sattva, rajas and tamas, is extremely difficult to get over; those, however, who take refuge in Me alone overcome it."[134] Even the wise are perplexed to know what is action and what is inaction."[135] "The Lord through His Māyā makes all beings revolve, as if mounted on a machine."[136] Indeed, mysterious are the ways of the Law of Karman. So says the Lord: " Gahanā karmaṇo gatiḥ".[137]

Functioning of the Law of Karman concluded.

The Law of Karman is the very Māyā of the Lord Himself.

10. *Life after Death and Mukti*

An idea of the nature of the highest goal according to the *Gītā* has been given above. Now, in that connection it is to be discussed whether that end can be realized while maintaining the organism or only after death? This leads us to discuss the process of Death and life after Death, as found in the *Gītā*.

It is necessary to point out here that there are mainly two paths which a Jīva takes after death according to the nature of its deeds done in the present or in the past births. There is a path which, if a Jīva happens to take, leads it to the highest goal of life directly or indirectly, and wherefrom the Jīva does not ever return to this world.

Process of Death and life after Death.

The Path wherefrom the Jīva does not come back to this world.

The second path is that through which a Jīva goes to the region as determined by its own action and after having experienced the fruits of its action there, it comes back to this world again.

The second Path is that wherefrom the Jīva returns to the world again.

The former may be called *'Parā gati'*, while the latter *'Aparā gati'*. Under the second, there

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[134] *Bhagavadgītā*, VII. 14.
[135] *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 16.
[136] *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 61.
[137] *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 17.

are several sub-paths according to the nature of the deeds performed by a Jīva. Some lead to higher regions, while others go to the lower regions. In other words, due to the force of action, some Jīvas go to the Devaloka, assume there shining organisms and experience divine bhogas. Others go to lower regions, such as Naraka, etc., assume organisms capable of experiencing '*Yātanā*' (intense pain), experience painful bhogas and having exhausted them, again, come back to this world for experiencing the bhogas of the Karmic residue of the deeds of their past births. The *Gītā* has described these two paths as '*Śukla*' and '*Kṛṣṇa*' gatis respectively.[138] They are also called *Devayāna Mārga* or *Arcirādi Mārga* and *Pitṛyāna Mārga or Dhūmādi Mārga*, respectively.

Similarly, there are some differences in the *Parā gati* also. Some Jīvas, just after they leave the physical organism, go direct to the 'Dhāma' of the Lord and merge into Him without any delay. Some, on the other hand, pass through several planes and regions and then enter into the 'Dhāma' of the Lord and then merge into Him. As both the types of Jīvas ultimately proceed upwards and reach the same goal, they are said to have realized the *Paramā gati*. Even though there exist differences amongst the Jīvas of this type, yet none of this class of the Jīvas have downward motion and so all of them realize the highest end of life in due course.

Sadyo-mukti and Krama-mukti.

As the former type of Jīva realizes the emancipation immediately after its death, it is called '*Sadyo-Mukti*', while the latter's mukti is known as '*Krama-mukti*'. In both these cases, there is the going out of the Jīvas from the physical body after death which has been technically called '*Utkramaṇa*'.

Jīvan-Mukti.

But then there is another type of *mukti* wherein there is no *utkramaṇa*. According to this, a Jīva, while present in the physical body, realizes the highest truth and it does not go out of the body to merge into the Lord, but merges into Him while the *Jīva* is in the body itself. This is also an ins-

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[138] Na tasya prāṇā utkrāmanti, atraiva samavalīyante—*Chāndogya*, IV, iv. 6.

tance of a special type of *'Sadyo Mukti.'* It is also called *'Jīvanmukti.'* As pointed out elsewhere, a Jīvan-mukta does not like to destroy the physical body, which he has at the time of the realization of the self, but allows it to continue in the natural course, till it falls down itself after the exhaustion of the 'Prārabdha-Karma'. After this, when his body falls down as dead, the outer and the inner-sense-organs, and the Prāṇa, all merge into the avyakta. The *liṅga śarīra* (subtle body) also finds its end there, and there remains nothing. Thus the *Jīva* then realizes the *Videha-Kaivalya.*

Videha-mukti.

The difference between the *Jīvan-mukti* and the *Videha-mukti* is only due to the upādhis. As long as the organism (upādhi) remains the emancipated Jīva is called *Jīvan-mukta,* but when it becomes free from the body also, it is called *Videha-mukta.*

Difference between 'Jīvan-mukti' and 'Videha-mukti.'

11. *Realities*

From the study of the *Gītā* it is clear that it believes in three Realities : (1) Kṣara (2) Akṣara and (3) Puruṣottama. The *Kṣara* represents all the non-cetana products of this universe.[139] It has been variously called in the *Gītā,* namely, 'Aparā Prakṛti',[140] 'Adhibhūta',[141] 'Kṣetra',[142] and 'Aśvattha',[143] It has also been called the cause of all the bhūtas, the *vikāras* and the *karaṇas.*[144] The 'Vikāras' are the five subtle elements called Mahābhūtas, and the five tanmātrās, namely, śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa and gandha. The 'Karaṇas' are the five senses of cognition, the five senses of action, manas, ahaṅkāra and buddhi. Besides, the products of these, such as, desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, collocation of elements forming an organism (saṅghāta), animation and retention, all these constitute Kṣara.'[145] Of these, earth, water, fire, air, ākāśa, manas (identified with ahaṅkāra), buddhi and ahaṅkāra (identified with avyakta or mahat) are said to be the eight different forms of the 'Aparā Prakṛti' of the Lord.[146]

Kṣara is the cause of non-cetana products.

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[139] Samastaṁ vikārajātaṁ—Śaṅkara on *Gītā,* XV. 16, [140] VII. 4—5. [141] VIII. 4. [142] XIII. 1. [143] XV. 1—3. [144] XIII. 20. [145] XIII. 5—6. [146] VII. 4—5.

This Aparā Prakṛti is beginningless and has been associated with the Lord since time immemorial. It is the inferior type of Prakṛti and is impure. It causes bondage and leads to undesirable results.[147] All the bhūtas merge into this Prakṛti at the time of dissolution and stay there till the beginning of the next creation.[148] The Lord creates this universe having taken resort to (adhiṣṭhāya) this Prakṛti.[149] It is only because of this that the Lord has called it *'mama yonir-mahad-Brahma'* and Himself as *'ahaṁ bījapradaḥ Pitā.*[150] In fact, even for His own avatāra He takes resort to it.[151] That this 'Prakṛti' is different from the 'Māyā' of the Lord is clear when He Himself says: "Although I am unborn and imperishable and the lord of all the bhūtas, yet I take resort to *My own Prakṛti* and through the instrumentality of *My Own Māyā* (ātmamāyayā) I appear (in a bodily form)."[152] Again, that this Prakṛti is different from the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy is obvious from the fact that the guṇas, namely, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, are the *products* of Prakṛti according to the *Gītā,* while these form the *very constituents* of Prakṛti in Sāṅkhya.[153] Moreover, the Sāṅkhya Prakṛti is independent, while the Prakṛti of the *Gītā* is not so. Lastly, the Sāṅkhya Prakṛti produces evolutes independently because of its having rajas which is of the nature of motion, while in the *Gītā,* the Prakṛti produces evolutes only with the help of the Lord[154] and also because of its contact with the Kṣetrajña.[155]

The place of Aparā Prakṛti in the *Gītā.*

The Aparā Prakṛti of the Lord is different from His Māyā.

The Parā Prakṛti of the Lord is also different from the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

Coming to the second reality, that is, *'Akṣara,'* we find that it has been called by various names, namely, 'Jīva',[156] 'Parā Prakṛti',[157] 'Adhyātmā,[158] 'Puruṣa'[159] and 'Kṣetrajña.'[160] It is quite different from the

Nature of the Parā Prakṛti called 'Akṣara'.

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147 Śaṅkara on *Gītā,* VII. 5.
148 *Bhagavadgītā,* IX. 7.
149 *Bhagavadgītā,* IX. 8.
150 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIV. 3—4.
151 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 6.
152 *'Prakṛtiṁ* svāmadhiṣṭhāya sambhavāmyātmamāyayā.— *Bhagavadgītā,* iv. 6.
153 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIV. 5.
154 *Bhagavadgītā,* IX. 10.
155 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 26.
156 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 5 ; XV. 7.
157 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 5.
158 *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 3.
159 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 19.
160 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 1.

'Aparā Prakṛti.' It is superior to the latter and it upholds the world.[161] It is also the cause of all the bhūtas.[162] It is the enternal aṁśa of the Lord Himself.[163] It moves from one body to another at the time of death and carries the five organs of cognition and manas along with it. It is through these sense-organs that the empirical self experiences the objects of senses.[164] It appears different from the Lord due to avidyā.[165] It is beginningless.[166] It (Jīva), being in the *Aparā Prakṛti,* is the cause of experiencing pleasure and pain.[167] It experiences the guṇas of the (Aparā) Prakṛti only when it is in Prakṛti, that is, when it is in contact with any of the three kinds of organism, namely, gross (sthūla), subtle (sūkṣma) and causal (kāraṇa), and it is because of its contact with the guṇas of the Prakṛti that Puruṣa or Jīva takes birth in higher and lower yonis.[168] Though this Puruṣa is confined within the organism, yet it is the same as the Paramātman. This puruṣa is called 'upadraṣṭā' (observer) as it is the Sākṣī; it is also called 'anumantā' (adviser), 'bhartā' (supporter), bhoktā (experiencer), 'Maheśvara' and Paramātmā'.[169] It is due to the contact of the Kṣetrajña with kṣetra that the entire class of sthāvara and jaṅgama jīvas come to exist.[170] Kṣetrajña though in bondage, yet possesses the knowledge of the kṣetra, the organism wherein it is confined. It is because of this that it is called Kṣetrajña (one who knows kṣetra).[171] As the empirical self is essentially identical with the Lord, it has all the qualities of the latter, though due to its being under the influence of nescience, it cannot manifest them. So it illumines all the vikāras and their qualities.[172]

Puruṣottama.

The last and the most important reality is *Puruṣottama.*[173] He is also known as 'Paramātmā' and 'Īśvara',[174] 'Vāsudeva',[175] 'Kṛṣṇa',[176] 'Prabhu' and "Sākṣī',[177] 'Mahāyogeś-

[161] *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 5.
[162] *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 6.
[163] *Bhagavadgītā,* XV. 7.
[164] *Bhagavadgītā,* XV. 8–9.
[165] *Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya* on *Gītā,* XV. 7.
[166] *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 19.
[167] *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 20.
[168] *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 19–21.
[169] *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 22.
[170] *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 26.
[171] *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 1.
[172] *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 33.
[173] *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 1; XV. 17–19.
[174] *Bhagavadgītā,* XV. 17.
[175] *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 19; X. 37; XI. 50; XVIII. 74.
[176] *Bhagavadgītā,* XVIII. 75, 78.
[177] *Bhagavadgītā,* V. 14; IX. 18; IX. 24; IX. 4; XIV. 21.

vara',[178] 'Brahma',[179] 'Adhiyajña'—one for whom all the sacrifices are performed, in other words, Viṣṇu Himself',[180] 'Parama Puruṣa', 'Viṣṇu', 'Parama Akṣara', 'Yogeśvara',[181] and so on.

Nature and characteristics of the Highest Reality.

He is all in all. He is the eternal source of creation and destruction of all the bhūtas.[182] He is eternally associated with His Māyā which consists of the three elements—sattva, rajas and tamas, is divine and is capable of deluding all the bhūtas.[183] He is beginningless and is not called either *sat* or *asat*, because He is beyond the means of knowledge. He is a Reality which is both immanent and transcendent. He is all pervasive. It is through Him that everything shines. He is beyond the reach of sense-organs. He is not attached to anything and yet He supports everything. He is nirguṇa, and yet He is the enjoyer of all the guṇas. This proves His being both *sākāra* and *nirākāra*. He is so subtle that no one can know Him through the ordinary means of knowledge.[184] He is both far off and also very near. He is undivided and yet He seems to have been divided in the created beings. Indeed, He is an entity where all contradictions meet. He is the illuminator of all the luminous objects and is beyond tamas (nescience). He is the very conscience, the object of knowledge and is to be realized through inner vision. He is, in fact, in the heart of every one. It is only a few who perceive Him within themselves through concentration of citta. He is the supervisor, supporter and also the enjoyer and is the most powerful Lord. He alone commands over all. He is equally present in all the bhūtas. He is beyond the influence of action and, so, though present in everybody, yet He is actionless and is free from the fruits of action.[185] He is the highest entity. There is nothing beyond Him and the entire universe is interwoven with him,[186] and this He illustrates by saying that He is the

178 *Bhagavadgītā,* XI. 9.
179 *Bhagavadgītā,* V. 6, 19 ; VII. 29 ; VIII. 3, 13, 24 ; X. 12 ; XIII. 12, 30 ; XVIII. 50.
180 *Bhapavadgītā,* VIII. 4.
181 *Bhagavadgītā,* XI 4.
182 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 6, 10.
183 Daivī hyeṣā guṇamayī mama Māyā duratyayā—*Gītā,* VII. 14.
184 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 12—15.
185 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII.
186 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 7.

'rasa' (sap) in water, 'radiance' in the sun and the moon, the 'praṇava' in all the Vedas, 'sound' in ākāśa, 'manliness' in men, 'odour' in earth, 'tejas' (light) in fire, 'life' in all beings, 'penance' in ascetics, 'eternal seed' of all the bhūtas, 'intellect' in all the intellectual beings, 'power' which, freed from kāma and rāga, belongs to the powerful ones and also 'kāma', which is not against dharma. All these are His distinctive features.[187]

He is the source of sāttvika, rājasika and tāmasika 'bhāvas' (objects). But He Himself is above the influence of these.[188] He loves most the jñānin who is constantly absorbed in Yoga and who has acquired single-minded devotion in the Lord.[189] In fact, the jñānin is His own Self.[190]

As pointed out above, there is only one Reality which is to be known (jñeya), and it is called 'Paraṁ Brahman' amongst so many other names used for it in the *Gita*.[191] This is 'anādi'. It pervades all. It shines with all the senses and is also devoid of all the senses. It is unattached and is the support of all. It is nirguṇa (attributeless) and is the experiencer of all attributes. It is movable and immovable. It is very subtle and is imperceptible. Though appearing divided while present in the bhūtas, yet it is really one. During the state of existence it protects the bhūtas, at the time of dissolution it engulfs them and lords over them at the time of creation. It gives light to all the luminous objects and is said to be beyond tamas (nescience). It itself is jñāna (knowledge), jñeya (knowable) and jñānagamya (attainable through knowledge). It remains in the heart of all. This is in brief the nature of the Highest Reality. The Lord says, "My devotees having realized this Reality become fit for entering into My being (Madbhāva)." In fact, the Lord describes here His own mysterious nature. So he who knows the 'Para-Brahman' knows the Lord.

The Lord makes His *svarūpa* quite clear when He indentifies Himself with *'adhibhūta'* which is the

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187 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 8–11.

188 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 12.

189 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 17.

190 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 18.

191 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 12, 14.

same as His *Aparā Prakṛti* and the *Kṣara Puruṣa,* with the *Hiraṇya-grabha,* also called *sūtrātman* and *Brahman,* and lastly, with *'adhidaiva'* which is identical with *'adhiyajña'* which is His own unmanifest form.[192] Thereby He shows that both the external inanimate reality and the empirical self are essentially identical with the Lord. He is thus all in all in the Universe. In fact, the universe itself is also His own nature.[193] It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the Śaṅkara Vedāntins who do not attach the same importance to the external reality. The svarūpa of the Lord is in tune with the spirit of the Śruti—'Sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ Brahma'.[194] It is this very idea which the Lord wants to emphasise when He says—'Mattaḥ parataraṁ nānyat kiñcīdasti Dhanañjaya' (O Dhanañjaya! there is nothing other than Me)[195], and 'Vāsudevaḥ sarvamiti'.[196] He Himself says 'He who perceives all the bhūtas in his own Ātman and also his own Ātman in all, is the *Samadarśī.* "He who perceives Me everywhere and all in Me, I am always with him. He is never away from Me."[197] He pervades the entire universe through His unmanifest form. All the bhūtas are present in Him but He Himself is above them.[198] In fact, this is His Divine Power (aiśvaraṁ yogaṁ) that He being the support and the creator of the entire universe is not in the bhūtas, nor are the bhūtas in Him. He is beyond it. This He Himself explains with an illustration. Just as Vāyu (air) being produced out of the Ākāśa[199] moves everywhere and is in the Ākāśa, but Ākāśa is not in the Vāyu, as it is ever beyond the influence of Vāyu, so everything produced out of the Lord is in Him yet He is not in them, that is, He is not attached to them. But when the Vāyu and its

The Universal nature of the Paramātman.

Difference between the position of the Gītā and the Śaṅkara-Vedāntins.

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192 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 30, VIII. 4.

193 See His 'Viśvarūpa' in the *Gītā,* XI.

194 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad,* III. xiv. 1.

195 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 7.

196 *Vāsudeva* is all in all—*Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 19.

197 *Bhagavadgītā,* VI. 29—30.

198 *Bhagavadgītā,* IX. 4.

199 Cf. 'Tasmādvā etasmādākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ ... ākāśādvāyuḥ, etc.—*Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* II. i 1.

further evolutes merge into the Ākāśa during the Pralaya and Ākāśa alone remains, the evolutes do not find their separate existence any more. Such is also the case here. Everything merges into the Prakṛti of the Lord and the Lord alone remains unattached and quite apart from the Prakṛti and its evolutes.[200] But then it is also a fact, that the Lord is present in His devotees who worship Him with devotion and who are also in Him.[201]

He is the Supreme Lord of the bhūtas and the lokas. It is, therefore, that buddhi (intellect), jñāna (knowledge), asammoha (integral vision), forgiveness, truthfulness, restraint of external sense-organs (dama), restraint of internal sense-organs (śama), pleasure, pain, being (bhāva) and non-being (abhāva), fear and fearlessness, harmlessness, equanimity, contentment, penance, charity, fame and ignominy, all these various 'bhāvas' proceed from the Lord.[202] All this is His vibhūti and yoga.[203] The Lord has given the nature of His vibhūtis Himself.[204] The Lord being in His own bhāva, shows mercy to His true devotees and destroys their wrong notions due to their having ajñāna, through the effulgent light (jñānadīpa).[205] All His manifestations and powers described in the tenth chapter[206] of the *Gītā* are, no doubt, divine; otherwise how can there be any synthesis between His various forms shown in the *Vibhūtiyoga*? He has Himself told Arjuna that His birth and action both were divine[207] and that he (Arjuna) would not be able to see His *'aiśvaraṁ yogaṁ'* without divine eyes.[208]

The Divine Nature of the Lord.

This very Paramātman assumed the human form in order to protect the good and punish the wicked, to establish dharma and to guide the masses towards the right path. He is indeed an entity where all contradictions meet and it is therefore, that ignorant persons, who are busy acquiring the results of their deeds, do not realize His true nature.[209] As He is

Aim of Avatāra.

200 *Bhagavadgītā,* IX. 4–7.

201 Teṣu cāpyaham,–*Bhagavadgītā,* IX. 29.

202 *Bhagavadgītā,* X. 3–5.

203 *Bhagavadgītā,* X. 7.

204 *Bhagavadgītā,* X. 19–41.

205 *Bhagavadgītā,* X. 11.

206 *Bhagavadgītā,* Verses 19–42.

207 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 9.

208 *Bhagavadgītā,* XI. 8.

209 *Bhagavadgītā,* IX. 11.

beyond the Kṣara—the perishable matter and also the Akṣara—the imperishable Jīva, enveloped in Māyā, He is known as the '*Puruṣottama*.[210] He has Himself said, "The Highest person (Uttama-Puruṣa) is distinct from both the 'kṣara' the perishable organisms of all the beings and the 'akṣara' the imperishable, unchanging Jīva and is called Paramātman. He interpenetrates the three worlds and sustains all and is the Imperishable Lord."[211]

Lord as the Creator and Protector of the universe and Dharma.

It has been said that the Lord is the sole creator of the universe. He is eternally associated with His own Māyā. He is 'āptakāma' and has nothing to do for Himself. But He does not remain idle and refrain from performing action. As the Highest Being in the universe equipped with every power, He feels Himself responsible to set an example to the created beings by His own actions. He is not only a creator of the universe but also one who is to establish a social order in the universe which the created beings should follow for their own good and also for the good of their fellow beings. So says the Lord, "O Pārtha! I have no duty awaiting to be performed in all the three worlds, nor is there anything that I have yet to obtain and still I am ever engaged in action. Because, if I be not ever diligent in action, people will follow My example blindly."[212] He further adds, "Whatever a great personage does, others do the same in conformity to his example. The people follow whatever he takes as an authority.[213] "If I do not perform any action," says the Lord, "all these worlds will suffer. Besides, I shall become an agent responsible for the misery of the people, and (by My faulty example) will lead these created beings to ruin."[214]

The Lord establishes the social order in the universe.

He is not only the creator but also the protector of the created beings. As pointed out above, He has to show the Path of duty to all. Therefore, whenever there is chaos in the universe and wicked people are putting obstacles in the way of good people doing their duty, and Dharma

The Lord is the Protector of Dharma.

210 *Bhagavadgītā*, XV. 18—19.
211 *Bhagavadgītā*, XV. 17.
212 *Bhagavadgītā*, III. 22—23.
213 *Bhagavadgītā*, III. 21.
214 *Bhagavadgītā*, III. 24.

(which maintains the order of the world on firm basis) declines and Adharma (unrighteousness) prevails, the Lord assumes a physical form and comes down to the earth for the protection of righteous people and for the destruction of the evil-doers and also to set right the Dharma.[215]

All this makes it clear that the ultimate end in creating the universe is to do good to the created beings.

Path of duty to be followed by all.

The Lord has repeatedly advised Arjuna to follow the path of duty according to the status he occupies in his society. He wants that everyone should follow the example of Arjuna and should not hesitate in doing anything to clear the path of duty even by killing the wicked. It is by doing one's duty free from attachment and aversion, without having any desire to reap the fruit of one's actions, that the highest aim of life is achieved, as has been the case with Janaka and others.[216] This is the ultimate aim of the teachings of the *Gītā*.

12. *Māyā and Prakṛti*

Māyā of the Lord.

The Lord is eternally associated with His Māyā which consists of the three guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas. It is Divine (Daivī). It is very difficult to be crossed over. It has been expressed by the Lord as *'Mama Māyā'*,[217] *'Yoga-Māyā'*[218] *'Ātmamāyā'*[219] and merely *'Māyā'*.[220] This Māyā is exclusively for the use of the Lord Himself. It is through the help of it that the Lord manifests Himself as an *Avatāra*. Besides, it keeps the Lord away from the eyes of the ignorant. The entire universe remains in delusion through its influence.[221] It is due to its influence that the understanding of the sinners and the ignorant is removed.[222] The Lord through His Māyā makes all the bhūtas rotate as if they are placed on some machine.[223]

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215 *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 7–8. By *'Dharma'* we should understand the natural course of life or the Path of Duty one leads in order to achieve the highest end of life.

216 *Bhagavadgītā*, III. 20.

217 *Bhagavadgītā*, VII. 14.

218 *Bhagavadgītā*, VII. 25.

219 *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 6.

220 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 61.

221 *Bhagavadgītā*, VII. 13.

222 *Bhagavadgītā*, VII. 15.

223 *Bhagavadgītā*, VIII. 61.

From all this it may be concluded that the Māyā of the Lord fulfils two-fold purpose: (1) It remains with the Lord who is above it and helps Him to assume a physical form as an Avatāra. (2) Under its delusion bhūtas assume different roles in the world. Again, it is due to this delusion that the Lord remains concealed from the eyes of the ignorant. Though it has delusive effects, yet it is not itself illusory like the Māyā of the Śaṅkara Vedānta.

Māyā of the *Gītā* different from that of the Śaṅkara Vedānta.

By the way, it may be pointed out that in order to take birth in this world a Jīva requires mainly two things: (1) *Sañcitakarman* (accumulated action) of the past life or lives and its resultant *Vāsanā* which will force the birth of a being and (2) the presence of the five bhūtas and other elements in the world which will provide the Jīva with a physical organism. These two are necessary for every creation of a being. Similarly, when the Lord Himself wants to come to this universe as an Avatāra, He also has to assume a physical organism. So He also likewise, requires two things: (1) a 'Force' including a desire to protect the good and punish the evil-doers, to make Him manifest Himself in the universe as an *Avatāra* and (2) the presence of the five bhūtas and other elements which constitute a physical organism for Him. Accordingly, the Lord in the *Gītā* says that having His Prakṛti as the support (adhiṣṭhāna or ādhāra) He manifests in this universe as an Avatāra with the help of His own Māyā.[224] In other words, His own Māyā is the 'Force' which makes Him assume a physical organism as an Avatāra. He has no *Sañcitakarman* of the past. But without there being some such 'Force', no being can appear in this universe. In His case, this purpose is served by His own Mñyā. Then as for the elements to constitute His physical organism, His Aparā Prakṛti is there. This is what the Lord Himself has said—'Prakṛtiṁ svāmadhiṣṭhāya sambhavāmyātmamāyayā.'[225]

Conditions for the coming of a Jīva to the world.

Conditions or forces required for an Avatāra of the Lord.

In this connection we should understand the nature of the *Prakṛti'* in the *Gītā*. The word 'Prakṛti'

224 *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 6. 225 *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 6.

has been used variously in various contexts. In order to discuss its nature it is necessary to give all the references to Prakṛti in it.

Nature of the Prakṛti in the Gītā.

(1) '*Prakṛteḥ*' kriyamāṇāni guṇai karmāṇi sarvaśaḥ,[226]—All actions are performed in all possible ways by the guṇas of the Prakṛti.[227]

Use of 'the word prakṛti' in tse *Gītā*.

(2) '*Prakṛter*—guṇasammūḍhāḥ sajjante guṇakarmasu:'[228]—People deluded by the guṇas of the Prakṛti attach themselves to the actions of the guṇas.

(3) 'Sadṛśaṁ ceṣṭate svasyāḥ *Prakṛter* jñānavānapi|*Prakṛtiṁ* yānti bhūtāni nigraḥ kiṁ kariṣyati,'[229]—Even a wise man acts in conformity with his innate nature. Bhūtas (beings) follow their own nature.[230]

(4) '*Prakṛtiṁ* svāmadhiṣṭhāya sambhavāmyātmamāyayā'[231]—The Lord says—"I manifest Myself through My own Māyā having taken My own Prakṛti as the support (adhiṣṭhāna)."[232]

(5) '—Itīyaṁ me bhinnā *Prakṛti—raṣṭadhā*',[233]—All this is the eightfold division of My Prakṛti.[234]

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226 *Bhagavadgītā*, III. 27.

227 Śaṅkara explains 'Prakṛti' here as the equilibrium of the three guṇas—sattva, rajas an tamas.

228 *Bhagavadgītā*, III. 29. 229 *Bhagavadgītā*, III. 33.

230 Śaṅkara means by Prakṛti here 'Pūrvakṛtadharmādisaṁskāro vartamānajanmādāvabhivyaktaḥ'—disposition produced by the meritorious or demeritorious actions of the past and which manifests itself in the beginning of the present birth.

231 *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 6.

232 Śaṅkara explains 'Prakṛti' here in the following manner:

'Prakṛtiṁ svāṁ mama vaiṣṇavīṁ māyāṁ triguṇātmikāṁ yaskā vaśe sarvaṁ jagadvartate yayā mohitaṁ satsvamātmānam Vāsudevaṁ na jānāti tāṁ prakrtiṁ svāmadhiṣṭhāya vaśīkṛtya sambhavāmi dehavāniva bhavāmi jāta ivātmamāyayā ātmano māyayā na Paramārthato lokavat,—my own Prakṛti which is the Vaiṣṇavī Māyā constituting the three guṇas, under whose control the entire world remains, under the delusion of which (the jagat) does not realize its own Ātman as Vāsudeva. Having controlled this Prakṛti of mine (I) manifest myself, that is, become as if one having an organism, through my own Māyā, not from the Highest Reality, like an ordinary being.

233 *Bhagavadgītā*, VII. 4.

234 Śaṅkara means by 'Prakṛti' here—'Itīyaṁ yathoktā Prakṛtirme mamaiśvarī māyāśaktiḥ'—This Prakṛti, as described, is my aiśvarī Māyāśakti.

(6) 'Apareyamitastvanyāṁ *Prakṛtiṁ* viddhi me parāṁ| Jīvabhūtāṁ....yayedaṁ dhāryate jagat"[235]—This (as described under (5) above) is My lower Prakṛti. There is another, different from the former, which is My Parā Prakṛti, the Jīva which upholds the world.[236]

(7) 'Sarvabhūtāni kaunteya *Prakṛtiṁ* yānti māmikāṁ|Kalpakṣaye punastāni kalpādau visṛjāmyahaṁ'||[237]—O Son of Kuntī! at the time of Pralaya all the bhūtas go to My Prakṛti and again, in the beginning of the creation, I bring them out.[238]

(8) '*Prakṛtiṁ* svāmavaṣṭabhya visṛjāmi punaḥ punaḥ| Bhūtagrāmamimaṁ kṛtsnamavaśaṁ *Prakṛtervaśāt*||'[239]—Again and again, having My own Prakṛti under My control, I create this entire group of bhūtas which is produced out of Prakṛti and is not independent.[240]

(9) Mayādhyakṣeṇa '*Prakṛtiḥ*' sūyate sacarācaraṁ| Hetunānena kaunteya jagadviparivartate||[241]—The '*Prakṛti*' produces animate and inanimate objects under My supervision; O Son of Kuntī! it is due to this that the universe undergoes changes over and over again.[242]

(10) '*Prakṛtiṁ*' Puruṣṁ caiva viddhyanādī ubhāvapi| Vikārāṅśca guṇāṅścaiva viddhi *Pra-*

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235 *Bhagavadgītā*, VII. 5.

236 Śaṅkara commenting on these two Prakṛtis says—'Through these two Prakṛtis the Omniscient Lord is the cause of the creation, the existence and the destruction of the world. '—*Bhagavadgītā*, XIII. 19.

237 *Bhagavadgītā*, IX. 7.

238 Śaṅkara while explaining 'Prakṛti' says 'Prakṛtiṁ triguṇātmikāmaparāṁ nikṛṣṭāṁ yānti māmikāṁ madīyāṁ.'

239 *Bhagavadgītā*, IX. 8.

240 Śaṅkara explains '*Prakṛti*' as *Svabhāva*.

241 *Bhagavadgītā*, IX. 10.

242 Śaṅkara explains '*Prakṛti*' here as 'Mama Māyā triguṇātmikā avidyālakṣanā Prakṛtiḥ sūyate utpādayati sacarācaraṁ jagat—'*Prakṛti*' which is My Māyā consisting of three guṇas which is of the nature of avidyā, creates this world.

kṛti—sambhavān||[243] Both *'Prakṛti'* and *'Puruṣa'* should be known to be without any beginning. Both evolutes (vikāras) and guṇas should be known to be produced out of 'Prakṛti.'[244]

(11) 'Kāryakaraṇakartṛtve hetuḥ Prakṛtirucyate| Puruṣaḥ sukhaduḥkhānām bhoktṛtve heturucyate||'[245]—*'Prakṛti'* is the cause as far as the production of vikāras and the karaṇas are concerned, while Puruṣa is the cause of the experiencing of pleasure and pain.[246]

(12) 'Puruṣaḥ' Prakṛtistho hi bhuṅkte Prakṛtijānguṇān| Kāraṇam guṇasaṅgo'sya sadasadyonijanmasu||[247]—Puruṣa, being present in the *Prakṛti,* experiences the guṇas born of that *Prakṛti.* His contact with these guṇas is the cause of His taking birth in good or bad yonis.[248]

(13) *'Prakṛtyaiva* ca karmāṇi kriyamāṇāni sarvaśaḥ'—Actions being performed exclusively by Prakṛti.[249]

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243 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 19.

244 Śaṅkara explains this as follows:—' Prakṛtim ' Puruṣaṁ caiveśvarasya Prakṛtī tau Prakṛtipurvṣāvubhāvapyanādī viddhi. Na vidyata ādiryayostāvanādī. Nityatvādīśvarasya tatprakṛtyorapi yuktaṁ nityatvena bhavituṁ. Prakṛtidvayavattvameva hīśvarasyeśvaratvaṁ.... *Prakṛtirīśvarasya vikārakāraṇaśaktistriguṇātmikā Māyā sā sambhavo* yeṣāṁ vikārāṇaṁ guṇānāṁ ca tānvikārānguṇāṁśca viddhi Prakṛtisambhāvan *Prakṛtipariṇāmān'*- ' *Prakṛti* ' is the Māyā, which consists of three guṇas and is the force (śakti) of the Lord and which is the cause of evolutes.

245 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 20.

246 Śaṅkara identifies this ' *Prakṛti* ' with the ' *Prakṛti* ' of Sāṅkhya Philosophy. So he says that by ' *Kārya* ' we should understand the sixteen vikāras of the Sāṅkhya and by ' *Kāryakarana* ' he means the seven elements of the Sāṅkhya which are Prakṛtivikṛti, namely, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra and Pañcatanmātrās .... Puruṣa, he identifies with Jīva, also called kṣetrajña, and bhoktā.

247 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 21.

248 Śaṅkara explains thus—*Prakṛtau avidyālakṣaṇāyāṁ* kāryakāraṇarūpeṇa pariṇatāyāṁ sthitaḥ Prakṛtisthaḥ Prakṛtimātmatvena gata ityetaddhi yasmāttasmādbhuṅkte upalabhate.... Prakṛtijān Prakṛtito jātān sukhaduḥkhamohākārābhivyaktān guṇān.' Here Prakṛti is the same as Avidyā.

249 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 29.

Śaṅkara, as before, explains ' *Prakṛti* ' as the Māyā of the Lord which constitutes three guṇas and he supports it from the Śruti—' Māyāṁ tu Prakṛtiṁ vidyāt ', etc., and he further says that this *'Prakṛti'* manifests ' Mahadādikārya ', as it is in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

(14) 'Sattvaṁ rajastama iti guṇāḥ *Prakṛti*—sambhavāḥ'[250]—Sattva, rajas and tamas are the three guṇas, which are produced by the Prakṛti.[251]

Besides, there are four or five more uses of the word '*Prakṛti*' occurring in the text.[252] where it has been explained by Śaṅkara as '*svabhāva*'. So by analysing the above, we find, according to Śaṅkara, that the word 'Prakṛti' has been used in the following senses: (1) Svabhāva; (2) a particular kind of disposition acquired from the previous life; (3) Pradhāna, that is, the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas; (4) the Divine Māyāśakti, which is identical with the '*Aparā Prakṛti*' of the Lord; (5) the 'lower *Prakṛti*' which constitutes the guṇas; (6) the same as avidyā; and (7) the 'Parā Prakṛti' of the Lord which is the same as the Jīva.

Various meanings of Prakṛti according to Śaṅkara in the *Gītā.*

From the above it is obvious that Śaṅkara does not make any distinction between Māyā, Avidyā and Prakṛti and identifies it with the 'Prakṛti' of Śāṅkhya. Accordingly this '*Prakṛti*' also is triguṇātmikā (constitutes the three guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas) and is the cause of the vikāras of the Sāṅkhya.

Śaṅkara does not differentiate between Māyā, Avidyā and Prakṛti and identifies 'Māyā' with the Prakṛti' of the Sāṅkhya.

But, if we read the text of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* apart from its commentaries, it becomes quite obvious that '*Prakṛti*' is regarded as wholly different from '*Māyā*'. Māyā has been described as divine, guṇamayī (constituting three guṇas) and *duratyayā,* that is, difficult to be overcome. In support of this we may refer to the line—"Prakṛtim svāmadhiṣṭhāya sambhavāmyātmamāyayā,"[253] where both the words—'*Prakṛti*' and '*ātmamāyā*' have been used separately for two different purposes; one for '*adhiṣṭhāna*' and the other for '*sambhava*'. The Lord calls this 'Māyā' as '*Mama māyā*', *Svamāyā*, 'Ātmamāyā, '*Yogamāyā*', Himself being the 'Yogeśvara'. This re-

250 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIV. 5.

251 Śaṅkara explains '*Prakṛti*' as before—Prakṛtisambhavā '*bhagavanmāyāsambhavā*'.

252 VII. 20; IX. 12; XI. 51; XV. 7; XVIII. 59.

253 IV. 6.

peated emphasis on egoistic expressions is very significant, and it cannot be used for the ordinary *'Prakṛti'* of Sāṅkhya.

Use of the word 'Māyā' in the *Gītā*.

The Lord never uses the word *'Māyā'* without associating it with Himself or His powers. There are six references to the word *'Māyā'* in the *Gītā*:

(1) 'Sambhavāmi ātmamāyayā'— I manifest through My own 'Māyā.'

(2) 'Daivī hyeṣā guṇamyī *'Mama Māyā'* duratyayā'[254]—This *'Māyā* of Mine is Divine. It constitutes three guṇas (sattva, rajas and tamas) and is difficult to be overcome.

(3) *'Māyāmetāṁ taranti te'*[255]—They cross the influene of this 'Māyā'.[256]

(4) 'Māyayāpahṛtajñānā'[257] — whose understanding has been snatched away by the Māyā (referred to under (2) above).

(5) 'Nāham prakāśaḥ sarvasya *yogamāyāsamāvṛtaḥ'*[258]—I, concealed with the *'Yogamāyā,'* am not manifest to all.

(6) 'Īśvaraḥ . . . . bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni yantrārūḍhāni Māyayā'[259]—The Lord through His Māyā makes all the bhūtas rotate as if they are on some machine.

'Māya' exclusively belongs to the Lord and is used by Him for His own purposes.

In all these references it is quite definite that this *'Māyā'* exclusively belongs to the Lord Himself and is used for His own purposes. People come under its influence only indirectly and that also when they are mentioned in connection with the Lord. It has never been used in the *Gīta* in connection with the world or the Jīvas exclusively. *'Prakṛti'*, particularly Aparā, on the other hand, no doubt, belongs to the Lord but it is much more concerned with the bhūtas created in the world. It is also used by the Lord for His own

'Prakṛti', particularly, 'Aparā' is more concerned with the bhūtas and is also the 'Adhiṣṭhāna' of the Lord.

254 VII. 14.

255 VII. 14.

256 Referred to under (2) above.

257 *Bhagavadgītā,* VII. 15.

258 *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 25.

259 *Bhagavadgītā,* XVIII. 61.

use, as His 'adhiṣṭhāna', when He wants to manifest Himself as an 'Avatāra'.

Besides, the Lord Himself makes a very clear distinction between the 'Aparā Prakṛti' and the 'Māyā':

Distinction between the 'Aparā Prakṛti' and the 'Māyā'.

(1) He uses the attribute 'Aparā', meaning 'of lower type,' that is, 'non-cetana' as distinguished from 'parā' which is the 'Jīva', the very form of the Lord Himself. (2) Then again, while *'Prakṛti'* is the cause of the three guṇas—sattva, rajas, and tamas,[260] He speaks of the 'Māyā' as 'daivī', 'guṇamayī', and 'duratyayā'[261]—divine, constituting three guṇas and is difficult to be overcome. The 'Māyā' is made up of the three guṇas, while *'Prakṛti'* is the cause of the three guṇas. One subdues this *'Māyā'* only after one has realized the Lord Himself.[262] The attribute *'daivī'* has been added to *'Māyā'* and not to *'Prakṛti'*.[263] One may even go so far as to say that the Jīva itself has never been associated with this 'Māyā,' though the *Gītā* believes in the identity between Jīva and the Lord.[264] The *'Māyā'* belongs to the Lord exclusively and not to the Jīva.

We may also point out that both these terms—*'Māyā'* and *'Prakṛti'*,—have different meanings in

'Māyā' is different from 'Prakṛti'.

the *Gītā*. *'Māyā'*, as used here, is different from the *'Māyā'* of the Śaṅkara-Vedānta and the *'Prakṛti'*, as used here, is different both from the 'Māyā' of the Śaṅkara-Vedānta

'Māyā' of the *Gītā* is different from that of the Śaṅkara Vedānta and 'Prakṛti' of the *Gītā* is different from that of the Sāṅkhya.

and also from the *'Prakṛti'* of the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*. We know that the latter is the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas, while the 'Prakṛti' of the *Gītā* is the cause of the three guṇas. The 'Prakṛti' in Sāṅkhya is as much

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260 'Sattvaṁ rajastama iti guṇāḥ . . . Prakṛtisambhavāḥ'—Gītā XIV. 5; Vikāranśca guṇāṅścaiva viddhi *'Prakṛtisambhavān'*, XIII. 19; 'Puruṣaḥ 'Prakṛtistho hi bhuṅkte *Prakṛtijān guṇān'* XIII. 21; 'Kāryate' hyavaśaḥ karma sarvaḥ Prakṛtijairguṇai'—XII. 5; and Sattvam Prakṛtijairmuktaṁ yadebhiḥ *syāttribhirguṇaiḥ'Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 40; Śaṅkara, while—explaining the *Gītā* XVIII. 40; says—'Prakṛtijaiḥ *Prakṛtito .jātaiḥ*, 'Svabhāvaprabhavairguṇaiḥ' Gītā XVIII. 41. Again, Śaṅkara makes it clear by saying 'Svabhāvaprabhavaiḥ Prakṛti-prabhavaiḥ sattvarajastamobhirguṇaiḥ. Again, he says 'Sfabhāva Īśvarasya prakṛtistriguṇātmikā Māyā.'

261 *Bhagavadgītā*, VII. 14. 262 *Ibid.*

263 The use of the expression ,daivīṁ' and 'Prakṛtiṁ' in the *Bhagavadgītā*, IX. 13 is meant for the 'Prakṛti' of the gods and not that of the Lord, as in the *Gītā*, VII. 14.

264 Mamaivāṁśo jīvaloke Jīvabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ—*Bhagavadgītā*, XV. 7.

independent as the 'Puruṣa' while the 'Prakṛti' of the *Gītā* is entirely dependent on the Lord. The ' Prakṛti ' of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya, according to the Pariṇāmavāda, itself apparently manifests the evolutes, that is, without the help of the Puruṣa, while in the *Gītā,* the Lord says 'Mayādhyakṣeṇa Prakṛtiḥ sūyate sacarācaraṁ',[265]—the 'Prakṛti' produces both animate and inanimate beings under My supervision, or because of the contact of Kṣetra and Kṣetrajña.[266]

By the way, it may also be pointed out that according to Śaṅkara both ' Prakṛti ' and ' Māyā ' in the *Gītā* are the same as ' Avidyā '. How is it then possible for Śaṅkara to say that 'Prakṛti' is *nityā*? Śaṅkara himself says—Īśvara being *nitya* (eternal), His two Prakṛtis, namely, ' Puruṣa ' and ' Prakṛti ', both must be *nitya* —" nityeśvaratvādīśvarasya tatprakṛtyorapi yuktaṁ nityatvena bhavituṁ."[267] What does the term *'nityatva'* then mean? Does it mean merely 'beginninglessness', or 'endlessness' also? Śaṅkara says—the Īśvaratva of the Lord depends upon His lording over these two Prakṛtis, namely, *' Prakṛti '* and *' Puruṣa '* (Aparā and Parā respectively); so if these are not accepted as *nitya,* then the *Īśitva* of the Lord will not be possible. This being so, we will have to accept that by *' nitya '* Śaṅkara means both beginningless and endless; for the Lord is *nitya* not only because He is beginningless but also because He is endless. That is, He is imperishable and unchangeable. It is in the sense of beginningless, endless, imperishable and unchangeable that the word *' nitya '* is generally used. In other words, by *'nitya'* (eternal) we understand—it has existed, it exists and it will ever exist. If that be so, would it be possible for Śaṅkara to say that *' Māyā '* or *' Avidyā '* has existed in the past, of course, from time immemorial, exists at present and will also exist in future! If Śaṅkara's reply is in the affirmative, then why does he preach that there is only one reality,

Śaṅkara's view on the *' anāditva '* of Prakṛti discussed.

Meaning of the term ' Nityatva ' according to Śaṅkara.

'Īśitva' of the Lord is due to His lording over the two 'Prakṛtis'

If Śaṅkara's reply is in the affirmative, then the Advaita is questioned.

[265] *Bhagavadgītā,* IX. 10.
[266] *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 26.
[267] *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* on XIII. 19.

namely, Brahman? Where would go his *nitya* 'Puruṣa and Prakṛti'? Why not all these three, being equally eternal, are regarded as three different realities? Where will then stand Śaṅkara's Advaita philosophy? What will be the meaning of the Śruti—'Ekamevādvitīyaṁ neha nānāsti kiñcana'? There will be all confusion and the whole philosophy of Advaita will be nowhere.

It is, therefore, correct to explain the term *'anādi'* as 'having no beginning.' Thereby, it is possible to say that after both the 'Prakṛti' and the 'Puruṣa' merge into the Lord, there remains only one Reality ultimately and not two or three. So *nityatva*, according to Śaṅkara here in the present context, should be understood in the sense of only 'beginninglessness' and not endlessness' also. As for the *Īśitva* of the Lord, even when 'Prakṛti' and 'Puruṣa' have become one, or were one before, with the Lord before their manifestation, there will not be any difficulty. It is because He has the power to control these that they are within Him before their manifestation in this world and also after their dissolution in Him during the pralaya. There lies His *'Īśitva'*.

Meaning of the term *Nityatva* explained.

Īśitva of the Lord explained.

The position of Śaṅkara as explained by him seems to be supported, most likely, by his taking the Lord, as found in the *Gītā*, as the *Saguṇa Brahman*. In His Saguṇa form everything may be exactly as Śaṅkara has explained.

Is Bhagvān of the *Gītā* a Saguṇa Brahman according to Śaṅkara?

But this stand is not convincing to one who has studied the *Gītā*. In the text of the *Gītā* no clue has been given to differentiate between 'Saguṇa' and 'Nirguṇa' forms of the Lord. It seems as if both these aspects have been merged into the one and only one aspect of the Lord. In the garb of a human being, which is the creation of His own divine Māyā, the Lord says—'Mattaḥ parataraṁ nānyat kiñcidasti Dhanañjaya',[268] which leaves no doubt that He does not want to represent Himself as the Saguṇa Brahman.

Saguṇa and Nirguṇa both are the two aspects of the Lord Himself.

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268 *Bhagavadgītā*, VII. 7.

There is only one Reality which is the Highest Reality and which persists throughout the book and all the rest that we have therein are His own Prakṛtis. The conception of the Highest Truth is not put in the *Gītā* enveloped within certain 'upādhis' (limitations) as it is the case with a jīva, but it is emphatically recognised to be all in all. There is nothing beyond the Lord as He appears in the *Gītā* though in a human garb.

Only one Reality, which is the highest one, persists throughout the *Gītā*.

The Lord in human form is all in all.

It does not seem to be quite convincing that there is still some higher aspect of the Lord, which may be His nirguṇa form, when He says, "Vāsudevaḥ sarvamiti".[269] It is, therefore, that there exist only three Realities in this *Gītāśāstra*—Kṣara, Akṣara and Puruṣottama or Vāsudeva. Even though He may be in the human garb and be called Vāsudeva and may possess all sorts of contradictory attributes, yet He is all in all, the only Reality, call him by any name. He is 'Pūrṇa' even in this human garb and there is nothing to reduce, or to put a limitation to, his 'Pūrṇatva' in the *Gītā*.[270]

There is no Nirguṇa form beyond the Saguṇa.

The Lord has two Prakṛtis—Parā and Aparā. The former is the empirical self, while the latter is the inanimate forms manifesting themselves as the universe. These forms are—earth, water, fire, air, ākāśa, manas, buddhi and ahaṅkāra.[271] These eight forms represent the five bhūtas and the three inner-senses. From these follow all the bhūtas. The three guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas are the *products* of Prakṛti. Besides, we have the five sense-organs of cognition and the five sense-organs of action and the five objects of the senses, namely, śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa and gandha.[272] While pointing out the comparative nature of the organs of senses, the Lord says, "The senses are subtler than the gross organism, and subtler

Forms of Prakṛti according to the *Gītā*.

Gradations in the sense-organs.

269 *Bhagavadgītā*, VII. 19.

270 Upadraṣṭānumantā ca bhartā bhoktā Maheśvaraḥ | Paramātmeti cāpyukto *dehe'smin Puruṣaḥ Paraḥ* ||—*Bhagavadgītā*, XIII-22.

271 *Bhagavadgītā*, VII. 4–5.

272 *Bhagavadgītā*, XIII. 5.

than it is the manas, and still subtler than the manas, is the buddhi and the subtlest of all is the Abolute."[273]

All the bhūtas merge into the unmanifest during Pralaya, which, in its turn, merges into the Eternal Unmanifest Entity (sanātana avyakta). This is eternal. This never perishes. This has all the bhūtaṣ within Itself and pervades the entire universe.[274]

In order to present a comparative idea about the notion of *'Prakṛti'* in the *Gītā,* it is necessary to give here what the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* has said about it.

According to the Sāṅkhya, on the other hand, the following is the order of manifestation :

Puruṣa (jña) and Prakṛti (avyakta) are the two highest entities. The former is the only conscious entity, while the latter represents the entire non-conscious aspect of the universe. The Puruṣa is quite aloof. It does not take any interest in the evolution. The whole creation manifests itself from the Prakṛti. First comes out the buddhi from the Prakṛti, the Primordial cause. Buddhi manifests Ahaṅkāra, which in its turn, manifests itself into manas, the five organs of cognition and those of action, and the five tanmātrās, namely, śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa and gandha. These tanmātrās produce ākāśa, vāyu, fire, water and earth respectively.

Forms of evolutes according to the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā.*

The Sāṅkhya Prakṛti is the equilibrium of the three guṇas. The guṇas are there in the Prakṛti from time immemorial. One of these guṇas is rajas, the nature of which is *cala*—impulsive and so the Prakṛti and all its evolutes cannot remain inactive even for a moment. These three guṇas do not ever separate themselves and so all the direct and indirect evolutes of the Prakṛti do consist of these three guṇas. Of course, the degree or proportion of each of these three guṇas differs from evolute to evolute. In fact, the difference between one evolute and the other is really due to the difference of the proportion of these guṇas.

One evolute is different from the other simply because of the difference in the degree of the three guṇas.

These three guṇas, namely, sattva, rajas and tamas, according to Sāṅkhya, constitute the very

273 *Bhagavadgītā,* III. 42.

274 *Bhagavadgītā,* VIII. 18–22.

form of Prakṛti, while these are the evolutes of Prakṛti in the *Gītā,* and so they have been repeatedly called 'Prakṛtisambhavāḥ',[275] 'Prakṛtijāḥ',[276] and Prakṛtijaih.'[277]

Gītā and the Sāṅkhya Puruṣa and Prakṛti contrasted.

We can see from the above that the order of the evolution according to Sāṅkhya does not quite agree with that of the *Gītā.* Even the conception of 'Puruṣa' and 'Prakṛti' differs. Besides, the very notion of the Absolute Truth of the *Gītā* is not at all present in Sāṅkhya. Sāṅkhya ends with the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The Puruṣa, even then, is not absolutely free from the Prakṛti. The slight tinge of sattva remains with the Puruṣa during its Kaivalya (Prakṛtiṁ *paśyati* Puruṣaḥ). But it is not so with the *Gītā.* The Lord who is the highest entity and in Whom the entire creation merges is even above His own Māyā. He is very active. One who realizes Him, never comes back to this saṁsāra. The notion of Advaita which we find in the *Gītā* is not possible in Sāṅkhya.

13. *Conclusion*

From the study of the *Gītā* in its various aspects, it is clear that it contains all that we find in our Upaniṣads. Its highest aim is to lead to the realization of the Supreme Truth, the Lord Vāsudeva. All that exist are His own forms. He is all in all. It is in Him alone that the mahāvākya—*'Sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ Brahma'* finds its full implication.

The nature of the Lord and His interest in His devotees.

He is not only always conscious of His *svarūpa* but also teaches everyone who is qualified to hear His teachings, like Arjuna, all about Himself. When He finds that the seeker after truth is fully qualified, He never conceals any fact from him. He becomes his friend, father and everything. He becomes so much interested in His devotees that He takes all their responsibilities upon Himself. In fact, the Lord becomes so much attached to His devotees that He does

275 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 19; XIV. 5. 276 *Bhagavadgītā,* XIII. 21.

277 *Bhagavadgītā,* III, 5; XVIII 40—'Prakṛtito jātaiḥ' says Śaṅkara.

not at all like that they should think of anything other than of the Lord Himself in whatever form it may be. He does not want that His devotees should, in any way, find themselves helpless. He becomes practically one with them. He opens His heart to them. There remains nothing which the Lord would conceal from His devotees. He lays down before the devotees the rules of discipline of mind, heart and body, shows them the way to follow those rules and ultimately, shows them the right path to Duty. He never gives an opportunity to His devotees to think that there is anything which they cannot achieve through the help of the Lord.

Lord as the Universal Teacher.

He is not only a theoretical teacher but is also keen to see that His teachings have been fully understood and have served the real purpose. His words are most encouraging. His teachings are not merely words coming from the greatest authority and therefore command respect, but are full of reasons which make every unbiased mind fully convinced of their implications.

Protection of Dharma and Sādhus—the main object of the Lord.

For the Lord and as a matter of fact, for all His devotees and seekers after truth, *Dharma* and the *Sādhus* are the only two essential factors which should engage their constant attention and be the guide to the Path of Duty. *Adharma* and the wicked are to be hated and crushed by all. As the greatest of the teachers and the eternal guide to the righteous Path of Duty and the Protector of the universe, the Lord feels that *Dharma* and *good people* alone can maintain the standard of existence and can save the very universe from being ruined. That He is the very source of *Varṇāśrama Dharma* and that He teaches every one to follow it, is clear from His repeated injunctions to Arjuna to fight against the evil-doers in accordance with his Kṣattriya-Dharma.[278] He has told us how dreadful it is to follow the Dharma of others. He teaches us to believe and follow our own *Varṇāśrama Dharma* even though there may be some defect in it, as even then it is better than *Para-dharma*.[279]

Lord insists on the performance of the Varṇāśrama Dharma.

278 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 31. 37.
279 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 47.

He tells us that a slight defect present in one's own Dharma does not take away the essence of that Dharma. It is just like smoke surrounding the fire. So one should never give up one's own Dharma though there may be some defect in it.[280] He further says that to die in pursuance of one's own Dharma leads to the Highest Good, while resort to another's Dharma is attended with danger.[281]

Meaning and importance of Dharma.

That by the term '*Dharma*' the Lord means *Varṇāśrama Dharma* is clear from the references made to the Kṣattriya Dharma in the case of Arjuna and from His repeatedly asking Arjuna to fight against his enemies.[282] Again, we find that He has given the characteristics of the order of all the four castes[283] which are His own creation,[284] and says "Every man, fully devoted to the performance of actions prescribed for his grade, attains to the highest perfection. Do hear of the process by which each man being engaged in his own *Dharma* attains to perfection."[285] The Lord even adds that every one attains success when he worships Him in accordance with his own Dharma and Karma.[286] It is clear from His teachings that He emphasises the performance of actions, without any desire to reap the fruits of those actions, according to the Dharma of the performer and it is only then that the chaotic order of the universe will be put to an end. Perfect happiness and peace can be restored only when every man performs his duties according to his own Dharma, which in fact, is the very nature of the performer. It is because of this that the words 'Svakarma', 'Sahajaṁ karma', 'Svadharma' etc., have been used in the *Gītā*.[287] The Lord does not want to separate the individuality of a man from his own Dharma according to his grade in society.

Dharma is the very nature of a man. It is in accordance with the status that one occupies in society and the life that one leads in order to achieve the highest end of life.

A man is made of the three guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas. The various characteristics which are founed in a man are the modifications of the three guṇas,[289] and

280 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 48.
281 *Bhagavadgītā*, III. 35.
282 *Bhagavadgītā*, II. 18, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38; III. 30; VIII. 7; XI. 33-34; XVIII. 43.
283 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 41—44.
284 *Bhagavadgītā*, IV. 13.
285 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 45.
286 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 46
287 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 45—48.
288 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 41—48.
289 *Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 19—41.

as such, he cannot be separated from them. These are the very essence of a man and when we dispassionately consider the true nature of Dharma, we realize that it is also as much inseparable from the man as his very nature. It is because of this that this Dharma has been called eternal and natural (sanātana). It is inherent in the very nature of a man. It has not been imposed upon him from outside. Therefore, the Lord has repeatedly told Arjuna to follow his own Dharma and fight against his enemies.

Universal Grace of the Lord.

In the entire teachings of the Lord there is a sort of impetus which He wants to infuse in his devotees and through those most convincing repeated encouragements He wants to engage them in their own *Dharma*. He is not a partial teacher. He looks upon all His entire creation with one eye. What He wants is that every man must do his own duty without any attachment towards the results of actions and that he should be devoted to Him. All other teachings of the Lord, follow like a corollary, the only teaching of doing one's own duty without having any desire to attain its fruits.

Gītā not associated with the systems of Śaṅkara Vedānta and Sāṅkhya.

Though the teachings of the *Gītā* are directly or indirectly based on the teachings of the Upaniṣad, yet it is very difficult to say that the *Gītā* is a work of any particular school of thought such as Vedānta, or Sāṅkhya, as taught by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. We have seen there are technical words, such as, Brahma, Māyā, Prakṛti, Ahaṅkāra, Buddhi, etc., in the *Gītā* which are also found in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and others and also in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. But it has been made clear above that these words have not been used in the same sense anywhere. The Prakṛti of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* is different from the Prakṛti of the *Gītā*. Similarly, we find that the three guṇas —sattva, rajas and tamas are the products of the Prakṛti in the *Gītā*, while these are eternal constituents of the Sāṅkhya Prakṛti. Likewise, the Māyā of the Śaṅkara—Vedānta is illusory and anirvacanīyā, while it is quite different in the *Gītā*. In spite of these differences there are similarities between the thoughts of the *Gītā* and those found in the Vedānta, simply because both these have Upaniṣads as their common source.

The conception of 'Vāsudeva' and the nature of the 'Bhagavān' in all its aspects lead me rather to think that the *Gītā* is intimately connected with the old *'Bhāgavata-Sampradāya.'* It is associated with *'Vaiṣṇava Āgama.'* Moreover, it is closely connected with the *Nārāyaṇīya* section of the *Mahābhārata.* A further treatment, however, of this aspect is reserved for a separate investigation.

The old Bhāgavata Sampradāya found in the *Gītā*.

The Paramātman is answerable for the existence of the social order in this universe. He is responsible for the divisions in society by creating the four castes—brāhmaṇa, kṣattriya, vaiśya and śūdra based on their qualities and actions.[290]

The Lord is responsible for the social order in the universe.

With the help of His own Māyā, His own inseparable divine śakti,[291] He assumes the human form as an avatāra only when certain disorder has been created in the world, righteousness is on the decline and unrighteousness on the ascent. He comes to this earth and protects the virtuous and dutiful and destroys the evil-doers and re-establishes order by placing *dharma* on a firm footing. Though He is *āptakāma,* yet He does everything for the good of his people[292] as has been said before. He takes the entire responsibility for the devotee upon Himself and asks him to leave all his duties and surrender himself to the Lord. He does assume the reins of the whole social order. So He is not only the metaphysical highest entity, but also the highest head of the human and socio-religious order. This also supports the view advanced before that the highest aim of Philosophy, Religion and Life is the same. It is in Kṛṣṇa of the *Gītā* alone that the synthesis of life, philosophy and religion can be easily found. This is a unique feature of the *Gītā.*

The Lord takes avatāra to re-establish the social order and protect the good against the evil-doers.

He does everything for the good of the people.

The Lord is the highest head of the social and religious order.

It is in Kṛṣṇa that the synthesis of life, philosophy and religion is found.

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290 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 13.

291 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 13.

292 *Bhagavadgītā,* IV. 6–8.

CHAPTER V

MATERIALISM (CĀRVĀKA-DARŚANA)

1. *Introduction*

AFTER having dealt with what philosophy in India stands for and how its teachings can be practised in actual life, the next point which has to be dealt with, in a general way, is the classification of the schools of philosophy. We know that the ultimate end of an ideal human life and that of philosophy in India is the true realization of the self (Ātman) in order to get rid of sufferings. This ultimate entity, although strictly speaking indescribable, if ever described for the understanding of ordinary people, can be said to be pure (śuddha), eternal (nitya),[1] consciousness itself and all complete (pūrṇa and akhaṇḍa).[2] The idea of completeness is itself of such a character that it cannot permit any accurate description; for whatever description be given, it will put a limitation to the entity described and thereby the very nature of completeness becomes frustrated. The thinking faculty even fails to grasp this all comprehensive completeness; for, how is it possible to think of an entity which is, simultaneously, both the subtlest of the subtle (aṇoraṇīyān) and the largest of the large (mahato mahīyān),[3] which moves far and wide, and yet, is ever at rest; which goes everywhere in spite of the fact that it is ever asleep;[4] which is at the same time light and dark, joy and sorrow, good and bad, and yet, it is beyond all these; again, which is not in any point of space, though everywhere and hence, which is really not capable of being described, although we may talk a lot

Classification of the Schools of Darśana.

The idea of Pūrṇatva is beyond any description.

The nature of the ultimate truth is such wherein all contradictions meet.

1 *Jābāladarśanopaniṣad*, V. 13.

2 *Varāhopaniṣad*, III. 8; *Brahmabindūpaniṣad*, 100.

3 *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, I. ii. 20.

4 *Ibid.*, I. ii. 21–22.

about it? From these and similar other characteristics it becomes quite evident that the nature of this ultimate truth is such wherein all contradictions meet, which, again, is possible simply because it is Pūrṇa and Ananta.

Such being the case, how can any language with all its natural limitations give expression to that which is beyond the limitations of time and space? Similarly, the thinking faculty also is wholly incapable of approaching such an entity. So says the Śruti'—Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha.'[5]

Various schools of philosophy are so many stages in the realization of the ultimate Truth.

In the complete realization of this all-comprehensive entity, there are several stages which are represented by the various schools of Indian Philosophy. Again, as it is complete (Pūrṇa), it is quite natural that it would present itself through different aspects to different enquirers when viewed from different angles of vision. Hence, what the different schools of Indian Philosophy teach us is ultimately, the description of the same ultimate truth, of course, from different stages. It is therefore, that before an enquirer into the nature of the ultimate truth comes to realize the ultimate end of Philosophy, he has gradually to realize and pass through all these different stages, which, in their turn, merely represent different aspects of the ultimate truth.

Basis of the classification of schools.

Now, for the right understanding of the true spirit of Darśana all these schools may be classified on the basis of the triple relation between (1) subject (knower—jñātā) and object (non-conscious matter, knowable—jñeya), (2) subject and knowledge (jñāna), and (3) object (matter) and knowledge. Before proceeding further it is necessary to point out that the facts and objects of the universe, as they are, cannot be denied by any thinker. No thoughtful being can deny the hot touch of fire, or the cold touch of ice. However different their view-point may be regarding the nature of these objects, but that they exist cannot be gainsaid. So the existence of subject, object and knowledge has to be assumed in some form or the

[5] *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II. 9.

other by all thinkers. As regards the form of these, one is at liberty to hold any logical opinion one likes. Apparently, on the basis of the above mentioned triple relation, we find that there are three possible lines of thinking : (1) the line of thought, which deals with the identity among the above mentioned three factors and

Idealism.

asserts the independent supremacy of knowledge, may be regarded as representing *Idealism*. It lays emphasis on idea or vijñāna with the two other factors as its own forms. (2) The line of thinking, according to which all the

Realism.

three factors have their real and distinct existence, may be said to represent Realism: while (3) the line of thought, which asserts the supremacy of object (matter) over the other two

Materialism.

which, in their turn, are nothing but its own products or bye-products, may be designated as *Materialism*. It is so-called because according to it matter (jaḍa), as opposed to consciousness (cetana), alone exists, in the universe, while the knower and the knowledge are its own forms or products.

Proceeding on the basis of this classification we find that the schools of Śaṅkara-Vedānta, in its Pāramārthika

Idealistic Schools.

aspect and Kashmir Śaivaism from the āstika side, while the Buddhist Yogācāra and Sautrāntrika from the nāstika side, fall under Idealism (vijñā), the only difference between the two being that according to the Śaṅkara-Vedānta, it is nitya-vijñāna, while according to the Buddhist Yogācāra and Sautrāntrika it is kṣaṇika-vijñāna.

The schools of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, Sāṅ-

Schools of Realism.

khya, Rāmānuja, Mādhva and even the empirical school of Śaṅkara-Vedānta from the orthodox side, Jaina and Vaibhāṣika from the heterodox side, may be

Materialistic School.

said to represent Realism, while the school of Cārvāka alone may be regarded as representing Materialism.

Having thus classified the various schools of Darśana, it is desirable to deal with each and every one of these.

Materialism—Its place in life and philosophy

It has been said before that the origin of philosophical thoughts in India is linked with the creation itself, but the systematization of thoughts is of later date and may be said to have taken place between the Upaniṣadic and the Buddhistic periods. The materialistic thoughts however, were prevalent among very ordinary people representing their mode of crude living and thinking from very early times. Every thoughtful people considered these thoughts as anti-spiritual and anti-moral and so they attacked them from their own angle of vision. But as representative of the crudest form of thoughts, they remained unchanged. As the Jainas and the Buddhists have also referred to these views, I have collected them in one place and have dealt with them earlier than Jainism.

Direct perception through external sense-organs represents the first stage of our realization.

As already pointed out in the foregoing pages, an enquiry into the nature of the Ātman started simply to find out the permanent and radical remedy of our miseries. No doubt, the nature of sufferings differs widely from stage to stage and individual to individual. That which is painful at a particular stage and time to one may not be so to him or to any one else at another moment. But amidst all these differences in the experiences and degrees of sufferings, it is a fact that suffering does exist for all the individuals.

With the above facts in our mind, when we start in search of our ultimate aim, the first thing which we face for the first time in our life at the very outset of our enquiry is the existence of non-conscious elements surrounding our physical organism which itself is not different from them. These elements are cognized through direct means of cognition. It is also found that these very elements constitute what is known as the Ātman at that stage and in some form or the other are also capable of removing our pain. As this serves the purpose of the enquiry at a particular stage, it may be regarded as the first stage in the realization of the ultimate Truth. This may be said to represent the stage of

Materialism. If we take the main doctrines of this school and compare them with the activities in the primary stage of our life, it will be quite clear how very closely they resemble each other. In the very beginning of our life when the thoughts are not at all developed every one believes in acquiring knowledge through direct perception through external sense-organs alone. The other means of right cognition, such as, inference, analogy, valid testimony, etc. have no place at that stage. A baby, for instance, when only a few hours old, may not show any sign of cognitive activity, it may not even indicate the desire to suck the mother's breast, but gradually it begins to suck when milk is put in its mouth. Afterwards it cries out when it feels hungry, or is found to have experienced some feelings of pain. Similarly, it does not first make any distinction between its own mother or the nurse and other ladies of the family. But after sometime it gradually recognizes its mother and wants to go to her when it feels her touch and perceives her. Later on, the other sense-organs, such as, the organs of hearing and taste begin to function properly and the baby recognizes its mother through her sound and even taste of her milk. But the baby would not long for its mother, if she does not come before it, or does not give the baby any occasion to feel her touch and hear her sound.

Direct perception is the only means of cognition which is regarded as most authentic.

If closely observed we shall be able to find out that even little grown up children do not go beyond direct perception (pratyakṣa). They would not desist from an action unless that action had caused them some fresh pain then and there, although it might have caused them pain even before. We find that young children are repeatedly asked by their parents not to go near a bush, but they would not heed unless they see with their own eyes something in the bush which they feel would do them injury. Still younger children would not even fear snakes, but would like to play with them as if they were some moving toys. The reason seems to be that they do not directly perceive that snakes bite whenever they are touched and still less they realize that snake-bite is fatal.

Again, how many of us are there who actually believe in the results of an action which would accrue after sometime and are not perceivable along with the very performance of the action? We all know that to tell a lie is a great sin, but how many of us are there who really believe in it? If sin were as obvious and perceivable a thing as the hot touch of fire, then I am sure, no one would have ever spoken a lie and committed a sin, but that it is not so is a fact which admits of no denial. Does it not prove that we do not really believe in it, simply because it is not an object of our direct perception? Many more similar instances can be given from our everyday experiences. These facts distinctly show that we, whether young or old, at a certain stage, believe only in direct perception.

Looking at the materialistic advancement of the present day it may be said that most of us at present are no better than a materialist in practice and have no definite faith in moral responsibilities and would like only to eat, drink and be merry. We think that with death every thing perishes. Ātman or God, as different from mortal beings, is not accepted by these materialists. For them, heaven and hell are nothing beyond extreme pleasure and pain respectively experienced by them during their life time. One who leads such a life is, undoubtedly, a materialist.

Those, who do not merely depend upon direct perception but carry their investigation beyond pratyakṣa and depend upon other means of cognition also, may be said to be leading the life of a Naiyāyika, or a Mīmāṁsaka, or a Vedāntin, both in thought and practice. Hence, in order to trace the gradual realization of the ultimate truth, it is desirable to start with the materialistic thought.

2. *Origin and Sources*

The original propounder of the school is said to be Bṛhaspati, the presiding deity of learning and the preceptor of the devas. It is believed that when gods were

at war with the devils (asuras), the former requested their preceptor and leader Bṛhaspati to devise some means by which the devils would lose the sympathy of Śukrācārya who was their (asuras') preceptor; for, under the latter's guidance the devils were gaining ground. So once, when Śukra was out, Bṛhaspati, in the guise of Śukra, entered the camp of the asuras and taught them the doctrines of Materialism. When the real Śukra came back he was not respected and obeyed by the asuras as before. This made Śukra angry and the asuras lost his sympathy and assistance. Hence, some are of opinion that the doctrines taught by Bṛhaspati to the devils during the absence of Śukra, were put in the form of aphorisms, the fragments of which have come down to us. Haribhadra held that Bṛhaspati propounded the view to deceive Indra. It is, therefore, that these aphorisms are known as *Bārhaspatya-sūtras*, and the system also is, accordingly, named Bārhaspatya-darśana.

Bṛhaspati is the original propounder of the School.

Some attribute the origin of the system to one Cārvāka who might have been the friend of Duryodhana, as mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*. Whatever may be the fact, it is certain that both of these two names are intimately connected with the system and it is, therefore, that the system is named after both.

Some hold Cārvāka as the first propounder of the School.

Again, some are of opinion that the term 'Cārvāka' is not a proper name. It is derived from the root '*carva*', to eat. It means that he, who eats, that is, enjoys life and does not believe in the reality of merits and demerits etc. accruing from the deeds themselves and which control the activities of life, and in the objects beyond direct perception, is a 'Cārvāka'.[6] He is also called 'Lokāyatika', because he does not believe in any reason but depends upon what ordinary people say or do.[7] The system propounded by such persons is also sometimes called 'Bāhya', perhaps because of the

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6 Carva adane. Carvanti bhakṣayanti tattvato na manyante puṇya-pāpādikam parokṣam vastujātamiti Cārvākāḥ—Guṇaratna in his Com. on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, p. 300.

7 Lokā nirvicārāḥ sāmānyā lokāstadvadācaranti smeti lokāyatā lokāyatikā ityapi—*Ibid.*

fact that it is recognized to be out of the orthodox fold and also because the system concentrates only on perceivable objects of the external world.

It is, however, very difficult to say when the materialistic thoughts actually came to exist. But it may be pointed out that early Vedic Ṛṣis too could not have identified themselves with the Highest Truth from their very birth. They must have experienced life at other stages also before realizing the Highest Truth. Thus, even those great seers of the past have had experiences of the materialistic influences even in their own life at a certain stage. For even believing in the eternity of the Ātman and the beginninglessness of the saṁsāra, it will have to be assumed that when the emperical self (Jīva) becomes connected with a physical organism, the natural influence of that organism must be felt by that Jīva, for howsoever short a period it may be. If it were not so, then the particular emperical self would not ever have been entangled in a physical organism. If this be admitted, then even in the absence of any direct testimony about the existence of materialistic thoughts in the early days of our creation after the cosmic rest was over, we may assume that the materialistic thought is as old as the human creation itself. In a way, the experiences of materialistic feelings may be said to be but natural with every human being at a certain stage.

References in the Śrutis.

As for the external evidence about the origin of the thought some find the germs of it in certain hymns of the *Ṛgveda*.[8] Coming to the Āraṇyakas, we find the great Vedic teacher, Yājñavalkya, explaining to his wife, Maitreyī, the question of life after death according to the Materialists. He says that there are some who hold that consciousness is produced out of a peculiar collocation of the four elements (bhūtas), namely, earth, water, air and tejas, and is destroyed along with the destruction of that collocation; and there exists no consciousness after death (etebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānyevānuvinaśyati na pretya saṁjñāstīti).[9]

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8 *Ṛgveda*, VII. 89, S. Radhakrishnan—Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 273.

9 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II. IV. 12.

Next, we find the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* mentioning several views of old regarding the origin of universe.[10] Some of these views, namely Kālavāda, Svabhāvavāda, Niyativāda, Yadṛcchāvāda, undoubtedly, seem to be representing, in some aspect or the other, the Materialistic thoughts of ancient days. As these theories, according to the interpretation of Śaṅkarācārya and his followers, seem to be very closely related to the later materialistic thoughts, it may not be out of place to give a very brief exposition of each of these here with a view to present an opportunity to modern scholars to trace a connected history of this school from the earliest period till the present day.

Various old Materialistic theories.

(1) *Kālavāda*

Kālavāda appears to be a sort of fatalistic view. To depend entirely upon fate for the happenings of the worldly phenomena is to cut off the very root of reasoning. But no darśana, except the Cārvāka, in India, overlooks reasoning. Hence, it appears that it represents a school of Materialism. Śaṅkarācārya, while explaining the term 'Kāla', says—'Kālo nāma sarvabhūtānāṁ vipariṇāmahetuḥ svabhāvaḥ,'[11] that is, Kāla is the *svabhāva* (something like nature itself) which alone is resorted to for the modifications of all the bhūtas (elements) in order to form the constituents of the universe. Śaṅkara's interpretation appears to emphasise the fact that there is no need in believing in the regular causality attributed to Paramāṇu, or Īśvara, or Brahman for the explanation of the events of the universe. The Kāla itself would explain all the phenomena. So says Varadarāja Mishra that in spite of the fact that every requisite (sāmagrī) be present for the production of an object it will not be produced unless a particular time comes. Hence, it appears that 'time' (Kāla), without resorting to anything else, alone, is responsible for production. So there seems to be no

Fatalistic Theory.

No need of causality for creation.

10 I. 2.

11 Śaṅkarācārya on *Ibid.*

causality.[12] This view appears to be corroborated by Śaṅkarānanda, in his commentary on the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, who holds that as there is great gaurava in accepting the ultimate particles to be the cause of the universe, the theory of Kāla has been introduced in its place.[13]

Time alone responsible for creation.

This theory of Kāla is perhaps the same to which Īśvarakṛṣṇa refers to in his *Sāṅkhyakārikā*—Ādhyātmikyaḥ catasraḥ prakṛtyupādānakālabhāgākhyaḥ,[14] as one of the internal forms of contentment (tuṣṭi) and which has been mentioned along with the bhāgya (luck or fate), although it is mentioned in a different context.

References to Kālavāda.

Vātsyāyana holds that every event in this universe is due to Kāla. All the efforts of human beings depend upon Kāla. It is Kāla which brings desired and undesired results, victory and defeat, happiness and misery, etc., to human beings. It was due to Kāla that Bali the king of devils, was made Indra, king of the gods, and was removed from that highest position and sent to Pātāla. So it has been rightly said that Kāla causes change in the bhūtas, Kāla destroys men, everything being actionless in Pralaya, Kāla alone remains active. Thus, Kāla is unsurmountable.[14a]

Some scholars are of opinion that it is much like the notion to which Uddyotakara refers to in his *Nyāyavārtika* as—*kecit kālaṁ*,[15] etc. that is, some hold that Kāla is the instrumental cause (nimittakāraṇa), while the Paramāṇus are the material cause of the universe.[16] But from the interpretation of the theory of Kāla given above it appears that Kāla is not recognized as the instrumental cause alone, but as all in all. In other words,

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12 Anekakārakaṣādhyasyāpi kāryasya kasmiṁścideva kārake samavāyo na kārakāntareṣviti deśaniyamo hetvabhāve'pi saṅgacchate, tathā kaścidghaṭādiniyatakālasaṁsargaḥ svabhāvata evākāśādivaditi kālaniyamo'pi ahetuka eva saṅgaṁsyate—*Bodhanī* on the *Kusumāñjaliprakaraṇa*, p. 8 Saraswatībhavana text series, Banaras.

13 Vide his Com. on the *Śve-Upa, I.* 2.

14 Verse 50.

14a *Kāmasūtra*, II. 35-37 along with the *Jayamaṅgalā*.

15 IV. i. 21, pp. 457—59 Banaras Ed.

16 Īśvaraścejjagato nimittaṁ jagataḥ sākṣādupādānakāraṇaṁ kim? uktampṛthivyādiparamasūkṣmaṁ paramāṇusañjñitaṁ dravya (vyakta) miti. Vyaktakāraṇābhyupagame tu sati nimittaviśeṣavipratipattau Īśvaraprakriyā yasmānnimittakāraṇe vipratipadyante—kecit kālam......etc.—*Ibid.*

Kāla does not depend upon anything else for producing the constituents of the universe. Such a notion of Kāla differs from that which is given by Uddyotakara.

(2) *Svabhāvavāda*

Supremacy of the potentiality of a thing responsible for creation.

Svabhāvavāda lays stress on the supremacy of the immanent nature of a thing. So says Śaṅkarācārya—'Svabhāvo nāma padārthānāṃ pratiniyataśaktiḥ',[17] that is, svabhāva is that potentiality (śakti) of a thing which is immanent in it, like the hot touch of fire. Śaṅkarānanda says that as Kāla cannot do anything without the help of the potentiality of a thing which is immanent in it, the theory of Kāla has been replaced by the Svabhāvavāda. In fact, this theory does not like to struggle for finding out the efficient cause of production but asserts that it is the very nature of a thing, or an event to be so. Although we shall see that some of the schools of Indian Philosophy do take recourse to the immanent nature of a thing ultimately, and thus adhere to the theory of Determinism, yet it should be made clear that the extreme materialists become satisfied by appealing to the very nature of a thing in the very beginning, and thereby they entirely deny the place of reasoning. It is on account of this very fact that the Svabhāvavāda has been repudiated by other schools of Indian thought.

References to Svabhāvavāda.

This theory appears to have widely attracted the attention of scholars in ancient India. Its references are found in Brahminical literature and also in the canonical works of the Buddhists and the Jainas. "There are evidences in the Pali literature as to the existence, during the age of Buddhism, or even earlier, of a class of persons, Brahmins by caste, who spent all their wits in the subtleties of futile controversies."[18] These came to be known as Lokāyatikas, or the Materialists. Bhaṭṭa Utpala on the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* also says that there are others who are known as Laukāyatikas who hold

[17] Vide his Com. on the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, I. 2.

[18] *Princess of Wales Saraswatībhavana Studies*, Vol. II. p. 97.

that the creation of the universe, its diversity and its destruction, are all due to svabhāva.[19]

Divisions of Svabhāva.

Ujjvaladatta divides svabhāva into nisarga, meaning a kind of saṁskāra (habit) which is due to conscious and repeated efforts of the past, and svabhāva proper, that is, which has no extrinsic source of origin and is spontaneous.[20]

This theory of *Spontaneous Origination* does not believe in any kind of causality. It upholds that it is the very nature of a thing, or an event to be so. This idea has been variously illustrated in the following lines:

> Kaḥ kaṇṭakānām prakaroti taikṣṇyaṁ
> vicitrabhāvaṁ mṛgapakṣiṇāṁ ca|
> Mādhuryamikṣoḥ kaṭutāṁ ca nimbe
> svabhāvataḥ sarvamidam pravṛttam||[21]

(*Translation*—Who produces the sharpness of the thorn, the peculiar nature of deer and birds, the sweetness of the sugar-cane and the pungent flavour of the nimba fruit? This is all due to the immanent nature of each of the objects).

> Nityasattvā bhavantyanye nityāsattvāśca kecana|
> Vicitrāḥ kecidityatra tatsvabhāvo niyāmakaḥ||[22]

(*Translation*—That some are always strong, some are always weak, while others are of surprising nature; in all these it is the nature of the thing itself which is the only restraint).

> Agniruṣṇo jalaṁ śītaṁ samasparśastathā'nilaḥ|
> Kenedaṁ citritaṁ tasmāt svabhāt tadvyavasthitiḥ||[23]

(*Translation*—Who has made fire hot, water cool and air possessing moderate touch? None. This is all due to the very nature of these things).

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19 Apare anye laukāyatikāḥ svabhāvam jagataḥ kāraṇamâhuḥ. Svabhāvādeva jagadvicitramutpadyate svabhāvato vilayam yāti—I. 7.

20 Bahirhetvanapekṣī tu svabāvo'yam prakīrtitaḥ| Nisargaśca svabhāvaśca ityeṣa bhavati dvidhā|| Nisargaḥ sudṛḍhābhyāsajanyaḥ saṁskāra ucyate| Ajanyastu svataḥ siddhaḥ svarūpo bhāva ucyate||—*Nyāyakoṣa*, 2nd Edition p. 971.

21 Bhaṭṭa Utpala on the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā*, I. 7.

22 Quoted in the *Bodhanī*, p. 9.

23 *Ibid.*

Na kalpyau sukhaduḥkhābhyāṁ dharmādharmau parairiha|
Svabhāvena sukhī duḥkhī jano'nyannaiva kāraṇam||
Śikhiṇaścitrayet ko vā kokilān kaḥ prakūjayet|
Svabhāvavyatirekeṇa vidyate nātra kāraṇam||[24]

(*Translation*—Others should not postulate the existence of merit and demerit from the existence of pleasure and pain; for a man feels these by virtue of his very nature; and there is no other cause. Who gives peculiar colour to the peacocks, or who makes the cuckoos sing so sweet? There is no other cause except the inherent nature of the thing itself).

In this way, it is clear that the upholders of this theory reject the theory of causality and try to explain every phenomenon by directly appealing to the very nature of a thing. Udayanācārya thinks that the theory of *Spontaneous Origination* is one of the varieties of the theory of *Chance.*[25]

Udayana's view.

Almost a similar view is found in the *Nyāya-Sūtra*[26] —'Animittato bhāvotpattiḥ kaṇṭakataikṣṇyādidarśanāt'—which records the view that the production of positive things is without any cause, as is found in the sharpness of a thorn and the like.[27]

Guṇaratna in his commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* speaks of a theory of Non-causality (ahetu), which he attributes to Āśramin which also seems to be of the same type.[28]

(3) *Niyativāda*

Niyativāda appears to be a theory of *Chance.* Mm. Dr. Gopinatha Kaviraja holds "that it was a non-theistic assumption which had arisen in attempting to find out an explana-

A theory of chance.

[24] *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*—Lokāyatika Section, Verses 4—5.

[25] *Kusumāñjali,* I. 5.

[26] IV. I. 22.

[27] Here Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara hold that the instrumental causality alone is denied and not the theory of causality itself, but the context shows that it is not so. The entire causality is denied here, as is clear from the explanation of Vardhamāna Upādhyāya.

[28] Āśramī tvahetukam jagannigadati, p. 20 Edited by Luigi Suali.

tion of the appearance and disappearance of phenomena. It was more or less of a determinist cast. The reality of 'kṛti-puruṣakāra' (kāmakāra) or freedom of the will is denied everywhere, and with this the agency of the self. Naturally, therefore, 'Niyati' would seem to stand for the blind driving impulse of a Power from behind, without indeed the redeeming capacity of an initiative will. It is, so to speak, the determining power of the past asserting itself over against the vacuity of the present. Thus viewed 'Niyati' answers in a large measure to the ancient classical notions of Necessity (*necessiteo ineluctabilis*) or Fate (*fatum*)."[29] Nemicandrācārya also says that according to the Niyativāda the time, instrumentality, manner and the subject of an action are all predetermined and invariable.[30] Guṇaratna also holds that according to this view every positive object comes to exist invariably through the force of 'Niyati'. So, the object which is determined to come to exist from a particular object and at a particular time is invariably found to be so; otherwise, no definite certainty about any production is possible.[31]

(4) *Yadṛcchāvāda*

Yadṛcchāvāda has been explained by Śaṅkarācārya in the sense of mere coincidence (*ākasmikaprāptiḥ*).

Theory of mere coincidence.

The upholders of this view also deny the theory of causality and as such, there appears to be apparently no distinction between this and the theory of the *Spontaneous Origination*.

Distinction between Yadṛcchāvāda and Svabhāvavāda.

But that there is some distinction is clear from the fact that these two have been separately mentioned both in the Upaniṣads and in the later literature. Amalānanda Saraswatī trying to find out the distinction says whenever anything happens without caring for any res-

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29 *Princess of Wales Saraswatībhavana Studies*, Vol. II, p. 104.

30 Jattu jadā jeṇa jahā jassa ya niyameṇa hedi jattu tadā| Tena tahā tassa have idi vādo ṇīyadivādo du||—Gommaṭasāra, Verse 882.

31 Niyatenaiva rūpeṇa sarve bhāvā bhavanti yat| Tato niyatijā hyete tatsvarūpānuvedhataḥ|| Yadyadaiva yato yāvattattadaiva tatastathā| Niyatam jāyate nyāyāt ka enāṁ bādhitum kṣamaḥ||—p. 12.

triction in the form of an invariable antecedent, it is '*Yadṛcchā*', while where there is such a restriction in the form of spontaneity (*svabhāva*), it is '*Svabhāva*'.[32]

These are some of the theories of ancient India which may be said to have represented Materialistic thought in different aspects. Even in classical period we find its references very widely. Some of them are given here.

Reference to Materialistic views in the *Mahābhārata*.

The *Mahābhārata* mentions some of the more important doctrines of the Materialists. It is found there that according to the Materialists the destruction of the physical organism, which is identified with the Ātman, is seen with our own eyes in the presence of all sorts of people; hence, the view-point of those who hold, on the authority of valid testimony, that the soul (Ātman) survives the destruction of the physical organism, is vanquished. They hold that feelings of pain, attainment of old age, attack of diseases are, in fact, the destruction of the Ātman in parts and with the annihilation of the body, the final death of the Ātman also takes place and after this no Consciousness in any form remains. The notions of 'ajaratva' (undecayingness), 'amaratva' (immortality), etc. are merely false impositions and are like the act of bestowing blessings of immortality and imperishability upon a king simply in praise. Thus, they accept only direct perception and deny the validity of authority (Āgama-Prāmāṇya), as it goes against direct perception.

Authority of Valid testimoney denied.

Regarding the validity of Inference, the Materialists say that in the absence of invariable coexistence, how can one be sure of any inference? Moreover, Pratyakṣa is the basis of the two other means of right cognition; hence, really speaking, there is nothing beyond direct perception.

Validity of Inference denied.

As regards the consciousness found in an organism,

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32 (i) Niyatanimittamanapekṣya yadā kadācit pravṛttyudayo 'yadṛcchā', svabhāvastu sa eva yāvadvastubhāvī, yathā śvāsādau—*Kalpataru* on the *Bhāmatī*, II. i. 33.

(ii) *Kāmasūtra*, II. 34. 39.

they hold that just as out of a single banyan-seed leaves, flowers, fruits, roots of a banyan tree are produced, or from the same kind of food a cow produces both milk and butter, or from the same human-seed mind, intellect, egoistic faculty (ahaṁkāra), citta, body and the various qualities are all produced, or from garbage when preserved for sometime and when it is decomposed a sort of life is produced in it, or due to a peculiar combination of certain objects an intoxicating element is found to be produced, so from the peculiar collocation of the four elements consciousness is produced. Again, just as fire is produced by rubbing two pieces of wood and which enlightens the wood, so consciousness is produced out of the combination of the four elements and enlightens the elements themselves.

Consciousness is produced out of the peculiar Collocation of four elements.

Memory or remembrance is possible here also, just as it is possible with the Naiyāyikas according to whom out of the two 'jaḍa' (unconscious) elements, namely, Manas and Ātman, Smṛti-form of cognition is produced. Such consciousness will be able to make the sense-organs etc. work in the same way as a magnet makes the iron piece move this way or that.

Memory is produced out of the jaḍa elements.

Bhoktṛtva (the capacity for experiencing) is also possible in the collocation of the bhūtas, just as it is found in the case of drying up of water by fire.[33]

Bhoktṛtva is possible in the Collocation of the bhūtas.

Again, an asura (devil), named Cārvāka, is mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* as an enemy of the gods and the Brāhmaṇas.[34] This might be the same Cārvāka after whom the system is named.

Reference to the word 'Cārvāka'.

Coming to the *Rāmāyaṇa* of *Vālmīki*, we find Rāmacandra describing the Materialists (lokāyatikas) as Brāhmaṇas well-versed in fostering wrong and injurious ideas and hence, quite ignorant of the truth

Reference in the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

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[33] *Mahābhārata*, Śānti. Mokṣa, 218, Verses 23–29.

[34] *Ibid.*, Rājadharma, Adhyāyas 38–39.

and yet calling themselves wise. Really. they are not wise and yet they talk of things which are all untruth.[35]

Manu also refers to this class of people by the term 'Nāstika' in his *Saṁhitā*. He describes them as Brāhmaṇas who reject the authority of the Śrutis and the Smṛtis with the help of mere arguments. He says that such persons should be excommunicated from all activities by good people, as they denounce the authority of the Vedas and are unbelievers.[36]

Manu-Saṁhitā refers to Nāstika.

Several Purāṇas and both philosophical and non-philosophical literatures have widely referred to the views of this school of thought.[37] Vātsyāyana refers to the Laukāyatikas in his *Kāmasūtra*.[37a]

References in *Kāmasūtra* and Kāvyas.

We have enough references to this school in Buddhistic works. It is said that the Buddha did not allow his followers to learn or teach the Lokāyata system.[38] "Several vestiges show that even in the pre-Buddhistic India proclaimers of purely materialistic doctrines appeared; and there is no doubt that those doctrines had ever afterwards, as they have to-day, numerous secret followers."[39]

Reference in Buddhism.

Guṇaratnasūri has also referred to several sub-schools of this in his commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri.[40] The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, a Jaina canonical work, refers to the views of the Materialists and says that according to them there are five mahābhūtas, namely, earth, water, tejas, air and ākāśa. Out of these five (when they form into an organic body) comes to exist an Ātman (not distinct from these bhūtas). When these five elements are destroyed. the dehin also

References in works of Jaina-writers.

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35 Ayodhyākāṇḍa. Chapt. 100. 38—39.

36 Yo'vamanyeta te mūle hetuśāstrāśrayād dvijah sa sādhubhirbahiṣkāryo nāstiko vedanindakah ||—II. 11.

37 *Naiṣadhacaritam*, XVII. Verses 38—83. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*; I—II; *Advaita—Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 98—106. *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*; *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*, etc.

37a *Kāmasūtra*, II. 30.

38 *Vinayapiṭaka*, Cullavagga, V. 32. 2; *Suttanipāta*, Sela-Sutta, p. 118 Mahābodhisabhā, Saranatha, Banaras edition.

39 Garbe—*The philosophy of Ancient India*, p. 25.

40 PP. 9—19.

is destroyed. The consciousness which is found in these becomes manifested in these very elements when they form into an organic body.[40a] Thus, a physical organism is identified with the conscious Āṯman. Śīlāṅkācārya, while commenting upon the above, says that the destruction of the dehin, called Devadatta for instance, is due to the falling off of any one of the five elements which form into an organism or of either air or tejas, or of the both. It is then that the particular organism is called dead. The upholders of this view are called *Bhūtavādins* or *Bhūtāvyatiriktacaitanyavādins*.[40b]

Physical organism is identical with the conscious Ātman.

The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* mentions slightly different type of Materialists under the name of *Tajjīvataccharīravādins* according to whom consciousness (which is the same as the Ātman) is produced or manifested out of the five bhūtas formed into an organism. So there are as many Ātmans as there are individuals. There is no one universal Ātman to pervade over all the beings. All these Ātmans do not exist after death. In other words, there does. not exist an Ātman which is distinct from the organism and goes to the socalled other world.[40c] This view is also supported by the Śruti, as quoted by Śīlāṅkācārya, 'Vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānvevānu vinaśyati', meaning—the consciousness becomes manifested out of the bhūtas and is destroyed following their own destruction. There exists no consciousness after death.[40d]

Tajjīvataccharīravādin's view.

Plurality of Ātman.

No Ātman after death.

[40a] Santi pañca mahabbhūyā, iha megesimāhiyā|
Puḍhavī āu teū vā, vāu āgāsapañcamā||
Ete pañca mahabbhūyā, tebbho egotti āhiyā|
Aha tesiṁ viṇāseṇaṁ, viṇāso hoi dehiṇo||—I.i. 7—8.

[40b] *Vṛtti* by Śīlāṅkācārya on *Ibid*, pp. 15—16.

[40c] Patteaṁ kasiṇe āyā, je bālā je a paṁḍiā|
Santi piccā na te santi, natthi sattovavāiyā||
Natthi puṇṇe va pāve vā, natthi loe ito vare|
Sarīrassa viṇāseṇam, viṇāso hoi dehiṇo||—I. i, 11—12.

[40d] (i) *Vṛtti* by Śīlāṅkācārya, pp. 19—20.
(ii) *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV. v. 13.

The difference between the two views mentioned by the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* is that in the former case the bhūtas themselves, when they form into an organism, perform all the activities, such as running, leaping, dancing etc., while in the latter case, the Ātman, also called Caitanya, is produced or manifested out of the five bhūtas formed into an organism which, of course, is not identical with the Ātman.[40e] So all the activities in the latter case will be attributed to the Ātman itself and not to the bhūtas.

Distinction between the above two views.

It is further held that as nothing exists after death, the existence of merit and demerit (puṇya and pāpa) and of the world beyond this is also not true. So along with the death of the organism the destruction of the dehin (Ātman) also takes place.[40f]

3. *Literature*

As for the literature of this school, it may be pointed out that no independent work on the system has come down to us and we are not even sure if any complete work of the school ever existed except a few aphorisms attributed to Bṛhaspati which are found quoted here and there in the works of other schools of thought. Our knowledge of the views of the thought is, however, mainly based on these aphorisms and other fragmentary references found in the literature of other systems as pointed out in the foregoing pages under the last Section.

As only a few Sūtras attributed to Bṛhaspati are found here and there quoted by various authors in their own works, it will not be out of place to quote here all of them as collected by me so far:

Sūtras attributed to Bṛhaspati.

(1) Athātastattvaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ[41]—Now, we shall explain the categories.

[40e] Bhūtavādino bhūtānyeva kāyākāraparinatānī dhāvanavalganādikāṁ kriyāṁ kurvanti. asya tu kāyākārapariṇatebhyo bhūtebhyaścaitanyākhya ātmotpadyate'bhivyajyate vā, tebhyaśca bhinna (another reading is abhinna) ityayam viśeṣaḥ—*Vṛtti* on the *Sūtra*, I. i. 11.

[40f] *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, I. i. 12 along with the *Vṛtti* on it.

[41] *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, p. 64; *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, p. 1.

(2) Pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni[42]—Earth, water, tejas and air are the four categories.

(3) Tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṁjñā[43]—the names—organism, sense-organ and object are given to the collocation of these four elements.

(4) Tebhyaścaitanyam—Consciousness is produced out of these.

(5) Kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivad vijñānam—Consciousness is produced out of these elements just as intoxicating efficacy is produced out of some particular seeds, called kiṇva, (used to cause fermentation in the manufacture of spirits) etc.

(6) Bhūtānyeva cetayante[44]—Elements alone comprehend.

(7) Caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ Puruṣaḥ[44a]—Physical organism endowed with consciousness is called Puruṣa, that is, Soul.

(8) Jalabudbudvajjīvāḥ—Emperical selves (Jīvas) are (perishable) like bubbles over water.

(9) Paralokino'bhāvātparalokābhāvaḥ[45]—there is no other world, since there does not exist any one who lives in the other world.

(10) Maraṇamevāpavargaḥ[45a]—Physical death itself is salvation.

(11) Dhūrtapralāpastrayī, svargotpādakatvena viśeṣābhāvāt[46]—The three Vedas—*Ṛgveda, Yajurveda* and *Sāmaveda*—are prattlings of deceitful persons, as there is no difference between their talks and what contains in the three Vedas as far as the experiences of pleasure, called svarga, is concerned.

(12) Arthakāmau puruṣārthau[47]—Material gain and fulfilment of one's mundane desires are the two aims of life.

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42 *Bhāmatī on Śaṅkarabhāṣya,* III. iii. 54; *Nyāyamañjarī,* p. 64; *Tattvopaplavasiṁha,* p. 1.

43 *Ibid.*

44 *Prabodhacandrodaya.*

44a *Advaitabrahmasiddhi,* p. 99.

45 *Tattvopaplavasiṁha,* p. 45.

46a *Advaitabrahmasiddhi,* p. 99.

46 *Prabodhacandrodaya.*

47 *Ibid.* Another version of this Sūtra is—Kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ—*Advaitabrahmasiddhi,* p. 99.

(13) Daṇḍanītireva vidyā (atraiva Vārtā antarbhavati)[48]—Politics alone is the perfect science. It includes Agriculture.

(14) Pratyakṣameva Pramāṇam[49]—Direct perception is the only means of cognition.

(15) Śarīrādeva[50]—Consciousness is produced out of the physical organism itself.

(16) Laukiko mārgo'nusartavyaḥ[51]—Path pursued by common men should be followed.

4. *Doctrines of the School*

Having given a brief account of the history and literature of the system, we now deal with the more important doctrines which the system is believed to advocate in some detail and which have not been mentioned before.

(1) *Pramāṇa (Means of right cognition)*

The most important doctrine of the school appears to be the means of right cognition. The Materialists believe in only one Pramāṇa, namely, direct perception (pratyakṣa) with the help of which all the four categories accepted by them and products thereof can be explained. That which is not perceived is non-existent according to this school. But as this total denial of the non-perceived objects would lead them to scepticism, it appears that they, in order to defend themselves against it, do believe in probability (sambhāvanā), that is, that which is not directly perceived *may* exist, but is not certain. Thus, they think that the belief in the existence of fire in the mountain through the perception of smoke may be true, as it is indirectly based on direct perception. or it may be entirely false. But in cases where it is found to be true beyond doubt, it is so merely by chance.[52] It may be pointed out that they do not generally believe in Infer-

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48 *Ibid.* 49 *Ibid.* 50 *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, p. 88.

51 *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, p. 1, G. O. S. Edition.

52 Dhūmādijñānānantaramagnyādijñāne pravṛttiḥ pratyakṣamūlatayā bhrāntyā vā yujyate. Kvacit phalapratilambhastu maṇimantrauṣadhadivat yādṛcchikaḥ—*Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, p. 6, old Calcutta edition.

ence, simply because they cannot easily account for the validity of the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) which is the most important factor in an Inference.[53] So they hold that it is not possible to have an infallible 'vyāpti' between the major term (sādhya) and the probans (liṅga), and it is, therefore, not free from doubts; hence, Inference, as an independent means of right cognition, should not be accepted. Moreover, as it depends upon direct perception alone, it is not different from pratyakṣa.[54] Hence, they assert that direct perception is the only valid means of right cognition.

It may be however, pointed out that in accordance with the gradual growth of our knowledge the Cārvākas believed originally in only one kind of Pratyakṣa. namely, the visual: but it seems that gradually they admitted cognitions derived through other external sense-organs also under direct perception. Thus, they came to believe in course of time in five kinds of pratyakṣa.

Guṇaratna on Inference according to Cārvāka.

Guṇaratna, on the other hand, says that the Cārvākas do believe in such cases of Inference which would help them to carry on their every day dealings without any difficulty, such as, the Inference about the existence of fire in the mountain. But they do not believe in such Inferences which would prove the existence of heaven, adṛṣṭa, etc., which are not useful for their daily life.[55]

Śabda-Pramāṇa also is denied.

As for the Śabdapramāṇa (Authority) the Materialists hold that as it is not recognized even by several orthodox schools themselves and also as it is not different from direct perception, there is no need in believing in it as an independent Pramāṇa.[56]

After having thus proved the futility of Pramāṇas other than Pratyakṣa, and having shown that Pratyakṣa

53 *Mahābhārata*, Śantiparva, Moksadharma, 218: 26: Śataśah sahacaritayorapi vyabhicāradarśanāt asati liṅgaṁ kathaṁ vahnyādivyavahārānu—mānaṁ—Nīlakaṇṭha's Com. thereon.

54 *Ibid,* Verse 27.

55 Viśeṣaḥ punaścārvākaiḥ lokayātrānirvāhaṇapravaṇaṁ dhūmādyanumānamiṣyate kvacana na punaḥ svargādṛṣṭādiprasādhakamalaukikamanumānamiti—Guṇaratna's Com. on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya,* p. 306.

56 *Mahābhārata,* Śāntiparva, Mokṣadharma, 218: 27.

alone serves the purpose of realizing the nature of the constituents of the world, the Materialists believe in only one kind of Pramāṇa. Since they reject the validity of Authority, they have no faith in the Vedas and in the literature based on them, like the Āstikas. Accordingly, they do not believe in the world beyond the perceptible one.

Subdivisions of Pratyakṣa.

It may be pointed out here that originally the Cārvākas believed in only one kind of Pratyakṣa, namely, visual, but it seems that gradually Pratyakṣa included cognitions derived through all the five external sense-organs. Thus, they recognized five subdivisions of Pratyakṣa.[57]

(2) *Prameya—Number of the constituents of the universe*

The first four bhūtas are the constituents of the universe.

The next doctrine of the school deals with the number of the constituents of the universe. As they believe in direct perception alone, it is clear that the constituents of the universe, according to them, should be only such as are perceptible to our external senses. Hence, they recognize earth, water, air and tejas,[58] as the four categories which constitute the universe.

Cognition of air through the sense-organ of touch.

Although air has no colour, and hence, cannot be perceived through our eyes, yet as they believe in five kinds of direct perception according to the number of the five sense-organs, air is cognized through the organ of touch. So says Yāmunācārya, that the perception of air is possible as a substratum of touch which is known through the tactile organ.[59]

Characteristics of the bhūtas.

These categories possess the characteristics of hardness and solidity (khara), viscidity

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57 Guṇaratna's Com. on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, p. 301.

58 Vide—'Pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni'—*Bhāmatī* on the *Vedāntasūtra—Ṣaṅkarabhāṣya*, III. iii, 54 p. 85 Nirṇayasāgara, Bombay edition Nīlakaṇṭha on the *Mahābhārata*, Ṣānti. Mokṣa; 218: 23; *Nyāyaratnāvalī* on *Madhusūdana's Siddhhāntabindu*, p. 118, Choukhambha, Banaras edition.

59 Vāyośca tvagindriyeṇa sparśādhiṣṭhānamātratayopalambhadarśanācca—*Siddhitraya*, pp. 7, 9.

(sneha), movement (īraṇa) and heat (auṣṇya) respectively.[60]

The Materialists also, like the Buddhists, believe in the momentary existence of these elements, according to the dictum—that which exists is momentary.[61] The argument adduced in support of this is that the potentiality (kārya-kāritva) present in an object to perform a function cannot permit any delay in the performance of that function. So an object when it comes to exist must exhaust its entire capacity in the single moment of its existence. Hence, of what use is that object if it also exists in the second moment? As it can be of no use for want of any potentiality (kāryakāritvābhāvāt), the very existence of it is denied after the first moment and its appearance in the subsequent moments is only in different forms.[62]

Materialists believe in the momentary existence of things.

The existence of 'Ākāśa' as a separate entity is not generally believed by the Cārvākas. They think that it is merely a void, the negation of covering (āvaraṇa). As it is not momentary, it cannot exist.[63] But according to a certain section of these Materialists the existence of 'Ākāśa', as a separate category, is also accepted, but even then it does not constitute an organism.[64] This recognition of the fifth category at a later stage may be said to be a gradual development of thought in the system representing the growth of knowledge in human beings. From this it may be assumed that the Materialists believe in the existence of four kinds of positive (bhāva) categories and one kind of negative category called 'āvaraṇābhāva' (absence or negation of a covering). Later on, gradually we find that they came to accept the separate existence of vital air (prāṇa) and 'manas' also. Although these two

Ākāśa is only an absence of āvaraṇa.

Existence of Prāṇa and Manas in the system.

60 Nīlakaṇṭha on the *Mahābhārata*, Śānti. Mokṣa., 218, 23.

61 *Nyāyaratnāvalī* on Madhusūdana's *Siddhāntabindu*, pp. 118–19 Chowkhamba, Banaras edition.

62 *Ibid.*

63 *Ibid.*, p. 119.

64 Āvaraṇābhāvatvenābhimatasya sthirasyāsata *ākāśasya* dehānupādānatvam—*Siddhāntabindu*, p. 119.

are also material products,[65] yet they are not gross and cannot be cognized through external direct perception.

It may be however, repeated here that the Cārvākas represent the earliest stage of the gradual development of knowledge. So their views, though confined to matter and material products alone, cover ordinary experiences of our life also. Thus, they recognize the specialities of vital-air (prāṇa) as distinct from ordinary air and also those of manas which help the sense-organs in their function. Both prāṇa and manas, according to the Upaniṣads, are products of matter though these are subtler.[66]

But according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa it appears that a particular section of these Materialists even accept manas as eternal (in the sense, lasting for more than a moment), one in every individual, having access to every object (sarvaviṣaya) and even non-bhautika, most likely in the sense, separate from and independent of, the five bhūtas, in case manas were regarded the substrate of consciousness, desire, hatred,[67] etc.

Existence of Sāmānya and Samavāya denied.

They do not believe in the existence of generality (Sāmānya). The reasons adduced are: (1) As an individual is differentiated from another individual itself, there is no need of having a generality for the purpose; (2) that which is eternal cannot produce any knowledge (vijñāna) and as the generality is believed to be eternal, it cannot produce any knowledge; (3) that there is no proof to show that a knowledge is produced by an eternal category, like generality; and (4) as the Cārvākas do not believe in inherence (Samavāya), gene-

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[65] Annamaśitam tredhā vidhīyate tasya yaḥ sthaviṣṭho dhātustatpurīsam bhavati yo madhyamastanmāmsam yo'ṇiṣṭhastanmanaḥ—*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI. v. I.; Āpaḥ pītāstredhā vidhīyante tāsām yaḥ sthaviṣṭho dhātustanmūtram bhavati yo madhyamastallohitam yo'ṇiṣṭhaḥ sa prāṇaḥ—*Ibid*. 2; Bhautikayoḥ prāṇamanasoḥ—*Siddhāntabindu*, p. 120; 'Annamayam hi saumya manaḥ Āpomayaḥ prāṇaḥ', iti Śrutyā bhūtakāryatveṇāṅgīkṛtayoḥ prāṇamanasoḥ—*Nārāyaṇī* on the *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 120.

[66] *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI. iv. 1—2.

[67] Nanu manastarhīcchāderadhiṣṭhānam bhaviṣyati taddhi nityamekam sarvaviṣayakamabhautikamiti na prāktanadoṣaiḥ spṛśyate—*Nyāyemañjari*, p. 441; Vizianagaram Series edition.

rality cannot be accepted to inhere in any object through inherence.

On these grounds the Cārvākas reject both the categories of Sāmānya and Samavāya.[68]

Heaven and hell, according to them, exist in this very world. They hold that heaven is not different from the experiences of pleasure, derived from partaking of sweet food, use of fine clothes, sweet scents, flower garlands, sandle-paste and such other luxuries, and that hell is nothing but the experiences of pain, caused by enemies, by injurious weapons, by diseases and similar other causes of sufferings. The ideas of various lokas, namely Śivaloka, Brahmaloka, etc. are said to have been invented by impostors.

The system does not believe in Paraloka.

Experiences of pleasures and pains represent heaven and hell respectively.

The achievement of final emancipation (mokṣa), according to the Cārvākas, is nothing but death which is the cessation of the functioning of vital air. It is the death which, according to the Materialists, brings freedom (mukti) from all sorts of miseries.[69]

Conception of Mokṣa.

They further hold that as this freedom from miseries is certain in natural course (svabhāvataḥ), it is no use on the part of a wise man to practise severe austerities for its achievement. They even go so far as to say that it is only a fool who becomes thin and worn out to dryness by performing penances, and by fastings, etc.[70]

Freedom from miseries takes place in natural course.

Chastity and other such cunning conventions, according to the Materialists, have been invented by clever people who are of weak temperament. Gifts of gold and of lands, etc., the enjoying of sweet dinners on invitation, are all the devices of persons who are poor and hungry. Regarding the construction of

No morality or ethics except for self-enjoyment.

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68 *Siddhāntabindu* and its Com. p. 117; *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, p. 101.

69 *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*, Lokāyatamata, Verses 8—10; also vide 'Maraṇaṁ mokṣaḥ' attributed to Bṛhaspati.

70 *Ibid*, Verse 11.

temples, of places for distributing water and food to the needy, of tanks, of wells, of pleasure gardens and similar other so-called meritorious acts, it is held that they are meant simply for meeting the requirements of the needy and not for any other unseen results.[71]

The performance of Agnihotra, the study of the Vedas, the acceptance of the triple staff by the ascetics, the smearing of one's body with ashes are all the various means of livelihood for those who are destitute of intelligence and energy. Hence, a wise man should depend upon the perceivable means, the Materialists hold, such as, agriculture, the tending of cattle, trade, politics and administration, etc., for the enjoyment of life.[72]

Conception of Dharma.

'Dharma' is identified with 'Kāma', that is, the highest pleasure derived from Kāma is Dharma.[72a]

All these things show that the Materialists not only believed in the direct perception but also in such activities which would bring to them visible pleasing results.

(3) *Theory of creation or production*

No Pralaya and hence no Creator of the Universe.

As regards the theory of creation, it may be pointed out that they do not believe in the final dissolution (pralaya) and, therefore, the question regarding the existence of a Creator, or of Divine Will, or of an unseen force (adṛṣṭa), does not arise with them. It appears that they believe in the existence of an internal continuity of production; so that the continuous chain of production of one organism from another, through parental combination, remains unbroken. The differences in the production, however, are due to mere chance.[73]

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[71] *Ibid*, Verses 12–14.

[72] *Ibid*, Verses 15–16.

[72a] *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* along with Guṇaratna's Com. on Verse 86, p 308.

[73] Pralayāsvīkāreṇānādimātāpitṛparamparāvyāpāreṇa śarīrarūpasaṅghātotpattiḥ—*Nyāyaratnāvalī* on the *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 118.

Collocation of trasareṇus alone forms a composite.

Regarding the formation of a composite (avayavin) out of the bhautika elements, they hold that it is not something different from the mere collocation of the ultimate particles, namely, trasareṇus (triads), of the bhūtas. An organism or a jar, for instance, is nothing but a particular kind of collocation of momentary triads (truṭis) of the four elements.[74] Ākāśa, being of the nature of negation of a covering cannot be assumed to help the production of any organism.[75] The reason why they cannot believe in the formation of a composite, like that of a Naiyāyika, is that they do not think it at all possible to believe in any kind of contact (saṁyoga), or in inherence (samavāya), to bring together the various ultimate particles (trasareṇus),[76] which do not exist for more than a moment, so as to form a composite; and without there being a contact or an inherence, there can be no composite.[77] Moreover, the Materialists hold that if it be believed that both a composite and its constituents have their existence, then we would have found weight and other qualities in double in an object, as in that single object both would have had their real existence. But as that is not a fact, they deny the existence of a composite apart from the mere collocation of triads.[78]

Ākāśa is not a cause of any product.

Trasareṇus, being momentary, cannot form a composite either by contact or by inherence.

Regarding the production of inorganic mass, like

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[74] Kṣaṇikacatuṣṭayatruṭipuñjarūpo dehaḥ—Kāśmīraka—Sadānanda in his *Advaita-Brahmasiddhi*, p. 99; tanmate avayavyanaṅgīkārāt—*Siddhāntabindu*, pp. 116—17; Ghaṭa ityupalabhyamānāḥ truṭaya eva hi ghaṭasvarūpāḥ—*Nyāyaratnāvalī*, p. 117.

[75] Ākāśasya dehānupādānatvaṁ—*Siddhântabindu*, p. 119.

[76] The Materialists cannot believe in paramāṇus and dvyaṇukas, as these are supersensuous. Hence, for them trasareṇu itself is the ultimate particle, so says, Kāśmīraka Sadānanda—Truṭyanyadaprāmāṇikatvena—Advaita-*Brahmasiddhi*, p. 101.

[77] *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 117; *Nārāyaṇī* on the *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 117; *Advaita—Brahmasiddhi*, p. 101.

[78] *Ibid*, p. 101. *Nyāyaratnāvalī*, p. 117.

stone, wood, etc., the process is the same. That is, every production, whether organic or inorganic, is produced out of the four primordial class of matter, either due to the immanent nature of the products themselves, or to the Law of Chance. As for the production of the various qualities, it should be pointed out that they are also regarded as the modifications of the four ultimate particles themselves.[79] In fact, the whole universe is the product of these four elements alone and thus there is no other category beyond these four.[80]

Production due to Chance.

Universe is a product of four elements.

(4) *Life and consciousness*

As for life and consciousness found in the organic products, it appears that practically the Materialists do not differentiate between the two. These are also material products. Their manifestation, however, which is spontaneous, takes place only in certain collocations and not in all. This assumption of the Materialists is supported by their every day experience. Thus, it is said that although no intoxicating property is found in each and every constituent of a particular preparation, say wine, yet when all those constituents come to be grouped together in a particular form, the intoxicating property spontaneously becomes manifested therein. Similarly, although the various material particles, forming a particular group, do not severally possess life or consciousness, yet when they group together so as to form a particular organism, life and consciousness find their place in it. Their appearance and disappearance are just like the variations in the form of opening and closing of the petals of a lotus flower, and they are not due to any particular cause. On the basis of these and similar other instances given above, the Materialists conclude

Life and Consciousness, regarded as identical, are products of matter.

79 Bhūtapariṇāmabhedo rūpādirna tu bhūtacatuṣṭayādarthāntaram-evaṁ bhūtapariṇāmabheda eva caitanyaṁ, na tu bhūtebhyo'rthāntaraṁ—*Bhāmatī* on the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, III, 54, p. 854.

80 Caturṇāmeva bhutānāṁ samastaṁ jagat pariṇāmaḥ—*Ibid.*

that consciousness is produced out of a peculiar grouping of the ultimate particles.

(5) *Origination of life*

Life is spontaneous.

This leads us to examine the problem whether life comes out of another life, or there is the spontaneous generation of it. The Materialists believe that as life is produced out of matter alone, there is no need to accept the existence of an antecedent life. We find, they hold, that during the rainy season, for instance, in a very short time, small worms and insects are found moving in curd and similar other rotten substances. It is quite obvious that the worms etc., are produced therein from no other cause than the constituents of the curd themselves. Similarly, in every decomposed substance insects and worms are spontaneously produced. There never exists any life either in the fresh curd, or in rice or in similar objects so as to attribute the production of life of the insects to it. Hence, it is obvious that life is spontaneous. Similarly, it can be asserted that the life in a child is not produced out of the life of its mother, but that it comes out of those very material particles out of which the child's body is made. Several instances of this type of spontaneity of life can be cited from our every day experiences, such as, the production of scorpion out of cow-dung, that of frogs from mud, etc.

No moral justification.

The organism being recognized as the conscious agent of all actions and the constituent particles of the organism believed to possess only momentary existence and hence, always in a fluctuating state, the organism which performs an action at one particular moment would not remain to reap the fruit of that action at the next moment; so that there would be no moral justification for any kind of experience (bhoga). It may be pointed out in this connection that the Materialists do not believe in any kind of moral justification. Everything happens, according to them, by chance, and therefore, no such problem would strictly arise with them.[81]

[81] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 429.

As for the difficulties of memory and recognition, they hold that the impression left by the past experiences would be transmitted from the previous moment to the next; so that no difficulty would ever arise. Besides, the various stages in the development of an organism, namely, boyhood, youth, old age, etc. may differ with one another, but the organism as a whole remains ever the same. This is quite obvious from our recognition of the body also.[82]

Memory and recognition explained.

(6) *Conception of Ātman*

From what has been said above one should not conclude that consciousness is not a property of the self (Ātman), for, it cannot but belong to the self. But what is the self itself according to the Materialists? It is needless to repeat that they cannot believe in things which are non-perceptible: and what is perceptible is nothing but the four elements and their products. So the self also should be an entity indentified with any of these elements or their products. Further, they believe that activities and their absence belong to a physical organism. In other words, the presence of activity in an organism shows that there is desire in it for the fulfilment of which the particular organism performs certain activities. In the same manner, the absence of activity in an organism indicates the existence of hatred in that organism. Both activity and inactivity must be accompanied by consciousness; and hence, consciousness cannot but belong to an organism. It is, therefore, clear from the above that as consciousness belongs to an organism, the individual self is believed to be identified with the organism itself. Hence, the individual self should be defined as an organism endowed with consciousness. So says the Sūtra—Caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ.[83]

Ātman also is a form of matter.

Ātman identified with physical organism.

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[82] *Ibid*, pp. 437, 439.

[83] Sankarabhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtra*, III. iii, 53.

Again, that consciousness is an attribute of physical organism is further proved by the joint methods of Agreement and Difference (anvaya and vyatireka). It may be concluded from this that the Materialists may not like to call a dead body an organism in the true sense of the term for want of consciousness in it. It is on account of this identification between the two that consciousness is manifested through an organism alone; and also it is because of this that the Indian Medical Science prescribes particular food and drink for the development of consciousness, that is, the intellectual powers in the body. It is due to this very fact that butter has been indentified with the life itself (āyurvai ghṛtam).[84] Further, this very view of the dehātmavāda, so it is designated, has been supported by the universal experience as expressed in judgments like, "I am fat", "I am thin", etc. They also quote a Śruti—'That is this Puruṣa (Self) which is a product of food and drink',[85] in support of the above, for the sake of those who believe in Śrutis alone. There is no doubt that the term 'I' in the above mentioned expressions refers to the organism itself. Moreover, in our every day experience and also in the Śāstra, the term 'aham' is always used for the Self. Thus, it becomes clear that consciousness belongs to the organism, which again, is identified with the Self.

Dehātmavāda.

It may be pointed out that the Materialists even go beyond their own physical organism to identify a son with the Ātman. They hold that their son is their very Self and support it with a Śruti—Aṅgādaṅgāt sambhavasi hṛdayādabhijāyase| Ātmā vai putranāmāsi, etc.[86] This is further supported by the ordinary experience of people who realize their own happiness or misery in those of their son.[87]

Son identified with Ātman.

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84 *Kāvyaprakāśa,* II. 12.

85 *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* II. i. 1; *Vedāntasāra,* p. 95 Jīvānanda's sons' edition.

86 *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad,* I. ii. *Śabarabhāṣya,* IV. iii. 38.

87 *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda, p. 94.

According to the crudest and the dullest of these Materialists, the Ātman is identified even with an inorganic mass, like material wealth (vitta).[88] It is also found in actual experience that some people actually love and protect their wealth as if it is their own Ātman and feel happy or otherwise with its growth or decay.

Material wealth identified with Ātman.

The reason for all these seems to be that that which is the dearest of all is regarded as the Ātman which is also supported by the Śruti,[89] and since there are grades in the objects of love according to the gradual growth of consciousness in human beings, the conception of the Ātman also differs from stage to stage.

Ātman is the dearest of all objects.

All these have been said from the view-point of those who believe in the identity of the physical organism and the Self. This view appears to be the crudest form of the Materialism. But from our studies of the various doctrines of the school, it seems that there is a gradual improvement in thoughts of this school also towards the manifestation of the highest truth. Thus, a section of these Materialists think that organism is subordinate to our sense-organs which should therefore, be recognized as identical with the self. They produce ordinary experiences in their support, expressed in statements like—'I am blind', 'I am deaf', etc. wherefrom it is clear that the term 'I' which is used for the Self, has been identified with a sense-organ. They also quote a Śruti —"Te ha prāṇāḥ prajāpatim pitarametyocuḥ"[90]—in their support for the sake of those who would like to have such an authority.

Indriyātmavāda.

Under this head, there are two schools: the first is that according to which a single sense-organ represents the Self, while the second is that which holds that all the sense-organs join together to form the Self.

Pratyeka-Indriyātmavāda.

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88 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, I. iv. 8; *Vārtikāmṛta* as quoted by Madhusūdana in his *Siddhāntabindu*, pp. 204—5, Banaras edition.

89 Tadetat preyaḥ putrātpreyo vittātpreyo'nyasmātsarvasmādantaraṁ **taraṁ yadayamātmā....ātmānameva priyamupāsīta,** etc.—*Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* **I. iv. 8.**

90 ***Chāndogya Upaniṣad,* V. i. 7.**

Militendriy-ātmavāda.

It must be made clear here that in the former case, as there are five sense-organs, there will be five different sub-schools under it and accordingly, there will be five Ātmans in one organism.[91]

Prāṇātmavāda.

Again, another section of the Cārvākas, not being satisfied with the identity of the sense-organ and the Self, holds that, in fact, even the sense-organs are subordinate to the vital-air. If the vital-air ceases to function, then the sense-organs cannot do anything. Moreover, they have their every day experiences to support their view, namely. 'I am thirsty', 'I am hungry', etc. and also a Śruti[92]—"anyo'-ntarātmā prāṇamayaḥ." So they hold that Prāṇa is the Ātman.

Ātmamanovāda.

But this view also could not satisfy another school of the Cārvākas which thinks that all these three—organism, sense-organ and prāṇa—are entirely dependent upon the Manas for their individual functions. If the Manas retires, they fail to function independently. So it is the Manas which should be recognized as identical with the Self and not the organism, etc, as mentioned before. They have, as usual, their every day experiences in the form,'I am contemplating', etc., to support their case, wherein the thinking Manas and the term 'I' have been identified. They also quote a Śruti in support of this view-point—"Anyo'ntarātmā manomayaḥ."[93] This view removes the difficulties which were found in previous cases, such as, the plurality of the selves in a single organism and subordination, etc.

Different views regarding Ātman are based on the different substrata of consciousness and activities.

All these various views appear to be based on the different substrata of consciousness and the source of activities. They also seem to have in their mind the idea of independence to which the superiority is attributed; and that which is proved

91 *Siddhāntabindu,* p. 107, Chowkhamba Banaras edition.

92 *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* II. ii. 1.

93 *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha,* pp. 181—88, Vizianagram Sanskrit series edition; *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda, pp. 94—97, Jīvānanda's sons' edition. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* II. iii. 1.

to be independent and most superior has been taken for the Self (Ātman).

These various views of the different schools of Materialism may be easily so arranged as to show that there is a sort of gradation amongst them following the gradual manifestation of consciousness in a human being. They begin with the grossest form of material product, namely, wealth and the physical organism and gradually pass through comparatively subtler stages towards the realization of the highest truth, represented by sense-organs, and vital-air, etc. till they come to believe in Manas as the Self. Truly speaking, Manas is the subtlest of the material products according to these Materialists which is also supported by the Śruti as pointed out before.[94] At this stage the progress of these Materialism stops, as they cannot go beyond matter in any care.

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94 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI. iv. 1.

CHAPTER VI

JAINAISM

1. Introduction

AMONGST the heterodox philosophical systems (*Nāstika-darśanas*[1]) of India, Jainaism may be placed after Materialism both chronologically and metaphysically. That Jainaism flourished later is quite obvious from the fact that several Canonical Jaina works have referred to the materialistic views in various ways. We have seen in the previous chapter that Ātman, the ultimate object of philosophical enquiry, has been identified with matter or its products and has not been regarded as an independent non-material substance by the materialists.

Certain affinities of Jīva with matter in Jainaism.

In Jainaism, however, it is obvious that the existence of Ātman, as an independent category, has been accepted. But at the same time, the Jainas believe that Ātman is *Pariṇāmin* and possesses middle dimension (*madhyama-parimāṇa*). As both these attributes are found only in matter or material products, it may be said that in Jainaism, there exist certain affinities with materialism as far as some aspects of Ātman are concerned. Again, a Jīva is regarded as 'astikāya', and also possesses 'Pradeśas,' both of these characteristics are found in Ajīvas also. Though the Jīva possesses other qualities which do not belong to non-conscious objects, yet there are certain characteristics which are in common with Ajīvas. Hence, it may be said that Jainaism has not yet cast off the materialistic tinge and that there is a gradual development towards the realization of the

[1] The term *'Nāstika'* is used in various senses: (1) one who disregards the Vedas (nāstiko vedanindakaḥ), or (2) who denies the existence of the other world (nāsti paralokaḥ), or (3) who does not believe in the transmigration of Jīva, or (4) who denies the existence of Īśvara, is a *'Nāstika'*.

The Jainas are regarded *'Nāstikas'* by the orthodox schools because, they do not regard the Vedas with the same reverence and esteem as the orthodox people and also because they deny the existence of Īśvara—*Syādvādamañjarī*, verse 6.

true nature of Ātman and that it is an improvement upon materialism. These may be said to justify the treatment of Jainaism after Materialism amongst the *Nāstika-darśanas.*

Causes which might have led people to mistake Jainaism for an off-shoot of Buddhism.

Before proceeding further, it will not be out of place to mention that there was a time when Jainaism was regarded as an off-shoot of Buddhism, particularly by the Westerners. Reasons for this confusion may be due to the following facts: Both the systems originated in the same part of the country and almost at the same time; both have stood in opposition to the orthodox views prevalent all over the country; both have denied the existence of Īśvara and have laid greater emphasis on ahiṁsā; and lastly, both have in common a number of technical terms, though not always used in the same sense. These facts might have been the cause of mistaking Jainaism as a branch of Buddhism. But it is a fact that Jainaism has grown separately as an independent school of thought and is older than Buddhism.

Common features of Jainaism with other systems.

Jainaism is, no doubt, called a heterodox system, for reasons given above but its ultimate aim of life and philosophy is the same as that of any orthodox school of Indian Philosophy. The ultimate end of this system is to achieve liberation (mokṣa) from bondage caused by the influx of karman into the soul (Jīva). This is achieved through strict discipline of body and mind. In other words, for the realization of the ultimate aim, according to Jainaism, attainment of right faith (samyak-darśana—complete faith in the truth taught by the Tīrthaṅkaras),[2] right knowledge (samyak-jñāna) and right conduct (samyak-cāritra), the three well-known jewels of Jainaism, is the only proper means.[3] Accordingly, the treatment of Jainaism

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[2] Tattvārthaśraddhānam Samyagdarśanam—*Tattvārthasūtra,* I. 2. The same idea is found in the *Bhagawadgītā*—'Śraddhāvān labhate jñānam. IV. 39. Buddhism also attaches the same importance to *Śraddhā*—

Duḥkhāntaṁ kartukāmena, sukhāntaṁ kartumicchatā ।

Śraddhāmūlaṁ dṛḍhīkṛtya, bodhau kāryā matirdṛḍhā ॥—Quoted in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, III. 21, p. 87. Bibliotheca Indica edition.

[3] Samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ—*Tattvārthasūtra*, I. 1.

may be roughly divided under two broad heads—metaphysical and ethical, the former deals with right knowledge, while the latter deals with the other two aspects.

It will not be out of place to state that there is no essential difference between Brāhmanic and non-brāhmanic schools on this point. All of them believe that purification of antaḥkaraṇa (inner-sense) alone leads to the attainment of the highest truth. This purification is possible through the observance of moral and ethical laws. In other words, when the Brāhmanic systems emphasise the performance of karman for citta-śuddhi, or the inhibition of the functions of citta, as is given in the *Yogasūtra*, or when Jainaism lays stress on the possession of right faith and right conduct after the annihilation of karman; or when Buddhism gives prominence to the resistance of karman or the citta, all of them mean the same thing.[4] They, however, differ in their mode of realizing the truth. This attitude of Jainaism allows us to place it in a line with other philosophical schools of India.

Now, before taking up a study of the system in detail, it is desirable to trace the history of the Jaina tradition (paramparā) from the very beginning.

Tradition of Jainaism.

2. *Pre-mahāvīra Period*

TRADITION links the teachers of Jainaism to pre-historic period. According to the Jainas the earliest teacher of Jainaism was Ṛṣabhadeva. He is also mentioned in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*[5] not only as the first teacher of the Jainas, but also as one of the twenty-four incarnations of Viṣṇu. He was the son of Nābhi from Marudevī. According to the Jainas a reference to Ṛṣabhadeva along with the two other teachers, namely Ajitanātha and Ariṣṭanemī is also found in the *Ṛgveda*.[6] Ṛṣabhadeva was also called Ādinātha.

Predecessors of Mahāvīra:

1. Ṛṣabhadeva

[4] *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VII. 26; *Yoga-sūtra*, I. 2; *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, I. 1; *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, V. 7-11; VIII. 4; IX. 1.

[5] V. 4-6.

[6] I, 89. 6.

His mother had seen a bull coming towards her in a dream before the birth of the child so he was called 'Ṛṣabha' by his mother.

The next sage of Jainaism was Ajitanātha who was born in Ayodhyā. He was so called because of his achieving great success in performing austere penances. His emblem was an elephant.

2. Ajitanātha.

Sambhavanātha was the third sage of the school. He was born in Śrāvastī from Rājaput parents. He had a large number of followers. Horse was his symbol.

3. Sambhavanātha.

The fourth sage Abhinandana was born of Saṁvara and Siddhārthā Rānī. He was so called because according to the belief of the Jainas, Indra used to come down to the earth and worship him. He was known by the symbol of an ape.

4. Abhinandana.

The fifth sage of Jainaism was Sumatinātha. He was born in the family of a Rājaput prince from Megharatha and Sumaṅgalā. He was born in Kaṅkaṇapura. Red goose or red partridge was said to be his emblem.

5. Sumatinātha.

The sixth sage was Padmaprabhu. His father was a Rājaput king of Kauśāmbī named Dhara. His mother, Susīmā had a desire to lie down on the bed of lotuses (padma) before the birth of the child. The child also when born had the complexion of lotus which he took as his symbol.

6. Padmaprabhu.

The next sage of the school was born in the family of a Rājaput prince of Kāśī. Unfortunately, his mother suffered from leprosy on both her sides which was cured after the birth of this child and hence, he was named *Su* (good)-*pārśva* (sides). He recognized *Svastika* as his emblem.

7. Supārśvanātha.

Before the birth of the eighth sage, named Candraprabha, his mother longed to drink the moon. So when he was born from the Rājaput parents of Candrapurī, he was found as bright as the moon. Hence, the moon was recognized as his symbol.

8. Candraprabha

The ninth sage was named Suvidhinātha, because his birth brought *suvidhi* to the family, the members of which were always fighting against one another. His teeth were beautiful like the buds of flowers, so he was also called Puṣpadanta. About his symbol there are two opinions: the Śvetāmbara sect of the Jainas holds that it was a crocodile, while the Digambara thinks that it was a crab.

9. Suvidhinātha or Puṣpadanta.

The tenth sage was named Śītalanātha. He was born in the family of a Rājaput chieftain of Bhaddilapura. It is said that his father was suffering from high fever and the physicians had given up all hopes of his recovery. But his mother, when the child was in her womb, laid her hand on the body of her husband and immediately fever left him and he was cured. Even after the birth of the sage, whomsoever he touched during fever, he was found cured. So he had the wonderful power to cure fever and bring coolness to the patients. Hence, he was called Śītalanātha. His emblem was *Śrīvatsa Svastika.*

10. Śītalanātha.

The eleventh sage was named Śreyāṁsanātha. He was the son of King Viṣṇudeva. It is said that he had a very handsome and peculiar throne. As it was haunted by evil spirits no one ever dared sit on it. His wife before the birth of the sage, however, made up her mind to sit on it. She did accordingly sit on it, but nothing untoward happened. So after the birth of the child he was called Śreyāṁsanātha, the lord of good. Rhinoceros was his symbol.

11. Śreyāṁsanātha.

The twelfth saint was born in Campāpurī. Before his birth the gods, Indra and Vasu, used to come to worship his father, named Vasupūja and brought for him vasu (wealth) from heaven. Therefore, he named his son Vāsupūjya. Male buffalo was his symbol.

12. Vāsupūjya.

The thirteenth saint of the Jainas was the son of the king of Kampilapura. He got the name of Vimalanātha after the clearness of intellect of his mother with which she was endowed before his birth. The sign of this saint was a boar.

13. Vimalanātha.

The fourteenth saint of the Jainas was born in Ayodhyā. The Rānī of Ayodhyā, his mother, had a dream before his birth of an endless necklace of pearls. So when he was born, he was named Anantanātha. Hawk or bear, according to the Digambara sect, was his emblem.

14. Anantanātha.

Dharmanātha, the fifteenth saint, was born in the family of a Rājaput ruler of Ratnapurī. His parents were very religious which led them name their child Dharmanātha. His symbol was a thunderbolt.

15. Dharmanātha.

The sixteenth saint of the Jainas was born of the parents who ruled in Hastināpura. As his birth brought peace to the place, he was named Śāntinātha. He is the first of these saints who became a Cakravartī. He achieved Final Emancipation on the Mt. Pārśvanātha in Bengal. His symbol was a deer.

16. Śāntinātha.

The seventeenth sage named Kunthunātha was born in Gajapurī, where his parents, king Śivarāja with his wife Śrīdevī, were ruling. Before his birth his mother had seen a large heap (*kuntha*) of jewels in her dream and as his birth stopped the activities of his father's enemies, he was named Kunthunātha. He also obtained salvation on the Mt. Pārśvanātha. His symbol was a goat.

17. Kunthunātha.

The eighteenth saint Aranātha was born of the parents, king Sudarśana and Devī, who ruled over Hastināpura. The mother had seen a treasure of jewels before the birth of the child and so he was accordingly named. His emblem was the third kind of *Svastika,* called *Nandāvartta.*

18. Aranātha.

The nineteenth saint was named Mallī or Mallinātha. There is a very interesting story concerning this saint. It is said by the Śvetāmbaras that the saint was a woman and as she had done all those penances that raised an ascetic to the position of a Tīrthaṅkara, nothing could prevent her to become one at that stage. She was the only woman saint who had reached that stage.

19. Mallinātha, or Mallī-Devī.

Digambaras, however, do not believe in this, for according to them, no woman can ever be liberated and subsequently become a Tīrthaṅkara. So they hold that the nineteenth Tīrthaṅkara also was a male.

She was the daughter of king Kumbera and Prabhāvatī who ruled over Mithilā. Before her birth her mother, the queen, had desired to wear a garland of flowers, called *Mallikā,* so she was named Mallī after her birth. Her symbol was a water-jar.

20. Munisuvrata.

The twentieth saint was born in the Hari dynasty of the Rājaputs who ruled over Rājagṛha. King Sumitra was his father . His mother observed all the vows of Jainaism before his birth and so when the saint was born, he was given the name of Munisuvrata. His symbol was a tortoise.

21. Naminātha.

Naminātha was the twenty-first saint of the Jainas. He was born in Mathurā from king Vijaya and rānī Viprā. When the saint was in the womb of the rānī, she made the enemies of the rājā bow down and flee away out of fear. Hence, when the saint was born, he was named accordingly.

22. Neminātha, or Ariṣṭa Neminātha.

Before the birth of the twenty-second saint, namely, Neminātha, his mother, the wife of king Samudravijaya of Saurīpura, saw a wheel (nemi) of black jewels (ariṣṭa) and so he was named after he was born. His symbol was a conch shell. He attained salvation in Girnar in Kathiawad.

23. Pārśvanātha.

After Neminātha, was born the twenty-third saint, named Pārśvanātha, in the city of Banaras about 817 B.C. His parents were Aśvasena and Vāmā who ruled over Kāśī. When the saint was in the womb of his mother, she saw a serpent crawling by her side, and so the child was named after his birth. It is said that Pārśvanātha was a great warrior and he defeated the Yavana king of Kaliṅga. Pārśvanātha had married the daughter of Prasannajita the king of Ayodhyā, named Prabhāvatī.

At the age of thirty, Pārśvanātha became an ascetic and practised penance for eighty-three days. On the eighty-fourth day he obtained *Kevala-jñāna.* He prea-

ched the truth for about seventy years and achieved salvation on the Mt. Pārśvanātha, named after him, in Bengal, at the old age of hundred years. His symbol was a hooded serpent's head.

Definite history of Jainaism from the time of Pārśva.

It is from the time of Pārśvanātha that we have some definite account of the school. He collected a large number of followers and taught them the following four truths: (1) not to injure life, (2) not to tell a lie, (3) not to steal, and (4) not to possess any property. To these four Mahāvīra added the fifth one, namely, observance of strict chastity. According to some, however, it is the fourth vow which was added to the truths taught by Pārśva, and it was perhaps on account of this that Mahāvīra himself went about the country unclothed.

The four vows of Pārśva.

3. *Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra) and his followers*

We now come to the twenty-fourth teacher of the Jainas, named Vardhamāna, later on, called Mahāvīra. The first twenty-three Tīrthaṅkaras are regarded as prehistoric teachers. So the historical account of Jainaism really begins from Mahāvīra. Hence, an attempt is made here to give a very brief account of his life and teachings.

24. Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra).

Mahāvīra was the second son of Siddhārtha, a chieftain of a kṣattriya clan, named Jñātṛka, ruling over Magadha. Triśalā, a daughter of another kṣattriya chief, was his mother. He was born in the village, called Kuṇḍagrāma, near Vaiśālī, modern Basārh, in the district of Muzaffarpur, in Mithilā, about 599 B.C., according to some in 540 B.C. After the death of his parents, Mahāvīra left his home at the age of thirty and led the life of a recluse wandering from place to place in search of the truth. Having performed austere penances for about twelve and a half years, he acquired perfect knowledge (kevala-jñāna). After this he was regarded Omniscient and a Tīrthaṅkara. It was at this stage that he became known as Mahāvīra and was regard-

Mahāvīra was born in 599 B. C.

ed the leader of the Nirgranthas, a class of people who had taken the vow of becoming free from all fetters. It was due to this that the Buddhists refer to him as 'Nigganṭho Nāthaputto.'

After Mahāvīra had acquired Perfect Knowledge, he preached to the world the truth which his predecessor Pārśvanātha had preached, of course, he added to it something more of his own. It seems clear from this that Mahāvīra was only the first historical prominent expounder of Jainaism and not the founder. No doubt, it was he who put the teachings of Jainaism on a strong footing and systematized them as an independent school of thought.

Mahāvīra followed the line of teachings of Pārśvanātha.

Having preached for several years the rules of conduct and good life to his followers while wandering from place to place, Mahāvīra attained nirvāṇa at Pāvā near Rājagṛha, about 527 B.C., at the age of 72.

4. *Teachings of Mahāvīra*

As a Tīrthaṅkara, Mahāvīra followed the line of Pārśvanātha in the beginning, but later on, he improved upon the old views. For instance, Mahāvīra introduced vow of celibacy even for the ascetics. Secondly, he felt that the ascetics must have completely conquered all their senses, emotions and become exclusively *nirlipta* in the world, and consequently, they should also get rid of clothes and must remain naked. Mahāvīra felt that as long as an ascetic put on any clothes, so long he was not absolutely free from the thoughts of good and evil. Hence, Mahāvīra preached his followers to remain unclothed.

Differences between the views of Pārśvanātha and those of Mahāvīra.

Mahāvīra preached his followers to give up clothes totally.

This created a schism amongst the Jainas. Followers of Mahāvīra were called '*Digambaras*' (sky-clads, that is, unclothed) and others were known as '*Śvetāmbaras*' (putting on white clothes). This was the most important schism in the community and since then there became altogether two different groups amongst the

Jainaism divided into 'Digambara' and 'Śvetāmbara'.

Jainas in every sphere of their life. But this division, however, did not bring any radical change in the philosophical outlook of the school. Some rigidity was introduced in the mode of living of the ascetics, so it could affect the ethical aspect of their life alone.

Emphasis laid on the right conduct of life.

Mahāvīra emphasised much more on the right conduct of life. He believed that for the attainment of the highest truth it was most essential to purify one's body and mind through strict observance of the rules of good behaviour. To take to the life of an ascetic was an essential step towards the realization of the highest aim according to Mahāvīra.

He taught that an ascetic had to become a homeless wanderer, possessing nothing and being dependent for his subsistence on the alms received from the gṛhasthas without giving them any information before. Accordingly, he prescribed the following rules of conduct for the ascetics beside observing the ordinary regular daily vows :

Five vows: (1) Ahiṁsā;

Five samitis.

(1) *Ahiṁsā*, that is, non-killing of any creature through any of the five auxiliaries, called 'Samitis' such as, (i) observance of the rules of walking (*īryā-samiti*), (ii) observance of the rules of begging alms (*eṣaṇāsamiti*), (iv) observance of the rules of keeping some portion of the alms for the performance of religious duties (*ādānanikṣepaṇā-samiti*), and (v) observance of the rules of depositing and refusing more gifts or alms under certain conditions. (*pratisthā-paṇā-samiti);*

(2) Asatya-tyāga; Pañcabhāvanā.

(2) *Asatyatyāga* (keeping aloof from untruthfulness) through the observance of the five vows, called *pañcabhāvanā*: (i) condemning speech without deliberation, (ii) censuring speech while in anger, (iii) disapproving speech when moved by avarice, (iv) disapproving speech by fear, and (v) condemnation of telling a lie even in joke and fun:

(3) Asteyavrata through five sources.

(3) *Asteyavrata* (vow of non-stealing) through the practice of the following five sources: (i) asking permission before occupying other's house, (ii) seeking permission of the *guru* to

take part of the alms collected, (iii) repeatedly asking the permission of the owner of the house before occupying it, (iv) seeking permission of the owner of the house for the use of the furniture of that house and (v) lastly, seeking permission of the owner of the house for the sake of another ascetic who comes later to occupy that house:

(4) Brahmacarya-vrata.

(4) *Brahmacarya-vrata* (vow of celibacy) to be observed in the following five ways: (i) not to talk about a woman, (ii) not to look at the form of a woman, (iii) not to recall the previous experiences when one had to live the worldly life with a woman, (iv) not to take such rich food or drink which may produce the feeling of sexual love and (v) lastly, not to live in the same building wherein a female lives; and

Aparigraha-vrata.

(5) *Aparigraha-vrata* (vow of non-acceptance of and non-possession of any property, movable or immovable). All these are the same as taught by Manu, not for ascetics alone, but for all.[7]

The conduct of the life of a Jaina ascetic may be summed up in the following words: "The true ascetic should possess twenty-seven qualities, for he must keep the five vows, never take any food at night, show compassion towards and protect all living creatures, have control over his senses, renounce avarice, practise forgiveness, have high ideals, and must be sure of not doing any injury to any living creature, howsoever low and insignificant it may be.

Three Guptis.

He must also be self-denying and maintain the three *guptis* (restraints) of the movements of body (kāya-gupti), of tongue (vāg-gupti), and of manas (manogupti), must endure hardships and bear sufferings till death."

Besides, if an ascetic wants to achieve final emancipation he has to pass through the following fourteen grades of spiritual realization, called *'Guṇasthānas'* and observe the twelve vows and eleven *Pratimās* as given below:

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[7] *Manusmṛti*, X. 63.

'*Guṇasthānas*' are the grades of spiritual realization through which a Jīva has to pass gradually upward and ultimately become liberated. These are: (i) *Mithyātva*, a stage when one has no belief in the truth of Jaina doctrines. (ii) *Sāsādana*, a stage when one loses belief in the truth of Jaina doctrines and comes to believe in other doctrines which are not correct according to the Jainas. (iii) *Miśra*, a stage when truth and falsehood regarding the Jaina doctrines are mixed up in the mind of the Jīva, (iv) *Avirata-samyaktva*, a stage when the Jīva realizes the truth of the Jaina doctrines, but has not acquired control over himself yet, (v) *Deśavirata*, a stage when the Jīva is more advanced in having self-control, (vi) *Pramatta*, a stage when the Jīva begins to refrain from injury, falsehood, lust, a desire to have worldly possession, etc., but has not been always successful in his attempts, (vii) *Apramatta*, a stage when the Jīva is quite successful in practising, without transgression, non-injury, truth, chastity, non-acceptance of things not presented, etc. (viii) *Apūrvakaraṇa*, a stage when the Jīva experiences such joy and happiness as he has never known before.

14 Guṇasthānas-the grades of spiritual realization-through which an ascetic has to pass.

At this stage the Jīva increases his powers of meditation through yogic practices.[8] (ix) *Aniyati-bādara* or *Anivṛtta*, a stage when of the four passions (kaṣāyas), namely, krodha (anger), māna (pride), māyā (deceit) and lobha (greed), the third disappears, but the ascetic is not totally free from the memories of its (māyā's) past experiences which at times become revived. (x) *Sūkṣmasamparāya*, a stage when the ascetic loses all sense of humour, all pleasure in beauty and the experiences of pain, fear, grief, disgust and smell. Some slight degree of greed still remains at this stage. (xi) *Upaśānta-moha*, a stage when the ascetic gets the power to control all the Mohanīyakarmans, which do not disappear altogether. (xii) *Kṣīṇa-moha*, a stage when the Jīva becomes free from

Four Kaṣāyas.

[8] According to some Digambaras a woman can rise up to the fifth stage only. While others believe that she can rise up to the eighth stage.

passions and the Mohanīya-karmans. (xiii) *Sayogi-kevalī,* is the stage when the Jīva becomes free from all the Ghātīya-karmans and is declared a Tīrthaṅkara. He obtains eternal wisdom, illimitable insight, everlasting happiness and unbounded prowess at this stage.

The duty of the ascetic who has reached this stage is to go about and preach the truth. The ascetic, though he has realized the truth, yet maintains his body, of course, having no personal interest in it any more. (xiv) The last stage is called *Ayogi-kevalī.* At this stage all his karmans are purged away, and he proceeds at once to the final emancipation as a Siddha. It is believed that when a Jīva becomes Siddha *Ayogi-kevalī,* he cannot remain alive.

State of a liberated Jīva.

According to the Jainas the liberated Jīva does not merge into the Absolute, but remains above the earth in *'Siddhaśilā'* wherefrom he never returns to this earth.

The four stages of the ascetic life:

Besides, in order to reach the highest goal, an ascetic has to pass through other four stages:

(1) Sādhu.

(1) *Sādhu*—a stage when a Jīva leads the life of an ordinary ascetic living in seclusion in case of Digambaras, or moving from place to place, if he happens to be a Śvetāmbara,

(2) Upādhyāya.

(2) *Upādhyāya*—a stage when an ascetic well versed in Jaina canons is chosen to give instructions to his followers. He possesses perfect faith, perfect knowledge and perfect conduct.[9] Mostly, such teachers teach the following canonical works: *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, Upāsakadaśāṅga-sūtra* and the *Bhagavatī-sūtra.*

(3) Ācārya.

(3) *Ācārya*—the ascetic, who is regarded as the ablest on account of his erudition and discipline of body and mind through the observance of the rules of good conduct, is called 'Ācārya.' He is said to have full control over his senses. He must be a brahmacārī. He must have restrained his body, speech and mind and be free from the four kaṣāyas, namely, anger (krodha), conceit (māna), in-

[9] *Dravyasaṅgraha,* Verse 53.

trigue (māyā) and greed (lobha). He must observe the five vows referred to above. Besides, he must follow the five rules of conduct (cāritra), namely, (i) *Sāmāyika cāritra*, that is, the giving up all evil conduct and turning to good actions, such as, meditation, etc. (ii) *Chedopasthāpanīya-cāritra*, that is, the confession of sins done before the guru and performing the penance inflicted as an expiation of the sin committed.

Five rules of Cāritra (conduct).

(iii) *Parihāraviśuddha-cāritra*, that is, "The Śvetāmbaras believe it to be carried out when nine monks, at the order of their superior, go out together to perform austerities or tapas for eighteen months. Of the nine monks, six will do tapas for six months, and the remaining three will serve them; for the next six months, the three servers will perform their austerities together with the three of the original six, and be served by the three remaining; and for the last six months, in the same way, another six will do tapas and three will serve. The Digambaras, on the other hand, regard the duty as performed simply by being careful not to injure any Jīva whilst moving about."

(iv) *Sūkṣmasamparāya-cāritra*, that is, being bound to the world as loosely as possible after having cast off the very last root of passion. And the last rule of conduct to be followed is (v) *Yathākhyāta-cāritra*, that is, doing away with all worldly attachments and thinking only of the Ātman. Again, along with the above he must maintain the five Samitis explained before.[10]

Tīrthaṅkara—A stage which every Sādhu desires to reach and which is certainly the highest goal of the Jainas. The term is used for one who shows the true path across the troubled ocean of life. According to some, however, it is used for one who forms four communities (tīrtha) of monks and nuns, and male and female lay-followers. When an ascetic reaches this stage, he attains perfection of knowledge, perfection of speech, perfection of worship and absolute security, for no danger or disease can

4. Tīrthaṅkara.

10 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Verse 52; Brahmadeva's commentary on the same, pp. 93—94.

ever come to him. He becomes fearless. He has to move from place to place along with his disciples and stay in one place during the four months of the rainy season. He must have destroyed the four ghātīya-karmans, while the rest of the four karmans must have become ineffective in him. But we should not forget that as even then these karmans are not absolutely destroyed, so they keep him in bondage. Of the four ghātīya-karmans, when he is freed from the jñānāvaraṇīya-karman, he attains perfect knowledge; when he is freed from the darśanāvaraṇīya-karman, he attains perfect faith; when he becomes free from the mohanīya-karman, he achieves infinite happiness, and when he is freed from the antarāya-karman, he comes to possess infinite powers.[11]

He is also called *'Arhat'* and is pure, as he is bereft of the following eighteen faults, viz., hunger, thirst, fear, hatred, attachment, delusion, anxiety, old-age, sickness, death, fatigue, perspiration, pride, displeasure, astonishment, birth, sleep and grief.[12]

Though from the *Niścayanaya* point of view an Arhat does not possess any physical organism, yet from the common-sense point of view (Vyāvahārika-naya), we speak of him as having a body free from the seven *dhātus* and possessing brilliance like a thousand suns. Such a body is called *'Audārika.'*[13] When an Arhat comes into the womb of his mother, is born, is first engaged in the performance of penances, is in the state of attaining perfect knowledge and is to attain nirvāṇa, he is worshipped even by gods. This worship is known as the *Pañcamahākalyāṇa.*[14]

Special characteristics possessed by Tīrthaṅkaras.

Besides, the Tīrthaṅkaras are invariably born with the three varieties of jñāna (knowledge), namely, *Mati-jñāna,* meaning, knowledge derived through the senses, including the knowledge which arises from the activities of manas; *Śruta-jñāna,* that is, knowledge

11 *Dravyasaṅgraha,* Verse 50 along with the com. of Brahmadeva on it.

12 *Dravyasaṅgraha* along with Brahmadeva's com. on verse 50, p. 90.

13 *Ibid.*

14 *Ibid.*

acquired through symbols or signs: and *Avadhi-jñāna,* that is, the psychic knowledge which is directly obtained by the Jīva without the instrumentality of the senses, including even manas. Again, they also acquire the fourth type of jñāna, called *Manaḥparyāya,* meaning, the knowledge of the thoughts of others, just after they become initiated into the life of an ascetic. And lastly, after the destruction of the forms of karma-bandha, the fifth type of jñāna, that is, the *Kevala-jñāna,* meaning knowledge without any limitation caused by time, space and object, also manifests in a Tīrthaṅkara.[15] That is, the Tīrthaṅkaras possess both the direct and indirect means of knowledge.[16]

Four excellences of a Tīrthaṅkara.

It is further believed by the Jainas that the Tīrthaṅkaras acquire the following four excellences (mūla-atiśayas) from their very birth : (i) Possessing excellent and beautiful physical organism devoid of perspiration, disease, dirt, etc., (ii) emitting lotus-smell from their body, (iii) possessing milky white colour of their flesh and blood, and (iv) non-visibility of taking in of food and attending to the call of nature to any one except those who have attained avadhijñāna. It is further added that "with the acquisition of kevala-jñāna, in addition to the four atiśayas (excellences) acquired by birth, Tīrthaṅkaras have eleven more atiśayas, such as, freedom from pestilence, famines, etc., for a distance of 125 yojanas, and nineteen atiśayas created by gods, such as, beating of divine drums, showers of divine flowers, etc., making a total of thirty-four atiśayas. They are adored by gods, demi-gods, Cakravartins, Baladevas, Vāsudevas and by devout human beings."[17]

Other excellences of a Tīrthaṅkara.

5. Siddha.

The last stage of the pilgrimage of the Jīva is that of the *Siddha,* when the Jīva becomes free from the body produced by all the eight types of karmans, becomes the seer

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[15] *Heart of Jainism,* pp. 32—33; Foreword to the *Fifteen Previous Bhavas,* Vol. I., by Muni Ratna Prabha Vijaya, p. 24.

[16] *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra,* I. 11—12.

[17] *Fifteen Previous Bhavas,* pp. 23—25.

and knower of everything existing both in the Lokākāśa (that is, that space of Ākāśa wherein dharma, adharma, kāla, pudgala and Jīva exist) and Alokākāśa (that space which is beyond Lokākāśa). Really speaking, a Siddha is without a gross body, and hence, incapable of being perceived by the external senses. But from the common-sense view-point, a Siddha is said to have a humn form, which is, again, of a little lower type than the Final body (kiñcidūnacaramaśarīrākāra) and which remains at the top of the loka (universe) called the *Siddhaśilā.*[18]

Pañca-parameṣṭhins.

All these five classes of Jīvas are called *Pañca-Parameṣṭhins,* the five Supreme Beings. These beings, together or separately form the objects of prayers of the Jainas.[19]

5. *Followers of Mahāvīra*

Though Mahāvīra was preceded by twenty-three Tīrthaṅkaras, yet it was he who made the position of Jainaism secure and placed it on sound footing. He lived the life of a Tīrthaṅkara, and preached the same to all his followers. There were two main classes of people amongst his followers—the ascetics and the gṛhasthas, both male and female. He encouraged all of them to form the Order and live in Apāsarās, place of residence of the Jaina ascetics, and follow the rules of conduct as taught in Jaina scriptures. It is believed that at the time of his death Mahāvīra had 14,000 monks in his Order.

Two main classes of followers-ascetics and gṛhasthas.

According to the Jaina traditions, as recorded in the *Sthavirāvalī,* there were nine groups of the disciples, called *Gaṇas,* of Mahāvīra and each of these groups was put in charge of a Chief-disciple, called '*Gaṇadhara*'. There were eleven chief-disciples. A brief account of these is given below:

Gaṇadharas.

(1) Gautama, also called Indrabhūti, was born in 607 B.C., in a village named Govaragāma, near Rājagṛha. His parents were Vasubhūti and Pṛthvī. He was a Brāhmaṇa by birth and had studied Śāstras. He was the

(1) Gautama Indrabhūti.

[18] *Dravyasaṅgraha,* Verse 51. [19] *Ibid.,* 49.

most favourite disciple. It is believed that Indrabhūti composed the twelve Aṅgas, the fourteen Puvvas, twelve Upāṅgas, ten Payannas, six Cheda-sūtras, four Mūla-sūtras, and two Culika-sūtras, the description of which will be found in the section dealing with literature. Indrabhūti had extensive knowledge of many Śāstras and possessed many wonderful powers (labdhis) and was very much devoted to Mahāvīra. He possessed the first four types of knowledge. But it is said that he acquired the fith type of knowledge, namely, Kevala-jñāna also, in the night in which Mahāvīra attained Nirvāṇa.[20] Twelve years after this, Indrabhūti also attained final emancipation at the age of ninety-two.[21]

(2) Agnibhūti.

The second Gaṇadhara was Agnibhūti, younger brother of Indrabhūti. He was born in 603 B.C. in the village named Govara-gāma. He renounced the world at the age of forty-six and became initiated into the Order of the Jaina monks. He then studied all the canonical works of Jainaism. He attained kevala-jñāna at the age of fifty-eight. He died during the life time of Mahāvīra at the age of seventy-four.

(3) Vāyubhūti.

The third Gaṇadhara was Vāyubhūti, the youngest brother of Indrabhūti. He was born in 599 B.C. He renounced the world and became initiated into Jainaism at the age of forty-two. He acquired kevala-jñāna ten years after that and achieved final emancipation at the age of seventy during the life time of Mahāvīra in Rājagṛha.

(4) Vyakta.

Vyakta was the fourth Gaṇadhara. He belonged to the Bhāradvāja gotra Brāhmaṇa family of Kulluka-gāma. His parents were Dharma-mitra and Vāruṇī. He became initiated at the age of fifty and realized kevela-jñāna at the age of sixty-two. He attained final emancipation during the very life time of his Master in Rājagṛha.

(5) Sudharmā.

The fifth Gaṇadhara was Sudharmā. He was born in the family of Brāhmaṇas belonging to the Agnivaiśyā-yana-gotra living in the village named Kulluka-gāma. His father

20 *Sthavirāvalī*, p. 112, Muni Ratna Prabha Vijaya's edition.
21 *Ibid.*, p. 113.

was Dhammila and his mother was named Bhaddilā. He renounced the world at the age of fifty and studied all the Jaina canonical works after that. After a period of forty-two years of ascetic life, he attained kevala-jñāna at the age of ninety-two and achieved final emancipation eight years after.

(6) Maṇḍita.

Maṇḍita was the sixth Gaṇdhara. He was born in a village named Mauryagāma in the family of a Brāhmaṇa of Vāśiṣṭha-gotra. His father was Dhanadeva and the mother Vijayādevī. Gaṇdhara Maṇḍita was initiated at the age of fifty-three and obtined kevala-jñāna after fourteen years at the age of sixty-seven. At the age of eighty-three he attained final emancipation.

(7) Mauryaputra.

Mauryaputra of Kāśyapa-gotra was the seventh Gaṇadhara. He was born in Mauryagāma. His mother was Vijayādevī, the mother of the sixth Gaṇdhara Maṇḍita. She was re-married to Maurya of Kāśyapagotra after her first husband Dhandeva, the father of Maṇḍita, had died. Hence, the seventh Gaṇadhara belonged to Kāśyapagotra. He became an ascetic at the age of sixty-five and acquired kevala-jñāna at the age of seventy-nine and salvation at ninety-five.

(8) Akampita.

The eighth Gaṇadhara Akampita of Gautama-gotra was born in Mithilā from Brāhmaṇa parents, namely, Vasu and Nandā. He was well-versed in Śāstras and also in the Jaina canonical works. He entered into the ascetic life at the age of forty-eight and acquired kevala-jñāna after austere penances when he was fifty-seven years old. He attained salvation at the age of seventy-eight.

(9) Acalabhrāta.

The ninth Gaṇadhara Acalabhrāta was born in the family of a Brāhmaṇa of Hārya-gotra living in Kośala. His parents were Deva and Jayantī. He entered into the life of an ascetic at the age of forty-six, acquired kevala-jñāna at the age of fifty-eight and attained salvation when he was seventy-two years old.

The tenth Gaṇadhara Metārya was born in a Brāhmaṇa family of Kauṇḍinya-gotra living in Vaccha-

purī. His parents were Datta and Aruṇādevī. Like other Gaṇadharas, he was well-versed in Śāstras and Jaina canonical works. He was initiated into the Jaina-dharma by Mahāvīra. He became an ascetic at the age of thirty-six and acquired kevala-jñāna when he was only forty-six. He attained nirvāṇa at the age of sixty-two.

(10) Metārya.

The last Gaṇadhara was Prabhāsa. He was born in Rājagṛha-nagarī in the family of Brāhmaṇas of Kauṇḍinya-gotra. His parents were Bala and Atibhadrā. He was initiated when he was quite young, only sixteen years old. He attained kevala-jñāna at the age of twenty-four and achieved salvation at the age of forty only.

(11) Prabhāsa.

Besides these eleven, Mahāvīra had two more disciples who were not faithful to him. The first of these was Gośāla, also called Maṅkhaliputra, head of the Ājīvaka monks. He did not behave properly and became unchaste in his conduct. So he preached, even during the life time of Mahāvīra, against Jaina traditions. Though he performed penances, he was not true to his faith and hence, he was discarded from the fold. His real character was exposed to others by Mahāvīra himself. The Jainas hold that Mahāvīra added the vow of celibacy to the four vows of Pārśvanātha only because of the misbehaviour of this Gośāla.

Gośāla.

The next disciple was Jamāli, Mahāvīra's own son-in-law who did not remain in the main Jaina fold but founded a separate group of his own.

Jamāli.

Of the eleven Gaṇadharas, nine had no continuous chain of disciples and so each one of them entrusted his individual Gaṇa to Sudharmā at his death time. The tradition holds that after Mahāvīra this very Sudharmā became the chief-head of the Order of the Jainas. He held that position for twelve years. It is to be kept in mind that though Indrabhūti was living, yet he, being a kevalī, was not burdened with the care of the Order. So the entire burden of the Order of the Jainas fell upon Sudharmā.

After having carried on the duty of the chief-headship of the Order when Sudharmā obtained kevala-jñāna, his disciple named Jambū became entrusted to the charge of the Order in 515 B.C. Jambū was the son of Ṛṣabhadatta of Rājagṛha. His mother was Dhāriṇī. He belonged to Kāśyapa-gotra. He had decided to remain a brahmacārī throughout his life, but later on, due to the desire of his father he had to marry eight girls, namely, (1) Samudraśrī, daughter of Samudrapriya and Padmāvatī, (2) Padmaśrī, daughter of Samudradatta and Kamalamālā, (3) Padmasenā, daughter of Sāgaradatta and Vijayaśrī, (4) Kanakasenā, daughter of Kuberadatta and Jayaśrī, (5) Nabhaḥsenā, daughter of Kuberasena and Kamalāvatī, (6) Kanakaśrī, daughter of Śramaṇadatta and Suṣeṇā, (7) Kanakavatī, daughter of Vasuṣeṇa and Vīramatī and (8) Jayaśrī, daughter of Vasupālita and Jayasenā. But Jambū had already taken the vow of celibacy, so he remained a brahmacārī and convinced his eight wives of his attitude and together with them he became initiated into the Order of Jaina monks under the instructions of Sudharmā.[22]

Jambū.

He served the Order in that capacity for full twenty-four years and then attained kevala-jñāna. It is said that he was the last monk to attain kevala-jñāna and mokṣa[23]. He obtained nirvāṇa in 403 B.C.

Jambū was succeeded by Prabhava, the eldest son of king Vindya of Jayapurī. Being ill-treated by his father, Prabhava left his palace and joined wild tribes and ultimately, became their head. Prabhava passed his earlier days in robbery. He had also acquired two miraculous powers, namely, *Avasthāpinī* (sleep-producing) and *Tālodghāṭinī* (opening of locks). In spite of all these, Prabhava became a great monk and became initiated into the Order. Ultimately, after Jambū, he was the only ascetic who could become the head of the great Order at the age of seventy-four. For eleven years he remained the chief of the Order and died in 397 B.C. It was during his regime

Prabhava.

22 Sthavirāvalī, pp. 143—86.

23 *Heart of Jainism,* p. 68.

that there appeared two splits in the community, namely, Osawāla and Śrīmāla.

Realizing that his end was near, Prabhava tried to find out his successor. But he could not find any suitable person amongst the Jainas. He then searched from beyond the Order and was successful in finding out a Brāhmaṇa, named Śayyambhava of Vatsa-gotra, who ultimately, became initiated into Jainaism and was placed in charge of the entire Order by Prabhava. He also wrote a work called *Daśavaikālika* dealing with Jaina tenets. This, it is believed, was written to teach Jaina doctrines to his own son by Śayyambhava. He died at the age of sixty-two.

Śayyambhava.

Śayyambhava was succeeded by Yaśobhadra who remained in charge of the Order for a very short time and died in 319 B.C.

Yaśobhadra.

Yaśobhadra was followed by Sambhūtivijaya who died after a rule of two years in 317 B.C.

Sambhūtivijaya.

Bhadrabāhu was a great scholar. He succeeded Sambhūtivijaya in 317 B.C. He is said to have written commentaries, called *Niryukti,* on the Jaina canonical works. He also wrote a work on astronomy which was called after his name, that is, *Bhadrabāhu-saṁhitā.* The authorship of the *Upasarga Harastotra Kalpa-sūtra* is also attributed to him. He was the last leader of the Order who knew all the twelve Aṅgas and the fourteen Puvvas with their meaning and explanations.[24]

Bhadrabāhu.

It is said that it was during the regime of this Bhadrabāhu that a great famine occured in Magadha in 310 B.C. which lasted for twelve consecutive years and it became difficult to feed the monks of the Order. So

Great famine in Magadha in 310 B.C.

[24] *Vātsyāyana* in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama refers to the ten factored syllogism (I. i. 32) of some Naiyāyika, and scholars have identified that Naiyāyika wtih Bhadrabāhu. Dr. Satishachandra Vidyābhūṣana however, attributes this view to the Junior Bhadrabāhu (*Indian Logic*, p. 165). But from the study of the rest of the five factors given by Vātsyāvana, such as, jijñāsā, Saṁśaya, Śakyaprāpti, prayojana, and saṁśayavyudāsa, it is clear that Vātsyāyana refers to some other Naiyāyikas of the Āstika school. The ten factors of the Jainas are quite distinct from those of Vātsyāyana.

Bhadrabāhu left the old, weak and invalid monks in charge of Sthūlabhadra in Magadha and went to south with other monks. Just after that in the absence of Bhadrabāhu, Sthūlabhadra desirous of preserving the canonical works of the Jainas, called a Council of the monks at Pāṭaliputra and tried to collect all the Aṅgas. But only the first eleven Aṅgas could be found, while the twelfth, namely, *Diṭṭhivāya* (Dṛṣṭivāda) was found missing. It was the twelfth Aṅga alone which contained the fourteen Puvvas. But as Sthūlabhadra knew all these fourteen Puvvas, he could supply them himself even in the absence of the *Diṭṭhivāya*.

Sthūlabhadra

Council of the monks at Pātaliputra.

After several years when Bhadrabāhu returned to Magadha with all his monks, he heard of the achievements of the first Council. But he said that as all the Aṅgas including the fourteen Puvvas were lost, he would not believe in what was decided in the Council at Pāṭaliputra. Besides, he found that the monks who were left in charge of Sthūlabhadra had begun to put on clothes which Bhadrabāhu did not like. Thus, the old two divisions, namely, Digambara and Śvetāmbara, become permanent. But actually this split did not materialise till 142 A.D. according to Jaina traditions, or 82 A.D. according to Dr. Hoernle.[25] These two sects, however, never joined again. Bhadrabāhu died in 297 B.C., while Sthūlabhadra lived till 252 B.C.

Digambara and Śvetāmbara. become permanent divisions.

The last six leaders of the Order did not attain kevala-jñāna, but they had complete knowledge of the canonical works of Jainaism. So they were called *Śruta-kevalī*. Again, even this could not be found in those who succeeded them. They had the knowledge of the ten Puvvas of the twelfth Aṅga only. Hence, they were called '*Daśapūrvī*.' This showed a sort of gradual degeneration amongst the great teachers of Jainaism.

After the death of Sthūlabhadra there was some chaos in the Order and three new separate groups were

[25] Heart of Jainaism, p. 72.

formed, namely, (1) *Avyakta,* under the leadership of Āṣāḍha-Ācārya in 251 B.C., (2) *Kṣaṇikavādī,* under the leadership of Aśvamitra in 247 B.C., and (3) the third, under the leadership of Gaṅga in 239 B.C. Thus so far, there were five schisms in all in the Jaina Order.

Further split in the Order.

But then came Mahāgiri a strong leader who was successful in establishing order in the community and so no more fresh trouble appeared after that. He gave life to the practices of the monks and encouraged them to follow the rules of conduct as taught by the Tīrthaṅkaras. He emphasised the practice of remaining naked. He encouraged scholarship as a result of which Umāsvātī wrote his famous work namely, *Tattvārthasūtra* in his regime, while his disciple Śyāmācārya wrote *Pannavaṇāsūtra*, one of the Upāṅgas.

Mahāgiri.

After Mahāgiri came another great spiritual leader of the community, named Suhastin. He had great influence over the monks even during the life time of Mahāgiri. He converted a large number of persons to Jainaism and added to the number of the monks of the Order. He was succeeded by Susthitasūri in 177 B.C. Then came Indradinna. It was during his regime that there flourished the great Jaina saint Kālikācārya. The well-known Jaina scholar Siddhasena Divākara also flourished during this very period and he was the first scholar who translated the Jaina works from Prākrit into Sanskrit. This the Jainas did not like. They felt that as all were not capable to read Sanskrit, the scriptures written in Sanskrit would not become popular and many would remain entirely ignorant of the contents of their scriptures.

Suhastin.

Susthitasūri.
Indradinna.

Siddhasena Divākara.

The next spiritual leader of the Jaina Order was Vajraswāmin. He was the last of the 'Daśapūrvīs'. It was during his time, about 71 A.D., that two more schisms, sixth and seventh, took place under the leadership of Rohagupta and Goṣṭa Mahāla.

Vajraswāmin.

Vajraswāmin was succeeded by Vajrasena. It was during his time that the Digambaras cut off all their con-

nections with the main Saṅgha. According to the Jainas, it took place in 142 A.D., while according to Dr. Hoernle it took place about 79 or 82 A.D. Vajrasena was a weak leader and could not keep order in the Saṅgha.

Vajrasena.

Next came Haribhadrasūri a great scholar and author. He was succeeded by another scholar Siddhasūri who wrote a commentary on the *Upadeśamālā* of Dharmadāsagaṇī. He was also well-versed in Buddhism. After him came many insignificant leaders, such as Śīlaguṇaśrī, Bappabhaṭṭīsūri, (died in 839 A.D.) Śīlāṅgācārya, and Abhayadevasūri (1031 A.D.). The last and the most important leader was the well-known scholar of Prākrit Grammar, Hemacandrasūri. He was very influential amongst the Jainas and non-Jainas. He died about 1184. After him the tradition degenerated and the high ideals of leadership faded away.

Haribhadrasūri and Siddhasūri.

Śīlaguṇaśrī. Bappabhaṭṭī. Śīlāṅgācārya. Abhayadevasūri.

Hemacandra.

6. The two sects—their sub-divisions and differences

We have seen above that about 79 or 82 A.D. there was the final split in the community. One section of the Order was called Digambara and the other Śvetāmbara. We know that this split was an old one. Pārśvanātha was not in favour of remaining naked, but Mahāvīra had favoured it. Again, Sthūlabhadra had allowed to put on clothes, while Bhadrabāhu did not like this. This confusion continued for sometime till about 79 or 82 A.D. when the entire community was permanently divided into two distinct sects under the old names, namely, Digambara and Śvetāmbara.

Points of difference between Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras.

Amongst the Digambaras there were four main sub-divisions: (i) Kāṣṭhā-saṅgha, (ii) Mūlasaṅgha, (iii) Māthurasaṅgha, and (iv) Gopyasaṅgha. There were minor differences even amongst these sub-divisions. The fourth, however, agreed in several respects with the Śvetāmbaras.[26]

Sub-divisions of Digambara Sect.

26 Guṇaratna's *comm.* on the *Saḍdarśansamuccaya*, p. 111.

There were a few differences even in their daily activities including the manner of going out, collecting alms, manner of blessing others, etc. Besides, there were some more important points of difference which are noted below :

(1) According to the Śvetāmbaras, the nineteenth Tīrthaṅkara was a woman, while Digambaras held that he was a man, as no woman could ever become a Tīrthaṅkara.[27]

(2) The Digambaras hold that no one who is born an eunuch can ever achieve salvation, nor can a woman ever attain final emancipation without becoming a man by taking another birth.

The Śvetāmbaras, on the other hand, are of opinion that as perfect knowledge etc., are all found in women, they also, like men, do get salvation directly.[28]

But it should be made clear here that the Gopya section of the Digambaras does agree with the Śvetāmbaras and holds that women do get mokṣa directly.[29]

(3) Śvetāmbaras hold that Mahāvīra was married, while the Digambaras are of opinion that he did not marry.[30]

(4) According to the Digambaras, one who has attained kevala-jñāna, does not eat any food, while the Śvetāmbaras do not believe in it.[31]

But again, the Gopyas agreed with the Śvetāmbaras here also.[32]

(5) Digambaras preach that the ascetics should not put on clothes, while the Śvetāmbaras hold that they should use white clothes.

(6) Accordingly, the Tīrthaṅkaras, hold the Digambaras, must be represented as nude and unadorned, and with down-cast eyes,[33] while the Śvetāmbaras do not agree with the above view.

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27 *Heart of Jainism*, pp. 56—57.

28 Guṇaratna's *comm.* on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri, p. 111., 201; *Heart of Jainism*, p. 169.

29 Guṇaratna's *comm.* on the *Saḍdarśanasamuccaya*, p. 111.

30 *Heart of Jainism*, pp. 30—31.

31 Guṇaratna's *comm.* p. 111.

32 Guṇaratna's *comm.*, p. 111.

33 *Heart of Jainism*, p. 80.

(7) The great Jaina scholar Umāsvātī, author of the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra,* is called Umāswāmī by the Śvetāmbaras, while the Digambaras call him Umāswātī.[34]

(8) The Digambaras refused to acknowledge the canons compiled in the first Jaina Council held at Pāṭaliputra under Sthūlabhadra and held that in their eyes, the Puvvas and the Aṅgas were all lost.[35]

(9) The Digambaras call the ninth Aṅga as *Anuttara-upapādikāṅga*[36], while the Śvetāmbaras call the same as *Aṇuttarovavāiyadasāo* (*Anuttaraupapātikadaśāḥ*).[37]

(10) There is a difference in the list of the canonical works of the two.[38]

(11) According to the Śvetāmbaras Siddhasena Divākara converted king Vikramāditya into Jainaism, in 57 B.C., while the other sect held that he was converted between 187 and 271 A.D.[39]

(12) The biographies of the 63 'great men' of the Jainas are called '*Purāṇas*' by the Digambaras, while they are called '*Caritras*' by the Śvetāmbaras.[40]

(13) The Śvetāmbaras do not allow their scriptures to be read by laymen, or even by nuns, but restrict their use for monks alone.[41]

(14) In the *Munisuvratastavana* of Jñānasāgarasūri certain characteristics of the Tīrthaṅkaras are mentioned which are not accepted by Digambaras to the same extent.[42]

(15) The shape of Vairoṭī, the Śāsanadevī of Vimalānātha, the thirteenth Tīrthaṅkara, is represented as haridvarṇā, mounted on a snake and holding snakes in her four hands, according to the Digambaras. In the Śvetāmbara literature, however, Vimalānātha's female attendant, described as being of the same colour, seated

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34 *Indian Literature,* Vol. II. p. 477.

35 *Indian Literature,* Vol. II. p. 432.

36 *Indian Literature,* Vol. II. p. 454n.

37 *Indian Literature,* Vol. II. p. 450; *Sthavirāvalī,* p. 30.

38 *Indian Literature,* Vol. II. p. 473.

39 *Indian Literature,* Vol. II. p. 477n.

40 *Indian Literature,* Vol. II. p. 497.

41 *Heart of Jainism,* p. 16.

42 *Introduction to the Ancient Jaina Hymns,* p. 23.

on a lotus, and holding a single snake, bow, arrow and noose in her hands, is referred to as Viditā or Vijayā.[43]

(16) According to the Digambaras, the Śāsanadevī of Mallinātha, the 19th Tīrthaṅkara, is Aparājitā and is described as haridvarṇā, seated on that fabulous creature named aṣṭāpada or Śarabha and carrying a shield in one of her hands. According to the Śvetāmbaras, she is kṛṣṇavarṇā, seated on a lotus and carrying rosary in one of her hands.[44]

(17) The two sects differ in naming the sixteen Vidyādevīs.[44a] But this view is not accepted by all. Later scholars, however, agree that this difference is in connection with the lists of the Śāsanadevīs and not Vidyādevīs.[45]

(18) The Digambaras and a section of the Śvetāmbaras hold that the two aspects of knowledge, jñāna and darśana, are found simultaneously in a kevalin. But there is a great majority of the Śvetāmbaras who believe that even in a kevalin they occur in succession.

(19) There are similar minor differences in connection with the Vidyādevīs and the Śāsanadevīs.[46]

(20) The Digambara 'Sādhu' class leads the life of an ordinary ascetic living in seclusion, while the Śvetāmbara Sādhu moves from place to place.

(21) According to the Śvetāmbaras Puṣpadanta, the ninth Tīrthaṅkara, had crocodile as his symbol, while the Digambaras thought that it was the crab.

(22) According to the Śvetāmbaras, Malli, the nineteenth Tīrthaṅkara, was a woman, while the Digambaras believed that as it was not possible for a woman to become a Tīrthaṅkara, Malli was a male.

(23) There is some difference between the two schools, in the observance of the *Parihāraviśuddhacāritra* type of vow.

(24) Besides, there are differences in the version of the texts of the school according to the two schools. As these are not a few, it is not practicable to give them here.

[43] *Introduction to the Ancient Jaina Hymns*, p. 66.

[44] *Introduction to the Ancient Jaina Hymns*, p. 67.

[44a] *Introduction to the Ancient Jaina Hymns*, pp. 73-75.

[45] *Introduction to the Ancient Jaina Hymns*, p. 76.

[46] *Introduction to the Ancient Jaina Hymns*, pp. 80–81.

7. *Literature*

Having thus traced the tradition and the background of the school of thought, we now pass on to the literature of the school. We have seen above that Sthūlabhadra had called a Council of the monks at Pāṭaliputra and was successful in collecting all the canonical works of Jainaism. But the decisions of the Council were not accepted by all particularly, the Digambaras. So the exact number of the canonical works could not be fixed and the knowledge of the scriptures was gradually decaying, and there was a danger of their being entirely lost.

Meantime, the centre of gravity of Jainaism shifted from Magadha to Gujarat. It seems that Jainaism got the patronage of wealthy persons there, while they did not feel safe in their original home due to the growing influence of Buddhism and the hatred of the local orthodox people due to their being regarded as 'nāstika'. Hence, another Council was called in 454 A.D. at Valabhī near Bhāvanagar, under the leadership of Devardhi to give a final form to their scriptures. Unfortunately, it is believed that even then no agreement could be arrived at. At that time, however, there were at least eleven sub-sects in the Sthānakavāsī Jaina group while eighty-four in the Śvetāmbara group, who held different views as to the correct list of books rightly comprised in their canon. However, a list is given here which is generally accepted by the Jainas of the Śvetāmbara school.

Second Council of the Jainas at Valabhī in 454 A.D.

The literature is divided into two broad heads: Canonical and non-canonical.

(1) *Canonical works of the Śvetāmbaras*

I. The *twelve Aṅgas,* namely, (1) Āyārāṅgasutta (Ācārāṅgasūtra), (2) Sūyagaḍāṅga (Sūtrakṛtāṅga), (3) Thānāṅga (Sthānāṅga), (4) Samavāyāṅga, (5) Bhagavatā or Viyāha-pannati (Vyākhyā-prajñapti), (6) Nāyādhammakahāo (Jñātādharmakathā), (7) Uvāsagadasāo (Upāsakadaśāḥ), (8) Antagaḍadasāo (Antakṛtadaśāḥ), (9) Aṇuttarovavāiyadasāo (Anuttaraupapātikadaśāḥ), (10) Paṇhāvāgaraṇāi

Aṅgas.

(Praśna-vyākaraṇāni), (11) Vivāgasuyam (Vipākasūtram), and (12) Diṭṭhivāya (Dṛṣṭivāda).

According to the Jaina tradition, the last mentioned Aṅga, namely, *Diṭṭhivāya*, which included the following fourteen Puvvas (Pūrvas), is lost.

Puvvas.

II. The *fourteen Puvvas* are: (1) Uvāya (Utpāda), (2) Aggeṇiya or Aggāṇiya, (Agrāṇīya) (3) Vīriyappavāya (Vīryapravāda), (4) Atthi-Natthi-ppavāya (Asti-Nāsti-pravāda), (5) Nāṇappavāya (Jñānapravāda), (6) Sacca-ppavāya (Satyapravāda), (7) Āyappavāya (Ātmapravāda), (8) Kammappavāya (Karmapravāda), (9) Paccakkhaṇa-ppavāya (Pratyākhyānapravāda), (10) Vijjāṇuppavāya (Vidyānupravāda), (11) Avanjha (Avandya), (12) Pāṇāyāma (Prāṇāyuḥ), (13) Kiriyā-visāla (Kriyāviśāla), (14) Logabindusāra (Lokabindusāra).

Upāṅgas.

III. The *twelve Uvaṅgas* (Upāṅgas) are: (1) Ovavāiya or Uvavāiya (Aupapātika), (2) Rāyapaseṇaijja or Rāyapasenaiya (Rājapraśnīya), (3) Jīvābhigama, (4) Pannavaṇā (Prajñāpanā), (5) Sūriyapannatti or Sūrapannatti (Sūryaprajñapti), (6) Jambuddīva-pannatti (Jambūdvīpa-prajñapti), (7)Canda-pannatti (Candraprajñapti), (8) Nirayāvaliyā or Niryāvalī (Niryāvalikā), (9) Kappāvaḍaṁsiāo (Kalpāvataṁsikāḥ), (10) Pupphiāo (Puṣpikāḥ), (11) Puppha-cūliāo (Puṣpacūlikāḥ), and (12) Vaṇhidasāo (Vṛṣṇidaśāḥ).

Prakīrṇāni.

IV. The *ten Paiṇṇas or Payannas* (Prakīrṇāni) are: (1) Causaraṇa (Catuḥśaraṇa), (2) Āurapaccakkhāṇa (Āturapratyākhyāna), (3) Bhattapariṇṇā (Bhaktaparijñā), (4) Santhāra (Saṁstāra), (5) Taṇḍula-veyaliya (Taṇḍula-vaitālika), (6) Candā-vijjhaya (Candra-vedhyaka), (7) Devindatthaa or Devindatthaya (Devendrastava), (8) Gaṇivijjā (Gaṇitavidyā), (9) Mahāpaccakkhāṇa (Mahāpratyākhyāna), (10) Vīratthaa or Vīratthava (Vīrastava).

Chedasūtras.

V. The *six Cheya-suttas* (Chedasūtras) are: (1) Nisīha (Niśītha), (2) Mahānisīha (Mahāniśītha), (3) Vavahāra (Vyavahāra), (4) Āyāradasāo (Ācāradaśāḥ) or Dasāsuyaskhandha (Daśāśrutaskandha), also called briefly Dasāo, (5) Kappa (Bṛhatkalpa), and (6) Pañcakappa (Pañca-

kalpa). Instead of the last named, the Jīyakappa (Jita-kalpa) by Jinabhadra is also mentioned by some.

Mūlasūtras.

VI. The *four Mūlasūtras* are: (1) Uttarajjhayaṇa (Uttarādhyayana) or Uttarajjhāyā (Uttarādhyāyāḥ) (2) Āvassaya (Āvaśyaka), (3) Dasaveyāliya (Daśavaikālika), and (4) Piṇḍa-nijjutti (Piṇḍa-niryukti).

The third and the fourth Mūlasuttas are also sometimes called Ohanijjutti (Oghaniryukti) and Pakkhi (Pākṣikasūtra), and sometimes the Piṇḍanijjutti and Ohanijjutti appear in the list of the Cheyasuttas.[47]

Culika-Sūtras.

VII. The *two Culikasūtras* are: (1) Nandisutta and (2) Aṇuogadārasutta (Anuyoga-dvārasūtra).

In certain other lists the number of the canonical works is found to be eighty-four including twenty more Prakīrṇas, twelve Niryuktis and nine miscellaneous works even including the Kalpasūtras. All these canonical works are written in the Ardha-Māgadhī type of Prākrit and it is believed that Mahāvīra preached his disciples in this very language of the common people.

(2) *Canonical works of the Digambaras*

It is not so easy to give an account of the canonical works of the Digambaras, but it is believed that they also recognize the twelve Aṅgas and hold that the twelfth Aṅga include the fourteen Puvvas. But their names differ. They hold that those texts which do not belong to the Aṅgas are called 'Aṅgabāhyas' or 'Prakīrṇakas' and are said to have been written for the benefit of the simple minded Jainas. Such texts are: Sāmāyika, Caturviṁśatistava, Vandana and Pratikramaṇa. Besides these, Daśavaikālika, Uttarādhyayana, and Kalpavyavahāra are also included amongst the Aṅgabāhya texts by the Digambaras. So we can see that as far as the titles of the texts are concerned there are several texts which are still common to both the sects, but it is not certain whether these texts also agree in their subject-matter. Again, there are certain texts which the Digambaras recognize as 'Secondary Canon' which they

[47] Winternitz, *Indian Literature*, Vol. II. pp. 429—30.

call their four Vedas. They are : (1) Prathamānuyoga, legendary works to which belong the Purāṇas, (2) Karaṇānuyoga, cosmological works, which include Sūryaprajñapti, Candraprajñapti, and Jayadhavalā; (3) Caraṇānuyoga, ritual works, such as, Mūlācāra, Trivarṇācāra,* Ratnakaraṇḍa-Śrāvakācāra; and (4) Dravyānuyoga which includes philosophical works of Kundakundācārya, Tattvārthādhigamasūtra of Umāsvātī with the commentaries and Āptamīmāṁsā of Samantabhadra.

(3) *Non-Canonical Works of the Śvetāmbaras with their authors*

Among the non-canonical philosophical works the following may be mentioned along with their authors as more important:

In earlier days it was not possible to separate philosophical topics from works written on religion, nor was it possible in Jainaism to make any distinction of sect in the very beginning, for the distinction itself did not exist so definitely at that time. Hence, authors of the earlier days are claimed by both the sects, Śvetāmbara and Digambara. Thus, we find that both the sects give their own account of Bhadrabāhu who may be said to be the earliest of the Jaina writers on philosophical topics. According to Śvetāmbaras, he was born in 433 B.C. and died in 357 B.C. The Digambaras, however, hold that there were two Bhadrabāhus, the first of whom died in 365 B.C., while the second in 12 B.C. The Śvetāmbaras do not mention anything about the second Bhadrabāhu. This also leaves us in doubt about the authorship of the *Daśavaikālika-niryukti*. But from various other sources it seems that the second Bhadrabāhu is the author of the above mentioned work.

Bhadrabāhu.

Umāsvātī, who is called Umāsvāmin by the Digambaras, and who is recognized equally authoritative by both the sects, was the son of Svātī and Umā, the mother. He is also called Vācaka-śramaṇa and Nagaravācaka. He lived for about 85 years and died in

Umāsvātī. 1st century A.D.

85 A.D. He was born in a village called Nyagrodhikā and came to live at Pāṭaliputra where he wrote his famous work named *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* with a commentary of his own. It is in ten chapters. It is a very popular work and has been commented upon by several authors, such as, Pūjyapāda Swāīnin, Akalaṅkadeva, Siddhasena Gaṇi, etc. The Digambaras regard him a pupil of Kundakunda.

The first Jaina scholar who wrote on systematic logic was Siddhasena Divākara of the 6th century A.D.

Siddhasena Divākara, alias Kṣapaṇaka about 480-550 A.D.

He was the pupil of Vṛddhavādi Sūri. He is said to have converted king Vikramāditya of Ujjaina identified with Yaśodharmadeva, king of Malwa. He is identified with Kṣapaṇaka, one of the nine gems of the court of Vikramāditya.

He wrote the *Sammatitarka-sūtra*, a work on Philosophy in Prākrit which contains an elaborate treatment of the principles of Logic. He is also the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra* a work on Pramāṇa and Naya in Sanskrit in 32 stanzas only. This is a very important work. It has been edited with notes and translation in English by the late Mm. Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana. There is an excellent commentary on it called *Vivṛti* attributed to Candraprabha Sūri of the beginning of the 12th century A.D. It must be noted that the *Nyāyāvatāra* is only a portion of the bigger book called *Dvātriṁśat-dvātriṁśikā*. He is said to have written 32 different works on logic, 21 of which are known.

Siddhasena Gaṇi was the disciple of Bhāsvāmin and a contemporary of Devardhigaṇi. He has commented

Siddhasena Gaṇi 600 A.D.

upon the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* of Umāsvātī wherein he has quoted from Siddhasena Divākara and so he is placed after him.

Haribhadra Sūri flourished in the 8th century, probably between 705 and 775[48], though Dr. Vidyābhusana has placed him in the beginning of the 12th century. Dr. Vidyabhūsan, however, holds that there

Haribhadra Sūri. 705-775 A.D.

were two Haribhadras, the senior lived in the 5th cen-

[48] *Indian Literature*, Vol. II. p. 479.

tury, while the junior flourished in the 12th. But others do not hold this view. After examining all the facts the view of Dr. Winternitz that there was only one Haribhadra appears to be more convincing. He was one of the most prolific writers amongst the Jainas. He was the disciple of Jinabhadra (or Jinabhaṭa) and Jinadatta Sūri, the author of the *Vivekavilāsa*. He was born in a Brāhmaṇa family. Later on, he became a Jaina and studied all the works on Jainism under Jinabhaṭa. He is said to have written hundreds of works on philosophy, of which a little more than hundred have come to our knowledge so far. Haribhadra wrote boh in Saṁskrit and Prākrit. *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, Daśavaikālikaniryukti-ṭīkā, Nyāyapraveśaka-sūtra* and the *Nyāyāvatāravṛtti* are some of the more important works of Haribhadra.

Mallavādin 827 A.D.

After Haribhadra Sūri we find several philosophers of the Śvetāmbara sect of minor importance, namely, Mallavādin (about 827 A.D.). author of the *Nayacakra* and a commentary, called *Dharmottaraṭippaṇaka* on the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmottara, the Buddhist logician; Jinabhadragaṇi, author of the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, Abhayadeva Sūri (about 1000 A.D.), author of the *Vādamahārṇava;* Deva Sūri of about the beginning of the 12th century A.D., author of the *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra* with a commentary of his own, named *Syādvādaratnākara,* and Hemacandra Sūri of the latter part of the 12th century A.D., author of the *Pramāṇamīmāṁsā, Anyayogavyavacchedikā. Ayogavyavacchedikā,* etc.

Jinabhadragaṇi and Abhayadeva 1000 A.D.

Deva Sūri 12th century A. D.

Hemacandra 12th century A.D.

Ratnaprabha Sūri. 1181 A.D.

Ratnaprabha Sūri flourished towards the end of the 12th century. He was a logician of repute. He wrote a small commentary, called *Laghuṭīkā* on the *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra,* also called *Syādvādaratnākarāvatārikā,* wherein the author has quoted the views of the Buddhist logicians Arcaṭa and Dharmottara.

Then we come to Malliṣeṇa Sūri, the well-known author of the *Syādvādamañjarī,* which is a commentary

on the *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṁśikā* of Hemacandra.

Malliṣeṇa Sūri 1292 A.D.

The commentary deals with Pramāṇas, Saptabhaṅgīnaya, etc., and has criticised the views of almost all the schools of philosophy including the views of Cārvāka. It is a well-written popular work on Jainaism. It has been composed in Śaka 1214, that is, 1292 A.D.

Maladhārī Rājaśekhara Sūri had studied logic under Jinaprabha and wrote a commentary on the *Nyāyakandalī* of Srīdhara on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya,* called *Pañjikā*. He also wrote a commentary called *Ratnāvatārikā-Pañjikā* on the *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra* and on two other works, called *Syādvādakalikā* and *Caturviṁśatiprabandha* of which the last was completed in Saṁvat 1405, that is, 1348. He also wrote a philosophical compendium called *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya.*

Rājaśekhara Sūri 1348 A.D.

Jñānacandra was the disciple of Rājaśekhara Sūri. He wrote a commentary on the *Ratnākarāvatārikā* called *Tippaṇa* at the instance of his teacher.

Jñānacandra 1350 A.D.

The importance of the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra Sūri is due more to the commentary of Guṇabhadra Sūri, called *Tarkarahasyadīpikā,* published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series*. The author has given, more or less, an exhaustive treatment of most of the systems of Indian Darśana. The book contains much important information which cannot be easily found elsewhere. Guṇaratna has also written *Kriyāratnasamuccaya* in 1409 A.D. He was the pupil of Devendra who lived about 1363 A.D.

Guṇaratna Sūri about 1409 A.D.

Yaśovijayagaṇi was a distinguished scholar of his time. He was born at Dabhoi in the Baroda State in the 17th Century and came to study at Banaras under the disguise of a Brāhmaṇa ascetic. He is said to have written several works on Nyāya criticising Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and others. Some of his more important works are *Nyāyapradīpa, Tarkabhāṣā, Nyāyarahasya, Nyāya-khaṇḍa-khādya,* etc.

Yaśovijayagaṇi. 1608-1688.

This is in brief an account of the important

writers and their works belonging to the Śvetāmbara sect of the Jainas.

(4) *Non-Canonical works of the Digambara Sect with their authors*

Next, we pass on to the account of the more important authors and their works according to the Digambara sect. The earliest non-canonical writer was Kundakunda, who, according to the genealogical list of the teachers and heads of schools, called *Paṭṭāvalī*, lived in the 1st century A.D. He was the pupil of Bhadrabāhu, most likely, the Junior. All his works are in Prākrit. According to the Digambaras, Umāsvāti, called Umāsvāmin by them, was the pupil of Kundakunda. Some of his more important works on philosophy are—*Samayasāra, Pañcāstikāyasamayasāra, Pravacanasāra, Niyamasāra,* etc. Besides, he has also written 84 Pāhuḍas (Prābhṛtas) on special subjects of which only six are said to be still available. Amṛtacandra Sūri, of about 905 A.D., has written commentaries on his works. Of these, the *Pañcāstikāyasamayasāra* has attracted several authors and we have commentaries by Devajita, Prabhācandra (1259 A.D.), Jñānacandra and some others, while there are several translations of it in modern Indian languages.

Kundakunda 1st century A.D.

The *Pañcāstikāya* is divided into three main sections: (1) treatment of the five *astikāyas*, namely, Jīva, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa; (2) treatment of the nine categories of Jainaism, namely, Jīva, Ajīva Puṇya, Pāpa, Āsrava, Saṁvara, Nirjara, Bandha and Mokṣa; and (3) the treatment of the nature of Mokṣa.

The *Pravacanasāra,* (Pavayaṇasāra in Prākrit), is written in Prākrit Gāthās and deals with psychology and ethics of the Jainas. The *Samayasāra* consists of 414 Prākrit Gāthās and gives the essence of the doctrines of Jainaism. It has been commented upon by Prabhācandra and Amṛtacandra. *Niyamasāra* deals with the discipline required for the attainment of salvation.

Pañcāstikāyasamayasāra, Pravacanasāra and *Samayasāra* are together called *'Prābhṛtatraya'*, or *'Nāṭakatraya.'*

F. 33

Kundakunda was known by various names, such as, Padmanandī, Elācārya, Gṛddhrapiccha, and Vakagrīva and was equally respected by both the sects of the Jainas.

Samantabhadra 7th or 8th century A.D.

Samantabhadra belonged to the Digambara sect of South India. He is referred to by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and a verse from his *Āptamīmāṁsā* is quoted by Vācaspati Mishra I in his *Bhāmatī*.[49] He is the author of a commentary named *Gandhahasti-mahābhāṣya,* on the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* of Umāsvātī. The introductory section of this work is called *Devāgamastotra* or *Āptamīmāṁsā* which is his most important and popular work. It has been commented upon by six persons.[50] Other works of his are—*Yuktyanuśāsana* and *Ratnakāraṇḍaśravakācāra,* also called *Upāsakādhyayana.*

Akalaṅkadeva about 750 A.D.

Akalaṅkadeva also belonged to the southern group of the Digambaras. He is said to have been a contemporary of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Śubhatuṅga whose son Govinda II lived in 783 A.D. So it is assumed that Akalaṅkadeva should have lived about 750 A.D. His works are—*Aṣṭa-śatī,* a commentary on the *Āptamīmāṁsā,* one of the most important works on Jaina philosophy dealing mainly with logic, *Tattvārthavārttikavyākhyānālaṅkāra,* also called *Rājavārtika,*[51] *Laghīyastrayī, Svarūpasambodha-pañcaviṁśati* which is sometimes attributed to Mahāsena, and *Prāyaścitta,* also called *Śrāvakācāra.* Another important work of his is the *Nyāyaviniścaya* commented upon by Anantavīrya and Vādirājasūri.[52] Some of these works are published. The *Aṣṭaśatī* has been commented upon by Vidyānanda. He has been called *Sakalatārkikacakracūḍāmaṇi* by Laghusamantabhadra.

Vidyānanda lived at Pāṭaliputra. He was also known as Pātrakesarī. He lived in the beginning of the 9th century. He is the author of a commentary on the

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49 *Vedāntasūtra, Śaṅkarabhāṣya,* under II. ii. 33.

50 *Jinaratnakośa,* Vol. I. pp. 178–79.

51 *Jinaratnakośa,* Vol. I. p. 156.

52 *Jinaratnakośa,* p. 221.

Āptamīmāṁsā, called *Aṣṭasāhasrī*, *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*, *Āptaparīkṣā* and *Ślokavārtika* on *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvātī.

Vidyānanda about 800 A.D.

Māṇikyanandin was a logician. He is said to be a contemporary of Vidyānanda, and so he also can be placed in the begining of the 9th century. He wrote *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, a sūtra work on logic. It is divided into six chapters and deals with Pramāṇas alone. It has been commented upon by Prabhācandra and Anantavīrya.

Māṇikyanandin, beginning of the 9th century A.D.

Prabhācandra is said to have been a contemporary of Māṇikyanandin. He is the famous author of the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, the earliest commentary on the *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*. He was the pupil of Padmanandin,[53] and also that of Māṇikyanandin.[54] He wrote a commentary called *Nyāyakumudacandra* on the *Laghīyastrayī* of Akalaṅkadeva.

Prabhācandra 9th century.

Amṛtacandrasūri lived about 905 A.D. and wrote *Tattvārthasāra* dealing with the categories of Jaina philosophy. He has also written a commentary, called *Ātmakhyāti*, on the *Samayasāraprābhṛta* of Kundakunda.[55] His other works are—*Jinapravacanakośa*, *Tattvadīpikā*, etc.

Amṛtacandra-sūri about 905 A.D.

Devasena Bhaṭṭāraka lived about the middle of the tenth century. He was the pupil of Rāmasena.[55a] He wrote *Darśanasāra*, a Digambara manual of heretic doctrines, in 933 A.D., at Dhara, *Ārādhanasāra* and *Tattvasāra*.

Devasena 894-933 A.D.

Laghusamantabhadra lived about 1000 A.D. He wrote a commentary, called *Viṣamapadatātparya*, on the *Aṣṭasāhasrī* of Vidyānanda.

Laghu-Samantabhadra 1000 A.D.

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53 *Jinaratnakośa*, p. 239.

54 *Jinaratnakośa*, p. 335.

55 *Jinaratnakośa*, p. 418.

55a *Jinaratnakośa* holds that he was the pupil of Vimalasena, p. 167.

Anantavīrya flourished about the middle of the 11th century. He is the author of a commentary, called *Pañjikā* on the *Parīkṣāmukha,* and of a *Vṛtti* on the *Nyāyaviniścaya* of Akalaṅka.

Anantavīrya about 1039 A.D.

Nemicandra Siddhānta-cakravartin was a very erudite Digambara philosopher. He was the pupil of Abhayanandin. He flourished about the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century A.D. in Gujrat. He wrote five works—(1) *Gommaṭasāra,* also known as *Guṇasthānaka* or *Pañcasaṅgraha,* in Prākrit. It is divided into two parts called Jīvakāṇḍa and Karmakāṇḍa. The first part deals with the classification of Jīvas, their origin and nature. It consists of purely scientific enumerations, descriptions and calculations about Jīvas.

Nemicandra about 10th and 11th century A.D.

The second part deals with the nature of karman and its relations with Jīva. It has been commented upon by nine commentators known so far.[56] (2) *Labdhisāra.* It is a sort of appendix to the *Gommaṭasāra.* There are two commentaries available on it.[57] (3) *Kṣapaṇasāra.* (4) *Trilokasāra.* It has been commented upon by several writers.[58] (5) *Dravyasaṅgraha.* It is a brief exposition of Jaina doctrines of philosophy in 58 Prākrit Gāthās. It may be divided into three parts. The first part deals with the six kinds of substances (dravyas) including the five astikāyas comprising the universe. The second part consisting of 12 Gāthās (28-39) deals with the seven tattvas and nine categories (Padārthas). The third part, comprising Gāthās 40—57, describes the means of attaining liberation. That it is one of the most important and popular works on Jaina philosophy can be known from the fact that there are 14 commentaries on it known so far.[59] Of these, the commentary of Brahmadeva is very informative and comprehensive. All the works of Nemicandra are in Prākrit and

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56 *Jinaratnakośa,* pp. 110—111.

57 *Jinaratnakośa,* p. 337.

58 *Jinaratnakośa,* pp. 162—63.

59 *Jinaratnakośa,* p. 182.

their commentaries are in Saṁskrit. Almost all these works have been published.

Śrutasāgaragaṇi was a pupil of Vidyānandin. He is referred to by Nemidatta of 1528 A.D. and so he must have lived before that date. He wrote a commentary, called *Tattvārthadīpikā,* on the *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāmin.

Śrutasāgaragaṇi, end of the 15th century.

Dharmabhūṣaṇa was a disciple of Varddhamāna Bhaṭṭāraka. He wrote *Nyāyadīpikā* which has been published and translated into Hindi. It deals with the two Pramāṇas accepted by the Jainas, namely, pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) and parokṣa (indirect knowledge). The latter includes recollection (smṛti), recognition (pratyabhijñā), argumentation (tarka), inference, authority (āgama) and naya (standpoint). This, in brief, is the treatment of the authors and their works according to the Digambara sect of the Jainas.

Dharmabhūṣaṇa about 1600 A.D.

Number of Pramāṇas according to Dharmabhūṣaṇa.

8. *Doctrines of the School*

(1) *Bondage and its Cause*

It has been already mentioned before that the treatment of Jainaism may be divided into two broad heads—Metaphysical and Ethical. In fact, the latter aspect, in Jainaism, and as a matter fact in all other schools of philosophical thought in India, is much more important than even the former aspect. Manifestation of the ultimate truth and its realization cannot be possible unless the antaḥkaraṇa becomes entirely free from dirt and is fully purified. This is, again, possible only when the Jīva has undergone very rigidly the discipline of body and mind. For this the Jīva has to follow all the rules of conduct and lead a detached life. Thus, the entire ethical aspect represents the *sādhana* side of philosophy. Hence, the treatment of the ethical aspect should be taken up first. But these are so inseparably connected

Purification of antaḥkaraṇa is essential for the manifestation of the ultimate Truth.

with each other that no exclusively separate treatment of any one aspect is possible.

Regular practice of austere penances along with the rigid discipline of body and mind in order to purify the antaḥkaraṇa presupposes that the Jīva is impure and has fallen in bondage. So the observance of all the ethical rules is meant to make the Jīva free from bondage. Now, a question may be raised here: how is the bondage caused and how is it removed?

According to the Jainas, Jīva is essentially cetana (conscious), pure and perfect. But from the emperical standpoint it comes to possess passions (kaṣāyas) due to the influence of nescience (avidyā) which is as much beginningless as the Jīva itself. Both Jīva and avidyā being beginningless, it is not easy to say when the Jīva came in contact with avidyā. In fact, their contact is also beginningless. So due to the influence of passions, the Jīva gives up its intrinsic nature and falls into bondage. These passions are helped by what is known as 'yoga', that is, the vibrations or activities of body, of speech and of manas. In fact, these two, that is, kaṣāya and yoga, are regarded as the main causes of bondage.[60]

Jīva loses its intrinsic nature due to its contact with Kaṣāyas (passions).

Causes of bondage.

Being associated with attachment and aversion, the Jīva takes in such Pudgalas as are capable of producing karman. This taking in of the karman is bondage.[61] In order to explain the process of taking in of Pudgalas in detail, it is necessary to explain first Pudgala and 'Pradeśas.'

According to the Jainas, as is the case with other systems, the world is without any beginning. It consists of two main categories only—Jīva and Ajīva (conscious and non-conscious elements). The latter is divided into four different elements, namely, Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Pudgala. These four are expressed, as Dharmāstikāya, Adharmāstikāya, Ākāśāstikāya and Pudgalāstikāya. The term 'astikāya' consists of two

Brief mention of the categories.

60 *Tattvārthasūtra,* VIII. I.

61 *Tattvārthasūtra,* VIII. 2–3.

words—'asti' and 'kāya'. Literally, the term means 'existence of body'. In other words, the five dravyas, namely, Jīva, Dharma, Adharma Ākāśa and Pudgala always exist (asti). Again, each one of these dravyas has several 'Pradeśas', (magnitudes), like bodies. Hence, each one of the above five dravyas is called 'astikāya', that is, that which exists and has different 'Pradeśas'.[62]

The term 'Astikāya' explained.

As for the meaning of the term 'Pradeśa', the Jainas hold that a 'Pradeśa' is that portion of Ākāśa which is obstructed (avaṣṭabdha) by one indivisible ultimate particle, called aṇu and which is capable of giving space to all ultimate particles (aṇus).[63] Again, the aṇus, in a Pudgala dravya, are capable of combining with one another and forming different groups (skandhas) which have many 'Pradeśas.' So, though a single aṇu of a Pudgala occupies a single 'Pradeśa,' yet due to the grouping, it comes to possess many 'Pradeśas.' Hence, that which has many 'Pradeśas' is called 'kāya.' But as 'Kāla', one of the non-conscious dravyas, has only one Pradeśa, it is not called 'kāya.'[64] In other words, every kind of dravya is made up of ultimate indivisible particles (aṇus) and each one of these aṇus forms a 'skandha' (group), except in Kāla. So, as said before, the space occupied by one such particle is known as 'Pradeśa.'

Meaning of the term 'Pradeśa'

Kāla has no 'kāya'.

Jīva, Dharma and Adharma have innumerable 'Pradeśas' (asaṅkhyeya), that is, they are beyond calculation. The universe (lokākāśa) contains innumerable 'Pradeśas' and as a Jīva can fill up the whole of the universe by its expansion, it is said to contain innumerable 'Pradeśas.' Dharma and Adharma also pervade the entire universe, as oil pervades the entire portion of a sesamum seed.[65] Hence, these two dravyas also have innumerable 'Pradeśas.' Ākāśa is infinite, for,

Number of Pradeśas in 'Kāyas'.

[62] *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā, 24.

[63] *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā, 27.

[64] *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthās 24—26.

[65] *Tattvārthasāra*, III. 14. 19. 23.

according to the Jainas, it not only pervades the entire universe, but exists even beyond it. So it has infinite 'Pradeśas.'

Pudgala has, on the other hand, numerable, innumerable and infinite 'Pradeśas.' In other words, a Pudgala consists of ultimate indivisible particles (aṇus) which may combine and produce a 'skandha.' Thus, a 'skandha' may contain any number of aṇus. The 'Pradeśas', obstructed by these aṇus in the form of a 'skandha,' can therefore, be counted and hence, a Pudgala is said to have numerable 'Pradeśas.' From a different point of view, if the aṇus do not combine into a 'skandha' and exist separately, contemplating a division, then a Pudgala may be said to consist of innumerable aṇus, for the Pudgala exists throughout the universe. Again, a Pudgala may be said to have infinite 'Pradeśas' in the sense that the aṇus of a Pudgala dravya in a sūkṣma (subtle) state may be said to possess infinite 'Pradeśas'.[66]

Pradeśas in a Pudgala.

Kāla, on the other hand, consists of ultimate particles, called Kālāṇus, which never mix up with one another, but are always separate. The universe (lokākāśa) is full of these particles of Kāla. There is no space in the universe which is devoid of these particles. These particles of Kāla are invisible, innumerable, inactive (niṣkriya) and without form. As the aṇus of Kāla do not form 'skandhas', these particles of Kāla exist separately in different 'Pradeśas' of the universe without having more than one 'Pradeśa' within it.[67] Thus, Kāla having but a single 'Pradeśa', is not called 'Kāya', like the other five dravyas, as mentioned before.[68]

Kāla has no skandha

The theory of Karman plays a great importance in Jainaism also. Jīva is essentially cetana (conscious), pure and perfect but from the emperical standpoint it comes to possess passions (kaṣāyas) due to the influence of nescience (Mithyātva-avidyā), which is beginningless like the Jīva and the world. So the contact of Jīva with pas-

Contact of Jīva with Kaṣāyas.

[66] *Tattvārtharājavārttika*, V. i. 3.

[67] *Tattvārthasāra*, III. 44; *Vardhamāna Purāṇa*, XVI. 35.

[68] *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā, 25.

sions is also likewise beginningless as has been mentioned before. The Jīva, under the influence of Mithyātva, has been taking in karma-Pudgalas since time immemorial and manifesting these Pudgalas afterwards as karmans. Thus, these are also beginningless and they continue to exit as long as the Jīva has not been able to stop taking in karma-Pudgalas through 'Saṃvara.' It may also be pointed out here that the relation between Jīva and karma-Pudgala is reciprocal from eternity.

Jīva takes in mūrta-karma-Pudgalas.

We know that Pudgala has several varieties. Of these, those which are capable of manifesting themselves into karman alone are taken in by the Jīva. It has already been pointed out above that the Jīva has innumerable 'Pradeśas.' Now, those karma-Pudgalas which are taken in by the Jīva, stick in very closely to the 'Pradeśas' of the Jīva. We are aware that the Jīva is intrinsically formless (amūrta), but due to its connection with kaṣāya and karman from time immemorial, it appears mūrta (with form) and so, it takes in only mūrta-karma-Pudgalas, and those very karma-Pudgalas appear as karmans later on. This is what is called 'bondage.'

Causes of bondage.

Other causes of bondage are mithyādarśana, also called mithyādṛṣṭi, or darśanamoha, or only mithyātva, wrong knowledge, delusion, or perverse attitude towards the truth taught in Jainaism, avirati (non-abstinence or lack of control against doṣas) and pramāda, that is, dullness towards right knowledge of the Ātman, or lack of mental energy towards right deeds and carelessness in differentiating right from wrong. All these may be said to be the different aspects of avidyā (nescience). A brief description of these is being given here for a better understanding of the causes of bondage.

Process of bondage.

It has been said above that the Jīva takes in such Pudgalas as are capable of producing karman. These Pudgalas stick to the 'Pradeśas' of the Ātman and these very Pudgalas afterwards turn into karman. This contact of the Pudgala in the garb of karman is 'bondage.' In this bondage there are also various other factors. These karmans obstruct

the intrinsic nature of the Jīva, produce changes in its attitude and vitiate its purity of darśana and jñāna. Mithyādarśana is one of the main factors. Due to its influence the Jīva does no longer possess its intrinsic quality of Samyagdarśana (correct vision), rather it comes to have perverse vision (viparītadarśana).

This perverse vision may be either the natural absence of faith and belief in the ultimate truth, or presence of wrong notions about the nature of the ultimate truth. The former is found in Jīvas totally devoid of knowledge; such as, insects, birds, etc., while the latter belongs to one who has acquired knowledge. In the former case, just as there is the inborn total absence of faith in the ultimate truth, so there is also the total absence of faith in the wrong notions about the truth. In the latter case, however, it is not only that there is no correct knowledge about the truth, but instead there are wrong ideas about the truth. This is just like the two aspects of *Māyā* of Śaṅkara-Vedānta, namely, the '*Āvaraṇa*' and the '*Vikṣepa*.' The former is not so dangerous as the latter.

Two aspects of Mithyātva.

Umāsvāti calls these two aspects '*anabhigṛhīta*' or '*naisargika*' (natural) and '*abhigṛhīta*' accepted with obstinacy (āgraha, rather durāgraha) respectively. This may be due to one's having acquired wrong notions about the truth through instructions. This is found in human beings mostly.[69] We find in other Jaina works various other names and sometimes further classification of mithyādarśana. But all these are, in fact, different due to the difference in degree or intensity of perverseness. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the aptitude towards wrong notions may take any shape with slight differences at every step and so there may be naturally several divisions and sub-divisions of mithyātva. All sorts of wrong notions and evil results thereof can easily be attributed to the perverseness. Such is the mysterious nature of this mithyātva.

Just for the sake of acquiring some definite idea about the varieties, I am giving here divisions of Mith-

69 *Tattvārthasūtra*, VIII. 1.

yātva. According to Nemicandra, it is of five kinds—(1) Ekānta—It is that state of delusion according to which one has a belief which is exclusively false from Jaina standpoint of view but he is totally ignorant of its falsity. (2) Viparīta—It is that state of delusion under the influence of which one has equally full faith in Jaina and non-Jaina tenets. (3) Vinaya—It is that state of delusion according to which a Jaina does not give up a belief even when he knows it to be false from the Jaina standpoint because of modesty. (4) Saṁśaya—It is that kind of delusion under which one is not able to decide whether a particular course is right or wrong. (5) Ajñāna—It is that type of delusion which makes a person not to have any belief at all.

Divisions of Mithyātva.

The next cause of bondage is Avirati, meaning, non-abstenance or lack of control against doṣas. It is also of five kinds—(1) Hiṁsā (injury), (2) Anṛta (falsehood), (3) Caurya (stealing), (4) Abrahma (incontinence) and (5) Parigraha (attachment towards a thing which has not been given to him). From a different standpoint there are forty-two varieties of this cause of bondage.[70]

'Avirati,' a cause of bondage.

The third cause of bondage is 'Pramāda'. This is of fifteen kinds. Vikathā (reprehensible talk), Kaṣāya (passions), Indriya (senses), Nidrā (sleep) and Rāga (attachment), are some of those varieties.

'Pramāda', a cause of bondage.

'Yoga' consists of the activities of manas, speech and body. Hence, this is of three kinds. 'Kaṣāya' (passions) has four varieties—Krodha (anger), Māna (pride), Māyā (deceit) and Lobha (greed).

With these attitudes of mind, a Jīva falls in bondage. As soon as the Jīva takes in the karma-Pudgalas, the latter stick to the 'Pradeśas' of the Jīva. Then in those very karma-Pudgalas sticking to the Ātmapradeśas, the following four peculiarities find their place: Prakṛti (nature), Sthiti (duration), Anubhāva (intensity) and Pradeśa (Parimāṇa-volume). In other words,

Process of Jīva falling into bondage.

70 *Tattvārthasūtra*, VII. 8—12.

as soon as the karma-Pudgalas enter into the Pradeśas of the Jīva, a sort of nature is produced in them by which jñāna (knowledge) and darśana (vision) become obscure, they tend towards giving pleasure and pain, etc. This assuming of a particular nature by the Jīva is called 'Prakṛtibandha.'[71]

Along with this, it also becomes certain that the particular nature of the karma-Pudgalas will stick to them for a particular period of time. This fixation of time-limit to the nature is called 'Sthitbandha.'[72] Again, this nature of the karma-Pudgalas is endowed with certain gradation in intensity, mildness, etc., in the resultant. This is called 'Anubhāvabandha.'[73] Lastly, the karma-Pudgalas will assume different forms in certain definite quantity. Hence, such a division according to quantity is called 'Pradeśabandha.'[74]

Of these four types of bondage, the first and the last depend upon 'Yoga', for the intensity or mildness of these, the Prakṛti and Pradeśa bandhas depend upon those of 'Yoga,' while those of the second and the third depend upon 'Kaṣāya.' In other words, the nature and volume of bondage result from the activities of thought, speech and body, while the duration and intensity of bondage result from the attachment and aversion of the Jīva towards worldly objects. It is therefore, that Kaṣāya (attachment and aversion) of the Jīva towards worldly objects is regarded as the internal (antaraṅga) cause of bondage, and which also determines the duration and intensity of it; while the activities of manas, speech and body are regarded as the external (bahiraṅga) causes of bondage and which determine its nature and volume.[75]

The nature of the Jīva after falling into bondage.

The various types of bondage mentioned above simply change the attitude of the Jīva and vitiate its intrinsic quality of Upayoga, (consciousness), so that both jñāna (determinate—sākāra—knowledge) and darśana (indeterminate—nirākāra—knowledge) become

71 *Tattvārthasūtra,* VIII. 4–14. 72 *Tattvārthasūtra,* VIII. 4, 15–21.

73 *Tattvārthasūtra,* VIII. 4. 74 *Tattvārthasūtra,* VIII. 4.

75 *Tattvārthasūtra,* VIII. 3; *Dravyasaṅgraha,* Gāthā 33; *Vardhamānapurāṇa,* XVI. 45; *Dharmaśarmābhyudaya.* XXI. 108; *Pañcāstikāyasamayasāra,* verse 148.

obscure and the Jīva falls in bondage. It is not easy to determine all the peculiarities the Jīva comes to possess after taking in the karma-Pudgalas, because of their subtle nature, but even then one can infer the presence of those peculiarities in the Jīva which manifest themselves externally. These peculiarities have been however, classified under eight heads which are called 'Mūla-Prakṛti' types of bondage. They are: (1) 'Jñānāvaraṇīya,' that is, the bondage which prevents the Jīva to have determinate knowledge of any object and (2) 'Darśanāvaraṇīya' which prevents the Jīva to have indeterminate knowledge of any object. The two qualities of jñāna and darśana being naturally unlimited and unobscured in the Jīva, become now limited and obscure when the Jīva is in bondage. Hence, in their absence, several worldly qualities, not intrinsically connected with the emancipated Jīva, will now come to be present in it. Under the influence of such qualities caused by similar karma-Pudgalas, the Jīva feels pleasure and pain (Vedanīya) which is regarded as the third type of Prakṛtibandha. (4) Similarly, the Jīva possesses 'Mohanīya—karmans' which infatuate it and make it incapable of distinguishing right from wrong. (5) Again, the Jīva comes to take in such karma-Pudgalas which sustain its existence for a certain definite period and determine its span of life in the world. This is called 'Āyuṣkabandha.' (6) Jīva possesses such karma-Pudgalas which give it its personality, name and fame in the world. Hence, it is called 'Nāmabandha.' (7) Then again, such karma-Pudgalas enter into the Jīva-Pradeśas which help the Jīva to take birth in a particular family and surroundings. This is called 'Gotrabandha.' (8) And lastly, the Jīva takes in such karma-Pudgalas which put obstacles in its way against the performance of right actions in the world. This is called 'Antarāyabandha.'

Mūla-Prakṛti types of bondage.

These are the main divisions of the 'Prakṛtibandha.' But those who are eager to go into, further details of these, will find ninety-seven divisions and sub-divisions of these.[76]

[76] *Tattvārthasūtra,* VIII. 5—14.

From what has been said above it is clear that both the Jīva and the Pudgalas exist together. Along with these two dravyas, there also exist karman (the accumulated result of our everyday karman) and kaṣāya. Now, the question is: what is that which makes the karma-Pudgalas flow into the Jīvas? The karma-Pudgalas being non-conscious cannot have any activity in themselves in order that they may enter into the Jīva. Hence, some active agent is required to help the flowing in of the karma-Pudgalas into the Jīva. This activity is found through 'Yoga' which is the activity of body, speech and manas in Jainaism. In other words, before the actual flow of the karma-Pudgalas into the Jīva, there appears vibration in the respective 'Pradeśas' of the Jīva caused by body, speech and manas. Hence, those vibrations in the Pradeśas of the Jīva are known as 'Kāyayoga,' 'Vāgyoga' and 'Manoyoga' respectively. This flowing in of the karma-Pudgalas into the Jīva through the activities of body, speech and manas is called in Jainaism, 'Āsrava.'[77]

Causes that make Karma-Pudgalas flow into Jīva.

Swāmī Kārtikeya, however, says that 'Āsravas' are certain modifications or movements of the Jīva resulting from the activities of manas, speech and body either accompanied by, or bereft of, Mohodaya (passions).[78] It is therefore, that 'Āsrava' has been called one of the causes of bondage. 'Āsrava' may be said to be something like a hole, a means, through which, for instance, water flows into the boat on the river.

'Āsrava', a Cause of bondage.

There are two main divisions of 'Āsrava.' When there are modifications in the thoughts alone before the actual flow of karma-Pudgalas into the Jīva, then it is called '*Bhāvāsrava*'. After these modifications of the Jīva, there is the actual flowing in of the kārmic Pudgalas into the Jīva and the modifications caused thereafter in the Jīva, are known as 'Dravyāsrava.' This, again, is either auspicious or inauspicious according to the nature of the thoughts of the Jīva. It is also called 'Karmāsrava'. This may be illustrated by an instance

Main divisions of 'Āsrava'.

[77] *Tattvārthasūtra,* VI. 1–2.

[78] *Swāmikārtikeyānutprekṣā,* 88.

of the sticking of dust particles on a body which is besmeared with oil. The smearing of the body with oil is like the 'Bhāvāsrava', while the sticking of the dust particles on that body is like the 'Dravyāsrava.'[79]

Number of Āsravas

There are forty-two 'Āsravas' through which karma-Pudgalas enter into the Jīva, of which seventeen are known as more important. These are: the three 'Yogas,' five sense-organs, four kaṣāyas, namely, anger (krodha) conceit and pride (māna), deceit and intrigue (māyā) and greed (lobha), and the non-observance of the five great vows, namely, the vows against killing, lying, stealing, coveting and leading unchaste life.[80] Besides, there are twenty-five other minor 'Āsravas' through which karman flows into the Jīva and causes its bondage.[81]

Conception of 'Bandha'.

This very thing may also be called '*Bandha*.' We have seen above that karman enters through Āsrava into the Jīva. Now, when there are modifications in the Jīva to cause the flow of the kārmic Pudgalas into the Jīva, then before the kārmic Pudgalas have actually flown into the Jīva, the Jīva becomes bound by the Bhāvas alone and such a bondage is called 'Bhāvabandha.' But when the kārmic Pudgalas have actually entered into the Jīva and have become implanted into it, then that Jīva becomes bound with karma-Pudgalas and such a bondage is called 'Dravyabandha.' So says Kundakunda: The modifications of the Jīva of the nature of delusion (moha), attachment (rāga) and hatred (dveṣa) which, again, may be either auspicious or inauspicious, after the Jīva has fallen down from its pure conscious nature (svasaṁvitteścyuto bhūtvā), which entangle that Jīva into bondage, are said to be '*Bhāvabandhas*.' The mutual interpenetration of the auspicious or inauspicious kārmic Pudgalas into the Jīva leading to the bondage of it is said to be '*Dravya-bandha*'.[82] This is how the Jīva falls into bondage.

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79 *Pañcāstikāya,* 135—39.

80 *Tattvārthasūtra,* VI. 1—6; VII. 1.

81 *Tattvārthasūtra,* VI. 6. For further divisions and subdivisions of Āsrava, see *Dravyasaṅgraha,* pp. 78—80.

82 *Pañcāstikāya,* 147.

Samvara.

Now, as for the freedom from bondage, it may be said that according to Jainaism, like other systems, the ultimate aim of life and philosophy is final emancipation. Hence, as long as there remains karman sticking to the Jīva, so long no Final Release is possible. It is, therefore, most essential to stop the influx of karman and its causes into the Jīva. The category dealing with the stopping of the influx of karman into the Jīva is called '*Saṁvara.*' It has been defined as that which causes the checking of the influx of karman (āsrava) into the Jīva. In other words, one who has no attachment, no hatred and no delusion towards any object of the world, realizes equanimity towards pleasure and pain, and his conscious Jīva becomes free from vikāra (modifications), so that there remains no influx of any auspicious or inauspicious karman into it. In fact, all the influx becomes stopped thereafter.

Like Āsrava, first there is the checking of the modifications in the form of attachment, hatred and delusion of the Jīva. This is called '*Bhāva-saṁvara.*' Here also, we have 'Bhāva-puṇyasaṁvara,' when the auspicious bhāvas are stopped to function, and 'Bhāva-pāpa-saṁvara' when the inauspicious bhāvas have been stopped to produce any change in the nature of the Jīva. Thereafter, when the actual flow of the karmic Pudgalas into the Jīva through the channel of 'Yoga' or sense-organs is stopped, it is called '*Dravyasamvara.*'[83] In other words, when the auspicious and inauspicious Bhāvas of the nature of attachment, hatred or delusion are stopped, the actual flow of kārmic Pudgalas is also stopped. Thus, first there is the 'Bhāva-saṁvara' and then comes the 'Dravyasaṁvara.' In fact, the former is the cause of the latter.'[84] This impediment of karman stops future inflow of karman into the Jīva, so that, after all the bhāvas and the karmans, which had entered into the Jīva, become annihilated, liberation follows.

'Saṁvara' shows the means to realize liberation, and so this is a very important category. The Jainas

83 *Pañcāstikāya,* 142.
84 *Pañcāstikāya,* 143.

mention sixty-two[85] ways of impeding karman. The first five ways of stopping the inflow of karman refer to the outward behaviour, and these are called 'Samitis' as has been also explained above. These are : (1) observance of the rules of walking (Īryā-samiti), (2) observance of the rules of speech (Bhāṣā-samiti), (3) observance of the rules of begging alms (Eṣaṇā-samiti), (4) observance of the rules of keeping some portion of the alms for the performance of religious duties (Ādānanikṣepaṇā-samiti), and (5) observance of the rules of depositing and refusing gifts or alms under certain conditions (Pratisthāpaṇā-samiti).

Means of checking the inflow of karman into the Jīva.

Five Samitis.

Like the Samitis, there are rules for the controlling of Manas, speech and body known as the three *'Guptis'* (restraints) explained before.

Three Guptis.

The five vows to be observed are—(1) Abstinence from injury (ahiṁsā), (2) Truthfulness (anṛta), (3) Abstinence from stealing (asteya) (4) Abstinence from sexual pleasure (brahmacarya), and (5) Abstinence from acceptance of worldly objects (aparigraha).

Five Vratas (vows).

Observance of ten kinds of 'Dharmas' are : (1) Uttama-kṣamā (excellent forgiveness), (2) Uttama-mārdava (excellent humility), (3) Uttama-ārjava (excellent straightforwardness, (4) Uttama-satya (excellent truth), (5) Uttama-śauca (excellent cleanliness), (6) Uttama-saṁyama (excellent restraint), (7) Uttama-tapas (excellent penance), (8) Uttama-tyāga (excellent abandonment), (9) Uttama-ākiñcanya (excellent indifference), and (10) Uttama-brahmacarya (excellent celibacy).

Ten Dharmas.

The inflow of karman can be checked by keeping the following twelve kinds of dispositions (Anuprekṣā) always in one's mind : (1) Thinking always that everything, including one's own body and relations, is transient (Anityānuprekṣā), except 'dharma' wherein the

Twelve kinds of 'Anuprekṣā', also called 'Bhāvanā'.

[85] According to Umāswātī, Amṛtacandra and a few others, Bhāvasaṁvara has fiftyseven varieties only. They exclude 'vrata' from the list.

Jīva has full faith, (2) Having the innate property of thinking that there is no other shelter except the Truth (Aśaraṇānuprekṣā), (3) Thinking about the cycles of births and deaths (Saṁsārānuprekṣā), (4) Feeling that a person is solely and individually responsible for his own deeds (Ekatvānuprekṣā), (5) Thinking that Ātman is distinct from body (Anyatvānuprekṣā), (6) Contemplating that body and all that appertains to it are unclean (Aśucitvānuprekṣā), (7) Thinking about the influx of karman (Āsravānuprekṣā), (8) Contemplating about the impediment of the influx of karman (Saṁvarānuprekṣā), (9) Reflecting about the removal of foreign energies which have already entered into the Jīva (Nirjarānuprekṣā), (10) Reflecting about Ātman, body and substances of the world (Lokānuprekṣā), (11) Thinking about the difficulty of attaining perfect faith, perfect knowledge and perfect conduct (Bodhidurlabhānuprekṣā) and (12) Reflecting about the essential principles of the universe (Dharmānuprekṣā).

Twenty-two Parisaha (control over hardships).

'Saṁvara' can be achieved with great difficulties and in order to be successful in that attempt one has to undergo hardships. So one must endeavour to sustain hardships and have control over them. These controls over hardships are twenty-two in number. They are: control over troubles of hunger, thirst, cold, heat, troubles from mosquitoes and gnats; control over the feelings of shame arising from nackedness; control over the feelings of dissatisfaction with hunger, thirst, etc.; control over the disturbance caused by women; control over the feelings of fatigue caused by travelling; control over the desire of moving from a fixed posture in meditation; control over the desire to have a bed; control over the feelings of anger when insulted; control over the feelings of ill-will against an enemy who comes to kill; control over the desire of asking for anything even in great need; control over the feelings of dissatisfaction arising from not obtaining worldly objects; control over the feelings of pain caused by some disease; control over the feelings of pain caused by the pricking of thorns; control over the feelings of disgust at the sight of dirtiness; control

over the desire to obtain reward and honour; control over the feelings of pride at one's learning; control over the feelings of despair arising out of failure to obtain knowledge and control over the feelings of despair when one fails to obtain desired aim.[86]

The last sub-division of the 'Bhāva-saṁvara' is Right Conduct. It is of five kinds: (1) 'Sāmāyikasaṁyama'. This entails two aspects: giving up of all evil deeds and taking up of good deeds, such as, meditation, etc.; (2) 'Chedopasthāpanā'—conduct of repentance for all the wrong done before one's guru; (3) 'Parihāraviśuddhi'—purity obtained by refraining from doing injury to living beings. This has been variously interpreted so as to include the conduct of the monks towards their fellow monks when engaged in performing penance; (4) 'Sūkṣmasāmparāya'—conduct when only the subtle form of greed remains, after the other forms of passions have disappeared; and (5) 'Yathākhyāta'—this is the stage when all the passions have been crushed and the ascetic thinks of liberation of the Ātman alone. These are the divisions of 'Bhāva-saṁvara' and when these are successfully followed, the inflow of kārmic-Pudgalas into the Jīva is stopped.

Five kinds of Cāritra (right conduct).

We have seen above how the future inflow of kārmic Pudgalas can be checked through the various means of impediment (Saṁvara). Now, the next step towards the attainment of liberation is to destroy the Pudgalas which have already entered into the Jīvas. This is achieved through what is called *'Nirjarā'*, meaning, the destruction of karman. Having stopped the auspicious and inauspicious modifications of the Jīva, and being equipped with the *Śuddhopayoga*, also known as *'Yoga'*, meaning, the *Nirvikalpaka* type of meditation, and having practised both the external and the internal penances, one becomes able to make all the karmans ineffective. So says Kundakunda: he who is equipped with 'saṁvara' and meditates upon the real nature of the Ātman after having cut off all his thoughts from the outside

5. Nirjarā.

[86] *Tattvārthasūtra*, IX. 9; *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 35.

world, casts off all the dust of karman acquired by him before.[87] The above description shows the importance of meditation at this stage in the progress of the Jīva towards the attainment of liberation. One who is free from attachment, hatred and delusion and also from the physical, vocal and mental activities, in him then flares up a fire of meditation which burns the auspicious and inauspicious karmans. While in meditation, the ascetic should have his firm activities of consciousness diverted towards the pure nature of the Ātman.[88]

Two kinds of Nirjarā.

This destruction of karman is also of two kinds—(1) *Bhāva-Nirjarā*, meaning, the modification of the Jīva which precedes and helps the destruction of karman, and (2) *Dravyanirjarā*, meaning, the actual destruction of karman which had entered into the Jīva. The former is of two kinds—(i) *Savipāka* or *Akāma*—that is, when the karmans have yielded all the fruits and have been experienced, and (ii) *Avipāka* or *Sakāma*, when the karmans are destroyed not in the usual course but through the force of penances before the karmans have yielded their fruits. The former is also called 'Akāma', because, this sort of 'nirjarā' will be obtained by all in course of time without any effort on the part of any one, while the latter is caused intentionally by the force of austerities of an ascetic, so the name 'Sakāma' has been given to it.

The twelve austerities.

It has been mentioned above that the ascetics can destroy the karmans which have entered into the Jīvas through penances. Such penances are of twelve types, six 'external and six internal'.

Six external austerities.

The six 'external' austerities are: Fasting (anaśana), partial fasting or regulation of diet (avamodārya, also known as aṇo-darī), by eating very little, limiting the quantity of food (vṛttisaṅkṣepa), abstaining from enjoying any particular taste in food (rasatyāga), sitting and lying in solitary places (vivikta-śayyāsana), and torturing of body (kāyakleśa).

87 *Pañcāstikāya*, 144—45.

88 *Pañcāstikāya*, 146.

The six 'internal' penances, on the other hand, are: Confession of crime and performance of austerities for its atonement (prāyaścitta), Reverence (vinaya), Service to ascetics (vaiyāvṛtya —something like sādhusevā), Study of scriptures (svādhyāya), Giving up of objects and thoughts of the mundane world (vyutsarga) and Meditation (dhyāna).[89]

Six internal austerities.

These are the means of destroying the kārmic Pudgalas which have entered into the Jīva. Nemicandra, however, calls these as specific types of 'Bhāva-saṁvara.' Thus, having stopped the inflow of fresh kārmic Pudgalas into the Jīva and having destroyed those which had already entered into the Jīva, an ascetic becomes entirely fit for liberation.

7. Mokṣa (liberation).

We have seen that Bhāvas in the form of attachment (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and delusion (moha) are the causes of Āsrava. When these Bhāvas are destroyed then follows the absence of Āsravas which then leads to the destruction of karman through Saṁvara and Nirjarā. Thus, when an ascetic becomes free from karmans, he becomes omniscient and omni-seer, and experiences unobstructed supersensuous eternal happiness. This state is called 'Bhāva-mokṣa,' or 'Jīvanmukti.'[90] Nemicandra defines Bhāvamokṣa as the modification of the Jīva which is the cause of the destruction of all its karmans.[91] It is to be kept in mind that in 'Bhāva-mokṣa' an ascetic is free from the four kinds of Ghātīya-karmans alone, namely, Jñānāvaraṇīya, Darśanāvaraṇīya, Mohanīya and Antarāya.[92] But no complete liberation is possible unless the four Aghātīya karmans, namely Āyu, Nāma, Gotra and Vedanīya also are destroyed. So when these Aghātīya-karmans are destroyed, then the Jīva is said to have achieved what is called 'Dravya-Mokṣa'.[93] An ascetic,

The state of Jīvanmukti, or Bhāva-Mokṣa.

Bhāva-Mokṣa defined.

Dravya-Mokṣa defined.

89 *Tattvārthasūtra*, IX. 19—20.

90 *Pañcāstikāya*, 150—51.

91 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā 37.

92 *Dravyasaṅgrahavṛtti* on Gāthā 37.

93 *Dravyasaṅgrahavṛtti* on Gāthā 37.

who has attained freedom from bondage and is liberated, is called a 'Siddha.' Once the state of liberation is achieved, the Jīva does not fall down from there and come to this earth again.

Upward movement of the Jīva after release.

As soon as the Jīva becomes free from all the karmans and the bhāvas of 'aupaśamika,' (produced out of 'upaśama,' a kind of purity of the Ātman), 'kṣāyopaśamika' (produced out of 'kṣaya' and 'upaśama'—a stage of the purification of the Ātman) and 'audayika' (produced out of 'udaya', a kind of dirtiness of the Ātman) and also from the 'bhavyatva' bhāva of the Pāriṇāmika[93a] nature of the Ātman, it gets a kind of impulse from its release from bondage which leads it upwards. It does not give up its upward motion (gati), which is its very nature after release. There remains nothing to create an obstacle in its way and above all, due to its nature of moving upwards, the Jīva goes to the end of the loka. It cannot go beyond the loka, for there is no dharmāstikāya beyond the loka,[94] and the Jīva cannot move where there is no dharmāstikāya.

Women are not qualified for mokṣa.

Some Jainas are of opinion that one who is born as an eunuch and a woman can never achieve liberation directly. They must first undergo rebirth as a man and then strive after liberation.

Fifteen kinds of Siddhas.

There are fifteen different kinds of Siddhas : Jīna, Tīrtha, Gṛhaliṅga, Anyaliṅga, Svaliṅga, Puṁlliṅga, Śtrīliṅga, Napuṁsakaliṅga Buddhabohī, Pratyekabuddha, Svayambuddha, Ekasiddha, Ajina, Atīrtha and Anekasiddha.[95]

Jīva when liberated retains its independent individuality.

It is to be kept in mind here that the Jīva does not lose its individuality in liberation. There is no identity amongst the Jīvas even in the state of liberation. It remains separate from other liberated Jīvas, experiencing eternal and infinite happiness. It possesses infinite

[93a] 'Pāriṇāmika-bhāva' is that modification of a dravya which takes place simply because of the very existence of that dravya. In other words, it is the very nature of the dravya itself.

[94] *Tattvārthasūtra*, X. 5.

[95] *Heart of Jainism*, pp. 170—71.

consciousness, perfect knowledge and absolute freedom. It realizes its true nature of having Darśana and Jñāna, so that it can easily have perfect and all comprehensible knowledge of every object.

Here ends the enquiry after the truth and progress of a Jaina ascetic towards the realization of the ultimate end. He never comes back to this earth again and becomes bound by karmans. It is here in this system that we find how there is a gradual upward movement of a Jīva, from the lowest stage, till the same Jīva, in course of time, achieves the highest aim of life and becomes free from bondage.

(2) *Pramāṇa*

Darśana and jñāna, the two intrinsic qualities of a Jīva.

It has been already said that the Jīva has the intrinsic quality of determinate (sākāra-jñāna) and indeterminate (nirākāra-darśana) knowledge. Before one has the knowledge of any object in all its details, there is always a stage of consciousness when one gets mere awareness (darśana) of that object acquired through the organs of sense. Thus, 'darśana' represents the first stage in our cognition, while 'jñāna' represents the next stage of it. This is something like the 'nirvikalpaka' and 'savikalpaka' forms of jñāna of the Naiyāyikas.

Types of indeterminate knowledge.

A Jīva consists of infinite jñāna and darśana by its very nature. The 'darśana' (indeterminate) type of jñāna is divided, by the Jainas, into four kinds, namely, Cakṣu (visual), Acakṣu (not derived through the organ of sight, but through other sense-organs and also through manas), Avadhi (knowledge limited by space and time, though derived directly by the Jīva itself) and Kevala (darśana of every object in the universe).

Types of determinate knowledge.

The determinate type of knowledge is divided into Mati (determinate knowledge derived through the senses and also through the manas), Śruta (determinate knowledge derived through words which are symbols of thoughts, gestures, etc.), Avadhi (determinate knowledge of limited objects derived directly by the Jīva without the instrumentality of manas or the sense-organs),

manaḥparyāya (determinate knowledge of the thoughts of others) and Kevala (determinate and unlimited knowledge of the entire universe derived by the Jīva directly).[96]

It may be pointed out here that a Jīva may not possess Samyag-darśana, but it is never free from some sort

Samyaktva and Samyag-jñāna explained.

of jñāna. Through the observance of strict discipline of body and mind when the Jīva becomes free from bondage and realizes its *Samyaktva* nature, then its jñāna, whatever might have been its nature before the realization, assumes '*Samyaktva.*' Really speaking, by *Samyag-jñāna,* in Jainaism, we mean that spiritual manifestation of knowledge which tends the Jīva towards final emancipation. By the term '*Samyaktva,*' we understand that state of the Jīva which is anxious to realize the truth and is free from kaṣāyas (passions). This state may be due to the merits of the Jīva in the usual course of Pariṇāma and also to the *anugraha* of some higher spiritual powers.

These five types of determinate knowledge are classed under two main heads of Pramāṇās, namely,

Two main types of Pramāṇa.

Pratyakṣa (direct knowledge) and Parokṣa (indirect knowledge). According to Umāsvātī, Pratyakṣa means right cognition acquired directly by the Jīva, without depending upon anything else. In other words, whatever the Jīva cognizes exclusively through its own independent

Pratyakṣa defined.

instrumentality is said to be a case of Pratyakṣa-jñāna.[97]

From the above it is clear that the cognition which the Jīva acquires directly after the annihilation of ghātīya and aghātīya karmans which obscure cognition, and subsequently, the true nature of the Jīva becoming manifest, without the instrumentality of either of the five sense-organs or the manas, is regarded as Pratyakṣa. Thus, it is obvious that according to the Jainas of the old school, Pratyakṣa-Pramāṇa is self-dependent.[98]

Siddhasena has, however, made it clear that a

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[96] *Tattvārthasūtra,* I. 9; *Dravyasaṅgraha,* Gāthās 4—5.

[97] *Tattvārthasūtra,* I. 9—13.

[98] *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra,* II. 1—4; III. 1—2; *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra,* II. 2—3.

Pramāṇa is the knowledge which illumines itself and also other objects (svaparābhāsi) without any obstruction.[99] From what Siddhasena has said, it is evident that not only the Pratyakṣa-Pramāṇa is 'svaparābhāsi,' but also the Anumāna-Pramāṇa.

Pramāṇa is self-evident and illumines every object.

It may be again, pointed out here that the ancient Jainas disregarded sensuous perception and believed, like the 'yogaja-Pratyakṣa' of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or the 'Aparokṣānubhūti' of Śaṅkara, in higher types of Pramāṇa, namely, Pratyakṣa and Anumāna. Believing in the nature of such Pramāṇas, it is evident that there will never be a chance for wrong cognition. It is therefore, that avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevala alone are recognized as types of Pratyakṣa in the true sense.

Pratyakṣa is derived without the instrumentality of any sense-organs, or the manas.

Other than Pratyakṣa is called Parokṣa.[100] It may be further added here that though with reference to external objects it is called Parokṣa, yet as far as the self realization is concerned it is also the same as Pratyakṣa.[101]

Parokṣa defined.

From the above definition of Pramāṇa, it becomes clear that it sets aside the definition of the Yogācāra Buddhists who believe that knowledge illumines itself alone, inasmuch as there is, according to them no external object beyond it. It also refutes the view of the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas who hold that knowledge illumines the external objects alone as it cannot illumine itself. Thus, according to the old Jainas, Pramāṇa, which is a knowledge, illumines both itself and the external objects like a lamp.

Difference between Jainaism, Buddhism, Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā.

It must be made clear here also that the definition of Parokṣa, that is, the knowledge derived indirectly, as given above according to Siddhasena Divākara, includes both Inference and Śabda. Hence, Śabda-Pramāṇa has

Parokṣa includes Inference and Śabda Pramāṇas.

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99 Pramāṇaṁ swaparābhāsi jñānaṁ bādhavivarjitam—*Nyāyāvatāra,* verse 1.

100 *Nyāyāvatāra,* Verse 4.

101 Tasmāt pratyakṣāt itarat asākṣādarthagrāhakaṁ jñānaṁ parokṣamiti jñeyamavagantavyametadapi svasaṁvedanāpekṣayā pratyakṣameva—*Nyāyāvatāravivṛti* on verse 4.

been defined as a knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper acceptance, express real objects not inconsistent with what are established by perception.[102]

It is also quite evident from the same definition that all the three Pramāṇas are free from invalidity. They do not regard knowledge as Pramāṇa, if it is invalid.[103]

Pramāṇas are always valid.

Umāsvātī, however, makes it clear that knowledge which depends exclusively upon Ātman alone is Pratyakṣa, while that which depends upon sense-organs and manas is Parokṣa. Of course, even in the case of Parokṣa-jñāna, the instrumentality of Ātman is also accepted. He seems to hold that if there is any other Pramāṇa, it is included under mati and śruta types of Parokṣa jñāna.[104]

Umāsvātī's definition of Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa.

Thus, there are, in a way, only two Pramāṇas according to the Jainas. But mention is found in the *Bhagavatīsūtra*[105] that the Jainas believe in four Pramāṇas, namely, Pratyakṣa, anumāna, aupamya and āgama. The *Anuyogadvārasūtra* also gives us these very four divisions of Pramāṇa.

Number of Pramāṇas in Jainaism.

Having thus discussed the nature of the Pramāṇas according to the Jainas, we proceed further to deal with their divisions in detail. It has already been told that right knowledge is of five kinds, namely, mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevala. Of these, the first two are the types of Parokṣa-jñāna, while the rest represent Pratyakṣa-jñāna.

(i) *Pratyakṣa*

Pratyakṣa is of two kinds: *Pāramārthika* and *Vyāvahārika,* which is the same as Saṁvyavahārika or laukika. That which is characterised as free from all obstructions in the form of karman and which illumines itself independent of any other knowledge, is called *Pāramārthika* (intuitional) perception.

Types of Pratyakṣa.

[102] *Nyāyāvatāra,* verse 8.

[103] Anumānaṁ tadabhrāntaṁ pramāṇatvāt samakṣavat—*Nyāyāvatāra*, verse 5; Bhrāntam pramāṇamityetadviruddhavacanaṁ yataḥ—*Ibid,* verse 6.

[104] *Tattvārtha,* I. 9–12.

[105] V. iii. 192.

Uninterruptedly, it illuminates the nature of all objects at all times. It is to be kept in mind that the term *'akṣa'* in 'Pratyakṣa', means, according to the Jainas, 'Jīva'. Thus, the cognition wherein there is the direct instrumentality of the Jīva independently, is *'Pāramārthika'* type of Pratyakṣa, while where there is the instrumentality of the Jīva through the activities of the sense-organs is called *'Vyāvahārika'* type of Pratyakṣa.[106]

It should also be pointed out here that a word or a statement expressive of the object ascertained through perception is also called Pratyakṣa, because it is the cause of the manifestation (pratibhāsa) of objects. In other words, as the result of perception can be communicated to others through words, the 'words' themselves are said to be Pratyakṣa.[107]

Again, the latter type of Pratyakṣa-jñāna is of two kinds: (1) that which is caused through the instrumentlity of the external sense-organs and (2) that which is not caused through the instrumentality of the external sense-organs, but through manas.[108]

It should be kept in mind that according to the Jainas, a sense-organ is that which is an extra-ordinary or an exclusive cause (asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa) of Pratyakṣa. But as manas is not exclusively instrumental to direct perception alone, it is not recognized as a sense-organ (indriya).[109]

Manas is not a sense-organ.

After having thus discussed the nature and main divisions of Pramāṇa in Jainaism, we proceed to the details of the divisions of the Pramāṇas. It has been pointed out above that Mati and Śruta types of knowledge are Parokṣa-jñāna, because, according to the old school of Jainaism, these two types are cognized through the sense-organs and manas, while, they believe that Pratyakṣa-jñāna is that which alone is directly acquired by the Jīva independently. But from the Vyāvahārika point of view as the mati and Śruta types of jñāna are cognized through the sense-organs and manas, these are

106 *Nyāyāvatāra* along with the *Vivṛti* on verse 27.

107 *Nyāyāvatāra* along with the *Vivṛti* on verse 12.

108 *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, II. 5; *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra*, II. 4–5.

109 Mano'nindriyamiti—no indriyamiti ca ucyate—*Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā-Vṛtti;* Ratnaprabhācārya on the *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra*, II. 5; *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra* along with the *Prameyaratnamālā*, II. 5.

regarded as types of Pratyakṣa according to the neo-Jainaism.

Each of the above mentioned two varieties of the Vyāvahārika type of Pratyakṣa has four stages: (1) Avagraha—meaning simple apprehension of an object after the sense-organ and object contact. It is also called grahaṇa, ālocana, and avadhāraṇa.[110] (2)Īhā—the next stage in cognition is a desire to know definitely the particulars of the object, which is called 'Īhā'. It is also called ūhā, tarka, parīkṣā, vicāraṇā, jijñāsā, etc. (3) Avāya—the third stage in a cognition is to have a definite knowledge of the particulars of the object cognized (īhitaviśeṣanirṇaya).[111] It is variously called apāya, apagama, apanoda, apavyādha, apeta, apagata, apaviddha, apanutta, etc.[112] (4) The fourth and the last stage in a cognition is the keeping of the lasting impression produced by having the definite knowledge of the particulars of the object cognized, in memory. It is called 'Dhāraṇā, etc.[113] There are several sub-divisions of each of these four varieties.[114]

Four stages of Vyāvahārika-pratyakṣa.

All these four stages of the mati-jñāna are found in case of determinable objects (artha) only, while in the case of vyañjana (indeterminable objects, that is, of objects of which we know very little), there is only avagraha, because the object is so little known that we cannot proceed to the other three stages of its cognition.[115] It is therefore, that there is no possibility of having avagraha (simple apprehension) through the organ of sight and manas.[116]

The cognition acquired through scriptures or through verbal testimony (āptavacana) is said to be 'śruta-jñāna.' It is always preceded by mati-jñāna. It is variously called āgama, upadeśa, aitihya, āmnāya, pravacana, jinavacana,

Śrutajñāna.

110 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 15.

111 *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra*, II. 9; *Pramāṇamīmāṁsā*, I. i. 30.

112 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 15.

113 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 15.

114 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 16.

115 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 17–18.

116 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 19.

etc.[117] It is of two kinds—(1) Aṅgabāhya (not contained in the twelve canonical works called Aṅgas) and (2) Aṅgapraviṣṭa (contained in the Aṅgas). There are several varieties of the first, while there are only twelve varieties of the second.[118]

Types of Śrutajñāna.

The differences between mati and śruta-jñānas are: (1) mati refers to objects produced and existing in the moment of their cognition, while the latter deals with objects past, present and future. (2) As the śruta-jñāna deals with objects contained in the Aṅgas composed by omniscient persons, it is regarded superior to the mati-jñāna.[119] (3) Besides, mati-jñāna, due to the conscious nature of the Ātman, is Pāriṇāmika, that is, of the nature of modifying itself; while the śruta-jñāna is preceded by mati-jñāna and proceeds from the words of a reliable authority (āptavacana) and hence, it is regarded purer.[120] (4) Śruta-jñāna is always preceded by mati-jñāna just like an external cause, but never *vice versa.*[121]

Differences between mati and śruta jñānas.

Pāramārthika type of Pratyakṣa-jñāna is that for which the Jīva directly depends upon itself alone after the obstacles have been removed. It is of two kinds: (1) When all obstacles obscuring the real nature of the Ātman, namely, the ghātīya and aghātīya karmans, are cast off due to the attainment of right vision, the Ātman, assumes its own real nature whereby it directly perceives all the substances and their modifications. It is called 'Kevala-jñāna' and also 'Sakala'.[122] This is found only in Arhats who are free from attachment, hatred and ignorance.[123] (2) When the knowledge is limited and refers only to a portion of the object, it is called 'Vikala-jñāna'. It is of two kinds: (1) Avadhi-jñāna and (2) Manaḥparyāya. The knowledge which is produced after the obstacles, which obscure the know-

Pāramārthika type of Pratyakṣa.

117 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 20.
118 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 20.
119 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 20.
120 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 20.
121 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 31.
122 *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra,* II. 23.
123 *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra,* II. 24.

ledge, are cast off, which is inborn in case of divine and hellish beings and which is acquired through merits in case of human beings and lower creatures, which is due to right vision, regarding substances having colour, is called '*Avadhi-jñāna.*'

Avadhi-jñāna explained.

The knowledge, which is produced by the removal of the obstacles obscuring knowledge due to the acquisition of right discipline and conduct and which cognizes objects having limited forms, present in the mind of others in all their details with the help of one's own thoughts and direct perception of the same in parts, is called '*Manaḥparyāyajñāna.*'[124] This is of two kinds: (1) *Ṛjumati-manaḥparyāya,* that is, simple direct knowledge of simple mental objects present in the mind of another at the time of cognizing, (2) *Vipulamati-manaḥparyāya,* that is, complex direct knowledge of what a man is thinking at the time when actual cognition takes place along with what the man has thought of it in the past and will think of the same in future all together. Of these two kinds of Manaḥparyāya-jñāna, the latter is purer and infallible.[125] The former is fallible.

Manaḥparyāya-jñāna explained.

The differences between the Avadhi-jñāna and the Manaḥparyāya-jñāna refer to their purity (viśuddhi), place (kṣetra), person (swāmī) and subject-matter (viṣaya). Thus, Manaḥparyāya is purer than visual knowledge (avadhi). Visual knowledge can extend to the whole universe, while the other is limited to the centre of the middle world where alone men live (manuṣyakṣetra). Avadhi-jñāna can be acquired by all beings of every type, while the other can be obtained by persons with restraint, like saints, etc. The last piont of difference is—while the subject matter of the visual knowledge is gross, that of the other is subtle.[126]

Difference between Avadhi-jñāna and Manaḥparyāya.

The objects of mati-jñāna and śruta-jñāna are all the

[124] *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra,* II. 22; *Commentary* of Brahmadeva on the *Dravyasaṅgraha,* Gāthā 5.

[125] *Tattvārtha.,* I. 24–25.

[126] *Tattvārtha.,* I. 26.

six substances but not all their modifications. The objects of avadhi are only those substances which possess colour but not all their modificaions. The objects of manaḥparyāya are the subtlest forms of that which possesses colour and can be known by the visual knowledge. The objects of kevala-jñāna are all the substances with all their modifications.[127]

It will not be out of place to point out that all the five kinds of knowledge cannot be found to be simultaneously and actively present in one Jīva. If there is only one kind, it must be Kevala-jñāna. If there are two, then they are Mati and Śruta-jñānas. If there be three, then they are either Mati, Śruta and Avadhi, or Mati, Śruta and Manaḥparyāya. If there are four, then all except Kevala are present. But it must be kept in mind that even when more than one types of knowledge are present, only one kind of knowledge remains active at a time. The maximum duration of these types of knowledge, except in the case of Kevala-jñāna which is everlasting, is one muhūrta after that it must shift to another object.[128] One who has śruta-jñāna must have mati-jñāna, but not *vice versa* as has been already said.[129]

Mutual relation between the five kinds of knowledge.

(ii) *Parokṣa*

(a) *Anumāna*

The knowledge determinant of that which is to be proved (sādhya, that is, the major term), arrived at through a probans (hetu, that is, the middle term) which is inseparably connected with the major term (sādhya), is known as 'anumāna' (inference). It is of two kinds: (1) inference for one's own sake (svārthānumāna), and (2) inference for the sake of others (parārthānumāna). The first kind is an inference deduced in one's own mind after having a long observation. A man, for instance, after having seen several cases of somke being accompanied by fire comes to the conclu-

Inference—parokṣa Pramāṇa.

[127] *Tattvārtha.,* I. 27–30.

[128] *Tattvārtha.,* I. 30.

[129] *Tattvārtha.,* I. 31.

sion within himself that fire is always an antecedent of smoke. Afterwards seeing smoke rising from a mountain, he, at once, remembers the concomitant relation between smoke and fire, and then concludes that there must be fire on the mountain. This is what is called 'inference for one's own sake.'

When the same or similar other inferences are resorted to for convincing others, then those are called inferences 'for the sake of others.'[130] It is to be kept in mind that in the second type of inference there is a statement expressive of the probans (hetu, that is, the middle term) which is inseparably connected with that which is to be proved (sādhya), that is, the major term, having been composed of the minor term (pakṣa), etc.[131]

Minor term (Pakṣa) explained.

While explaining the various terms used in an inference, Siddhasena says, that a *Pakṣa* (that is, the minor term) is that which is asserted to be connected with the sādhya (meaning, the major term), and is not excluded by perception, etc. It is to be used in inference as showing the substratum of the hetu (probans, that is, the middle term). Otherwise, owing to a misconception as to the substratum of the middle term, that is, the minor term (pakṣa), as intended by the disputant, his middle term (probans) may appear to his opponent as absurd. He will only know, for instance, Fiery (major term), because, smoky (middle term), and not that wherein these two terms are found abiding together.

Middle term (Hetu) explained.

The hetu, or the middle term, can be used in two ways: (1) the middle term may exist only if the major term (sādhya) existed, as we find in the proposition—'here there is fire, because, there is smoke', the smoke (middle term) may exist only if there is fire (major term); (2) the middle term (hetu) cannot exist if the major term (sādhya) does not exist, such as, in the proposition —'here there is fire, because, otherwise, there could not be any smoke,' the smoke could not have existed if there had been no fire (major term).

[130] *Nyāyāvatāra*, 10.

[131] *Nyāyāvatāra*, 13.

Where the concomitant relation between the major term (sādhya) and the middle term (hetu) is shown through similarity (sādharmya), the example is called a 'homogeneous one,' on account of the connection between these terms being recollected. As in the following case—'the hill is fiery, because, it is smoky; as for example, a kitchen,' wherein the major term and the middle term abide homogeneously. There is a negative example also here when the absence of the major term is followed by the absence of the middle term. As for example—'the hill has no smoke, because, it has no fire, just as a lake'. The lake is an instance of 'heterogeneous example.'

Dṛṣṭānta explained.

From the above it is evident that in the inference, for the sake of others, there should be a full fledged syllogism consisting of five factors an example of which is given here below :

Form of the five factored syllogism.

(1) *Pratijñā* consisting of the major and the minor terms—This hill (pakṣa-minor term) possesses fire (major term),

(2) *Hetu* (probans-middle term)—because, it has smoke (middle term),

(3) *Dṛṣṭānta* (example) preceded by a generalization showing the concomitant relation between the sādhya (major term) and the hetu (middle term)—

Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in kitchen (dṛṣṭānta).

(4) *Upanaya* (application of the generalized middle term to the minor term)—

The hill possesses smoke which is inseparably connected with fire,

(5) *Nigamana* (conclusion)—

Therefore, this hill possesses fire.

In the *Daśavaikālika-niryukti* of Bhadrabāhu we find however, mention of the ten-factored syllogism. The following may be given as an example of the ten factors :

Form of the ten factored-syllogism.

(1) *Pratijñā* (statement of the Proposition):

"To refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues."

(2) *Pratijñā-vibhakti* (limitation of the Pratijñā):

"To refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues, according to the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras."

(3) *Hetu* (statement of the reason):

"To refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues, because those who so refrain are loved by the gods and to do them honour is an act of merit for men."

(4) *Hetuvibhakti* (limitation of the *hetu*):

"None but those who refrain from taking life are allowed to reside in the highest place of virtue."

(5) *Vipakṣa* (counter-proposition):

"But those who despise the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras and take life are said to be loved by the gods, and men regard doing them honour as an act of merit. Again, those who take life in sacrifices are said to be residing in the highest place of virtue. Men, for instance, salute their fathers-in-law as an act of virtue, even though the latter despise the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras and habitually take life. Moreover, those who perform animal sacrifices are said to be loved by the gods."

(6) *Vipakṣapratiṣedha* (denial of the counter-proposition):

"Those who take life as forbidden by the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras do not deserve honour, and they are certainly not loved by the gods. It is as likely that fire will be cold as that they will be loved by the gods or to do them honour will be regarded by men as an act of merit. Buddha, Kapila and others, though really not fit to be worshipped, were honoured for their miraculous sayings, but the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras are honoured because they speak absolute truth."

(7) *Dṛṣṭānta* (example):

"The Ārhatas and Sādhus do not even cook food, lest in so doing they may take life. They depend on householders for their meals."

(8) *Āśaṅkā* (doubting the validity of the example):

"The food which the householders cook is as much for the Arhats and Sādhus as for themselves. If, therefore, any insects are destroyed in the fire, the Arhats and Sādhus must share in the householders' sin. Thus, the instance cited is not convincing."

(9) *Āśaṅkā-Pratiṣedha* (dispelling of the doubt):

"The Arhats and Sādhus go to householders for their food without giving any notice and not at fixed hours. How, therefore, can it be said that the householders cooked food for the Arhats and Sādhus? Thus, the sin, if any, is not shared by the Arhats and Sādhus."

(10) *Nigamana* (final conclusion):

"To refrain from taking life is, therefore, the best of virtues, for those who so refrain are loved by the gods, and to do them honour is an act of merit for men."

Nature of internal co-existence – Antar-vyāpti.

We have seen above that in order to establish the concomitant relation between the major term and the middle term it is necessary to have an instance from outside. But certain logicians maintain that to cite an example from outside is useless, as that which is to be proved (sādhya) can be proved through 'internal concomitant relation' (antar-vyāpti), even without any example from outside.[132]

'Internal inseparable connection' (antar-vyāpti) occurs when the minor term (pakṣa) itself, as the common link of the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sādhya), shows the inseparable connection between them. Thus—

(1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term);

(2) because, it is full of smoke (middle term).

Here, the inseparable connection between fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term), which is their common ground. In this case, the common link is within the inference itself,[133] while in the case of 'bahirvyāpti,' the dṛṣṭānta is outside the inference. This idea of having 'antar-vyāpti' was first introduced by Buddhist logicians.

Fallacies.

Siddhasena mentions the following fallacies which frustrate an Inference:[134]

1. *Pakṣābhāsa*—If that, of which the sādhya (major term) is affirmed, is opposed by evidence (liṅga),

132 *Nyāyāvatāra,* verse 20.

133 *Nyāyāvatāra,* 20; *Syādvādamañjarī* on verse 22.

134 *Nyāyāvatāra,* verses 21–26.

public belief, one's own statement, etc., it is called *Pakṣābhāsa* or the fallacy of the minor term.

In other words, the fallacy of the minor term (pakṣābhāsa) occurs when one predicates of the minor term (pakṣa) that which is yet to be proved, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or is inconsistent with public opinion, or is in contradiction to one's own statement. As for example, in the argument—

(1) 'Jar is made of Pudgalas.' This is an argument which is yet to be proved.

(2) 'Everything is momentary.' This is incapable of being proved in Jainaism.

(3) 'General and Particular (Sāmānya and Viśeṣa) are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone.' All these are opposed to perception.

(4) 'There is no omniscient being.' This is opposed to inference, according to Jainaism.

(5) 'The mother is to be taken as wife.' This is against public faith (lokabādhita).

(6) 'All things (bhāvas) are non-existent.' This is incongruous with one's own statement (svavacanabādhita).

2. *Hetvābhāsa*—This fallacy arises from non-conception (apratīti), doubt, or misconception (viparyāsa) about the middle term (hetu), which is found inseparably connected with the major term (sādhya). This is of three kinds :—

(1) *Asiddha*—That which has not yet been proved, (apratītaḥ) is called *'Asiddha'*. As—'It is fragrant, because, it is a sky-lotus.' Here, the middle term (hetu) is unreal.

(2) *Viruddha*—That which is possible only in the opposite way is called *'Viruddha'*. As—'It is fiery, because, it is water. Here, the hetu proves just the opposite of what is to be proved.

(3) *Anaikāntika*—That which can be explained in one way as well as in the opposite way is called *'Anaikāntika.'*

As—'All things are momentary, because, they are existent.' The opposite may also be argued. Thus—'All things are eternal, because, they are existent.'

These three are included under the fallacies of 'hetvābhāsa.'[135]

3. *Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*—The fallacies of the example of the sādharmya type arise from an imperfect middle term, or from a defect in the major term, or both, or from doubt about them.

Sādhanavikala

As (1) 'Perception during waking state is invalid (major term),

Because, it is a source of true knowledge (middle term),

Like a dream-cognition.'

It is a fallacy of the middle term, as 'dream-cognition' is not a source of true knowledge.

(2) Again,

Sādhyavikala.

'Inference is invalid (major term),

Because, it is a source of knowledge (middle term),

Like perception.'

Here, there is the fallacy of the major term, for 'perception' is not invalid.

(3) 'The omniscient being (sarvajña) is not existent,

Ubhayavikala.

Because, he is not cognized through perception, etc.,

Like a jar.

Here, the jar (example) is existent and is also cognized through perception, etc. Hence, there is the fallacy of both, the middle term and the major term, being defective.

(4) 'This man is free from passions (major term),

Sandigdha-sādhya-dharma.

Because, he is mortal (middle term),

Like the man in the street (sādharmya dṛṣṭānta)'.

Here, the example involves a doubt as to whether the man in the street is free from passions.

(5) 'This man is mortal.

Sandigdha-sādhana-dharma.

Because, he is full of passions,

Like the man in the street.

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[135] *Nyāyāvatāra* verses 21—23. Here it must be kept in mind that the Jainas do not use the term *'hetvābhāsa'* in the general sense, like orthodox school.

Here, the example involves doubt whether the man is full of passions, as passions are found even in the *vītarāga* persons.

All these are the examples of the fallacies of Sādharmyadṛṣṭānta. We can have similarly the fallacies of Vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta. This sort of fallacy arises when the absence of the major term, or the middle term, or both, is not shown, or when there is doubt about them. As—

'Inference is invalid (major term),

Because, it is a source of true knowledge (middle term);

Whatever is not invalid is not a source of true knowledge,

As a dream-cognition (heterogeneous example).'

Here, there is a fallacy of the defect in the major term, for a 'dream-cognition' is really invalid, though it has been cited as not invalid.

Dūṣaṇābhāsa.

4. The last kind of fallacy accepted by Siddhasena is the fallacy or 'Refutation,' called *'Dūṣaṇābhāsa.'* This fallacy is committed when a disputant refutes the argument of the opponent pointing out defects in the arguments of the opponent, when in reality there is no fallacy of the types mentioned above. In fact, this is not an independent fallacy. This is a sort of mistake which a disputant commits by trying to point out a fallacy mentioned above in the arguments of the opponent, while in reality there is none.

(*b*) *Śabda*

Śabda-Pramāṇa.

Verbal testimony (śabda) is one of the two 'Parokṣa Pramāṇas.' Knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper acceptance, express real objects not inconsistent with what are established by perception, is known as *Śabda-Pramāṇa* (verbal testimony). It is of two kinds: (1) *Laukika* knowledge derived from the words of reliable persons who have seen the truth, and (2) *Śāstraja* (scriptural), that is, knowledge derived from scriptures.

It will not be out of place to mention here what the

Jainas mean by *Śāstra*. Siddhasena says that *Śāstra* is that which was first known to the reliable persons, called *Āpta*, which is not such as can be overlooked by any person, which is not incompatible with the actual reality, which imparts true instructions, which is beneficial to all men and which is preventive of the evil path.[136] Speech though itself is not knowledge, yet as it conveys knowledge, it is figuratively identified with knowledge. It is called 'knowledge for the sake of others'.[137]

Meaning of śāstra.

This is all that we find about the Pramāṇas in the work of Siddhasena. He also points out that a Pramāṇa is ever valid. Invalidity and Pramāṇa cannot be found together.[138] Pratyakṣa and inference having disclosed objects with which we are familiar, and they being the means of communication of knowledge to other people, both of them are 'knowledge for the sake of others' and not only a section of inference.[139]

Characteristics of Pramāṇas.

Speaking about the effects of a Pramāṇa, Siddhasena Divākara says that the immediate effect of a Pramāṇa is the removal of ignorance, the mediate effect of the absolute knowledge (kevala) is bliss and equanimity, while that of the ordinary practical knowledge is the facility to accept or reject.[140]

(3) *Nayas*

Having finished a brief treatment of the Pramāṇas, according to the Jainas, we pass on to another means of knowing the categories accepted by the school.[141] Like Pramāṇas, the knowledge of Nayas plays a very important part in Jainaism. The Jainas hold that in order to have a complete and most accurate knowledge of any thing it is most essential to know the relations of that

136 *Nyāyāvatāra,* verse 9.

137 *Nyāyāvatāra,* verse 10.

138 Nyāyāvatāra, verses 5—7.

139 *Nyāyāvatāra,* verse 11.

140 *Nyāyāvatāra,* verse 28.

141 *Tattvārtha.,* I. 6.

object with other things. A thing is to be known from different angles of vision and then alone one can have a comprehensive idea of that object. It is therefore necessary to have a clear understanding of the various *stand-points* (Nayas) wherefrom one looks at an object for having a comprehensive knowledge of that object.

Stand-points (Nayas).

In order to illustrate and show the importance of this, the Jainas quote the parable of the blind men and the elephant. Each one of these blind persons, desirous to know what an elephant was like, touched and felt the different parts of its body, and went home satisfied with the knowledge each acquired out of his actual experience. When they together began to give an idea of the animal, each one of them described it according to his own experience and they never came to any agreement and really speaking, had no comprehensive knowledge of the animal. So when they were discussing and pressing for their own individual experiences, another man who had eyes appeared on the scene and explained to them that each one of them though had a very accurate idea about the animal, yet the knowledge which each one had was only partial and not complete, for each one had got the knowledge from one's own angle of vision and thus, they had no complete knowledge of the animal as a whole. So unless all the different aspects of an object are known from all possible stand-points, complete knowledge of that object is not possible.

Accordingly, the Jainas divide the philosophical stand-point into two broad heads—(1) the Niścaya-naya and (2) the Vyāvahārika-naya. Of these, the former deals with the permanent attributes of the object which never change in all the three times. This is the real stand-point to realize the correct nature of the reality. It is either *Śuddha* (pure), or *Aśuddha* (impure). The latter deals with the practical worldly point of view. The knowledge acquired from this point of view is meant for worldly purposes only. It is the ordinary or common-sense point of view.[142]

Niścayanaya and Vyāvahārika-naya.

[142] *Dravyānuyogatarkaṇā,* 823.

Again, Naya is of two kinds: (1) Dravyārthika and (2) Paryāyārthika. The former of these is the substantive point of view, since it describes things with reference to their general qualities or substances. The latter is the stand-point of evolution and gives prominence to forms or conditions, which souls and matter assume from time to time, in course of their evolution.

Divisions of Naya.

From the Dravyārthika point of view, it is correct to say that souls are all alike, since they are made of the same substance and have the same nature, but from the Paryāyārthika point of view the souls differ in respect of their special qualities, which have evolved out in course of transmigration or modification.[143]

The Dravyārthikanaya is further divided into (1) Naigama, (2) Saṅgraha and (3) Vyavahāra, while the Paryāyārthikanaya is divided into (1) Ṛjusūtra, (2) Śabda, (3) Samabhirūḍha and (4) Evambhūta. Thus, in all, there are seven nayas in Jainaism.[144] According to some Ṛjusūtra is to be included under the Dravyārthikanaya.[145]

Sub-divisions of Naya.

A brief explanation of these Nayas is given below: (1) Before we come to the details, it is essential to point out that every object in this world possesses two kinds of properties, namely, Sāmānya (general) and Viśeṣa (specific). That stand-point which takes into consideration both these two aspects, namely, the general and the specific, is called '*Naigama*.' According to this stand-point there can be no general quality without the specific, nor can there be any general characteristic without the specific one.[146]

Treatment of the Nayas.

Naigama-Naya.

(2) That stand-point which looks at the general aspect of the object alone and does not believe in the specific aspect as something apart from the general, is called '*Saṅgraha*'-*Naya*.[147]

Saṅgraha-Naya

143 *Introduction to the Nayakarṇikā*, pp. 6–7.
144 *Nayakarṇikā*, verse 21.
145 *Nayakarṇikā*, verse 21.
146 *Nayakarṇikā*, verse 5.
147 *Nayakarṇikā*, verses 6–7.

(3) That stand-point which takes into consideration only the specific properties of an object and maintains that the general is not apart from the specific characteristics, is called '*Vyavahāra*'-*Naya*.[148]

Vyavahāra-Naya

It is to be kept in mind that the term 'Vyavahāra' occurs twice in this connection. As a main division, it means common-sense stand-point, while as a subdivision, it means a stand-point referring to the specific properties of an object.

(4) That stand-point which only refers to the present form of an object, without taking into consideration its past and future aspects, is called '*Ṛjusūtra*'-*naya*. It looks at the natural form of the object present before the mind.[149]

Ṛjusūtra-Naya

Of the four means of recognizing an object, namely, name (nāma-nikṣepa), shape or image (sthāpanānikṣepa), causes which bring about the object (dravyanikṣepa), and nature (bhāva), the 'Ṛjusūtranaya' takes only the *bhāva* into consideration,[150] because it is the *bhāvanikṣepa* alone which constitutes the real nature of the object.

The next three nayas, namely, Śabda, Samabhirūḍha and Evambhūta also take into account the bhāvanikṣepa alone.[151]

(5) That stand-point which takes into account synonymous words as all having the same sense, as for instance, kumbha, kalaśa, ghaṭa, etc., all of which give the same meaning, is called '*Śabda*'-*naya*. No consideration of their differences is made at any stage according to the 'Śabdanaya.'[152]

Śabda-Naya.

(6) That which holds that with the difference of the words expressing the object, the significance of the object also differs; just as a pot differs from a piece of cloth, so 'kumbha' differs from kalaśa,[153] is called '*Samabhirūḍha*'-*naya*.[154]

Samabhirūḍha-Naya.

148 *Nayakarṇikā*, verse 8.

149 *Nayakarṇikā*, verse 11.

150 *Nayakarṇikā*, verse 13.

151 *Nayakarṇikā*, p. 50.

152 *Nayakarṇikā*, verse 14.

153 *Nayakarṇikā*, verse 15.

154 *Nayakarṇikā*, verse 15.

Evambhūta-Naya

(7) That stand-point which recognizes an object denoted by a word only when that object is in the actual state of performing its natural function as suggested by the derivative meaning of the word, is called '*Evambhūta-*'*naya.*[155]

Of these seven kinds of Nayas, each succeeding standpoint is purer than the preceding one. Each one of these has hundred sub-divisions. But if the last two be regarded as the sub-divisions of the 'Śabdanaya,' then there are only five hundred nayas. This is all that we find from the *Nayakarṇikā* of Vinayavijaya.

Umāsvātī's divisions of Naya.

Umāsvātī, however, believes mainly in five kinds of Nayas alone. These are Naigama, Saṅgraha, Vyavahāra, Ṛjusūtra and Śabda.

Naigama is of two types—Deśaparikṣepī and Sarvaparikṣepī. Śabda is of three kinds—Sāmprata, Samabhirūḍha and Evambhūta.[156]

With the help of these Nayas and the Pramāṇas mentioned above true knowledge of the categories of the Jaina-darśana can be realized.[157]

(4) *Syādvāda—Saptabhaṅgī-naya*

The form 'Syādvāda' explained.

The other logical topic which is found in the *Sūtra-kṛtāṅganiryukti* of Bhadrabāhu is the theory of the assertion of possibilities (Syādvāda) which has been developed, later on, into the sevenfold paralogism (*Saptabhaṅgīnaya*).

The Jainas believe that every *sat*, that is, substance (Sat-dravyalakṣaṇam), possesses the characteristics of utpāda (production), vyaya (destruction) and dhrauvya (continuous existence). For instance, the production of a pot from a lump of clay is called *utpāda*, the disappearance of the pot after it is destroyed into various particles, is called *vyaya*, while we know that during both these two states the essential characteristics of the lump of clay have continued to remain what they are, which is called *dhrauvya*. That is, the form of the

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155 *Nayakarṇikā*, verse 17.

156 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 34—35.

157 *Tattvārtha.*, I. 6.

object may change but the essential feature (tadbhāva) does not undergo any change, hence, it is also unchanging (dhruva),[158] and it is therefore, that the *sat* is eternal.[159]

This leads the Jainas to feel that all these assertions of existence, destruction and eternity, or continuous eternity, are relative, and therefore, it is essential to consider all the aspects or possibilities of the object before one arrives at certain definite conclusion about the truth. This seems to be the back-ground of their theory of *Anekāntavāda.*

Idea of reality 'sat'- in Jainaism.

In other words, the Jainas do not believe that 'sat' (reality) is eternal, like the Śaṅkara Vedāntins; or is of the nature of momentariness subject to creation (utpāda) and destruction (vināśa) every moment, like the Buddhists; or is eternal (kūṭastha) in the form of consciousness (cetana-Puruṣa) though changing (pariṇāmi-nitya) in the form of Prakṛti, as it is in Sāṅkhya; or both, eternal (in the form of cause—Paramāṇu) and destructible (in the form of effects—as a jar, etc. and hence, anitya), like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. According to them, 'sat' (reality) is not only 'kūṭastha' or 'kṣaṇika' exclusively; nor is it partly unchanging and partly changing, but is both, conscious and non-conscious and so it possesses all the aspects of 'reality', namely, production or creation (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and unchangingness (dhrauvya); or it may be called changing and unchanging. It is because of this peculiarity that Jainaism is called—*Pariṇāminityatva-vāda*).

It may be pointed out here that like other systems, in Jainaism also, we find that the Jainas depend for the true realization of the reality, upon their actual experience of the objects of the universe. So they hold that an object, whether conscious or unconscious, has infinite attributes, like jñāna, upayoga, amūrtatva, etc, in case of the Ātman.[160] Thus, when it is said that 'Ātman is sat', a question is raised : whether the reality

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158 *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra,* V. 29.

159 *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra,* V. 30.

160 *Syādvādamañjarī,* verse 22.

attributed to the Ātman is in relation to its own attributes, like consciousness, amūrtatva, etc., or even in relation to the attributes of a jar, for instance? The correct answer is that the reality attributed to the Ātman is in relation to its own attributes and so the Ātman is 'sat', but it is not-sat (asat) in relation to the attributes of a jar, for instance.[161] Thus, the reality has to deal with all possible aspects of the relation of an object with other objects.

In order to know exactly the true nature of a thing, it is not only necessary to know it in all its details, but it is also necessary to distinguish it from all the rest of the things. The Jainas use the term 'syāt' only to denote that the jar, for instance, in the expression 'a jar is sat', exists in its own form, but not in the form of any other thing.

With a view to give a very accurate idea about the nature of a thing, the Jainas have adopted the seven different forms of expression called '*Saptabhaṅgī-naya*'. Apparently, it is not possible to attribute both 'asti' and 'nāsti' to any object simultaneously, but it is certain that the two contradictory terms have been used to denote the two different aspects of that object, for which no one word can be given; hence, the expression 'syāt avaktavyam' has been used. In this way, all the seven forms of expression, as given below, have been used only to arrive at the exact nature of a thing as far as it is possible through words. Thus, it is clear that though an object possesses infinite aspects according to the Jainas and it is necessary to give infinite forms for expressing these aspects, yet they have tried to express those infinite forms through the well-known seven forms alone.[162]

Forms of the Seven modes of expressing the nature of reality.

So they consider every substance in terms of (1) May be, it exists, (2) May be, it does not exist, (3) May be, it is indescribable. The first two forms of possibilities are found mentioned even in earlier works. To which later on, other forms, namely, (4) May be, it exists and it exists not, (5) May be, it exists

161 *Syādvādamañjarī*, verse 23.
162 *Syādvādamañjarī*, verse 23.

and yet is indescribable, (6) May be, it is not and it is also indescribable, and (7) May be, it is and it is not and it is also indescribable, along with the third form mentioned above, have been added.

It is to be noted here that though the earliest mention of all the seven forms of possibilities is found in the *Pañcāstikāya*[163] of Kundakunda, yet there is no fuller treatment of the theory in it. It is for the first time that a fuller explanation of it is given in the *Āptamīmāṁsā* of Samantabhadra. This theory is called *Syādvāda* or *Saptabhaṅgīnaya*. The complete form of it is as given below by way of illustration :

(1) Syāt asti dravyaṁ (May be, a thing is existent)—from a certain point of view;

(2) Syāt nāsti dravyaṁ (May be, a thing is non-existent)—from another point of view;

(3) Syāt asti ca nāsti ca dravyaṁ (May be, a thing is both existent and non-existent)—from a third point of view;

(4) Syāt avaktavyaṁ dravyaṁ (May be, a thing is indescribable being both existent and non-existent simultaneously)—from a fourth point of view;

(5) Syāt asti ca avaktavyaṁ dravyaṁ (May be, a thing is existent and indescribable)—from a fifth point of view;

(6) Syāt nāsti ca avaktavyaṁ ca dravyaṁ (May be, a thing is non-existent and indescribable)—from a sixth point of view;

(7) Syāt asti ca nāsti ca avaktavyaṁ ca dravyaṁ (May be, a thing is both existent and non-existent and also indescribable)—from a seventh point of view.

This may be further explained in the following way :

(1) Before we proceed to elucidate the above forms it is necessary to keep in mind that every object has to be considered with reference to its own material (dravya), place (kṣetra), time (kāla) and nature (bhāva). Thus, an earthen pot is existent in the form of earthly substance, but not in the form of watery substance; again, the same pot is present, for instance, at Prayāga,

163 Gāthā 14.

with reference to place, but is not present at Banaras; again, the same pot is existent in the month of March when it is considered with reference to time, but is, non-existent in April; again, the same pot is existent as far as its blue colour and particular shape and size are concerned when considered with reference to its nature, but it is non-existent as far as its another form, such as, red colour, is concerned. This is what is meant by *Syādasti*.

(2) As both existence and non-existence are relative terms, the same pot is existent as made clear above, but from another point of view, that is, the point of view of another, as made clear above while explaining the first possibility, the pot is non-existent when considered with reference to its material, place, time and nature. This is what is meant by *Syāt nāsti*.

(3) As for the third possibility, when a pot, for instance, is both existent with reference to all the four considerations mentioned above, as an earthen pot, but non-existent as a watery substance (pot), then it is said that the pot is existent in one sense, while it is not existent in another sense. This tells us what the thing is and what it is not.

(4) But existence and non-existence both, being mutually exclusive, cannot be simultaneously attributed to one and the same thing. That is to say, though the nature of the pot is present in the pot and the nature of another is absent in the pot, yet it is not possible to say anything about the pot. Hence, it is indescribable. This is what is meant by *Syāt avaktavyam*.

(5) When a thing, existent with reference to its own nature, is considered with reference to the indescribable, then it is called *Syāt asti avaktavyam*.

(6) When again, the thing, say the same pot, non-existent with reference to the nature of another (namely, water, Banaras, April and red-colour etc.,) and is considered with reference to indescribable, it is called *Syāt nāsti avaktavyam*.

(7) The last possibility is found when the same pot, for instance, though both existent and non-existent from two different points of view, yet is considered in that dual form with reference to what is indescribable

being both existent and non-existent simultaneously. This is called *Syāt asti nāsti avaktavyam.*

(5) *Categories*

Categories in Jainaism.

As for the categories (tattvas), the Jainas hold that there are seven categories, namely, Jīva, Ajīva, Āsrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjarā and Mokṣa[164] A brief treatment of each one of these is given below:

(*i*) *Jīva*

Nature of Jīva.

Ātman, during the state of its worldly existence, is called 'Jīva.' Jīva is that which lives, that is, which maintains Prāṇa. By 'Prāṇa,' from the 'Śuddhaniścaya' point of view, the Jainas understand 'pure consciousness of the nature of pure knowledge and vision.' This Prāṇa has four aspects —(1) *Balaprāṇa,* meaning physical, vocal and mental strength; (2) *Indriyaprāṇa,* meaning, sense-organs; (3) *Āyuḥprāṇa,* meaning span of life; and (4) *Ucchvāsaprāṇa,* meaning, lifebreath. From the 'Viśuddhaniścayanaya' (Purest stand-point) the Jīva lives with the pure consciousness of the nature of pure knowledge and vision. From the 'Aśuddhaniścaya' stand-point of view the Jīva lives with *Bhāvaprāṇas,* that is, the Jīva possesses conscious modifications of the nature of the five Bhāvas,

Five Bhāvas of Jīva.

namely, Aupaśamika (that modfication in the conscious Jīva which arises from the subsidence of a karman of obscuring nature), *Kṣāyika* (that modification in the conscious Jīva which appears from the removal of the four destructive—ghātīya karmans), *Kṣāyopāśamika,* also called *Miśra* (that modification in the conscious Jīva which appears from the partial destruction, subsidence and operation of the destructive karmans), *Audayika* (that modification in the conscious Jīva which arises from the operation, that is fruition of karmans) and *Pāriṇāmika* (natural conscious modifications in the Jīva independent of karman).

The Jīva lives, from the common-sense point of view (vyavahāranaya), with *Dravyaprāṇas* when there appear modifications in the Jīva in the form of Pudgalas.

164 *Tattvārtha.,* I. 4.

When both, the Bhāvaprāṇas and the Dravyaprāṇas, are maintained continuously without any interruption in all the three times in the world, then the Jīva is called '*Saṁsārī*'. A released Jīva maintains only *Bhāvaprāṇas*.[165]

Characteristics of Jīva from Niścayanaya.

From the Śuddhaniścaya point of view, the Jīva is of the nature of pure knowledge and consciousness, while from the aśuddhaniścaya stand-point, it is of the nature of impure consciousness of the form of the fruition of karmans. Hence, it is called 'Cetayitā' (knower). A class of Jīva, called 'sthāvara,' experiences pleasure and pain; another called 'Trasa,' performs desirable and undesirable deeds; while the third experiences Kevalajñāna.[166]

Jīva is identical with 'Upayoga' which is the modification (pariṇāma) of consciousness, which again, is the very nature of Jīva. Hence, it is 'One.' From the Śuddhaniścaya stand-point, its 'upayoga' is of the nature of 'Kevalajñāna,' while from the Āśuddhaniścaya point of view, its 'upayoga' is impure of the nature of Mati, śruta, etc., and of the nature of the five Bhāvas mentioned above.

It independently lords over the Bhāvakarmans in Āsrava, Bandha, Saṁvara, Nirjarā and Mokṣa. Hence, it is 'Prabhu' (the Lord). In other words, from the Śuddhaniścaya stand-point, the Jīva is all in all as far as its pure modification of the nature of liberation and its causes are concerned, while from the Aśuddhaniścaya stand-point it is the sole master of its modifications of the nature of the world and its causes.

From the 'Śuddhaniścaya' stand-point, the Jīva is the 'Agent' of the modifications of the *śuddha-bhāvas,* while from the 'Aśuddhaniścaya' point of view, the Jīva is the 'Agent' of the modifications in the forms of attachment, hatred and stupidity caused by the Pudgala-karmans.

Jīva is the experiencer of happiness in the form of highest bliss due to its being free from attachment (vītarāga) caused by the purified Ātman from the

165 *Pañcāstikāya* along with its commentaries called *Tattvadīpikā* and *Tātparyavṛtti,* Gāthā 30.

166 *Pañcāstikāya*, Gāthās 38—39.

Śuddhaniścaya stand-point. It is also the enjoyer of pleasure and pain brought about by sense-organs from the Aśuddhaniścaya point of view.

Jīva is itself a modification (pariṇāma) of Ātman and in its turn, it undergoes further modifications (pariṇāmin), like Pudgalas;[167] and the modification of the Jīva is without any beginning and hence, natural.[168]

Characteristics of Jīva from Vyavahāra-naya.

From the common-sense point of view, Jīva maintains 'Dravyaprāṇa' and possesses cit-śakti which is separate from the modification in the form of caitanya (consciouness), it lords over the Dravyakarmans in Āsrava, Bandha, Saṁvara, Nirjarā and Mokṣa; it is the Agent of the Pudgala-karmans caused by the modfications of its own self; it is the experiencer of desired and undesired objects brought about by good and bad deeds respectively; living in a small or a large body produced by name and karman, it is equal to the physical organism in extent; it possesses form because of its modification along with karman and is not free from karmans which are the modifications of Pudgala caused by the modifications of Jīva itself.[169]

The Pradeśas of the Jīva are called 'Avayavas,' so that a Jīva is an 'avayavī,[170] and its Pradeśas are also called modifications (Paryāyas). In fact, there is identity (svabhāvaḥ, Ātmabhāvaḥ, ananyattvam) between an astikāya and its attributes and modifications.

Amṛtacandra tells us in his *Tattvadīpikā* that kevalajñāna, etc., are the natural qualities (*svabhāvaguṇas*) of the Jīva, Matijñāna, etc., are its *vibhāvaguṇas* and the Siddharūpa (that is, the Siddha class of the asceticism) is the natural modification (*svabhāvaparyāya*), while the forms of human beings and the hellish beings are its *vibhāva-paryāyas*.[171] Though the Jīvas, like other dravyas, intersperse with one another amongst themselves, give space to others and ever mix with them, yet

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167 *Tātparyavṛtti* of Jayasena on the *Pañcāstikāya*, 27.

168 *Tattvārtha.*, V. 42.

169 *Pañcāstikāya*, 27.

170 *Tattvadīpikā* on Verse 5.

171 *Tattvadīdikā* on the *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 5.

they do not give up their nature, nor do they become influenced by the nature of any other dravyas.[172]

The Jīva is a substance (dravya), because it undergoes modifications and assumes various forms like other modifications appearing in all the three times; and that which undergoes modifications and assumes various forms is called a 'Dravya.'[173] Though the Jīva undergoes modifications and possesses utpāda, dhrauvya and vyaya by virtue of which it is called a dravya, yet it maintains its own natural form (dhrauvya). It is eternal, because though it undergoes modifications, yet it does not give up its natural form (pratiniyatasvarūpa). It can never remain without modifications, nor can modifications ever remain without a substance.[174] Similarly, a substance cannot remain without qualities, nor can qualities remain without a substance.[175]

Dravya defined.

The main characteristics of a Jīva are only two—consciousness (cetanā) or self-realization (anubhūti) and resultant of consciousness (upayoga). The former is either pure or impure (śuddha or aśuddha). The latter is also either of the nature of knowledge (jñānopayoga), or that of vision (darśanopayoga). According to the relation of consciousness to jñāna, karman and karmaphala, it is callel 'jñānacetanā,' which is the same as the pure consciousness, and 'karmacetanā', and 'karmaphalacetanā,' which are regarded as impure consciousness (aśuddhacetanā). The realization of its very svarūpa (nature) in the form of jñāna is called *jñānacetanā*; the realization of karman (action) is *karmacetanā*, while the realization of the resultants of karman, namely, pleasure and pain, etc., is *karmaphalacetanā*.[176]

Two main characteristics of Jīva.

Of the upayoga (resultant of consciousness), the jñānopayoga is the determinate (savikalpaka) knowledge, while the darśanopayoga is the indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) knowledge. The former is of eight

[172] *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 7.

[173] *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 9.

[174] *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 12.

[175] *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 13.

[176] *Tattvadīpikā* on the *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 16.

kinds, namely, mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevala along with the three forms of ignorance, that is, kumati, kuśruta and vibhaṅgāvadhi (ignorance of avadhijñāna). All these have been explained before. Of these, the kevalajñāna is called *kṣāyika,* because it manifests after the destruction and removal of karmans and hence, it is a purified knowledge (śuddhajñāna). The rest of the seven kinds of knowledge and ajñāna are impure and hence, they are 'kṣāyopaśamika' (that is, that modification of the Jīva which appears from the partial destruction, subsidence and operation of the ghātīya-karmans).

Jīva and other Bhāvas and Paryāyas.

Jīva and the other five padārthas (categories) namely, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla are called '*Bhāvas.*' Divine beings, human beings, hellish beings and birds are the four classes of impure 'Paryāyas' (modifications) of the Jīva.[177]

Divisions of Dravya-Paryāya.

In fact, 'Paryāya' is of two kinds—'Dravyaparyāya' and 'Guṇa-paryāya.' That which is the cause and condition of the Pratipatti (knowledge) of oneness (aikya-pratipatti) in the form of various dravyas, is called 'Dravyaparyāya.' It is of two kinds—homogeneous and heterogeneous. That which is produced by the combination of one non-conscious substance with another non-conscious one, as for instance, a 'skandha' produced by the combination of two, or three, or four atomic Pudgalas, is called 'homogeneous modification of substances' (samānajātīyadravyaparyāya), while that which is produced by the combination of the conscious Jīva and non-conscious Pudgalas, as for instance, the modifications in the forms of human beings,' etc., produced by the combination of the Jīva which has left the world with the karma-Pudgalas, is called 'heterogeneous modification of substances.' These are all impure modifications, because these are produced by the mutual combination of the Jīva and Pudgalas only. Such modifications are not possible with the combinations of dharma, adharma, etc.

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177 *Tattvadīpikā* on the *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 16.

Modifications produced in the qualities of the same substance, just as the modifications found in the colour of a mango-fruit, are called 'Guṇa-Paryāyas.' Similarly, modifications are found in the jñāna of the Jīva in the forms of mati, śruta, avadhi, etc.[178]

Guṇa-Paryāyas.

Jīva may become either a Divine being or a hellish being, but it will ever remain as Jīva. Neither the destruction of a *Bhāva* (substance), nor the production of a non-existing *bhāva* is ever possible according to the Jainas.[179] So the deaths and the births take place of a manuṣya, or of a nārakīya body and not of the Jīva.[180] This may be said to be a sort of '*Sadbhāvavāda*,' like the 'Satkārya-vāda' of the Sāṅkhya School. It is only the 'Paryāya' which takes its birth and dies, but not the Jīva. Thus, the 'dravya' is eternal in its own svarūpa, while it is non-eternal in the form of its Paryāyas. This is what the Jainas want to show through the *Anekāntavāda* which they advocate. This '*Anekāntavāda*' of the Jainas remove all possible apparent contradictions which may appear to be present in substances.

Sad-bhāva-vāda.

Because the Jīva has existence (sattā) as its very nature (sattāsvabhāva), it has momentary modifications of the type of 'utpāda' (coming into existence), 'vyaya' (disappearance from existence) and 'dhrauvya' (continuous persistence of the object amidst all the changes, that is, permanence). In other words, the assuming of the form of a human being after death and coming into existence in this world as a Jīva, leaving the previous form, is called 'utpāda,' again, leaving this human form and assuming another form, that of a Divine being or so, for instance, is called 'vyaya', while its remaining as the Jīva through-out all these changes from one body to another, is called 'dhrauvya' of the Jīva. The cause of all these modifications is the *Kāla*.[181]

Pariṇāma of Jīva.

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178 *Tattvadīpikā* on the *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 16.

179 *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 17.

180 *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 17.

181 *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 23.

The Jīva, under the influence of kaṣāyas which have no beginning, lives within the body and pervades it with all its Pradeśas. Just as the body grows in length and breadth due to good and wholesome food, so the number of Pradeśas in the Jīva also grows accordingly, and when the body decreases the Pradeśas in the Jīva also likewise decrease. So the Jīva during its worldly existence remains equal in extent with the body.[182] Thus, it is clear that under the influence of the characteristics of contraction and expansion produced by karman, the Jīva assumes the form of the body it comes to possess.[183] Though from the Śuddhaniścaya standpoint, the Jīva is of the nature of jñāna and darśana, yet due to the influence of karman which has no beginning, it comes to have *Bhāva-karma* in the form of the delusion of darśana and that of cāritra (conduct) and the defects of *Dravyakarma*. Thus, influenced by karman and its defects, the Jīva assumes other bodies in other births.[184]

Divisions and sub-divisions of Jīva.

Ordinarily, Jīvas are either worldly, or liberated. The former is again, either mobile (Trasa), or immobile (sthāvara). Earth, water, tejas, air and vegetables are *Sthāvara-Jīvas* which possess only one sense-organ, namely, the sense-organ of touch. Those Jīvas which possess more than one sense-organs are called '*Trasa-Jīvas.*' These Jīvas possess two, three, four and even five sense-organs. Worms, oysters, conches, etc., are 'Trasa' Jīvas having two sense-organs, namely, the sense-organs of taste and touch. Ants, bugs, lice, etc., are 'Trasa' Jīvas having three senses, namely, the sense-organs of touch, taste and smell. Mosquitoes, flies, bees, etc., are also 'Trasa' Jīvas which possess four senses, namely, the sense-organ of touch, taste, smell and sight. Men, birds, beasts, gods, hellish beings are all 'Trasa' Jīvas which possess all the five sense-organs.[185]

It is to be kept in mind that though Jīvas are of the nature of pure knowledge and vision (darśana), yet

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182 *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 33.

183 Pañcāstikāya, along with its commentaries on verse 33.

184 *Tātparyavṛtti* on the *Pañcāstikāya*, verse 34.

185 *Pañcāstikāya*, verses 110, 112, 114–17.

under the influence of karman, they assume various kinds of bodies with one, or two, or three, or four, or five sense-organs. The Jīvas which resort to earth for their body are called 'Pṛthvī-kāya,' for example, stones, etc. Again, those which resort to water are called 'Apkāya,' such as, moss (śaivala—a kind of aquatic plant), and so on.[186]

Such Jīvas as possess five sense-organs are again, either with manas (samanaska) or without manas.[187] All the rest of the Jīvas are without manas.[188] All those Jīvas which have one sense-organ are either Bādara (gross) or Sūkṣma (subtle). The Jainas believe that the entire universe is full of Sūkṣma Jīvas. They have classified Jīvas under fourteen divisions and sub-divisions.[189]

Those Jīvas, which have manas, are capable of distinguishing right from wrong and of making efforts to acquire what is wholesome to them and to get rid of those things which they hate.[190] The liberated Jīvas, in course of their transmigration from one body to another, move straight towards the Ākāśa and there is, at that time, vibration only in the body produced due to karman. In the case of the worldly Jīvas, however, the transmigration is both straight and crooked.[191]

According to the Jainas, there are three virtuous and five vicious modifications in the Jīva. The former

Virtuous and vicious modification in Jīva.

modifications are—(1) Devotion and love towards Arhat, Siddhas and Sādhus (Praśastarāga) and desire to do religious deeds and maintain good conduct; (2) Compassion towards the thirsty, hungry, miserable and similar others (anukampā); and (3) absence of anger (krodha), conceit (māna), delusion (māyā) and avarice (lobha). The vicious modifications of the Jiva are—(1) Action full of carelessness (pramādabahulacaryyā), (2)

186 *Tattvārthasūtra*, II. 10—14, 23—24; *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā 11.

187 *Tattvārtha.*, II. 25.

188 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā 12.

189 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā 12.

190 *Tattārtharājavārtika* on the *Tattvārthasūtra*, II. 5, 24.

191 *Tattvārtha.*, II. 25—29.

defilement of citta (kāluṣya), (3) greed for the worldly objects (viṣayalaulya), (4) giving pain to others (paraparitātapa) and (5) speaking ill of others (parāpavāda).

Kinds of birth which a Jīva takes.

There are three kinds of birth which the Jīvas take —(1) Spontaneous (sammūrchana), (2) Uterine birth (garbha—by the union of father and mother) and (3) Instantaneous rise (upapāta), that is, instantaneous grouping of matter to form a liquid body which is peculiar to hellish and celestial beings.[192]

All these three kinds of birth are found to take place in the following nine places of birth (yonis): (1) *sacitta,* of living matter, as the stomach, wherein worms find their birth; (2) *Acitta,* of matter only with no life, as a wall or a chair wherein mosquitoes may find their birth; (3) *Sacittācitta,* of living and dead matter, as lice; (4) *Śīta,* some small insects take birth on account of cold; (5) *Uṣṇa,* some beings take birth on account of heat; (6) *Śītoṣṇa,* some beings spring up from the co-existence of cold and heat; (7) *Saṁvṛta,* covered, that is, some small beings spring up out of things kept covered; (8) *Vivṛta,* some living beings spring up from objects kept open, as creepers, moss, etc., when these are exposed to the sun then only these flourish and (9) *Saṁvṛta-vivṛta,* beings spring up on account of partly being exposed and partly being covered.

Divine and hellish beings take their birth from *acittayoni,* beings springing up from a womb have *cittācitta-yoni,* others have their birth from all the three, namely, *sacitta, acitta* and *sacittācitta.* Again, those beings which spring up from a womb and the divine beings all have *śītoṣṇa-yoni. Tejaḥkāya* beings, that is, beings having shining Taijasa organism, spring up from *uṣṇa-yoni.* Again, hellish beings, beings having one sense-organ and divine beings all have *saṁvṛta-yoni.* Those who spring up from a womb have again, *saṁvṛta-vivṛta-yoni.*[193]

Viviparous (beings born from a womb), oviparous (born from an egg) and beings born like *pota* (cubs of a

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[192] *Tattvārthasūtra,* II. 31.

[193] *Tattvārtha.,* II. 34.

lion) have uterine-birth. Divine and hellish beings have birth by instantaneous rise (upapātaḥ). All the rest have birth from sammūrcchana (that is, born by spontaneous generation).[194]

Kinds of organism of Jīvas.

Jīvas having existence in the world possess the following kinds of organism: (1) *Audārika* (physical body of men and animals), (2) *Vaikriya* (fluid—the body of divine and hellish beings are made of fluid nature which can be changed at any time to any form), (3) *Āhāraka* (assimilative), (4) *Taijasa* (body made of subtle taijasa elements), (5) and *Kārmaṇa* (body made of kārmic matter). Of these five bodies, each successive one is subtler than the preceding one. Likewise, in the first three types of body each preceding one has innumerable times more number of Pradeśas than those which are in the successive ones. Of the last two kinds of body, each one, compared with the body immediately preceding it, has an infinite number of Pradeśas. The last two types of body have unchecked movement up to the end of loka. The Jīvas have connection with these two bodies from time immemorial, though there is a difference of opinion on this point amongst the Ācāryas.[195]

Peculiarities of the bodies which a Jīva takes.

Characteristics of kārmaṇa and other bodies.

The *Kārmaṇa* body does not help the experiencing of anything. In other words, the Jīva does not experience pleasure and pain through it, nor does it bind itself through this body, nor again, does it know anything through it. The rest of the four bodies do help the Jīvas in all these matters and hence, these are *'sopabhoga,'* while the kārmaṇa body is *'nirupabhoga.'*[196]

The hellish beings and those beings who are spontaneously generated (sammūrcchana) are eunuchs, neither males nor females. The divine beings are of both the sexes and are never eunuchs. The vivparous, oviparous and Potaja beings are of all the three types.[197]

194 *Tattvārtha.*, II. 34—36.

195 *Tattvārtha.*, II. 37—43.

196 *Tattvārtha.*, II. 45.

197 *Tattvārtha.*, II. 51.

(ii) *Ajīvas*

The second category of the Jainas is the '*Ajīva*.' Some Ajīvas have a body; because, they are extensive in space, as they have more than one Pradeśa. So they are called *Ajīva-kāya*. It is divided into Dharma-astikāya, Adharma-astikāya, Ākāśa-astikāya and Pudgala-astikāya. Kāla which is also an Ajīva, has no 'kāya.' These are also called dravyas (substances). These dravyas are eternal, that is, non-destructible in their nature. These do not possess colour and such other qualities as are possessed by Mūrta objects, (that is, objects having limited forms), namely, touch, taste and smell, except the Pudgalas which do possess touch, taste, smell and colour.[198] Of these, Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa each is a single substance, that is, these are indivisible wholes, while Pudgala and Jīvas are many.[199] Similarly, the first three, namely, Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa, have no motion, while the Pudgalas and the Jīvas possess motion.[200] Kāla does not move from one place to another.

Nature of Ajīvas.

Dravyas and their characteristics.

Dharma and Adharma and Jīva each has innumerable Pradeśas (that is, such portions of Ākāśa as are occupied by an ultimate particle of matter) individually. Ākāśa has, on the other hand, infinite Pradeśas. But an atom (aṇu) has no Pradeśa. So it is called *anādi* (without any beginning), *amadhya* (without any middle) and *apradeśa* (without any Pradeśa). These dravyas freely move (avagāha) in the 'lokākāśa.' It is therefore that the 'Lokākāśa' has been defined as that which gives space to Jīvas, Dharma, Adharma, Kāla, and Pudgalas.[201]

198 *Tattvārtha.*, V. 1—4.

199 *Tattvārtha.*, V. 5.

200 *Tattvārtha.*, V. 6.

201 Loka and Ākāśa explained—In the *Tattvārtharājavārttika*, Verse 12, Akalaṅkadeva defines 'Loka' as the place wherein pleasure and pain are found as results of virtue and vice respectively, the place in which things are obtained (upalabhate arthāniti lokaḥ), or that place which is perceived by omniscient. 'Ākāśa', on the other hand, is that which gives space to other substances, Jīva, Pudgala, etc.,—*Dravyasaṅgraha*, Verse 19. The chief characteristic of Ākāśa is to allow all substances, namely, Jīva, Pud-

'Dharma' in Jainaism has been defined as a substance which itself does not move, nor does it impart motion to anything but helps the moving Jīvas and the Pudgalas in their movement,[202] just as water assists the movement of moving fishes. It has absolute absence of taste, colour, smell, sound and touch, so it is formless (amūrtasvabhāva). It pervades the entire 'Lokākāśa.' It is connected with all its Pradeśas, just as oil (taila) is connected with all the parts of the *tila* (seasamum seed). By its very nature it is pervasive and hence, it is called gross (*Pṛthulaḥ*). Though from the Niścaya-point of view, it has only one Pradeśa, yet from the common-sense point of view, it has innumerable Pradeśas.[203] Though it undergoes infinite modifications, and accordingly, has both utpāda and vyaya (production and destruction), yet it does not leave its nature (svarūpādapracyavanam), so it is eternal. It is indifferent to motion (gati) and modification (pariṇāma) and is an inseparable cause of all these. As it is existent because of its 'svarūpa', it is not a product.[204]

Dharma-astikāya

'Adharma' has been defined as a cause of helping the Pudgalas and Jīvas which are at rest, in taking rest, just as earth, which is at rest, helps those who want to stay and take rest. It is just opposed to 'Dharma.' Like 'Dharma' it also has absolute absence of taste, colour, smell, sound and touch, and so it is formless (amūrtasvabhāva). It pervades the 'Lokākāśa.' It is connected with all its Pradeśas. By its very nature it is all-pervasive. From Niścaya stand-point, it has only one Pradeśa, but from the common-sense standpoint, it has innumerable Pradeśas. It is eternal. It is indifferent to sthiti (rest). It is not a product of anything.[205]

Adharma-astikāya.

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gala, Dharma, Adharma and Kāla, to penetrate it (avagāha) without any resistence.

Now, Ākāśa with reference to Loka, or similar in extent to Loka, is called 'Lokākāśa.' So it has been explained by Nemicandra as that wherein Dharma, Adharma, Kāla, Pudgala and Jīva all exist—*Dravyasaṅgraha,* Verse 20.

202 *Dravyasaṅgraha,* Gāthā 17.

203 *Pañcāstikāya,* 85.

204 *Pañcāstikāya,* 84–85.

205 *Pañcāstikāya,* 86.

Reasons to prove the existence of Dharma and Adharma.

That substances, like 'Dharma' and 'Adharma', do exist is proved by the fact that without them there would have been no distinction of *loka* and *aloka*. By the former, we understand that space wherein all the six substances, such as, Jīva and the rest, are found to exist, and by *aloka* we mean that space where there is nothing except Ākāśa. Moreover, Jīva and Pudgalas, by their very nature, possess modifications in the form of motion and rest. Now, if there were no external causes in the form of 'Dharma' and 'Adharma,' how could the existence of these modifications have been absent from the 'Alokākāśa'? It is because of the existence of these two substances, namely, 'Dharma' and 'Adharma,' as the two external causes for helping the movement and stay of the Jīvas and Pudgalas, that there exist the divisions of *'loka'* and *'aloka.'* Though these two substances, with reference to their own Pradeśas, are quite different from each other, yet as they function in the same sphere of the 'lokākāśa,' they are not separate. In other words, in whatever Pradeśas of the 'Lokākāśa,' the 'Dharma' exists, the 'Adharma' also exists in all those Pradeśas. Both are motionless and pervasive and are the external causes of the movement and stay respectively of the Jīvas and the Pudgalas. Both have innumerable Pradeśas.[206] It should be always kept in mind that the 'Dharma' is itself motionless and yet it helps the movements of those which are in motion. Similarly, the 'Adharma' is motionless and helps in the stay of those which want to take rest.

Ākāśa-astikāya.

'Ākāśa' is that which gives space to the Jīvas, Dharma, Adharma, Kāla and Pudgalas.[207] This is what is called *'lokākāśa.'* That space where none of the five above mentioned dravyas exists is called *'Alokākāśa.'* The former has innumerable Pradeśas, while the latter has infinite Pradeśas.[208]

Lokākāśa and Alokākāśa distinguished.

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[206] *Pañcāstikāya* along with the *Tattvadīpikā*, 87.
[207] *Pañcāstikāya*, 90. [208] *Pañcāstikāya*, 91.

'Pudgala' is one of the Ajīva-kāyas. It has been defined as that which undergoes modifications by combinations (*Pud*=to combine) and dissociations (gala=to dissociate).[209] It has 'rūpa', meaning, the qualities of colour, touch, taste and smell.[210] It possesses a form (mūrta).[211] There are eight kinds of touch which Pudgalas have, namely, soft (mṛdu), hard (kaṭhina), heavy (guru), light (laghu), cold (śīta), hot (uṣṇa), smooth (snigdha) and rough (rukṣa). The taste, it has, is of five types, namely, bitter (tikta), pungent (kaṭu), acid (amla), sweet (madhura) and astringent (kaṣāya). The smell, it has, is of two varieties, namely, fragrance (surabhi) and its opposite (asurabhi). Its colour is also of five kinds, namely, black (kṛṣṇa), blue (nīla), red (lohita), yellow (pīta) and white (śukla).[212]

Pudgala-Astikāya.

Characteristics of Pudgalas.

Kundakunda defines 'Pudgala' as that which can be experienced by the five sense-organs. The five sense-organs, the five varieties of body, namely, audārika, vaikriyaka, āhāraka, taijasa and kārmaṇa,[213] Manas, the kārmic matter (karmāṇi) and all Mūrtas are made of Pudgalas.[214]

Broadly speaking a Pudgala has two forms—'Aṇu' (atomic) and 'Skandha' (groups of smallest ultimate particles, which may be called molecules). So they say that 'aṇus' are not-combined, while 'skandhas' are combined or grouped

Forms of Pudgala.

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209 Pūraṇagalanānvarthasaṁjñatvāt Pudgalā—Rājavārttika, V. 1–24; *Tattvārthadīpikā* on the *Pañcāstikāya*, 76.

210 *Tattvārthasūtra*, V. 3–4.

211 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā 15.

212 *Tattvārthasūtra*, V. 23.

213 That which is born from the womb, *i.e.*, the organism of men and animals, is called *'Audārika'* body. That which is possessed by divine and hellish beings is called *'Vaikriyaka'* body. It is not visible to ordinary vision and is capable of change to any shape and size. That which is the creation of yogins of higher plane, is very subtle and can be sent to any distance when so needed, is called *'āhāraka'* body. That inner subtle body which is the seed of all mental and physical activities is called 'Kārmaṇa' body. It is this subtle material body which is responsible for keeping Jīvas bound to the confines of the loka. When the gross matter of the Kārmic body is cast off, it becomes light and the Jīva moves upwards till it reaches the top of the lokākāśa beyond which it cannot go because of the absence of the medium of motion—*Tattvārthasūtra*, X. 5-6.

214 *Pañcāstikāya*, 82.

(baddha). The 'aṇus' are produced by division of matter into subtle parts, while 'skandhas' are produced by grouping (saṅghāta), or division (bheda), or by both together—grouping and division.[215] Thus, by the combination of two Paramāṇus, *'Dvipradeśa'* is produced and by the combination of a 'Dvipradeśa' and an 'aṇu' is produced 'Tripradeśa' and so on.[216] So says Kundakunda that the modifications of Pudgala appear in the following four forms—(1) Skandha—a group formed out of the combination of infinite Paramāṇus; (2) Skandhadeśa—half of the skandha is 'skandhadeśa'; (3) Skandhapradeśa—half of the skandhadeśa is the 'skandhapradeśa';[217] while (4) the fourth is called 'Paramāṇu' which cannot be further divided. It is eternal. It is produced out of a form (mūrti) which possesses touch, taste, smell and colour and is different from the formless substance, called *Paramātman*.[218] The 'Skandhas' produced by division and grouping are visible to eyes, while there are non-visible forms of matter which are produced by all the three means, namely, division, grouping and both together.[219]

Amṛtacandra's view on 'Pudgala' and its modifications.

Amṛtacandra Sūri, while explaining 'Pudgala', says—Paramāṇus are called 'Pudgalas', because of their possessing the qualities of combination and dissociation (pūraṇagalanopapatteḥ) which are in the very nature of the Pudgalas. 'Skandhas' also are called Pudgalas, as they are the modifications of several Pudgalas. The 'Pudgala-skandhas', with their six following types of subtle and gross modifications, occupy the creation of the three worlds.

The six kinds of modifications of Pudgala, called 'skandhas', are: (1) *'Bādara-bādarāḥ'*, also called *'Atisthūlāḥ'*—such Pudgalas which when split up into parts cannot join together themselves so as to assume the old undivided form again, as for instance, stone, wood, etc., (2) *'Bādarāḥ' or 'Sthūlāḥ'* meaning, such Pudgalas which when separated can again join together and become one

[215] *Tattvārthasūtra,* V. 25–27. [216] *Tattvārthasūtra,* V. 25–27.
[217] *Pañcārtikāya,* 74–75.
[218] *Tātparyavṛtti* on the *Pañcāstikāya,* 76.
[219] Tattvārthasūtra, V. 28.

as before, as for instance, milk, butter, oil, water, and other liquid substances. (3) *'Bādara-sūkṣma'*, or *'Sthūla-sūkṣma,'* meaning, such Pudgalas which though in appearance gross, yet are incapable of splitting, piercing through, or taking up in hand, as for example, shadow, sun and heat, light, darkness, etc. (4) *'Sūkṣma-bādara'*, or *'Sūkṣma-sthūla'*, meaning, such Pudgalas which though subtle, yet are apparently gross, such as, touch, smell, colour, and śabda. (5) *'Sūkṣma,'* such Pudgalas which are very subtle and are beyond cognition through any of the sense-organs, as for example, 'karma-vargaṇā', in the form of 'jñānāvaraṇa', etc. (6) *'Sūkṣma-sūkṣma'*, extremely subtle forms of Pudgalas, as for example, all the subtle forms of matter from 'karma-vargaṇā' down to the 'Dvyaṇuka-skandhas.'[220]

Besides these, there are other forms of the modifications of Pudgalas, such as, sound (śabda), union (bandha), fineness, grossness, shape (saṁsthāna), division (bheda), darkness which obstructs the sight, image (chāyā), lustre and heat.[221] Of śabda, as a form of the modification of Pudgala, Kundakunda says—'Skandha' is the grouping of Paramāṇus and when 'skandhas' strike against one another, 'sound' is produced. Hence, 'sound' is said to be produced from skandha. 'Sound' is not of the nature of Ākāśa, nor is it (sound) its quality; for if it were so, then the quality of Ākāśa being formless, sound would not have been heard through the organ of hearing.[222]

Sound is not the quality of Ākāśa.

'Bandha' or union is of two kinds—(1) *'Prāyogika'* which is produced through the efforts of human body, speech and manas and (2) *'Vaisrasika'* which is produced from clouds etc., without any human effort Both of these two varieties have several sub-divisions.[223]

'Saukṣmya' (fineness) is of two kinds—that which is extremely fine, as in Paramāṇus and that which is relatively fine, as found in other substances (āpekṣika). Similarly, in case of *'grossness'* there is the highest maximum limit of grossness and another that of a rela-

220 *Pañcāstikāya*, 76.

221 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, 16.

222 *Tātparyavṛtti* on he *Pañcāstikāya*, 79.

223 *Tattvārtharājavārttika*, V. 24.

tive nature. *'Saṁsthāna'* (shape) is also of two kinds—that which has definite shape, as in the various figures of triangle, etc., and that which has no definite shape, as in the shapes of clouds, etc. *'Division'* (bheda) is of six kinds—(1) *Utkara* (as the sawing of a piece of wood), (2) *Cūrṇa* (powder), (3) *Khaṇḍa* (parts by breaking up a pot, for instance), (4) *Cūrṇikā* (separating the chaff from the grains), (5) *Pratara* (dividing mica into many slices) and (6) *Aṇucaṭana* (causing sparks to fly out from iron-balls). *'Image'* (*Chāyā*) is either caused by light (prakāśa) or by āvaraṇa (concealment).

All these are the modifications of Pudgalas. Here ends the treatment of the *'Ajīva-astikāyas'* as found in Jaina works. As these divisions of Ajīva are non-conscious, they do not experience pleasure and pain, nor do they act for things which bring good to them, nor, again, do they keep off from things which do harm to them.[224]

Points of difference amongst 'astikāyas'.

Ākāśa, Kāla, Jīva, Dharma and Adharma are formless, while Pudgala alone has form (mūrti). Of all these substances, it is the Jīva alone which is conscious. As a substance having form Pudgala possesses touch, taste, smell and colour by its very nature, while all these qualities are entirely non-existent in formless substances.

A Jīva has also a form.

Though a Jīva is formless by nature, yet due to its connection with karman, it has also a form.[225] A Jīva though by nature is without any motion, yet through the instrumentality of Pudgalas, it has movements, due to which it can go from one Pradeśa to another.

Kāla is the cause of the modifications of Pudgalas And as Kāla is never absent, Pudgala can never be without any movement.[226]

Kāla and Samaya.

'Kāla' is to be explained from two stand-points—Ordinary common-sense stand-point and Pāramārthika stand-point. From the former stand-point, it is that which helps to produce changes in substances and which is known from the

[224] *Pañcāstikāya*, 125.

[225] *Pañcāstikāya*, 97.

[226] *Pañcāstikāya*, 98.

modifications produced in substances. The Jainas call it '*Samaya*.' It may be called 'relative time.' It has various forms consisting of the various notions of time, such as, hours, minutes, seconds, days, nights, years,[227] etc. In fact, though it (*samaya*) is the modification (paryāya) of Niścaya-kāla, yet as it is manifested by the movements of the Jīvas and Pudgalas, it is called 'Pariṇāmbhava' (produced through modifications). *Samaya* is said to be a period of time occupied by the movement of the smallest particle of matter in going from one Pradeśa to another which is called 'Kāla-aṇu.'[228] '*Samaya*' is momentary and changes every moment.[229]

The Niścaya-kāla is the support (ādhāra) of the '*samaya*'.[230] This Niścaya-kāla assists changes in substances, but it is not the cause of those changes. It is only the very background of all the changes. It is eternal.[231]

This '*Kāla-aṇu*' occupies only one Pradeśa and hence, it has no Kāya.[232] So says Nemicandra—'The innumerable substances which exist one by one in each Pradeśa of the 'Lokākāśa,' like heaps of jewels, are called 'Kāla-aṇus.'[233] These subtle particles of Kāla do not mix together. They remain separate from one another. The 'Lokākāśa' is full of these subtle particles of time. These are invisible, innumerable, inactive and without any form.[234] It is these characteristics which differentiate Kāla from the rest of the five 'Astikāyas' which have inseparable particles, while these particles are seperable in Kāla.[235]

(6) *Conclusion*

After having presented the main thoughts connected with Jainaism it will not be out of place to recapitua-

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227 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā 21.
228 *Tattvārtha*, V. 40.
229 *Pañcāstikāya*, 100.
230 *Pañcāstikāya*, 100.
231 *Pañcāstikāya*, 100.
232 *Pañcāstikāya*, 102.
233 *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā 22.
234 *Tattvārthasāra*, III. 44.
235 Brahmadeva's *com*. on the *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Gāthā 22.

late its place, both in Indian Ethics and Metaphysics, and see what progress it has made towards the realization of the true nature of the Ātman which is the ultimate end of philosophical enquiry.

We have seen in the foregoing pages that as far as the nature of the Ātman is concerned, Jainaism has been able to establish Ātman's independent and separate existence and unfold its essential nature of having consciousness, which though vitiated by avidyā, yet assumes its purity and is realized by the Jīva when the latter achieves kevala-jñāna. As every Jīva is capable of rising up to the stage of a kevalin, the realization of the pure nature of consciousness is possible by every Jīva, from the lowest to the highest. Thus, when the Jīva becomes absolutely free from bondage, it reaches the highest stage of perfection and is variously called Arhat, Siddha, Tīrthaṅkara, Sarvajña, Kevalin, etc. It must be, however, kept in mind that the Jīva, even when it achieves the highest stage, does possess the same human form, at least from the Common-sense point of view (vyavahāra-naya), which it had assumed at the time of its entering into the world.[236]

Conscious nature of Ātman is realized at the Kevalin stage.

Arhat possesses a physical organism.

Considering the facts mentioned above, it is clear that Jainaism has definitely made a great progress towards the realization of the true nature of the Ātman and occupies a higher place in the metaphysical world, not achieved by the Materialists.

But there are other considerations in this connection which deserve the serious attention of a tattvajijñāsu before he arrives at any final decision. We are aware that the Jainas believe that the Ātman possesses the size of the organism wherein it is encircled (dehaparimāṇa).[237]

Ātman possesses the same size as the organism where it is encircled.

[236] Commentary of Brahmadeva on the *Dravyasaṅgraha*, Verse 50, p. 90.

[237] This idea most probably has been taken by the Jainas from the Āraṇyakas wherein it is said that the Ātman possesses Madhyama-Parimāṇa (middle-sized), in the sense that it is identified with physical body. The Jainas have, however, taken the expression in its literal sense.

This means that the Ātman has a shape with definite length and breadth. Again, that one's Ātman does not exist beyond one's own body is clear from the fact that the Ātman does not experience pleasure and pain beyond the organism wherein it is encircled. The Ātman which is present in the organism of an elephant, for instance, may easily enter into the organism of an ant or *vice versa*, simply because, the Ātman, according to the Jainas, possesses the nature of contraction (saṅkoca) and expansion (vikāsa).

Ātman has length, breadth and shape: Ātman does not exist beyond its body.

Ātman possesses the qualities of contraction and expansion.

The next point which deserves consideration is that as the Ātman possesses infinite 'Pradeśas,' it is regarded as having parts (sāvayava). The Jainas believe that the Ātman undergoes change from one form to anothei and as such, it is a substance (dravya) and hence, a product, and accordingly, non-eternal, in a sense. This is further proved by the fact that, according to the Jainas, the Ātman, being of the size of an organism, may be cut into pieces and be separated from the body, just as a finger, for instance, is cut off from the body and remains separate. The system further adds that just as the cut-piece of a body is a part of the body, so the Ātman, of the size of the finger cut off, is also cut off from the main Ātman and is a part of the particular Ātman having some 'Pradeśas'. It is due to its being a piece of the Ātman that there is found motion in the separated portion of the body, as in the case of a snake or a lizard. The portion of the Ātman which is cut off comes back to the main Ātman, that is, the organism with which the portion cut off remains connected with some subtle link, through some unseen force (adṛṣṭa), like the two parts of a lotus-stalk which remain connected with each other through subtle threads.[238]

Ātman possesses parts.

Āman is a product.

Ātman can be cut into pieces and be separated from the body.

Pieces of the Ātman comes back to the body.

238 *Syādvādamañjarī* along with the commentary of Hemachandra on Verse 9.

We are also told that the Ātman of the Jainas is nitya-pariṇāmin, that is, changing every moment to assume new forms, of course, without breaking the continuity.

Ātman is nitya-pariṇāmin.

The Jainas believe that a reality is many faced which is, therefore, explained by them through the seven-fold mode of expression (saptabhaṅgīnaya). They also hold that this is a special characteristic of Jainaism towards the feeling of tolerance for the views of others. But can this be not interpreted as a sort of lack of clear understanding and certainty of the true nature of the reality, because of which, the Jainas fail to stick to one definite mode of expression? We have seen that the methods of Agreement and Difference (anvaya and vyatireka) can establish the desired result beyond doubt. Hence, the sevenfold mode of expressing the nature of the reality only leaves the tattvajijñāsu in a fix as to what exactly the nature of the reality is.

Saptabhangīnaya not only proves the existence of tolerance in Jainaism but also lack of certainty in its own stand-point.

Above and over all these, it may be said that the ultimate aim of the enquiry should gradually lead the enquirer towards unity and not diversity, as we find in Jainaism.

Jainaism does not lead towards unity amidst diversity.

From all these considerations, one is led to think that though the Jainas have gone far beyond the Materialists in certain aspects regarding the nature of the Ātman, yet the system has not been able to cut off its close contact with the Materialists in some very important aspects in the metaphysical side of the system.

Now, coming to the Ethical aspect of the school, we know that the Jainas do not believe in the existence of Īśvara, the Ethical head of a school of thought. It is accepted even by the Jainas that the observance of physical and mental discipline is very essential for the realization of the highest truth. And for achieving complete success in this, a tattvajijñāsu has to observe very carefully and rigidly certain ethical laws from certain definite common standard, which is, ultimately, regarded as the highest standard. This highest standard must be identified with one who is regarded

Lack of the notion of Ethical head (Īśvara) in the system.

as the highest Ethical entity. He must belong to a rank which is higher than that of human beings for whom he is to act as the highest standard. Unless we believe in such an Ethical head, the highest standard of moral judgment cannot be maintained by all. In the absence of such a head, every one may begin to have his own standard of judgment and may lead to various confusions. Again, for all practical purposes no peace can be realized by common people without God (Īśvara) who is the highest Ethical entity.

No correct standard can be maintained without the notion of the highest ethical entity.

The Jainas have, however, tried to replace the notion of God (Īśvara) by having an 'Arhan', a Jīva who has achieved the highest stage, endowed with all such attributes as we find in Īśvara. But it is difficult to convince all in this. "Arhan" is after all, at least from the commonsense point of view, a Jīva, or a human being and there can be many 'Arhans,' at one and the same time, through sādhanā. He, or all of them, may be respected and adhered to as an incarnation of God or one who has achieved the stage of Īśvara, but it is certain that they are not Īśvaras; a Jīva, even after it has achieved the *Īśvaratva*, will remain a Jīva and it will be absolutely different from and lower than Īśvara. This being so, it is difficult to understand Prof. S. Radhakrishnan when he says, "The liberated souls are above the gods."[239] It is a fact that they are not born again. But do the gods (Īśvara) ever take birth? Again, it is not proper to believe in the existence of more than one Īśvara at the same time. Moreover, the nature of human beings is such that a human being, howsoever qualified he may be, cannot be regarded by all as belonging to absolutely different rank. Therefore, it is very necessary that we should have also an Ethical highest entity to lead human beings towards the highest stage of Perfection. Hence, the existence of both, metaphysical and ethical heads, in the forms of Ātman or Paramātman and Īśvara respectively, is absolutely required for achiev-

'Arhan' cannot be a substitute for Īśvara.

Without having the highest ethical entity, Perfection cannot be achieved.

[239] *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 331.

ing the highest aim taught by the particular school of thought.

Jaianism not practical in Ethical aspect.

As already pointed out at the very outset, Jainaism began first as a school of ethical discipline which ultimately developed into a school of metaphysics. In this respect, no doubt, the Jainas have made great progress, but it will not be out of place to say that they did not take the practical side of the ethical laws into consideration, which ultimately, has resulted into great confusion in many ways. Even as regards the observance of the rules of Ahiṁsā, which the Jainas have emphasized more than anything else, it may be said that they are not practical. It is due to this that these rules have been followed to a certain extent only by a very few sādhakas, called sādhus, and have not been popular. It is because of this very impracticability existing in the system that a very large majority of the Jainas have remained *gṛhasthas*, leading the life of a householder, and have left the sādhus alone to observe the ethical laws. It may also be said that even the sādhus have found it extremely difficult to follow the ethical rules rigidly. The system could not appeal to the masses due to its being most impracticable as far as the ethical life was concerned. Hence, the statement of Prof. S. Radhakrishnan, that "since the severally simple religion of the Jainas did not admit grace or forgiveness, it could not appeal to the masses,"[240] does not appeal to me. In order that any law be respected and be of permanent value, it is absolutely necessary that the law must be both theoretically and practically sound.

[240] *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 332.

CHAPTER VII

BUDDHISM

1. *Introduction*

LIKE Jaina-ism, Buddhism also began first with the rules of training the body and mind in order to get rid of miseries, as derived from the direct teachings of Gotama, better known as the Buddha. Later on, his followers evolved a system of philosophical thought out of his experiences and discourses. These are the two aspects of Buddhism which are dealt with in this chapter. It must also be pointed out at the very outset that the two aspects are linked together, the first as dealing with the Sādhanā, while the second as the gradual realization of the Truth.

Buddhism began first with the training of body and mind.

It will be made clear that Gotama was moved at the sight of sufferings all around him and being unable to bear them any more, he kicked all his royal comforts in order to find out permanent remedy of sufferings and attain peace of mind and happiness. His meritorious deeds of the past lives, his sincere and austere penances and meditations of the present life brought success to him. He became Jīvanmukta and decided to save all his country-men, nay the world at large, from sufferings and miseries which beset every one in this world with the help of his own experiences. He taught to the world all that he had himself realized directly—'sayaṁ abhiññā sacchikatvā.'[1] There was nothing in his teachings of the nature of mere speculation and not directly realized. It is, therefore, necessary to deal briefly with the life-history of Gotama before proceeding with the details of his own and also of his followers' contributions to the world of knowledge.

Gotama left home to get rid of miseries and attain peace of mind.

He taught his experiences to the world.

[1] *Dīgha-Nikāya*, (PTS), III. P. 76.

First Stage
Life-history of Gotama (624—544 B.C.)

Birth history of Gotama.

Gotama was born in 624 B.C.[2] in a park attached to the village of Lumbinī or Lummini, which was close to Kapilavastu, the capital of the Śākya kingdom, while his mother was journeying from her father's house to Kapilavastu, on the full-moon night of Vaiśākha. His father, whose name was Śuddhodana, was the head of the Śākyas who ruled over the western tract lying at the foot of the Himālayas. Gotama's mother was Māyā who died only seven days after his birth, and he was then brought up by his step-mother. He was married at the early age of sixteen with Yaśodharā, daughter of Suprabuddha, a kṣatriya prince who ruled over Kóli; and had also a son, named Rāhula, who later became Gotama's disciple.

Details of his early life.

Early in his childhood certain peculiar signs were seen on his person which enabled the foretellers to predict that at the sight of four signs, namely, decrepitude, sickness, a dead body and a recluse, he would be induced to abandon the family life and become a mendicant. Having full faith in these, his father commanded that those objects should always be kept away from places to which Gotama usually resorted, but all this proved entirely futile.

Causes of his becoming a recluse: (i) Experiences of miseries in the world.

One day, when he was out in his chariot he happened to see an old and feeble man walking with great difficulty with the aid of his stick. The charioteer, on being asked about the condition of the man, told Gotama by way of reply that the man had grown old and weak and being of no use to the family any more, had been forsaken by his relations and that no one in this world would ever escape it. Another day, again, the prince saw a sick man quivering with high fever and abandoned by his relations, as his life was to leave his body soon. Next day, the prince, again, saw a dead body surrounded by his relations weeping and crying, because they would never see him again. On

[2] R. Spence Hardy—*Eastern Monachism*, P. 1. Some hold 563 B.C. as his date of birth.

another day, the prince saw a recluse who had abandoned his comforts of life and was moving about in search of the Truth. The prince having been greatly moved by these scenes of distress and realizing that he too would not escape the miseries of the world, determined to find out a remedy for the removal of human sufferings.

We know that being the son of a great kṣatriya Rājā and living amidst all possible luxuries, Gotama had no occasion to experience lack of any worldly comfort, and consequently, there was very little chance for him to experience miseries like other common people. Besides, his father had taken special care not to give him any opportunity to be moved at the sight of sufferings of others. But who could know the mysterious functioning of the law of karman. So, in spite of all this, as the force of his past karmic energy would have it, he was very sensitive from his very childhood and would not bear even a very ordinary pain, which as a human being, born on the surface of the earth, he had to face. His psychical faculties were too weak to endure the distress even of others, what to speak of his own.

(ii) His sensitive nature.

It is needless to say that there is pain in this world and that no one ever likes it whether he be a human being fully equipped with the faculties of reasoning and capable of discriminating between right and wrong and apt to maintain well-balanced and sober mind, or a lower creature engaged in eating and drinking that which brings to it good taste. Every one hates it. In fact, as has been made clear before in the introduction, every activity of our life, mental or physical, proceeds with the feelings of pain, and those who experience such feelings do try every moment to get rid of them. Had there been no pain in the world, perhaps there would have been no activity at all. And according to one's means and capacity, remedy, temporary or permanent, is also sought after by every one, and it is also a fact that until and unless a radical and permanent remedy is found there is no cessation of our

Experience of pain and dislike common to every creature.

Every activity proceeds from pain and ends in its annihilation alone.

activities and it is for this very reason that one has to take birth after birth till the goal is reached.

Ways and means of removing sufferings.

Some living along with their relations, looking after all their day to day duties and believing that the performance of one's own duty is also a means to redress these sufferings, pass their days without much hue and cry, mutually sharing sufferings and helping one another, and trying to get rid of their sufferings; while there are others who too sensitive to endure even a slight pain, not only their own but even those of others, do not care for their own regular duties, abandon their home and society and run away to some secluded place thinking that cutting off relations with the society and the family will bring some relief to their sufferings, and continue their efforts to find out some permanent remedy for the removal of their own sufferings and also of the world.

Gotama was, like the latter type of person, too sensitive to put up with the afflictions even of others. He could not see his way out of these sufferings while engaged in the duties of a house-holder. So tormented by the miseries of the world, unable to do anything to lessen them, Gotama could not stay any more in his house, deserted it one mid-night at the age of 29 (Ekūnatiṁso vayasā Subhadda ! yaṁ pabbaji kiṁ kusalānuesī)[3] to find out a sure cure of sufferings. Before leaving the palace for good he peeped into the chamber of his wife who was lying asleep with her own arm around the newly born babe and caught a glimpse of his only child. He reached a convenient place in the forest of Uruwelā, assumed the form of a recluse and began practising austere penance.

Resumé

Gotama ran away from his home not because he did not like it, not because he hated the society or the social order of the age, not again, because he disliked the family life, not because he found his own life burdensome, not because he hated the world, but because he could not face the miseries of the world, and thought that he would be able to get hold of some permanent remedy of miseries by going to some secluded place. Thus, it is quite clear that the only

[3] *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, 221.

cause of his leaving the life of a house-holder was his not being able to bear the sufferings. He thought and believed that his efforts would certainly bring peace and comfort to the distressed.

Means of achieving the aim.

Gotama first became a disciple of a sage named Ālāḍa Kālāma in Vaiśālī, in Mithilā, but he was not satisfied with his teachings and consequently, left for Magadha to practise penance on the bank of the river Nairañjanā, also called Phalgu. So he had to depend exclusively upon himself for laying out the plan of his future work. But for a really sincere seeker after the truth the Guru is always to be found within his own-self. In fact, the thoughts of an honest Sādhaka are really and essentially the thoughts of his guru who is always awoke within him. So Gotama under the guidance of his guru within him rightly thought that in order to realize the highest aim of life and to have the clear vision of the Eternal Light, discipline of body and mind was the most essential factor.[4] Nothing could a man achieve successfully without first being fully qualified by having full control over his body and mind. A human being is by nature beset with the defects of malice, love, hatred, etc., towards others and so long these are not removed from the mind and the inner sense organ is not completely purified, the Truth can never be achieved and the highest aim will ever remain unrealized. So Gotama began to purify his body and mind first through austere penance. This continued for full six years. But not finding any success till then, Gotama became restless and left the place and sought shelter under a *pippala* tree in the same forest. He did not realize that the time had come when he was to have the clear vision of the Eternal Light. The austere penances performed under the rigid discipline of body and mind had completely rooted out the five well-known human defects[5]

Gotama's exclusive dependence upon himself for his future work.

Discipline of body and mind essential for the realization of the highest aim.

Human nature beset with defects.

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[4] Śamathena vipaśyanāsuyuktaḥ kurute, kleśavināśamityavetya| Śamathaḥ prathamaṁ gaveṣaṇīyaḥ sa ca loke nirapekṣayābhiratyā||—*Bodhicaryāvatāra*, VII. 4.

[5] *Yogasūtra*, II. 3.

from his mind together with the very root cause of these, namely, *tṛṣṇā* or *vāsanā* for the worldly objects and had purified his inner-self to receive the Perfect Knowledge which alone could permanently put an end to his sufferings. Then there was no delay for even a single moment. His changing of place and taking shelter under the *pippala* tree was only an indication to show that the *karmakṣetra* is quite different from the *jñānakṣetra* though both have to be cultivated for the realization of the truth. At once, the Knowledge manifested itself within him and he thus became the Buddha, Enlightened at the age of 35.

Enlightenment is acquired after the removal of Vāsanā.

Combination of Karman and jñāna indispensable for the realization of the truth.

There was a harmonious synthesis of Action and Knowledge in him. Action having prepared the ground for removing the dirts (malas) from the antaḥkaraṇa, led to the manifestation of the Supreme Knowledge. Since then not only the Buddha came to be honoured and worshipped by all lovers of Perfect Knowledge, but even the very tree under which he got the clear vision of the Eternal Light became symbol of Knowledge and people worshipped it with great respect.

We know that the Buddha had left his home to find out the radical and permanent remedy of sufferings and that he was quite successful in his attempts. The Buddha knew that every being in this world was tortured with afflictions and he thought that it was his duty to move from place to place in order to preach his experiences to all and show them the Path which had brought to him the Eternal Light and permanent peace of mind. Thus, the Buddha did not like to put an end to his life soon after the realization of the truth. He did not interfere with the natural working of the Prārabdha-karman, and continued his physical organism till the day of the Mahānibbāna. But meantime though he had nothing to do for himself, yet like so many other world-teachers, the Buddha decided to preach to the world at large the true Message of Peace and Deliverance as directly experienced by him. This attitude of the

The Buddha decided to preach his experiences to his fellow beings.

Buddha was also a sort of Grace of that Almighty Power which moved him to feel compassionate towards his fellow-beings and show them also the same path which had brought to him permanent peace of mind. So it is clear that the Buddha started for his new adventure being afflicted with sufferings, found out the true remedy, achieved perfect happiness and peace of mind, felt pity on others and preached the Message of true happiness and peace to the world. This is all that the Buddha did.

Age of the Buddha was the age of jñāna and Bhakti as taught in the Upaniṣads and the *Gītā*.

It will not be out of place to make it clear at this stage that believing in the chronological order amongst the Vedic Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads followed by the *Bhagawadgītā* which are all believed to be pre-Buddha works, we can easily and confidently assert that the Age when the Buddha was born was the Age of Jñāna and Bhakti. The Age of the Saṁhitās, specially that of the *Yajurveda*, which had taught performance of sacrificial rites as one of the means of removing pain through directly communing with the higher powers, was far separated from the time when the Buddha flourished in the country. The Upaniṣads had taught that though *Action* was very essential for the achievement of the highest aim of life, yet its main purpose was to purify the inner sense organ, make the communion with divine powers easy and ultimately lead to the Highest Truth, Perfect Knowledge, which could be realized directly through *Knowledge* alone. The teachings of the *Gītā*, on the other hand, had emphasised another aspect, that is, perfect devotion, which as has been shown in the previous chapter, was equally essential for the manifestation of Perfect Knowledge as has been well illustrated in the actions of Arjuna and the Lord Kṛṣṇa. So the atmosphere of the then Hindu society was quite calm, peaceful and devotional. There was ordinarily no talk of sacrificial rituals. Due

Hindu Society calm, peaceful and devotional.

to the influence of the teachings of the Upaniṣads and the *Gītā*, the performance of sacrifices was not so prominent and frequent. But it must also be kept in mind that even

during the period of the Vedic Saṁhitās the performance of sacrifices was never obligatory. It was never meant to be a *nitya-karman,* the performance of which alone was binding. It was a *kāmya-karman,* an action to be performed only when a man wanted to fulfil certain ambitions of his own and not otherwise. Thus, it is a fact that every person did not perform sacrifice. Moreover, even those who had decided to perform sacrifices had to undergo rigid discipline and had to take a good deal of trouble to collect materials for the performance of a sacrifice and had also to follow the rules very rigidly and carefully in order to make the sacrifice a success; for, there was always a serious danger to destroy the sacrifices and put the performers of the sacrificial rites to serious troubles even at the slightest deviation from the rules or through carelessness, or ignorance on the part of any member engaged in the sacrifice even in the pronunciation of a word or even a syllable, as has been well illustrated in the sacrifice performed by Indra to destroy his enemy. So says the Śruti—" A defective sound either due to 'svara' or 'varṇa,' and used wrongly, does not yield the proper result. It, on the other hand, becomes adamantine (vajra) in the form of a word and destroys the *yajamāna* (the main performer of the sacrifice) as was the case with the word—*indraśatruḥ,* due to the defect of the 'svara."[6] Hence, there seems no justification in such statements as —" The cruel rites with which worship was accompanied shocked the conscience of Buddha;"[7] "The bloody sacrificial rituals were the marks of the period;"[8] "The authority of the Vedas having been discarded etc."[9] It should never be forgotten that neither during the period of the Upaniṣads, nor that of the *Gītā,* nor that of the Buddha, the authority of the Vedas was discarded. The teachings of the Vedas and their allied literatures all

Sacrifices were never obligatory.

Difficulties in the way of performing sacrifices.

[6] "Duṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ svarato varṇato vā mithyāprayukto na tamarthamāha/ Sa vāgvajro yajamānaṁ hinasti yathendraśatruḥ svarato'parādhāt//"

[7] *Indian Philosophy* by S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. 1. P. 354.

[8] *Buddhistic Studies* by B. C. Law, P. 113.

[9] *Basic Conception of Buddhism* by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, PP. 7–8.

were never obligatory so as to lead any revolt against them. What the Vedas preached was mainly devotional prayers and other similar forms of worship including sacrifices and meditation which were all non-obligatory in general, though obligatory for those alone who were ambitious. But it is needless to say that all were never ambitious, and so the performance of sacrificial rites where killing of animals was obligatory was not common but very rare, for, only a few could manage to perform such rites. As regards the haters of the Vedas, it would not be at all improper to say that in all ages, even during the days of the *Yajurveda* itself, there were non-believers who spoke against the Vedas. It is all but natural. We find similar things having been recorded even about the Buddha himself. We are told that just after his death when the Bhikkhus were weeping and lamenting over the death of the Master, one Subhadda, whom the Buddha himself had converted as his disciple, said to other Bhikkhus—"Enough Sirs, weep not, neither lament! We are well rid of the Great Samaṇa. We used to be annoyed by being told—This beseems you, this beseems you not. But now we shall be able to do whatever we like, and what we do not like, that we shall not have to do.'[10] Again, from the dialogue of the Buddha with Māluṅkhyāputta it seems that the latter was not a sincere believer in what the Buddha preached. So there was nothing unusual in the days of the Buddha to cause revolt against the orthodox culture of the age.

Sacrificial rites were not common.

No revolt against the orthodox traditions of the age.

Really speaking, the age of the Upaniṣads was a period of rational thinking. Reasoning was not considered a crime at all, rather it was encouraged by the sages and the wise. Almost all the Upaniṣads are full of reasonings and contain all sorts of arguments, both orthodox and heterodox. As a matter of fact, there was a general injunction that no truth should be accepted

Upaniṣadic period was the age of rational thinking.

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10 *Vinayapiṭaka*, XI, I, 1, *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, 273.

unless it had been critically examined and verified. So says the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*—"The Ātman, O Maitreyī! should be realized (through the process of realization as given below); it should be heard of, should be critically examined and should be verified. By the realization of the Ātman through hearing (śravaṇa), critical reasoning (manana) and verification through meditation (nididhyāsana), all this is known."[11] There was perfect freedom of thought, though all thoughts were not necessarily valid from the point of view of there being really only one Absolute Truth. We find that the teachers of the Upaniṣads warned their pupils against the imitation of all their (teachers') actions. So says the *Tattirīya Upaniṣad*—"Follow flawless actions of ours and no other."[12] Similarly, when we read the dialogue of the Buddha with Kālāmas where the former is reported to have said, "This I have said to you, O Kālāmas! but you may accept it not because it is a report, not because it is a tradition, not because it is so said in the past...... nor because your preceptor is a recluse, but if you yourself understand that this is as meritorious and blameless, and when accepted, is for benefit and happiness, then you may accept it,"[13] we do not feel astonished in the least. It is nothing more than what the Upaniṣads had already taught.

The Buddha followed the path of the Upaniṣads.

Thus, we find that the path which the Buddha followed for the attainment of Enlightenment and what he preached to his disciples was all on the lines of the Upaniṣads, or we may say, on the lines of the orthodox Sanātanists. So when the Buddha began to preach his teachings for the first time, people did not feel restless. They all received him and his teachings well. There might have been possibly another reason which helped the Buddha more in gaining public favour. We know that prior to the advent of the Buddha it was most probably not possible for the common people to know thoughts of subtler nature. Those

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11 II. iv. 5.

12 I. 11.

13 *Aṅguttaranikāya*, PTS. III, 653.

thoughts were still confined within the Upaniṣads and were not easily available and also easily intelligible to common people. It was for the first time that the Buddha preached the means of getting rid of miseries in a connected form. Again, the Upaniṣads being written in Sanskrit, could not be easily understood by them, while the Buddha preached the same thought in the language of the people; so they felt happy to learn all about their desired end from him, who had personal experience of all that he preached. It was because of this that the people installed him as one of the ten incarnations of the Almighty Lord. They respected his knowledge so much that since he had the vision of the Eternal Light sitting under the pippala tree, it (the pippala tree) came to be recognized as the *symbol of Knowledge* and people worshipped it even when they went on pilgrimage to Gayā to perform the śrāddha of their deceased relations, which would not have been ever possible had the Buddha been a reactionary and had preached against the Vedic culture. This may be well supported by the fact that the Buddha always kept perfect silence when debatable questions, such as, "the world is eternal; the world is not eternal; the world is finite; the world is not finite; soul is different from body; soul exists after death; it does not exist after death" and so on, were put to him. Amongst the various reasons put forth in support of his silence there was one that the Buddha did not speak on such questions because, "he had sufficient ground for thinking that there was every possibility of his answer, if given, being not properly understood, or being misunderstood by the enquirers."[14] So his silence did not interrupt the thoughts of people. In order to avoid clash amongst the people and himself being called partial, the Buddha took up the Middle Path (*Madhyama Pratipada*), that is, the avoidance of the two extremes, such as, 'it is,' and 'it is not,' 'it is eternal' and 'it is not eternal,' etc.[15]

Probable cause of the Buddha's silence on controvertial problems.

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14 *Basic Conception of Buddhism* by V. Bhattacharya, P. 15.

15 *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā*, XV. 7.

State of Enlightenment.

To return then to the state of Enlightenment of Gotama, it is said that he, in his ecstatic mood, uttered the following well-known lines just after getting the Enlightenment—

" Anekajātisaṁsāraṁ sandhāvissaṁ anibbisaṁ /
Gahakārakaṁ gavesanto dukkhā jāti punappunaṁ //
Gahakāraka diṭhṭhosi puna gehaṁ na kāhasi /
Sabbā te phāsukā bhaggā gahakūṭaṁ visaṅkhitaṁ //
Visaṅkhāragataṁ cittaṁ taṇhānaṁ khayamajjhagā" //[16]

Translation :

"Many a birth and transmigration wandering o'er in ceaseless round,
Seeking for the house's builder, painful births I have found,
O house-builder! thou art found out, house thou shalt not build again,
All thy rafters lo! are broken, and the roof-peak split amain,
Reaching dissolution my heart doth here end of thirst attain."[17]

(i) *Main teachings of the Buddha*

First sermon at Sāranātha.

After having achieved his aim, the Buddha desirous of preaching his experiences to the world at large, first came to Sāranātha near Banaras and preached his first famous sermon on the 'Four Noble Truths' and 'The Noble Eightfold Path' and thus moved the first 'Turning of the wheel of the Laws' (Dharmacakrapravartana).

Tṛṣṇā cause of births and rebirths.

From the lines of the *Dhammapada* quoted above it is clear that by the word 'geha' is meant 'body' and by 'gahakāraka' the builder of the house, that is, desire (tṛṣṇā). It is due to this tṛṣṇā itself that one has to undergo births and rebirths. So the Buddha was able to cast off

[16] *Dhammapada*, 153—154.

[17] *Systems of Buddhistic Thought* by Yamakami Sogen, P. 69.

this tṛṣṇā once for all and there was no more possibility of its recurrence.

Now, a question may be asked : What is the cause of this tṛṣṇā itself?

In reply to this the Buddhists hold that through the series of causes and effects, ultimately, ignorance (avidyā) is found to be the cause of all our sufferings including tṛṣṇā. And this chain of causes and effects is evolved out of the Four Noble Truths taught by the Buddha himself. The following is the twelve-linked *Chain of Causation,* also called Nidānas, as found in the *Abhidhammakośa.*[18]

Cause of Tṛṣṇā. Chain of the Pratītya-samutpāda — Dependent Origination.

(1) From ignorance (avidyā) proceeds the Conformation (Saṁskāra),

(2) From Conformation proceeds Consciousness (vijñāna),

(3) From Consciousness proceed Name and Form (nāma-rūpa),

(4) From Name and Form proceed Six organs of sense (Ṣaḍāyatana),

(5) From Six organs of sense proceeds Contact (sparśa),

(6) From Contact proceeds Sensation (vedanā),

(7) From Sensation proceeds Desire (tṛṣṇā),

(8) From Desire proceeds Attachment (upādāna),

(9) From Attachment proceeds Disposition for becoming (bhāva),

(10) From Disposition for becoming proceeds Birth (jāti),

(11) From Birth proceeds Old Age (Jarā), and

(12) From Old Age proceeds Death (maraṇa).

It has to be kept in mind that Jarā and Maraṇa are put together as one effect.

After carefully analysing the nature of all these twelve Nidānas, it will be clear that these are evolved out of the *Four Noble Truths* of the Buddha. Now,

18 III. 21–24.

dividing these twelve Nidānas into two groups of (1) *Past cause and Present effect,* and (2) *Present cause and Future effect,* it is found that the first two nidānas, namely, avidyā and saṁskāra are evolved out of the second Truth, that is, the cause of suffering (duḥkha-samudaya) dealing with the present life. These two nidānas constitute the two causes which exist in the past and which give birth to the five effects in the present, each and all of which represent the first Truth, that is, suffering in the present life. The five effects are—Vijñāna, Nāma-rūpa, Ṣaḍāyatana, Sparśa and Vedanā. Each of these is associated with suffering.

The seven nidānas from avidyā to vedanā represent the two causes in the past and the five effects produced by them in the present. The remaining nidānas from Tṛṣṇā downwards represent the three causes in the present and their two effects in the future. The three causes are—Desire, Attachment and Existence. Desire and Attachment are kleśas, while Existence is karman and these three represent the second Truth. These three causes existing in the present produce three effects in future, namely, Birth, Old Age and Death which represent the first Noble Truth.

This Twelve-linked Chain of Causation is called *Paticca-samuppāda* (*Pratītyasamutpāda*), one of the most vital problems of Buddhism. It is also known as the *Bhavacakra.* So has been said by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidhammakośa*[19]—

Sa pratītyasamutpādo dvādaśāṅgaḥ trikāṇḍakaḥ /
Pūrvā'parāntayordve dve madhye'ṣṭau paripūraṇāḥ //

According to the *Abkidhammakośa*[20] kleśa is of three types—ignorance (avidyā), desire (tṛṣṇā) and attachment (upādāna), while conformation (saṁskāra) and disposition for becoming (bhava) represent karman: consciousness, name and form, six organs of sense, contact, sensation, birth and old age and death are the substrata (āśraya = vastu) of kleśa and karman and the same seven āśrayas are the effects. Kleśa leads to kleśa, just

[19] III. 20.
[20] III. 26.

as desire leads to Attachment; and from kleśa is produced karman also, just as Attachment leads to bhava (disposition for becoming) and ignorance leads to conformation (saṁskāra). Karman also produces vastu (substratum), just as conformations lead to consciousness (vijñāna) and disposition for becoming leads to birth; again, vastu leads to another vastu, just as consciousness leads to name and form; Name and form lead to the six organs of sense, contact leads to sensation, while birth leads to old age and death; Vastu also produces kleśas, just as from Sensation proceeds Desire.

This is how the various factors (nidānas) of the 'bhavacakra,' that is, the *Dependent Origination* (Pratītyasamutpāda), function. In other words, the first and the second, namely, ignorance and conformation representing the cause, represent samutpāda; the effect (phala), namely, the eleventh and the twelfth (jāti and Jarāmaraṇa), has come to exist having depended upon the cause; while the ten middle factors are both causes and effects.[21]

Kleśa and Karman are causes of miseries.

From the above we can understand how kleśa and karman are at the root of all our miseries. So in order to get rid of sufferings it is most essential to put an end to these two causes of our afflictions. This, effort is made in Buddhism to get rid of these, and accordingly, there are three stages during which kleśas and upakleśas are removed before one achieves Buddhahood. The three stages of such a seeker after the truth are—the stage of Śrāvaka, of Pratyeka-Buddha and of Bodhisattva.

The three stages of achieving Buddhahood.

(1) *The stage of Śrāvaka,* also called śramaṇa, is that which is attained by one who has freed himself from all the defilements (kleśas); (2) the *stage of Pratyeka-buddha* is one which is acquired by one who has got rid of kleśas and also a few upakleśas;[22] and (3) *the stage of Bodhisattva* is that which is acquired by one who has freed himself from all the principal kleśas and the

21 *Abhidhammakośa,* III. 26–28.

22 An upakleśa is one of the five anuśayas and it includes all kleśas, though all upakleśas are not kleśas—*Abhidhammakośa,* V. 41, 46, 52.

upakleśas. It is the same as the stage of Arhantaship of the Hīnayāna Buddhism. This is the stage which precedes the stage of Buddhahood, or Nirvāṇa. Hence, it is called the Path of Nirvāṇa.

Four stages of the path to Nirvāṇa.

The Path to Nirvāṇa is divided into four stages, each of which again, is subdivided into lower and higher states, called Mārga and Phala respectively. The higher state is to be achieved only when the next lower has been attained. The first stage is that of the *Sotāpanna* according to which a sādhaka has entered into the stream (srotas) leading to Nirvāṇa. He has freed himself from the kleśas and the three *Saṁyojanas,* fetters of human passions, namely, *Satkāyadṛṣṭi* (error of individuality, also called *Diṭṭhi*), *Vicikitsā* (perplexity) and *Śīlavrataparāmarśa* (practice of rite and ritual); so it is said that the doors of the gate to torments (apāya) are shut for him. There are *Sotāpannas* of various degrees, the lowest of which is named *Saptakṛdbhavaparama* or only *Saptakṛtparama,* who will be reborn seven times only, while the highest of which is called *Kulaṅkula,* who will be reborn only twice or thrice.

The second stage is that of *Sakṛdāgāmin,* that is, one who is reborn only once in this world. He is free from all the kleśas. He has also got rid of the three above mentioned Saṁyojanas along with rāga, dveṣa and moha.

The third stage is that of *Anāgāmin,* who is not reborn in this phenomenal world at all. He is free from all the ten Saṁyojanas (fetters), namely, (1) lust after life in the kāmaloka (kāmarāgasaṁyojana), (2) lust after life in the rūpaloka (rūparāga), (3) lust after life in the arūpaloka (arūparāga), (4) aversion (paṭigha), (5) conceit (mānasaṁyojana), (6) error (diṭṭhi), (7) practice of rite and ritual (sīlabbataparāmarśa), (8) perplexity (vicikicchā), (9) distraction (uddhaccasaṁyojana), and (10) ignorance (avijjāsaṁyojana).[23] He may be born in the Devaloka once more after which he will enter into the stage of Arhat, the last stage after which he is never reborn.

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23 *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho,* VII, 10–11.

We know, as has been made clear before, that pain is at the root of all our physical and mental activities.

The Four Noble Truths.

That there is pain all round us cannot be denied. There is pain during existence; there is pain in death; there is pain in birth; painful is the separation from beloveds and painful is the union with objects causing hatred. In other words, desire which is also an activity of our mental faculty is also caused by the feelings of pain, and when there is desire (tṛṣṇā), then again there is pain. Again, it is not something eternal. It has its own cause, and consequently, there will be cessation of it also. It is also, therefore, true that there is the means to the cessation of sufferings. So the Buddha is said to have preached the *Four Noble Truths*—

"Cattāri ariya saccāni sammappaññāya passati/
Dukkhaṁ dukkhasamuppādaṁ dukkhassa ca atikkamaṁ/
. . . . dukkhūpasamagāminaṁ."[24]

In other words, the Buddha convinced people of the reality of the *Four Noble Truths*, namely, (1) Dukkha—suffering, which is universal; (2) Dukkhasamudaya, cause of suffering; (3) Dukkhanirodha, cessation of suffering and (4) Dukkhanirodhagāminī-pratipad, the path leading to the cessation of suffering. So the Buddha is said to have preached—

"Catunnaṁ ariya saccānaṁ yathābhūtaṁ adassanā
Saṁsaritaṁ dīghamaddhānaṁ tāsu tāsveva jātisu/
Tāni etāni diṭṭhāni bhava netti samūhatā
Ucchinnaṁ mūlaṁ dukkhassa natthi dāni punabbhavo'ti//[25]

Translation—Not having realized the four noble truths one has to wander through so many various births. When these are realized, on the other hand, the cause of disposition for becoming is destroyed, the suffering is uprooted and then follows the cessation of birth.

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[24] *Dhammapada*, 191–92; *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, Section 48.
[25] *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, II, 49.

Real nature of the world is full of miseries.

Having taught these four noble truths to the disciples, the Buddha told them that they were all in dark as to the real nature of the world which is full of miseries. People in their ignorance thought of pleasures of life, while in reality, there was none. He also explained to them how in every walk of life there were sufferings and that they should not consider themselves happy unless and until those sufferings were permanently removed. So it was very essential, said the Buddha, to find out permanent remedy for the removal of sufferings.

Means to remove miseries.

Naturally then arose the obvious question of finding out the means to get the afflictions removed. To this it may be pointed out by way of reply that whatever was taught by the Buddha was based exclusively on his own experiences. He had seen in his life that salvation from miseries was possible through one's own efforts for which perfect physical, moral, and mental discipline was most essential. Besides, sacrifice of all personal comforts, performance of austere penances, prayers and meditations alone could help one to realize the desired aim. It was, therefore, necessary, the Buddha preached, to follow the sort of life which he had himself led to get rid of miseries.

Causes which led people to become recluses.

By the way, it should be made clear that though the Buddha might not have directly taught any one to lead the life of a recluse and run away from his relations, yet being almost sure of the fact that without being a recluse the aim could not be easily achieved, the followers of the Buddha decided to become mendicants and follow the example of the Buddha himself who had become a mendicant and had run away from his relations to find out the remedy of suffering.[25a]

[25a] In the *Khaggavisāṇa Sutta,* however, it is found that the Buddha had taught his disciples to leave their family life and become recluses. But how far it is consistent with a verse from *Parābhava Sutta* given below is not known :—

Yo mātaraṁ vā pitaraṁ vā jiṇṇakaṁ gatayobbaṇam/

Pahu santo na bharati taṁ parābhavato mukhaṁ//

Perhaps all these are later teachings of the followers of the Buddha.

So he explained further the fourth noble truth, that is, the path leading to the cessation of sufferings by referring it to the *noble eightfold path,* known as *'aṭṭhaṅgikaṁ maggaṁ'* (aṣṭāṅga-mārga).[26] To avoid ambiguity, I give here in *verbatim* the translation of an extract from a sermon on it attributed to the Buddha, which is to be found in the *Majjhimanikāya.*

Four Noble Truths and the noble eightfold path explained.

" Now, what is the noble truth concerning the Path that leads to the cessation of suffering? This is the *Noble Eightfold Path,* viz.—(i) Right views *(sammā-diṭṭhi-samyagdṛṣti);* (ii) Right aspiration (*sammā-saṅkappa-samyak-saṅkalpa*); (iii) Right speech (*sammā-vācā-samyagvāca*); (iv) Right conduct (*sammā-kammanta-samayakkarmānta*); (v) Right means of livelihood (*sammā-ājīva-samyagājīva*); (vi) Right exertion (*sammā-vāyāma-samyagvyāyāma*); (vii) Right mindfulness (*sammā-sati-samyaksmṛti);* (viii) and Right meditation (*sammā-samādhi-samyaksamādhi*)."

Just a short explanation of these will not be uncalled for.

(a) By ' *Right views* ' are meant knowledge concerning suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path leading to the cessation of suffering.

(b) Renouncing of ill-feeling, of harm-doing and of worldliness all are called ' *Right aspirations* '.

(c) Abstaining from speaking lies, from slander, from the use of unkind words, from indulging in frivolous talk all are called ' *Right speech* '.

(d) Abstention from destroying life, from taking away what is not given, from wrongful satisfaction of the senses, all this is known as ' *Right conduct* '.

(e) All well-born laymen renounce bad livelihood and accept a good one—this is what is known as ' *Right livelihood.'*

(f) A Bhikkhu makes a strong and manly effort by preparing his mind thereto for putting a stop to the rise of evil and sinful states of mind which have not arisen, for renouncing the evil and sinful states of mind which have already arisen; for giving rise to good states

26 *Dhammapada,* 191.

of mind which have not arisen; for the continuance, realization, repetition, extension, meditation, and fulfilment of good states of mind that have already arisen; all this is what is ralled '*Right Exertion.*'

(g) A Bhikkhu lives zealously, consciously, mindfully, subduing covetousness and despondency in this world and regarding the body as body, sensations as sensations, mind as mind and mental states as mental states. All this is called '*Right mindfulness*'.

(h) It is the attainment of the four stages of intent meditation (Jhāna) one after the other, to wit—the first intent meditation which arises on one's separating oneself from passions and evil states of mind which is conjoint with application initial (*vitakka*) and sustained (vicāra) which arises from seclusion and is coupled with pleasure and joy; the second intent meditation which arises on the cessation of application initial and sustained, is conducive to inward peace, is characterized by concentration of mind, dissociated from application initial and sustained, originating from samādhi coupled with pleasure and joy; the third intent meditation which involves indifference to pleasure, is associated with mindfulness and knowledge and connected with the bodily feeling of joy; and the fourth intent meditation which involves the purification of mindfulness coupled with indifference, freedom from sorrow and joy consequent on the renunciation of either and the previous cessation of joy and sorrow. This is what is called '*Right Samādhi.*'[27]

This is in brief the substance of the *Noble Eightfold Path* which the Buddha preached to his disciples.

Common feature between Buddhism, Āyurveda, Yoga and Nyāya.

It will be interesting to note here that the four noble truths of the Buddha are the same as the four sections of the Indian medical science applied to the removal of pain from the organism and is not different from the four means applied to the practice of yoga as found in the *Yogabhāṣya* of *Vyāsa.*[28] So says the *Bhāṣya*—

[27] *Systems of Buddhistic Thought,* pp. 169–71.

[28] II. 15.

Yathā cikitsāśāstraṁ caturvyūhaṁ rogo, rogaheturārogyaṁ, bhaiṣajyamiti, evamidamapi śāstraṁ caturvyūhameva. Tadyathā—saṁsāraḥ, saṁsārahetumokṣo, mokṣopāya eveti.

Translation—As the medical science has four sections, viz., disease, cause of disease, removal of disease, and medicine (remedy), even so this science, that is, the Yogaśāstra has four sections, *viz.*, saṁsāra, cause of saṁsāra, Final Emancipation, and the means to Final Emancipation.

The same idea we find in the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana who says:—'Heyaṁ, tasya nirvartakaṁ, hānaṁ ātyantikaṁ, tasyopāyaḥ, adhigantavya ityetāni catvāryarthapadāni samyagbuddhvā niḥśreyasamadhigacchati'.[29]

Translation—The highest good is attained when one has rightly understood the real nature of the following four objects: (a) that which is fit to be discarded (*viz.*, pain) along with its cause (that is, ignorance and desire; merit and demerit, as leading to pain), (b) that which is absolutely destructive of pain, (that is, true knowledge), (c) the means of its (pain's) destruction (that is, true knowledge), (d) the means of its (pain's) destruction (that is, the scientific treatises), and (e) the goal to be realized (that is, the Highest good).

This should be kept here in mind that Vātsyāyana has joined the first two truths of the Buddha under one and has added one more to it, *viz.*, 'the goal to be realized.' The last one though implied in the truths of the Buddha, is a new addition in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*.

This is the first sermon which the Buddha delivered to his disciples. Those five persons who were sent by the Buddha's father to follow the Buddha in the forest of Uruwelā, were his first disciples. Besides these teachings, the Buddha is said to have delivered some of the farewell speeches handed down in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* to his disciples before his passing away. Even there we find that what the Buddha preached was quite consistent with his above mentioned teachings of discipline of body and mind. There is nothing which may be said to be in any way differing from the old Upaniṣadic teachings.

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29 I. i. 1.

He had also established an order of the Buddhist monks, his followers, who were about 500 in number[30] and laid down rules of conduct for them, known as dasa-sikkhā.[31] The last words of the Buddha to his disciples were—'Behold now, Bhikkhus! I exhort you saying,—Decay is inherent in all component things! Work out your salvation with diligence.'[32]

Thus, having preached all such moral and intellectual lessons to his disciples and having prevented them against indulgence into problems not conducive to good and not in the least helpful in removing their pain, the Buddha gradually, at the age of eighty (asītiko me vayo vattati)[33] attained *Mahānibbāna*, lying in the midst of his dear disciples, at Kuśinārā, a village in the district of Gorakhpur, in 544 B.C.

This is in brief the life and teachings of the Buddha himself. There was a good deal of confusion even amongst the very disciples of the Buddha as to the actual extent of the Buddha's teachings. It is a fact that no teachings of the Master were ever recorded during his life-time. After his death his disciples made several efforts to correctly record them. But that there was no unanimity amongst the disciples will be clear from the following account. In this context for the purpose of this account, I fully depend upon what Winternitz has said in his *History of Indian Literature* which has been shared by others as well. He writes—

Faithful recording of the Master's teachings.

30 Pañcannaṁ bhikkhu satānaṁ—*Mahāparinibbānasutta*, 234.

31 The ten commandments are: (1) I will observe the precept, or ordinance, that forbids the taking of life. (2) I will observe the precept, or ordinance, that forbids the taking of that which has not been given. (3) I will observe the precept, or ordinance, that forbids sexual intercourse. (4) I will observe the precept, or ordinance, that forbids the saying of that which is not true. (5) I will observe the precept, or ordinance, that forbids the use of intoxicating drinks, that led to indifference towards religion. (6) I will observe the precept, or ordinance, that forbids the eating of food after mid-day. (7) I will observe the precept or ordinance, that forbids attendance upon dancing, singing, music and masks. (8) I will observe the precept, or ordinance, that forbids the adorning of the body with flowers, and the use of perfumes and unguents. (9) I will observe the precept, or ordinance, that forbids the use of high or honourable seats or couches. (10) I will observe the precept, or ordinance, that forbids the receiving of gold or silver.—R. S. Hardy—*Eastern Monachism*, pp. 23—24.

32 *Handa dāni Bhikkhave! āmantayāmi vo vayadhammā saṅkhārā appamādena sampādethā—Mahāparinibbānasutta*, 235.

33 *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, 77.

"It is true that in the *Tripiṭaka,* the Pali canon of the Buddhists, most of the speeches and sayings are placed in the mouth of Buddha himself; it is even related exactly and circumstantially where and on what occasion the master delivered a speech or made an utterance. How much out of all this, should really be attributed to Buddha, will probably never be decided; for Gotama Buddha has not left behind him any written matter, even as little as Yājñavalkya, Śāṇḍilya, or Śaunaka. However, as much of the contents of the speeches and utterances of these sages has probably been handed down in the Upaniṣads, so, doubtless, many speeches and utterances of Buddha were faithfully preserved in the memory of his disciples and handed down to posterity. We may without laying ourselves open to the charge of credulousness, regard as originating with Buddha himself, speeches such as the famous sermon of Banaras on the 'four noble truths' and the 'noble eightfold path,' which recurs always in the same wording, not only in many parts of the Pali canon, but also in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts, some of the farewell speeches handed down in the *Mahāparinibbānsutta,* which the master supposed to have addressed to his disciples before his passing, and some of the verses and short utterances handed down as "words of the Buddha" in the *Dhammapada,* in the *Udāna,* in the *Itivuttaka* and in more or less the same form also in Sanskrit texts of Nepal, as well as in Tibetan and Chinese translations. Gotama Buddha, however, did not only preach his new doctrine of suffering, but also founded a monastic order; he gathered around himself a community of disciples who, according to strict precepts, led a holy life in the way of the master, in order to reach the end of suffering—the much praised Nirvāṇa. And some of the rules and laws for this monastic community probably originated with Buddha himself, above all the ten commandments for mendicant monks (dasasikkhāpadāni), perhaps also the list of the transgressions (pātimokkha), though in an earlier and shorter form than that in which we have it now."[34]

[34] Vol. II. pp. 2–3.

Resumé of the teachings of the first stage of Buddhism.

These are the main ideas of Buddhism during the first stage of its history. This period stands for the peaceful teachings of Buddhism from the mouth of the Buddha himself. It did not produce any clash with the traditional line of the Upaniṣads. No re-action of any kind is found to have taken place during this period. People might have liked the teachings of the Buddha mainly for the following reasons: (1) The teachings were the outcome of the direct experience of one who was one of them and was living the same life which he preached himself to his disciples. (2) The Buddha did not conceal anything from his disciples, so he himself said, 'Ānanda! the Tathāgata has no such thing as closed first of a teacher (*ācariya muṭṭhi*)'.[35] (3) He did not preach anything which was against the Upaniṣadic or the Vedic teachings. (4) He put the ways and means of realizing the highest aim of life and philosophy, *viz.*, permanent cessation of sufferings, in a systematized form. (5) And all this was preached and explained personally through personal experience and through the language of the people. (6) Besides, he was kind, truthful and honest in his behaviour towards his disciples. (7) And lastly, because of the most needed nature of the Message of Deliverance. Here, ends the first stage of the history of Buddhism.

Second Stage

After the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha

Causes which led people to become Buddhists.

People, mostly ignorant, liked the Buddha, became much impressed with his magnetic personality and gathered round him in thousands and listened to his charming and hopeful Message of Deliverance with rapt attention. At once, they decided to follow his path. It was all due to the sublime and most needed nature of the theme of his message. Every one in this world is pricked and tortured by various kinds of miseries, and so who is not eager to hear and follow the ways of deliverance? The Message of Deliverance becomes much

[35] *Mahāparinibhānasutta*, 77.

more attractive when it comes from one who has himself followed it and has achieved success. This was what people found in the Buddha. They were mostly sensitive and credulous and little did they consider of the consequences which would result if the message were followed only out of sentiment, zeal and emotion. So the sentimentalists left their home and their family and turned recluses and joined the party of the disciples of the Buddha.

Majority of Sentimentalists among the Buddha's disciples.

But it is to be kept in mind that those people, both men and women, who followed Buddha's teachings, no doubt, became enchanted with the wonderful result which the Buddha had achieved namely, final cessation of pain or the attainment of Buddhahood, did not care much for the very means which had brought success to the Buddha. In other words, they forgot the importance of austere sādhanā and ran away with great temptation after the idea of Enlightenment alone, without realizing that the latter entirely depended upon the former. It is perhaps, therefore, that no importance is attached to the *Karmakṣetra* of Uruwelā in Buddhistic worships. So the result was that though they turned recluses, yet they could not maintain the high standard of discipline of body and mind which alone could have brought success to them, and consequently, failed to realize the aim. Though the number of the followers of the Buddha might have been very large, yet we are told that during Buddha's own life-time only five hundred were admitted into the Order (Cf. Pañcannaṁ bhikkhu satānaṁ).[36]

Probable effect of Buddha's teachings.

Now, let us pause for a moment and consider the situation which might have been created by the teachings of the Buddha. After listening to the charming, peaceful and solacing message of the *Path of Deliverance* from the Master, credulous emotionalists, irrespective of caste and creed, age and sex, must have left their home, leaving all their relations in utter despair and creating chaos in the family.

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[36] *Mahāparinibbānasutta,* VI. 234.

No doubt, the Upaniṣads have also taught to take to the life of a recluse and to seek after the Highest aim of life, but those teachings were not for all.

Teachings of Upaniṣads *versus* those of the Buddha.

The consideration of the fitness of the person (*adhikārin*) attending the teachings was foremost in the mind of the teachers of the Upaniṣadic period, and consequently, such persons alone could enter into the life of a mendicant who had passed through other preliminary stages, and had thus, qualified themselves for the life of a recluse. The result was that such persons had acquired experiences of the various previous stages of their life in the world

Sincere retirement in the case of the followers of Upaniṣadic teachings.

and had really become disgusted with it because of sufferings and had felt a natural longing for retiring from the active life of the world to the peaceful life of a recluse thinking and meditating upon the truth. Following that sort of life they felt that they had done all their duties towards their relations and the society and that there was left practically nothing in the world to be achieved by them. So it was a natural retirement for the search of the Truth.

Sense of satisfaction in having done one's duty towards the society.

Hence, once a person entered into that retired life, neither he repented for what he did, nor did his relations ever feel that he did not do anything for them and left his family in utter disappointment and became the cause of the ruin of the family in several cases. They were, like the followers of the Buddha, equally tortured by worldly afflictions and had also heard of the *Path of Deliverance*, from the Upaniṣads, but they had restraint over their activities and so whatever they did was in certain definite order and in natural course.

No repentence in becoming a recluse according to the Upaniṣadic teachings.

In the case of the Buddha, on the other hand, there was no such restriction. Every body was free to adopt the life of a recluse.

Buddha's teachings.

So when they listened to the solacing message of the Master, they did not pause to think of their duties in the family and the society but at once, in their emotional mood without being really dis-

No natural renunciation.

gusted with the world, might have left their home and become mendicants. The result of the hasty step of those people, mostly due to their sentimental nature, was that though they became mendicants, yet they could not observe the rules and laws laid down for them and consequently, they did many things which they should not have done in the usual course. Force of emotion did not help them to maintain the balance of their mind and retain the spirit of the lessons taught by the Buddha for a long period. No sooner it began to diminish, than they might have begun to misbehave and quarrel amongst themselves. Moreover, it will have to be admitted that all those who listened to the teachings of the Master were not equally qualified. Though the Master teaches the same lesson to all, yet the disciples receive the teachings according to their own capacity.

Mendicants, mostly sentimentalists, failed to maintain discipline.

So some of these recluses might have been happy, but not all. They could not for sometime express their resentment before the Master. But that there were many such disciples of the Buddha is evident from the instance of Subhadda referred to above. Again, that all those feelings of the disciples were not concealed from the Master is also obvious from the Buddha's last words which he had uttered to Ānanda, just before his death,—"When I am gone, Ānanda! let the Order, if it should so desire, abolish all the lesser and minor precepts." Again, the Master says—"When I am gone, Ānanda! let the higher penalty (*brahmadaṇḍo*) be imposed upon Sanna (a Bhikkhu)."... . "Let Sanna say whatever he may like, Ānanda! the Bhikkhus should neither speak to him, nor exhort him, nor advise him."[37]

They concealed their feelings of resentment.

Buddha aware of the schism, resentment and mischievous behaviour present in the Order.

Buddha's order for social boycott.

From all this we gather that there was enough symptoms of disturbance in the Order even during the life-time of the Master. But while he was alive not much trouble could arise. So writes Yamakami Sogen,

[37] *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, VI. 228–30.

"As is well known to most of you, in Buddha's life-time his disciples were saved from the curse of a schism, thanks to the magnetic personality of the teacher. But tradition relates that when 116 years had elapsed after the death of the Great Teacher, there arose amongst his followers a violent controversy regarding the theory and practice of the Vinaya, or rules of the Order, which divided them, at last, into two bitterly antagonistic camps."[38]

Chaos and schisms in the Order

Thousands of followers were turned out of the Order for misbehaviour.

Again, we find that at the time of the third Council, there was so much corruption in the Order that several thousands of the disciples had to be turned out of the Order. So writes R. S. Hardy, "They continued the practice of many things that were contrary to the Vinaya. When these abuses came to the knowledge of Dharmāśoka, he commanded Moggaliputta Tissa to expel from the priesthood 60,000 tirttakas who had transgressed the ordinances, and from 60,000 faithful priests to choose a thousand for the holding of a convocation of which he was to be the president."[39] This is also the view of Dr. M. Winternitz who writes, "About a hundred years after the passing of the Buddha, a schism occured, which stirred up so much controversy that a great assembly of monks had to be summoned, to decide what should be regarded as right with reference to the debatable points."[40]

Confusion in the correct interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha.

From all these reports we gather that there was a good deal of confusion as to the exact spirit or interpretation of the teachings of the Master after his Mahānibbāna. His teachings were never recorded up to that time. They were like śrutis kept in the memory of his disciples and handed down to posterity orally. So it gave an opportunity to many, and particularly to those who wanted change in the

38 *Systems of Buddhistic Thoughts*, p. 99.

39 *Eastern Monachism* by R. S. Hardy, p. 183.

40 *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II. p. 5.

rules, to assert their own interpretation in the light of their own interests. No one could ever put any check over those views and subsequently, several schools came into existence just after the passing away of the Master. All those thoughts might have been brewing during the life-time of the Master, but his personality did not give them any chance to burst up. But no sooner than the Master had passed away, every body began to insist upon his own interpretation of the rules as was clear from the utterance of Subhadda just after the death of the Buddha.[41] This led the older disciples to call a meeting of the Order. Accordingly, the first Council, known as the *Pañca-śataka-saṅgha,* was called on the 61st day of his death at Rājagṛha in Magadha. All the five hundred monks attended it and it was presided over by Mahākāssapa, the most qualified of the Buddha's disciples. In that meeting Upāli, the senior-most disciple, recited the rules and laws regarding discipline of body and mind to be observed by the members of the Order which became included in the Vinayapiṭaka. Next Ānanda, the favourite disciple of the Master, was called upon to recite the teachings of the Master given through stories and parables, particularly during his preaching tours. And lastly, Mahākāssapa, the president, himself was requested to recite the metaphysical views of the Master which came to be included in the Abhidhammapiṭaka. Each doctrine was correctly and honestly delivered. No change was introduced in the doctrines. There being no other business, the Council was dissolved after it had lasted for seven months.[42]

Followers asserted their own views. Several schools were formed.

First Council on the 61st day of the Nibbāna at Rajagṛha.

Recitation of the correct version of the teachings was the only achievement of the First Council.

No change was introduced in the teachings.

Again, it should be kept in mind that no teaching of the Buddha was committed to writing. In the absence of any written record of the teachings, it was bound to be misinterpreted when several differences of opinion

Tension continued uninterrupted amongst the disciples.

41 Cullavagga, 11.

42 *Eastern Monachism.* pp. 173—77.

were already in the field. Tension amongst the interpreters did not lessen in any way. By then the old disciples had also passed away and every one claimed to be the custodian of the correct teachings of the Buddha. A good deal of chaos was found in the Order and it became necessary to call another meeting of the monks to determine the correct version of the rules and laws of the Order. Accordingly, the second Council of the Order was called at Vaiśālī, a hundred and sixtyone years after the death of the Master, in 383 B.C. It is believed by one authority that in this Council also nothing new was introduced. All the old doctrines were merely repeated by the old disciples. But another report,[43] however, records that the Council lasted for eight months and a revision of the doctrines took place. We have seen before that the conflicting views were spreading amongst the members of the Order and under the circumstances it was not possible merely to repeat the old doctrines and dissolve the Counril. There must have been some consideration and some changes, in accordance with the last desire of the Master, introduced in the rules. However, even in this meeting the rules and the laws probably remained without being committed to writing.

Second Council was called at Vaiśālī under Yasa, in 383 B.C.

Revision of the doctrines took place but nothing was written down even in the Second Council.

2. *Canonical Literature*

According to the report of the chronicles of Ceylon, a real Canon of sacred texts was compiled on the occasion of the third Council which was called in the reign of king Aśoka by Tissa at Pāṭaliputra, in 247 B.C., that is, 297 years after the Mahānibbāna of the Master. About one thousand monks attended this meeting. It was presided over by Tissa at the instance of the king. It is said that the session lasted for about 9 months and all the texts of

Canon was compiled in the third council at Pātaliputra, under Tissa, in 247 B.C.

[43] *Dīpavaṁsa*, V; *Mahāvaṁsa*, IV.

the Canons came to be finally put into writing. After the Council was dissolved, Tissa Moggaliputta sent missionaries to foreign lands to preach Buddhism. Accordingly, Mahindo, a pupil of Tissa, carried the Texts of the Canons to Ceylon. These Texts remained there in Ceylon in the memory of the followers of the Order till the time of the Simhalese King Vaṭṭagāmini in the first century B.C. when the texts were committed to writing and it is believed that the Canons, as put down in writing in Ceylon, are the same as found in the present Pali Tripiṭaka.

Missionaries were sent abroad to preach Buddhism after the third council.

All canons were put down in writing in Ceylon in the first century B.C.

It was in the reign of Kaṇiṣka that the most important and authoritative canon of the Sarvāstivādins was compiled under the supervision of the Sthavira named Pārśva who was the teacher of Aśvaghoṣa. The great monumental encyclopaedia of Hīnayāna philosophy, called the *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra*, a voluminous commentary on Kātyāyanīputra's *Abhidharmajñāna-prasthāna-śāstra,* also known as *Jñānaprasthāna,* was compiled in this period.

Canon of the Sarvāstivādins was compiled under Pārśva.

The three Piṭakas are: *Vinayapiṭaka* containing rules and laws regarding the bodily and mental discipline of the members of the Order, to be observed from day to day; *Suttapiṭaka,* meaning short discourses mostly in the form of dialogue regarding Dhamma; while *Abhidhammapiṭaka* dealing mostly with metaphysical and psychological problems of the school. The last Piṭaka is believed to be a development of later origin.

Three Piṭakas:

The *Vinayapiṭaka,* which is regarded earlier than the *Suttapiṭaka,* consists of the following texts: (1) Suttavibhaṅga, (2) Khandhakās, (3) Parivāra, and (4) Pātimokkha.

(1) *Vinayapiṭaka*—its divisions and subdivisions.

The first text is subdivided into (a) Pārājika and (b) Pācittiya. The second text consists of (a) Mahāvagga and (b) Cullavagga.

The *Suttapiṭaka,* containing, in prose and verse, the most important teachings of Buddhism, is group-

ed into five collections known as Nikāyas: (1) Dīgha, (2) Majjhima, (3) Saṁyutta, (4) Aṅguttara and (5) Khuddaka.

(2) Suttapiṭaka—its divisions and subdivisions.

The Dīgha-Nikāya is divided into three parts: (a) Śīlakkhandha, (b) Mahāvagga, (c) and Pātheya or Pāṭikavagga. The *Mahāparinibbānasutta* or *suttānta* belongs to the Dīghanikāya. The Saṁyutta-Nikāya consists of the following groups:—(1) *Sagāthavagga* divided into 11 saṁyuttas, (2) *Nidānavagga* divided into 10 saṁyuttas, (3) *Khandhavagga* divided into 13 saṁyuttas, (4) *Saḍāyatanavagga* divided into 10 saṁyuttas and (5) *Mahāvagga* divided into 12 saṁyuttas.

The Ekuttara or Aṅguttara-Nikāya is the fourth book of the Sutta-Piṭaka. This book consists of the following 11 Nipātas:—Eka, Duka, Tika, Catukka, Pañcaka, Chakka, Sattaka, Aṭṭhaka, Navaka, Dasaka, and Ekādasaka.

The Khuddaka-Nikāya is the fifth and the last book of the Sutta-Piṭaka. It consists of 16 independent books. Most of these books are very old and are considered very important for the study of Buddhism. The 16 books are: (1) Khuddakapāṭha, (2) Dhammapada, (3) Udāna, (4) Itivuttaka, (5) Sutta-Nipāta, (6) Vimānavatthu, (7) Petavatthu, (8) Theragāthā, (9) Therīgāthā, (10) Jātakas, (11) Mahāniddesa, (12) Cullaniddesa, (13) Paṭisambhidāmagga, (14) Apadāna, (15) Buddhavaṁsa and (16) Cariyāpiṭaka.

According to the Burmese tradition, the following four books also are added to the above list: Milindapañha, Suttasaṁgaha, Peṭakopadesa, and the Nettipakaraṇa.

The third and the last division of the Piṭaka is the *Abhidhamma-Piṭaka*. It deals with the metaphysical doctrines of the school and is considered to be of later origin. It consists of the following seven books:—(1) Dhammasaṅgaṇi, (2) Vibhaṅga, (3) Kathāvatthu, (4) Puggalapaññatti, (5) Dhātukathā, (6) Yamak and (7) Paṭṭhāna.[44]

(3) *Abhidhamma-piṭaka*—its divisions and subdivisions.

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[44] *A History of Pāli Literature*—B. C. Law, Vol. I. p. 33, M. Winternitz-*A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II.

3. *Schools and Subschools of earlier Buddhism*

Schism assumed definite shape in the form of two main groups: (1) Mahāsaṅghikas and (2) Theravādins.

It has already been pointed out before that there existed differences of opinion regarding the correct interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha amongst the monks long before the meeting of the Second Council which gradually continued to grow wider and wider and finally came to establish different schools in Buddhism. This split, in fact, due to dis-satisfaction amongst the monks and others and similar other reasons explained before, slowly and steadily began from the life-time of the Buddha himself. After his death, in the absence of the magnetic personality, it began to assume definite shape and gradually in course of time, formed into two main groups: (1) *Mahāsaṅghika* and (2) *Sthaviravāda*.

Points of difference between the two main groups.

The former group, under the leadership of a priest named Mahādeva, advocated some change in the Dhamma. They were in a way progressive persons. No correct record of their views is preserved which might have enabled us to know more about them. This much alone, however, is known to us that they thought 'that Buddhahood was a quality inborn in every human being, and that by adequate development it was capable of raising the possessor to the rank of a Tathāgata.' The other group, called Sthaviravādin, on the other hand, was very conservative and did not like to stir from the tradition. They, however 'maintained that Buddhahood was a quality that had to be acquired and accordingly, laid great stress on the observance of the rules of discipline as found in the Vinaya-Piṭaka and the practice of injunctions of morality, which in their opinion was the sole means whereby Buddhahood could be attained.' The followers of this school spread over Northern India and had their centre in Kāśmīra. It was this group which was regarded as the representative of the orthodox view. The Mahāsaṅghikas flourished chiefly in the Eastern and Western parts of the country with their centre in Magadha.

By the third century after the Mahānibbāna of the Buddha, the Sthaviravādins had split up into two main schools, namely, (1) Haimavantā, and (2) Sarvāstivāda. Later on, in course of the fourth century after the death of the Buddha, nine more schools grew up out of the old Sthaviravāda. They were: (1) Vātsīputrīyas, (2) Dharmottaras, (3) Bhadrayānikas, (4) Sammitīyas, (5) Shaṇṇagarikas (Chāndāgārikas), (6) Mahīśāsakas, (7) Dharmaguptakas (Dharmaguptikas), (8) Kāśyapīyas and (9) Sautrāntikas.[45]

Divisions of Sthaviravādins.

In the case of the Mahāsaṅghikas also there grew up nine independent schools, namely, (1) Mūlamahāsaṅghikas, (2) Ekavyavahārikas, (3) Lokottaravāda, (4) Kaurukullakā, (5) Bahuśrutīya, (6) Prajñaptivāda, (7) Caityaśailas, (8) Avaraśailas and (9) Uttaraśailas. Thus, by the fourth century after the death of the Buddha there were in all eleven schools under the Sthaviravāda and nine under the Mahāsaṅghikas. So in all there were twenty schools. Leaving aside the first two divisions of the Sthaviravāda, they recognized only eighteen schools known as the eighteen Nikāyas. It is to be kept in mind that there is some difference in the grouping and also in the order of the various schools mentioned above between the *Dīpavaṁśa* and the Eighteen Nikāyas of Vasumitra.[46]

Divisions of Mahāsaṅghikas.

From the commentator's Introduction to the *Kathā-Vatthu* (Points of Controversy) the following information of the development of the various schools of Buddhism is gathered. It is said that 'after a hundred years had expired, the Vajjiputtaka Bhikkhus declared for the 'ten bases' of relaxation of rules. But the old disciples quashed the ten bases and drew up a compendium of the body of doctrine and discipline. Refuted by those elders who had performed this task, ten thousand of the Vajjiputtaka bhikkhus seeking adherents, and gaining but a weak

Development of schools as given in the *Kathāvatthu*.

[45] *Systems of Buddhistic Thoughts*, pp. 100–101.

[46] *Introduction to the Abhidharmakośa* by Rahula Sankrityāyana, pp. 4–5.

following among themselves, formed the school called (1) Mahāsaṅghika. From this arose the secession of yet two other schools—(2) the Gokulikas and (3) the Ekabbohārikas. From the former of these again, arose the secession of yet two other schools—(4) Paṇṇativāda and (5) Bāhulikas, or as they were also called, Bahussutikas. Among these there arose other teachers—(6) the Cetiyavādins. Thus, from the school of the Mahāsaṅghikas, in the second century, five schools arose; so including the Mahāsaṅghikas the total number of the schools became six.

Cause of the growth of the Mahāsaṅghika group.

In the second century only two schools seceded from the Theravāda—(i) Mahīśāsakas and (ii) Vajjiputtas. Now, from the Vajjiputtas four other seceding schools arose, to wit, the (iii) Dhammuttariyas, the (iv) Bhadrayānikas, (v) Channāgarikas and the (vi) Sammitiyas. Again, from the Mahīśāsakas, in the second century only two seceding schools arose—the (vii) Sabbatthivāda and the (viii) Dhammaguttikas. From the Sabbatthivāda, in their turn, (ix) the Kassapikas split off; and the Kassapikas again, splitting later into two, (x) the Sankantikas were formed, and yet again, the Sankantikas splitting into two, (xi) the Suttavādins were formed.

Growth of the schools under Theravāda.

Thus, from the Theravāda arose the above mentioned eleven seceding bodies, making their number twelve in all. And thus, these twelve, together with the six schools of the Mahāsaṅghikas, constitute the eighteen schools which arose in the second century. But of the eighteen, seventeen schools are to be understood as being schismatics, the Theravāda only being non-schismatic.'[47]

The divisions and the sub-divisions of these did not stop here. There were several more with which we are not much concerned at present. It should be kept in mind that the Mahāsaṅghikas who, because of their progressive views, were always in bitter conflict with the Theravā-

Growth of the feeling of bitterness between the Mahāsaṅghikas and the Theravādins.

[47] pp. 2–4.

dins who were, on the other hand, very conservative and did not like to introduce any change in the rules of discipline supposed to have been laid down by the Buddha himself. This bitterness though it must have begun during the life-time of the Buddha, yet grew more and more at the time of the second Council held at Vaiśālī, when they could give full vent to their views in the absence of the Master. The Therās turned out these Mahāsaṅghikas from the Council accusing them as *'Pāpa Bhikkhus'*, and *'Adhammavādins'*.

4. *Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna*

Origin of the terms —Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.

Though, because of their liberal views, the Mahāsaṅghikas were gaining popularity in the country, yet they never forgot the harsh treatment of the Therās during the second Council. It always remained fresh in their mind and since then they made up their mind to take revenge upon the Theravādins whenever any opportunity presented to them. They tried to coin names and words to be used for the Therās which could distinctly show that the latter were looked down with contempt. It is for this very purpose that the Mahāsaṅghikas coined the term '*Hīnayāna*', meaning 'Small Vehicle' for the Theravādins, while the term *'Mahāyāna'*, meaning 'Great Vehicle', was used for themselves.

Supporters of Mahāyāna.

In later years, Mahāyānism found great support from Aśvaghoṣa I, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Āryadeva and Vasubandhu. Of these, Nāgārjuna was the most prominent, and hence, some scholars hold that he was the founder of the school. But it is not the fact; for from the study of the *Prajñāpāramitā-Śāstra* and the *Daśabhūmivibhāṣā-Śāstra* of Nāgārjuna we find that several of the *Mahāyāna-śūtras* have been quoted by Nāgārjuna himself. So there is no doubt that the *Mahāyāna-sūtras* were in existence long before the later half of the second century A.D., the date assigned to Nāgārjuna.

The Hīnayāna consists of twenty schools with the addition of the little known Satyasiddhi School, while

Mahāyāna is subdivided into the 'Partially developed Mahāyāna' and the 'Fully developed Mahāyāna.' The former consists of the Mādhyamika and the Vijñānavādin schools, while the latter embraces a large number of schools, the best known of which are the Avatamsaka, Mantra, Dhyāna, Sukhāvatī-vyūha, the Chinese *Tien-Tai* and the Japanese *Nichiren* schools.[48]

Divisions of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.

"Of all the schools of Buddhism perhaps the most rational and the least fettered by dogmas is the Dhyāna school, which was introduced in China by an Indian priest, Bodhidharma who was the third son of a king of Kāñcī, in South India, who went to China in 527 A.D. This school does not cling for support to any particular portion of the Tripiṭakas, but rather takes up whatever is excellent in the various portions of the sacred canon, not without subjecting it to a critical examination. The Dhyāna school, moreover, believes that the human tongue is too weak to give expression to the highest truth. As a natural consequence of such a belief, its adherents disclaim attachment to sacred books as their final authority, but nevertheless, they respect the canon, regarding it as an efficient instrument conducing to the attainment of enlightenment."[49]

Dhyāna School and its main objective.

As indicated above the two rival groups, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, propounded their views regarding the rules of discipline in Buddhism quite independent of each other for a pretty long time. But it appears that in course of time certain schools of the Mahāyāna Buddhism came to be grouped under the Hīnayāna. Thus, the eleven schools of the Sthaviravāda, together with the nine schools, which sprang from the Mahāsaṅghika, the founder of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, as mentioned before, make up the twenty schools of the Hīnayāna, which are mentioned in Vasumitra's treatise called *'Treatise on the Points of Contention between the Different Schools of Buddhism'*.[50] So

Amalgamation of a few schools of Mahāyāna into Hīnayāna.

48 *Systems of Buddhistic Thought,* p. 3.

49 *Systems of Buddhistic Thought,* pp. 5–6.

50 *Systems of Buddhistic Thought,* p. 101.

it seems that the nine schools of the Mahāsaṅghikas, who were the founders of the Mahāyāna, came to be included in the Hīnayāna.

Besides these, there sprang up many other schools and sub-schools under each of the two broad heads with their independent views on some point or the other. Though it is not easy to deal in detail with the philosophical views of each of these schools here, yet a brief account of a few of them is given below which may directly help us to know the growth of Buddhistic thought in later period:

Other sub-schools as found in the Kathāvatthu and some of their important views.

5. *A few more important doctrines of earlier Buddhism*

(*i*) *Ideas about Soul*

Thus, the Puggalavādins, consisting of Vajjiputtakas, Sammitiyas and some others, think that there exists a personal entity, called Soul, as a perduring immortal essence in man. It is real and is one of the fifty-seven ultimates of our conscious experience, namely *the, five aggregates* (*skandhas*), that is, (1) material body (rūpa-skandha), (2) feeling (vedanā-skandha), (3) retention (saṁjñā-skandha), (4) saṅkhāra (saṁskāra-skandha) and (5) consciousness (vijñāna-skandha); *twelve sense-organs and objects* (*āyatana*), namely, (6) eye (cakṣu), (7) ear (śrotra), (8) nose (ghrāṇa), (9) tongue (jihvā), (10) body (*i.e., skin*=kāya), (11) mind (manas), (12) visible object (rūpāyatana), (13) sound (śabdāyatana), (14) taste (rasāyatana), (15) odour (gandhāyatana), (16) tangible object (sparśāyatana), (17) cognizable object (dharmāyatana); *eighteen elements* (*dhātus*), namely, *the six subjective elements*—(18) eye, (19) ear, (20) nose, (21) tongue, (22) body (*i.e.,* skin), and (23) mind (manodhātu), the *six objective elements*—(24) sights (rūpadhātu), (25) sounds, (26) odours, (27) tastes, (28) touches, (29) and cognizables (dharmadhātu); (30—35) the *six intellectual elements,* namely, visual cognition, auditory cognition, olfactory cognition, gustatory cognition, tactile cognition and mind cognition; and *twenty-two controlling powers*—the controlling powers

Puggalavādins hold immortality of soul.

of—(36) eye, (37) ear, (38) nose, (39) tongue, (40) body, (41) female sex (womanhood), (42) male sex (manhood), (43) life, (44) mind, (45) pleasure, (46) pain, (47) joy, (48) grief, (49) hedonic indifference, (50) faith, (51) energy, (52) mindfulness, (53) concentration, (54) reason, (55) the thought—'I shall come to know the unknown' (56) gnosis, and (57) one who knows.[51]

The soul transmigrates, hold the Puggalavādins, from this world to another and from another world to this.[52] They also believe that a soul after being human becomes a deva.[53] It is also a fact, according to them, that 'one who has attained the stream' (*i.e.*, the first path towards salvation—*srota-āpanna*), when he is deceasing from the world of men, and is reborn in the world of devas, remains a stream-winner there also.[54] The Soul transmigrates along with consciousness.[55]

Soul transmigrates from one world to another.

They further think that the concept or notion of Soul, or personal entity, is derived from material and mental qualities, like feeling, just as shadow (chāyā) is derived from a tree and fire from fuel.[56] So it is also true to say that the concept of bad soul is derived from bad feeling. Bad feeling entails result or fruit—fruit that is undesirable, displeasing, spotted, an unhappy result such as conveys unhappiness. That an ethically indeterminate soul is derived from an ethically indeterminate feeling is now asserted because of the indeterminateness of Soul with respect to the Eternalist or Nihilist heresies. The indeterminate feeling, mentioned before, is impermanent and conditioned. It happens through a cause. It is liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease and to change.

Concept of Soul.

The concept of Soul is said to be derived from the other three aggregates—perception, mental co-efficients and consciousness. Good consciousness entails result

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51 *Kathāvatthu,* I. 1. 17.

52 *Kathāvatthu,* I. 1. 158.

53 *Points of Controversy,* I. I. p. 28.

54 *Points of Controversy,* I. I. p. 30.

55 *Points of Controversy,* I. I. p. 31.

56 *Ibid.* p. 33.

or fruit—fruit that is desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result such as conveys happiness. Similarly, bad consciousness produces undesirable results. There is the notion of Soul attributed to each moment of consciousness. They believe that both pleasure and pain exist here and in the higher and lower regions and that there exists an experiencer of these. Along with this they also believe that both the doer of an action and the experiencer of its fruit are the same.[57]

Both the doer of an action and the experiencer of its fruit are identical.

(ii) *Other minor views*

From the following statements of the Suttas, such as "liability to fall away, and the opposite, these two things, bhikkhus, are concerned with the falling away of a bhikkhu who is under training"[58] and "these five things, bhikkhus, are concerned with the falling away of a bhikkhu who now and then attains emancipation."[59] Sammitiyas, Vajjiputtiyas, Sabbatthivādins and some of the Mahāsaṅghikas hold that an Arhanta can fall away from Arhantship.

Sabbatthivādins hold that an Arhanta can fall away from Arhantaship.

The Pubbaseliyas hold that because the Arhanta was liable to be ignorant and to get perplexed about facts concerning every day life, and to be surpassed in such knowledge by others, an Arhanta might be considered as lacking knowledge or insight, as given to doubt, and as inferior to some, and so he can be easily excelled by others for lack of knowledge.

Pubbaseliyas hold that Arhanta can be excelled by others.

The Andhakas hold that inasmuch as an Arhanta cannot be said to lack insight, he must, at least at times, be practically without object, namely, when his visual consciousness is active, for then he is occupied with the visible object engaging his sense of sight.

Judging from the Suttanta passage: "Whatever is material quality, past, present, future," etc., the Sab-

[57] *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, II. 94.
[58] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I. 96.
[59] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III. 173.

batthivādins, who believe that everything persistently exists,[60] hold that all phenomena, past, present and future, once they rise in the aggregate constituents of personal life and experience, persist in that state and that therefore, all go on existing. In other words, according to them past and future both exist even in the present, because the aggregates and other factors of our experience retain their state as a sort of complex soul.

Sabbatthivādins hold that both past and future exist in the present.

The Kassapikas of the Sabbatthivādin group, on the other hand, hold that 'those past things of which the effect is not matured exist, those past things of which the effect is matured do not exist.

Kassapikas' view on past and future.

The Andhakas and Pubbaseliyas and others, however, declare that 'all things exist in time, by way of material and other qualities, as past, present, or future, but that there is no past that is at once future and present, nor any future and present that are also past, and therefore, all exists only as thus, and not as thus.

Andhakas and Pubbaseliyas on past and future.

The Andhakas, judging by the apparent continuity both of consciousness and of sub-consciousness in dhyāna, hold that a single unit of consciousness lasts for a certain length of time, say, a day or so.

Andhakas hold that a single unit of consciousness lasts for a certain length of time.

The Gokulikas on the basis of such Suttas as—"All is on fire, bhikkhus;"[61] "All conditioned things involve ill,"[62] hold that all conditioned things are absolutely cinderheaps, like an inferno of ashes.

Gokulikas hold that all conditioned things are absolutely cinderheaps.

The Andhakas hold that Buddha's ordinary speech was supra-mundane.

The Mahīśāsakas and the Andhakas hold that the Third Noble Truth, as to the cessation of ill, though constructed as one, relates to two cessations, according as sorrow ceases through reasoned or unreasoned reflections about things.

Mahīśāsakas hold that the Third Noble Truth relates to two cessations of ill.

60 Takakusu—*JPTS*, 1905; T. Watters.—On Yuen Chwang.
61 *Vinaya Texts*, I. 134.
62 Dialogues, II. 175.

The Andhakas are of opinion that just as a soiled garment is released from its stains on being washed, so emancipation means that a heart beset with lust is emancipated from lust. They further think that spiritual emancipation is a gradual process of becoming free.

Andhaka's view on emancipation.

Four sorts of knowledge (or insight) are grouped under 'knowledge of emancipation,' namely, insight or intuition, path-knowledge, fruit-knowledge, and reflective knowledge. In other words, emancipation considered as (i) freedom from perceiving things as permanent or persisting, or through perceiving the opposite; (ii) the severance and renunciation effected by the Path; (iii) the peace of fruition (Phalaṇ paṭipassaddhi-vimutti), and (iv) contemplation of emancipation as such. Now, only the peace of fruition, according to the Theravādins, is abstract, unqualified emancipation and the rest cannot be called emancipated things. But the Andhakas hold that all the four are such.

Knowledge of Emancipation.

It is a belief of the Andhakas that in an Ariyan (that is, one who has 'made sure,' is in some stage of the Path or Way) all 'knowledge' is supramundane or transcendental.

Andhaka's view regarding knowledge.

The Andhakas hold that the term 'truth' is to be applied without any distinction being drawn between popular and philosophical truths.

Andhaka's view regarding 'Truth'.

Future includes both what will happen proximately and what is not just proximate. Concerning former there is absolutely no knowledge, any more than there is of what is included in a single track or moment of cognition. But some, like Andhakas, are inclined to a belief that knowledge concerning any part of future is possible.

Andhakas hold that knowledge concerning future is possible.

Again, because of the statement—'When all phenomena are seen to be impermanent, the insight itself, as a phenomenon, is also seen to be impermanent,' some, like the Andhakas, have the opinion that there is

Andhaka's view concerning the knowledge of present.

knowledge of the entire present, without distinction. Now, if there be such a knowledge, it (as present) must take place at the present instant through itself. But because two knowledges cannot be simultaneous in the one self-conscious subject, knowledge of the present cannot be known by the same act of knowledge. In other words, self-consciousness is really an act of retrospection, and its object is not present, but past.

Space is of three modes: as confined or delimited, as abstracted from object, and as empty. Of these, the first is conditioned, the other two are mere abstract ideas. But some, like the Uttarāpathakas and Mahīśāsakas, hold that the two latter modes also, inasmuch as, being mental fictions, are not conditioned and must therefore, be unconditioned.

Uttarāpathakas and Mahīśāsakas on the concept of space.

Andhakas are of opinion that because we have cognition of enclosed space, such as keyholes, etc., therefore, all void space is visible. They argue that in that case space is *rūpa,* that is, a material visible object.

Andhakas on 'space' as a material visible object.

Those who do not agree with the Andhakas hold that the space, for instance, between two pillars is not visible. It is merely an act of ideation, and not of sense-cognition (*Manodvāraviññāṇaṁ uppajjati, na cakkhuviññāṇaṁ*).[63]

Space is an act of ideation and not of sense-cognition.

The Andhakas, from the fact that we 'see' oscillations in stones, water, flames, trees, as well as colours of sentient surfaces and the shapes of hands, feet, etc., on occasion of bodily intimations, believe that the four elements, the five senses, and action, each of these is visible.

Andhakas on the objects of visibility.

The other party, however, like before, thinks that the four elements are not the material compounds, earthy, etc., but they are mere abstract common qualities distinguishing the four so-called groups. *Indriya* is the controlling power, or faculty exercised in sense. *Kamma* is the notion of action in

Some hold that the four elements are mere abstract common qualities.

63 This advance in psychological explanation is a notable trait in Buddhaghosa's age.

overt physical movements. All that we actually see are changing coloured surfaces.

Rājagirikas and Siddhātthikas hold that mental states do not pervade one another.

The Rājagirikas and the Siddhātthikas hold that the phrase 'associated with knowledge', as used in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi,* is meaningless, for feeling or other mental states do not pervade one another (anupaviṭṭhā), as oil pervades sesamum-seeds.

Andhakas hold that the earth is a resultant of Karman.

Inasmuch as there is human action directed to gain dominion and sovereignty over the soil, some like the Andhakas, hold that the earth itself is a resultant of such action (or karman). The argument goes to show that (1) land has nothing in common with the sentient results which are caused by karman (sukhavedanīya, etc.); (2) that such results are a matter of individual subjective experience, not shared by others, myriads of whom do not even live upon the earth.

Andhakas hold that old age and death are results of action.

Inasmuch as some action does conduce to that deterioration we call decay or old age, and to that curtailing of life we call death, some like the Andhakas, hold that old age and death are the results (vipāka) of that action. Now, there is between morally bad action and material decay the relation known as karman, but the moral cause and the physical effect differ in kind. Hence, the latter is not the subjective result (vipāka). It is unlike any mental state—contact, feeling, etc., such as is produced by karman. Besides, it is partly due to the physical order.

Uttarāpathakas hold that mind is without an object while recalling past and future objects.

The Uttarāpathakas hold that since past and future mental objects are not actually existing, therefore, mind recalling a past object is mind without an object. So also is the case with future object, the mind recalling it is without an object.

Pubbaseliyas hold that action is not in conformity with thought.

Inasmuch as any one, hold the Pubbaseliyas, when proposing to go in one direction, can go elsewhere, so action is not in accord, or conformity with, or consequent upon, thought.

The Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas believe that the six-fold sense-

organism takes birth at the moment of conception, by taking effect of one karman only.

The Theravādins, however, think that at the moment of conception, the co-ordinating organ (manas-āyatana) and the organ of touch alone among the sense-organs are congenital. The remaining four take seventy-seven days to come to birth, and this is partly through that karman which brought about that conception, and partly through some other karman, called janaka-karman and upatthambaka-karman.[64]

Existence of sense organ at the time of conception.

In view of the swift alternations of seeing and hearing at performance of dancing and singing, some, like the Uttarāpathakas, hold that the sense cognitions arise in a mutually unbroken succession.

Sense-cognitions arise in unbroken succession.

These are some of the more interesting and important views found in the *Kathāvatthu* attribued to the various schools and subschools of earlier Buddhism.

(*iii*) *Common Fundamental Principles*

In spite of these differences in their views, there are three fundamental principles which are accepted by all the schools of Buddhism, namely, '*All is impermanence; there is no Ātman;* and *Nibbāna is peaceful.* Mahāyānists, however, add one more to the above and it is—'*All is such as it is.*'

All the above mentioned three fundamental principles can be easily evolved out of the teachings of the Buddha himself. We know that his last message to the disciples was that —'*Decay is inherent in all component things,*' and so there cannot be any permanence in anything in this world. Again, he had taught the *Four Noble Truths* that—'Suffering is universal,' that 'it has got a cause,' that—'there is cessation of it,' and lastly, that—'there is a means to bring about the cessation.' Now, all these show that nothing can remain permanent in the world. Everything is changing and perishable. Then again, the fact that everything changes presupposes that every moment everything is undergoing

Fundamental principles evolved out of the Buddha's teachings.

64 *Abhīdhammatthasaṅgaho,* V. 19.

change; for nothing can change all of a sudden without having been under the influence of the Law of Flux previously. Everything has its cause and all that is caused is subject to decay. Every birth is followed by death. So says Yamakami—"This impermanence presupposes impermanence of moments (kṣaṇa). A logical transition of thought makes it fully intelligible how any great change in a human being or in any other thing, which takes place within a certain space of time, is nothing else but the aggregate of minute changes which occur therein every moment." Thus, every man, every thing, is ever changing and can never be the same for even two consecutive moments. This is what is known in Buddhist philosophy as the theory of *'momentary impermanence.'* (kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda).

Impermanence of moments.

When anything undergoes a change, it is certain that its constituents should have equally changed, and again, the constituents of the constituents also must have changed before the composites have changed, and so on, till we come to the last ultimate particles which also must be changing every moment. Thus, it is clear that nothing remains stationary even for a moment. It is in the very nature of things in the world that since they are produced, they should go on changing and changing till they come to an end in the final dissolution, namely, Nirbāṇa wherein everything becomes *what it is.* Accordingly, Buddhism believes in the four characteristics of origination (utpāda), staying (sthiti) growth and decay (jarā), and destruction (nirodha), which are possessed by every object of this universe.

Nothing remains stationary even for a moment.

Four stages of every object.

The Sarvāstivādins regard these four characteristics as the only appearance or existence of a thing throughout the three divisions of time—past, present and future.[65] "According to this theory of the four characteristics, technically called *Caturlakṣaṇa* in Buddhist philosophy, (i) there exists *origination* by which everything is brought to a state of existence from the future to the

Origination according to the Sarvāstivādins.

[65] *Abhidharmakośa,* II. 45.

present; (ii) there also exists *staying* which tries to make everything stay in its actual or identical state as soon as a thing emerges from the future into the present by the force of origination; (iii) there is thirdly, *growth and decay* whereby everything is dragged into the pale of old age; and (iv) fourthly, and lastly, there comes *destruction* which destroys everything by carrying everything to the past. Such is the reason which explains why nothing can continue in the same state for even two consecutive moments in this phenomenal world."

Difference in the process of the theory of Origination.

As to the view whether all these four characteristics require four successive moments to appear, or they take place simultaneously, we have two distinct views in Buddhism. The Sarvāstivādins hold that all these happen simultaneously in the same kṣaṇa, while the Sautrāntikas are of opinion that the four characteristics do not exist simultaneously but spread themselves successively over the limits of a life-period.[66]

Meaning of the term 'Śūnyatā'.

It is this very theory of momentariness which ultimately leads to the *theory of Void,* (śūnyatā), which means, according to the interpretation of the Buddhists, "the perpetual changes occuring at every step in this phenomenal world." So says, D. Suzuki, in his *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism,*[67]—"*Śūnyatā* simply means conditionality or transitariness of all phenomenal existence. It is a synonym for *anitya* or *pratītya.* Therefore, 'emptiness,' according to the Buddhists, signifies negatively the absence of particularity, the non-existence of individuals as such, and positively the ever-changing state of the phenomenal world, a constant flux of becoming, an eternal series of causes and effects. It must never be understood in the sense of annihilation or absolute nothingness."

Thus, we find that when the Buddhists deny the permanency of the world, they refer to the phenomenal world. This is quite in keeping with what the Master himself taught by saying that there is universal pain which accompanies everything around us and that it

66 Com. on the *Abhidharmakośa–Śāstra,* Chapt. II.
67 Page 173.

should be removed. Every one should try to achieve salvation from the worldy sufferings which, again, is possible only when the *anityatā* of the phenomenal world is enjoined. Hence, by denying the substantiality of this world, the Buddha wanted to lead his disciples to the path of eternal peace, that is, nirvāṇa. So in one aspect, there is the negation, while in the other aspect, there is the positive teaching for the path of permanent peace.

Now, coming to the second fundamental principle of Buddhism namely, *"All that is, is without Ātman,"* we should keep in mind, with the help of the Buddhist authoritative texts, that Buddhism believes in the conception of two sorts of Anātman (non-self and non-ego): (i) the first is the denial of a subjective Ātman or a personal Ego, and (ii) the second that of the objective Ātman or of the *Ego of the Dharmas,* or of the phenomenal world. So, when the Buddhists criticised Ātman, what they actually meant by the term 'Ātman' was an eternal substance, ever unchanging, independent and separate from everything that is non-ātman. So says, Dharmapālācārya, the teacher of Śīlabhadra, of the Nālandā University, in his commentary on the *Vijñānamātrāśāstra*—"The term Ātman is said to mean supreme authority and is identical with freedom, eternality and absolute unity. The views held concerning it by the Tīrthakaras fall into three groups: (1) First comes the view which regards *Ātman* as an organism in itself made up of the five *skandhas,* or constituents of being. (2) Next comes the view which considers *Ātman* to be an absolute existence segregated from the five *skandhas.* (3) Third and the last comes the view of those who maintain that the *Ātman* is neither the same as, nor different from, the five *skandhas.*" In other words, what Dharmapāla means by the first view is the *materialistic view* which holds Ātman to be nothing but the composite of body and mind. The second is the *view of the orthodox schools.* The third and the last is said to be the *view of the Puggalavādins,* that is, the Vajjiputtakas and Sammitiyas and some others mentioned in the

Second Fundamental Principle explained.

Conception of Anātman.

Dharmapāla's summarising of the three meanings of the term 'Ātman'.

Kathāvatthu, referred to before, who believe in the existence of a personal entity, called Soul, or the perduring immortal essence in man.

Now, it should be kept in mind that Buddhism, as is clear from the view point of the Theravādins mentioned in the *Kathāvatthu,* refuses to accept any of the three above mentioned views. This also they deduce from their fundamental principle, namely, *'everything is impermanent.'* In other words, consistent with their doctrine of universal impermanence, the Buddhists can never accept the existence of an eternal and independent Ātman in any form; and moreover, when everything has to be explained in terms of cause and effect ultimately leading to the entire destruction of the object itself, how can one posit the existence of an independently eternal Ātman?

Buddhists cannot believe in the existence of an eternal and independent Ātman.

But it should never be overlooked that while denying the existence of an eternal Ātman, the Buddhists did assert the existence of the Emperical Self. So says Nāgārjuna in his commentary on the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra,* "The Tathāgata sometimes taught that the *Ātman* exists and at other times he taught that the *Ātman* does not exist. When he preached that the *Ātman* exists and is to be the experiencer of misery or happiness in the successive life as the reward of its own karman, his object was to save men from falling into the heresy of Nihilism (*Ucchedavāda*). When he taught that there is no *Ātman* in the sense of a creator, or perceiver, or an absolutely free agent, apart from the conventional name given to the aggregate of the five *skandhas,* his object was to save men from falling into the opposite heresy of Eternalism (*Śāśvatavāda*).

Buddhists assert the existence of Emperical Self.

Nāgārjuna denies both *Ucchedavāda* (Nihilism) and *Śāśvatavāda* (Eternalism).

Now, it may be asked: which of these two views represents the truth? It is, doubtless, the doctrine of the denial of *Ātman.* This doctrine, which is so difficult to understand, was not intended by the Buddha for those whose intellect was dull and in whom the root of goodness had not thriven. And why?

The doctrine of the denial of Ātman was not meant for dull intellects.

Because such men by hearing the doctrine of *Anātman* would have been sure to fall into the heresy of Nihilism.

Buddha taught both the existense of *Ātman* and the doctrine of Anātman.

The two doctrines were preached by the Buddha for two very different objects. He taught the existence of *Ātman* when he wanted to impart to his hearers the conventional doctrine, while he taught the doctrine of *Anātman* when he wanted to impart to them the transcendental doctrine.

The same idea is expressed by Dharmapāla in his commentary on the *Vijñānamātrā-śāstra,* when he says,

Dharmapāla supports the above view.

"The existence of the *Ātman* and of the *Dharmas* (namely, of the *Ego* and of the phenomenal world) is affirmed in the Sacred Canon only provisionally and hypothetically and never in the sense of their possessing a real and permanent nature."

Vasubandhu's view on the doctrine of Ātman and Anātman.

Again, the same idea is very well expressed by Vasubandhu in his own commentary on his *Abhidharmakośaśāstra*—

"Buddha's preaching of the Good Law resembles a tigress's bringing up of her cub. Buddha observes how some of the fellow creatures receive hurt from the heresy of Eternalism, while others allow their good *karman* to be eaten up by the heresy of Nihilism. Thus, whoever believes in the existence of *Ātman* in its transcendental sense, exposes himself to the tiger's tooth of the heresy of Eternalism, and whoever does not believe in the existence *Ātman* in the conventional sense, runs the risk of destroying the seeds of his own good *karman.*"

Āryadeva also likewise says in his commentary on the *Mādhyamika-śāstra*—

"Buddhas, in their omniscience, watch the natures of all living beings and preach to them the Good Law

Āryadeva's view on the above.

in different ways, sometimes affirming the existence of the *Ātman* and other times denying it. Without an adequate development of one's intellectual powers, no one can attain Nirvāṇa, nor can one know why evil should be eschewed. It is for people who have not reached this stage that the Buddhas preach the existence of *Ātman.*"

All this shows that the view adopted by Buddhism on this question is just in keeping with the attitude of the Buddha who had assumed the Middle Path, namely, midway course between Eternalism and Nihilism. It may be said here in accordance with the interpretation of the later writers that Buddhism, like the Vedāntins, insists on the *adhikārabheda* in such cases. From the above it is clear that what Buddhism denies is the existence of an individual soul regarded as the doer and experiencer and existing apart from the physical organism. So they preach against the conception of such an Ātman, as *'All is without Ātman.'* Along with this, they also deny the view of the existence of a Universal Creator.

Buddhism denies Individual Soul and Universal Creator.

It is interesting to note here that while condemning the theories of an Individual soul and of a Universal creator, Buddhism not only acknowledges the permanence of the noumenal Ego, but actually enjoins its adherents to train themselves in such a manner as to be able to attain union with the Great Soul of the Universe, technically known as *Mahātman*. So it has been said in the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra* that the world is nothing but a conglomeration of impressions (*saṁskāras*), devoid of an Ātman and full of woes and miseries and one should leave aside the individualism and take shelter in the doctrine of *Mahātman* to one's best advantage—

Buddhism acknowledges the permanence of the noumenal Ego and the Great Soul of the Universe (Mahātman).

Saṁskāramātraṁ jagadetya buddhyā nirātmakaṁ duḥkhavirūḍhimātraṁ |
Vihāya yānarthmayātmadṛṣṭirmahātmadṛṣṭiṁ śrayate mahārthām ||

The conception of this *Mahātman* is the same as that of *Anātman*, the difference lies in the fact as we look upon it from the positive or the negative point of view.

Conception of Mahātman.

Asaṅga even gives the name of *Paramātman* to this *Mahātman* while explaining the following lines of the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra*—

Conception of Paramātman according to Asaṅga.

Anenābhisandhinā buddhānāmanāśrave dhātau 'Paramātmā' vyavasthāpyate.

Śūnyatāyāṁ viśuddhāyāṁ nairātmyānmārgalābhataḥ/
Buddhāḥ śuddhātmalābhitvāt gatā ātmamahātmatām//[67a]

The term '*Mahātman*,' as noted by Yamakami, is even identified with the term '*Tathāgatagarbha*' implying that "all living beings are endowed with the essential nature of the Tathāgata, of which, however, they are not aware as long as it is shrouded by kleśas or passions." But it is realized by one who has attained supreme and perfect enlightenment (*anuttara-samyak-sambodhi*).

Mahātman is identical with Tathāgatagarbha.

Yamakami, in his *Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, says, "Psychologically speaking, the *Tathāgatagarbha* may be defined as 'the transcendental soul of man, just coming under the bondage of kārmaic causation.' And in certain sense the *Tathāgatagarbha* corresponds to the *Paramātman*, or the Universal Soul of the Vedāntins, from which they suppose the world of phenomena to emanate. The term '*Paramātman*' was not unknown to the Buddhists. But between the Buddhist and the Vedāntic conception of Paramātman there is a great difference. I may quote here from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* what the Buddhists themselves have said about this difference:[68]

Tathāgatagarbha explained.

Difference between the Buddhist and the Vedāntic conception of Paramātman.

"Then the great Bodhisattva, Mahāmati, spoke to the Blessed One the following—'The *Tathāgatagarbha*, however, has been described by you in the Sūtrānta-pāṭha, as pure by nature, brilliance, speech, purity etc., as possessed of thirty-two characteristics, present in the organism of every living creature, enveloped by the *skandhas, dhātus* and *āyatanas* like a costly gem wrapped with dirty covers, having *manas* defiled by elements (*mahābhūta*), due to passion and

Laṅkāvatārasūtra's view on the above mentioned difference.

67a Chapter IX. Verse 23.

68 *Studies in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, by Dr. D. T. Suzuki, pp. 137—38.

hatred. It has also been described as eternal, stable (unchanging), blissful and ever-lasting. So how does this theory of the *Tathāgatagarbha* not resemble the theory of the Ātman preached by the *Tīrthakaras* (*i.e.*, Vedāntins)? They also advocate their Ātman as eternal, agent, free from attributes (nirguṇa), all-pervasive and undecaying."

" To the above the Blessed One answered—O Mahāmati! my doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha* does not resemble the theory of the Ātman of the Tīrthakaras. O Mahāmati! the Tathāgatas who have realized the truth, having preached the doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha* as being constituted of the *padārthas,* like Śūnyatā (emptiness), limit of reality (bhūtakoṭi), Nirvāṇa, non-production (cessation of birth i.e., *anutpāda*), and exemption to the ignorant from thoughts (apraṇihita) and imaginations, impart for their easy understanding the doctrine of the Tathāgatagarbha which transcends the range of thought and imagination so that the ignorant may get over the terrors of the doctrine of the *nairātmya* (No-Soul). The theory of the Ātman should not be entertained by either the present or the future Bodhisattvas (Mahāsattvas). O Mahāmati! just as a potter with the help of his skill of the hand, rod, water, string and effort, makes various kinds of pots out of a single heap of earthly ultimate particles (*paramāṇus*), even so do the Tathāgatas preach the same *dharma-Nairātmya* (Non-Ātman) free from all attributes through the help of various skilful and intelligent methods, sometimes teaching the doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha,* at others that of *Nairātmya,* like a potter, through varieties of expressions and locations. For this reason, O Mahāmati! the doctrine of the Ātman of the Tīrthakaras is not the same as that of the *Tathāgatagarbha.*

Again, the Tathāgatas preach the doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha,* for the purpose of attracting (i.e. converting) the Tīrthakaras who stick to the theory of the Ātman. How would otherwise, the transcendentally perfect enlightenment become intelligible to those whose minds are confined within the narrow limits of the threefold emancipation and who have fallen into the heresy of

believing in the existence of an Ātman which in reality does not exist? It is, therefore, that the Tathāgatas preach the doctrine of the *Tathāgatagarbha*."

Now, coming to the third fundamental principle of Buddhism, namely, *'Nirvāṇa alone is peaceful'*, we may say that it is evolved out of the Third Noble Truth. As for its conception, the Buddhists have asserted that it is not possible to explain its conception accurately. We know the answer of Nāgasena to king Milinda, as given in the *Milindapañha*, how the notion of Nirvāṇa is indescribable like that of the great ocean. In fact, like the Brahman of the Vedāntins of the Śaṅkara school, it is not possible to describe it through any simile or metaphor. However, it can be easily said that Nirvāṇa is the cessation of sufferings, is the state of the realization of perfect Enlightenment, wherein all the vāsanās and tṛṣṇās and their causes vanish. It is this very state which puts an end to the births and rebirths and consequently, the life in the phenomenal world. It has been described as full of "confidence, peace, calmness, bliss, happiness, delicacy, purity, and freshness."[69]

Nirvāṇa, the Third Fundamental principle.

Nāgārjuna while describing the characteristics of Nirvāṇa, says—[70]

Aprahīṇamasamprāptamanucchinnamaśāśvatam /
Aniruddhamanutpannamevaṁ nirvāṇamucyate //

That is, Nirvāṇa is that which is not abandoned like passion, hatred, etc., not acquired, like the achievements of a śramaṇa, not extirpated like the *skandhas,* not eternal like non-void (*aśūnya*); it is by nature not suppressed and not produced. Herein there is the cessation of the entire phenomenal world (prapañca).

Conception of Nirvāṇa according to Nāgārjuna.

Candrakīrti, in his *Vṛtti,* says—*'Tataśca niravaśeṣakalpanākṣayarūpameva nirvāṇamuktam bhagavatā'*—that 'in Nirvāṇa nothing is either extinguished or abandoned (*prahāṇa*), nor is anything suppressed (*nirodha*),

Candrakīrti's views on Nirvāṇa.

69 Milindapañha, II. 1 6; II. ii. 9; III. iv. 6.
70 *Mādhyamika-Kārikā,* XXV-4.

It is, in fact, according to the Master, of the nature of cessation of the entire ideas or imaginations.[71] It is neither positive nor is it negative.[72] Herein ends both positive and negative considerations.[73] Further on, Nāgārjuna identifies *saṁsāra* with *nirvāṇa*.[74] Candrakīrti definitely says—'there is not even the subtlest distinction between the two'—

Nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ....saṁsaraṇasya ca/
Na tayorantaraṁ kiñcit susūkṣmamapi vidyate//

Idea of Nirvāṇa as given in the *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra.*

Lastly, I quote here from a passage of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* describing the idea of Nirvāṇa with a translation of the same from the *Systems of Buddhistic Thought* by Yamakami—[75] "Nirvāṇa is attainable by a cessation of cognition when the mind has been fixed on all the *samādhis* from the *Māyasamādhi* upwards, which gradually lead up to the stage of the Tathāgata, after the following antecedent conditions have been fulfilled:—

(i) realization of the non-existence of external things by knowing them to be the creations of one's own fancy;

(ii) realization of the position of Suchness as being free from the fourfold limitations, namely, (a) existence, (b) non-existence, (c) existence plus non-existence, and (d) neither existence nor non-existence;

(iii) rejection of the subject and object of perception by rejecting the two extremes of imagination (*i.e.*, 'is' and 'is not') concerning the creations of one's own mind;

(iv) realization of the impossibility of accepting any evidence as conclusive;

(v) non-adherence even to Truth by regarding it as illusory;

(vi) comprehension of the Noble Dharma as being the embodiment of all evidence;

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71 *Mādhyamikakārikā—Vṛtti,* on *Ibid,* XXV, 5.

72 *Ibid,* XXV. 8. 73 *Ibid.* 74 *Ibid,* XXV. 27.

75 pp. 41—42.

(vii) comprehension of the two sorts of Nairātmya; and

(viii) removal of the two forms of *Kleśas, (viz.,* intellectual and habitual) and of the two sorts of veil (*viz.,* passion and conventionalism)."

Now, a question may be asked here: if everything is impermanent and undergoes change every moment according to Buddhism, as has been explained above, and nothing survives the shocks of death, how in the absence of any continuous permanent entity, Pratyabhijñā, recognition, in the form of 'Devadatta perceives the same object which he had seen before', the laws of morality and the true reward of all our actions, etc., which require the presence of one continuous entity in all the circumstances as doer and its experiencer, will be explained?

The idea of continuity explained through the laws of Karman and Causality.

To this it may be said that the Buddhists explain all these through the *Law of Causality* and the *Law of Karman* which they believe in. They hold that all the phenomena of the universe including our own existence are brought about by our own karman which knows no beginning, and that every event in our life is linked together through the *Law of Causality* which according to Buddhists also has no beginning. Just as in the case of a burning lamp, the flame changes every moment no doubt, but every succeeding flame is due to its preceding one, and so on. Again, as has been said by Nāgasena, in the *Milindpañha,* that amidst all the changes through which milk has to pass in order to produce the various effects, namely, curd, butter etc., there does exist some sort of continuity. Or we may take the instance of an ocean with waves after waves. Now, the first wave undoubtedly is different from the second and yet not entirely different from the same, as the subsequent waves are linked with the preceding ones as causes and effects. This chain of *the Law of Causation* followed by the *Law of Karman* remains unaffected even in death. The link is not cut off even by death. So this series of continuity of causes and effects continue

amidst all the changes under the influence of the Buddhistic *Law of Momentary Flux*. Thus, though in a way the Buddhists deny the existence of a permanent entity, yet they do believe in the existence of an unbroken continuity of the *Laws of Karman and Causation*. This very argument may be adduced about the series of consciousness (*cittasantati*) in the psychic field. With the help of this, every problem of moral and physical life of an individual can easily be explained in this world as well as in the world hereafter.

CHAPTER VIII

FOUR MAIN SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM

Introductory

WE have seen above how the various schools and sub-schools of Buddhism spread from time to time with their different independent views. Of these various schools, the two schools of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, namely, Vijñānavāda and Mādhyamika and the two schools of the Theravāda, or Hīnayāna Buddhism, namely, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika became much more prominent later on and were the only recognized systems of Buddhist philosophy according to the orthodox people in later period. The two schools of the Hīnayāna were realists believing that both the world as it appears to our senses independent of the intellect, directly or through inference in the case of the Sautrāntikas, and also their corresponding thoughts have their real existence. The Vaibhāṣikas came into prominence in the third century after the death of the Buddha, while the Sautrāntikas in the fourth century after his death. The Mahāyāna school of the Yogācāra, also known as the Vijñānavāda, is idealist and preaches that ideas are the only reality and everything else is the creation of ideas and is unreal. The Mādhyamika school, on the other hand, leads everything to *śūnya*—void, which is the only reality, not positive in nature, but nor even negative, nor both simultaneously, nor other than both, so that it is undefinable and in a sense, has no 'character' (alakṣaṇam).

The Mādhyamika school came into prominence, according to Āryadeva five hundred years after the death of the Buddha, though the *Mādhyamika-sūtras* are said to have been referred to even by Nāgārjuna, who is believed to be a contemporary of Kaniṣka I. The Yogācāra, with Asaṅga as its founder, is said to have come into prominence in the third century A.D.

Background of Buddhist Philosophical thoughts.

Before we enter into the details of each of the main philosophical schools of Buddhism, it is necessary to give a brief idea about the background of Buddhist Philosophy. We know, as has been already said in the last

chapter, that Buddhism, like Jainaism, began as a religious and ethical code so arranged as to lead people at large to get rid of miseries through the discipline of body and mind, exclusively based on the teachings of the Buddha. It did not aim in the beginning to develop any independent metaphysical line of thinking. This is clear from the *four-fold noble truth* and the *noble eight-fold path* preached by the Buddha to his disciples.

There were certain general notions prevalent amongst the people regarding the beginninglessness of Saṁsāra, existence of the other world, death, law of karman and its results, and similar other common problems of life as usual, during the beginning stage of Buddhism. Besides, the Hindu society had already fully developed modes of life and thinking for the achievement of the highest goal of life, philosophy and religion, which also must have encouraged and influenced the followers of the Buddha in evolving a new line of thinking in tune with the spirit of Buddhism. In fact, for the main ideas, the Buddhists must have been indebted to the Upaniṣads and other philosophical texts of the orthodox people. Again, they had their own ideas of Dhamma and also of the Abhidhamma which must have formed the neucleus for the unfolding of new Abhidhamma ideas. All these must have been in the background and which must have helped the thinkers of the period to develop metaphysical ideas out of the teachings of the Buddha.

Philosophical ideas developed after coming in contact with orthodox thinkers.

As has been pointed out before, speculations of philosophical nature must have begun with the very followers of the Buddhist Saṅgha and developed later on, into a new line of thinking when they came in contact with the followers of Gautama, the author of the *Nyāyasūtra,* and with other orthodox thinkers. So it has been said by Dr. W. M. McGovern also—"the most important developments of Buddhist philosophy were made when the Buddhist speculators came into violent conflict with fully developed alien philosophies."[1]

With these ideas about the growth of metaphysical line of thinking in Buddhism, we proceed to give a short

[1] *Manual of Buddhist Philosophy,* Vol. I, p. 2.

account of each of the four main schools of Buddhism in the order of their gradation towards the realization of the ultimate end.

MAIN SCHOOLS OF HĪNAYĀNA

I. VAIBHĀṢIKA

1. *Literature*

THE Sarvāstivāda school is one of the oldest schools of Buddhism. It was closely allied to the Theravāda school from which the Sarvāstivādins separated later on. Kāśmīra was the centre of these Sarvāstivādins where their doctrine was fully taught and developed into an elaborate system under the name of the Vaibhāṣika system.

It has to be kept in mind at this stage that of the 19 schools of Buddhism mentioned in the previous chapter, the following schools and sub-schools followed Vaibhāṣikas for their philosophical views: Mūla-Sarvāstivāda, Kāśyapīya, Mahīśāsaka, Dharmaguptīya, Bahuśrutīya, Tāmarathārīya, Vibhajyavādin, Kurukulluka, Āvantika and Vātsīputra.

We know from various Buddhist sources that there were seven most important Abhidharma books according to the Sarvāstivādins. In fact, of these seven books, only one, namely, *Jñānaprasthāna* by Kātyāyanīputra, is the main book, while the other six books are its supplements, called 'Pādas'.[2] These are: *Prakaraṇapāda* by Sthavira Vasumitra, *Vijñānakāya* by Sthavira Devaśarmā, *Dharmaskandha* by Ārya Sāriputra, *Prajñaptiśāstra* by Ārya Maudgalyāyana, *Dhātukāya* by Pūrṇa and *Saṅgītiparyāya* by Mahā-kauṣṭhila. A very important commentary, called '*Mahāvibhāṣā*' was written on the *Jñānaprasthāna* and those who followed this commentary were called '*Vaibhāṣikas*' (Vibhāṣayā divyanti vaibhāṣikā iti—Yaśomitra) and they were regarded as a group of philosophers of the Vibhāṣā school. Thus, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, though a commentary on the *Jñānaprasthāna*, became a very important work on the Vaibhāṣika school.

Kātyāyanīputra's Jñānaprasthāna and its six supplements.

[2] *Journal of the Pali Text Society*—1904-1905, pp. 94-95, 119.

The Buddhist records prove that the *Mahāvibhāṣā* was written at, or probably after, the Buddhist Council under Kaniṣka and so it must have been written long before the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu, which is also one of the most important works on the school.

The Sarvāstivādins are of opinion that Kātyāyanīputra is the same as Ārya Kātyāyana, the well-known disciple of the Buddha. In the *Pali Piṭaka—Pariśiṣṭa,* the authorship of the *Netrprakaraṇa*, a work on the Abhidharma, is also attributed to Kātyāyanīputra. From the above it is obvious that the *Jñānaprasthāna* is the most important work of the Sarvāstivādins. The entire later literature may be said to be based on this very work. It will therefore, be proper to give here some idea of the contents of this work. It consists of eight Books called *Gantho* and each *Book* has several chapters, called *Vaggos.*

Contents of Jñānaprasthāna.

The First Gantho contains the following: Lokuttara-dharmma-vaggo; Ñāna (knowledge)—vaggo (dealing with the cause of knowledge, memory, doubt, six causes of stupidity reproved by the Buddha, cessation of the causes, etc.) Puggala-vaggo (meaning a section dealing with the individuality). It discusses how many of the twelve paṭiccasamuppādas do belong to the past, present and future puggala, final liberation, etc.) The fourth chapter is a Vaggo on love and reverence (dealing with respect out of love and honour, honour with wealth and honour with dhamma, strength of the body, Nirvāṇa—the ultimate end, etc.). Next comes the Ahirikānottappa-vaggo (dealing with shamelessness (ahirikā), fearlessness of sinning (anottappa), the increasing demerits, etc.). The sixth chapter is on Rūpa-vaggo dealing with the Rūpa (form), and discusses why the Rūpadhamma changing through birth and death and being impermanent, can be called a form? Impermanence (anityatva), etc. Then follows the Anattha (objectlessness)—vaggo dealing with the vainness of all the practices of austerity, and holds that things desired cannot be secured, etc. The last chapter is on Cetanā (thought)—vaggo which deals with thinking, rejecting, awakening (vitakka), observing (vicāra), unsettled mind (uddhacca), ignorance (avijjā), arrogance (māna), hardness of heart, etc.

The Second Book has four chapters dealing with Saṁyojana (bond of human passions), such as, Akuśala-mūla (demerits), Sakadāgāmin (those who come but once), Sattva (beings), ten gates, namely, causes of moral defilements—single cause, double cause, order of various thoughts, awakening thought, thought connected with *indriyas*, completion, incompletion, knowledge that can destroy the causes—prahāṇaparijñā and realization of the destruction (nirodhasākṣātkāra).

The Third Book deals with Ñāna (knowledge) in five chapters, namely, stages of learning—knowledge attained by the lower grades of sanctification, state of an Arhat—diṭṭhi—ñāna—paññā (wisdom), views of those free from passions (anāsavasamādiṭṭhi), etc. The second chapter deals with the five types of right and wrong views. The next chapter treats of the knowledge of another's mind (paracittañāna). The fourth chapter discusses the cultivation of the eightfold knowledge, namely, dharmajñāna, anvayajñāna, saṁvṛtijñāna, duḥkhajajñāna, samudayajajñāna, nirodhajajñāna, mārgajajñāna, kṣayajajñāna, and anutpādajajñāna, and its relation with the secular knowledge. The last chapter discusses all sorts of knowledge and all its bearings.

The Fourth Book is on Karman (Action) in five chapters. The first chapter deals with all the details of sinful actions (duccaritas) and their results. The second is on sins committed by speach (micchāvācā) and their results. The third discusses hiṁsā (sins committed in taking life) and their results. The next chapter deals with all good and bad (kuśalākuśala) actions, whether visible or invisible relating to past and future, etc. The last chapter deals with actions bearing the like fruits, etc.

The Fifth Book deals with the four mahābhūtas in four chapters. In the first chapter it deals with sense—organs as products of the mahābhūtas. It also gives a treatment of the causes leading to the combination of the four elements. The second chapter also discusses the pratyaya (conditions) of the four elements. The next chapter deals with the things belonging to the rūpa-dhātu. The last chapter discusses the production of sensations, feelings, ideas, etc.

The Sixth Book deals with organs (indriyas) in

seven chapters. The first chapter is called Indriya-vaggo which discusses cakkhu (eye), sota (ear), ghāna (nose), jihvā (tongue), kāya (body), mano (mind), itthindriya (the female—organ), puṁsa (male—organ), jīva (life), sukha (happiness), dukkha (suffering), somanassa (rejoicing), domanassa (sorrow), upekkhā (indifference) saddhā (belief), viriya (striving), sati (recollection), samādhi (contemplation), paññā (wisdom), etc. The second chapter deals with bhavavaggo (a section on being), including all forms of existence, such as, kāmabhava, rūpabhava, etc. The third chapter deals with all kinds of touch. The fourth and the fifth chapters discuss states of mind. The next chapter is on matsya (fish), but it is to be noted that there is nothing on fish in this chapter. It however. discusses some peculiarities of organs. The last chapter deals with causes.

The Seventh Book deals with Samādhi (meditation) in five chapters. The first discusses all the conditions of the past. The second deals with meditations on causes and conditions in the dhyāna. The next chapter is on Vimutti (liberation). It discusses the various forms of meditation, knowledge and samādhi. The fourth chapter is on the states of anāgāmin, that is, those who do not come back. The last chapter deals with the states of those who come back only once (sakadāgāmin), etc.

The Eighth Book is on Diṭṭhi in six chapters. The first chapter is on various types of meditation (satipaṭṭhāna). The second chapter is on the states of existence. The third chapter deals with the various stages of consciousness (saññā) as to impermanence, sorrow, anātman, impurity, death, destruction, etc. The next chapter gives an account of knowledge. The fifth chapter discusses micchādiṭṭhi (erroneous views). The last chapter is called Gāthā-vaggo dealing with miscellaneous topics.[3]

Contents of the six supplements.

It will not be out of place to give a brief summary of the contents of the six pādas—supplements to the *Jñānaprasthāna* also here:

(1) The *Saṅgīti-Paryāya* consists of twelve sections dealing with the Origin of the collection of the laws for Bhikṣus; Eka-dharma (all beings living on food); Dvi-dharmas (nāma-rūpa); Tri-dharmas (all such dharmas

[3] *Journal of the Pali Text Society,* 1904-1905.

which are three in number according to the Sarvāstivādins, such as, lobha, dveṣa and moha); Catur-dharmas; Pañca-dharmas; Ṣaḍ-dharmas; Sapta-dharmas; Aṣṭa-dharmas; Nava-dharmas; Daśa-dharmas and the last section on Admonition.

(2) *Prakaraṇa-Pāda.*—This is the second of the six Pāda works of the Sarvāstivādins according to the Chinese tradition. This consists of eight sections consisting of the distinction of five dharmas; distinction of ten kinds of knowledge—dharma, anvaya, paracitta, saṁvṛti, duḥkha, samudaya, nirodha, mārga, kṣaya, and anutpādajñāna; distinction of twelve organs and objects of sense (āyatanas); distinction of 18 dhātus, 12 āyatanas, 5 skandhas, 10 mahābhūmikadharmas, 10 kuśalamahābhūmikas; 10 kleśamahābhūmikas, 10 upakleśabhūmikas, and besides, 5 dhātus, 5 sparśas, 5 kleśas, 5 dṛṣṭis, 5 indriyas, 5 dharmas, 6 vijñānakāyas, 6 sparśakāyas, 6 vedanākāyas, 6 saṁjñākāyas, 6 cetanākāyas, 6 tṛṣṇākāyas, and 5 upādānaskandhas; distinction of 98 anuśayas, 36 of the kāmadhātu, 31 of the rūpadhātu, and 31 of the ārūpyadhātu; exposition of the things that can be known (jñeyadharma), anāsravadharmas, things to be inferred, etc.; discussion on one thousand questions and the last section is on conclusion.

(3) *Vijñānakāya* is the third supplement dealing with Maudgalyāyana's view about various elements; pudgalas and śūnyatā; hetupratyaya; ālambanapratyaya; and two sections on miscellaneous.

(4) *Dhātukāya* is the fourth supplement of the *Jñānaprasthāna*. It deals with all mental faculties which this school assumes as separate elements called 'dhātus'.

(5) *Dharmaskandha* is the fifth Pāda of the *Jñānaprasthāna*. This work is considered to be as important as the main work itself. It deals with all important points of the fundamental principles of this school, though it does not indulge into the details of metaphysical questions like the main work. It treats of the following topics in 21 sections: Śikṣāpadas, Srotāpattyaṅga, Avetyaprasāda (attainment of purity), Result of Śramaṇaship, Abhijñāpratipad (mental experiences), Classes of the Buddha's disciples, Right victory, Constituents of magic power, Smṛtyupasthānas, Ārya-satyas, Dhyāna, Apramāṇas, Four stages of the ārūpya—dhātu, Bhāvanā-

samādhi, Bodhyaṅga (branches of knowledge), Mental faculties, Indriyas, Āyatanas, Skandhas, Nānādhātus, and 12 Pratītyasamutpādas.

(6) The last Pāda is called the *Prajñapti-śāstra.* Some of the more important topics of the fourteen sections into which the book is divided are: loka-prajñapti, kāraṇa-prajñapti, trṣṇā, a great cause of life.

Mahāvibhāṣā is the commentary on the *Jñānaprasthāna* and it contains all the good points of metaphysical arguments, and the heterogeneous elements of Buddhist tradition. This work may have been written after Kaniṣka between *C.* 200 and 400 A.D. We know that there were two centres of the Sarvāstivādins—Kāśmīra and Gāndhāra. But it seems that after some time the Gāndhāra school disappeared or merged into the other and the only important centre of the Vaibhāṣikas afterwards was Kāśmīra. Hence, the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu ends with the lines—

Mahāvibhāṣā written between *c* 200 & 400 A.D.

Kāśmīravaibhāṣikanītisiddhaḥ,
Prāyo mayāyaṁ kathito'bhidharmaḥ /

This commentary consists of eight chapters dealing with miscellaneous topics, saṁyojana, knowledge, karman, elements, sense-organs, meditation and view-point. In fact, being a commentary on the *Jñānaprasthāna* it deals with all those topics which are found in the *Prasthāna.* Besides, the commentary is a mine of information regarding the contemporary writers and old views including those of the non-Buddhists. It was perhaps for the first time that the Hīnayāna Buddhists had discussed various philosophical problems in this work, in a rational manner. It is this very commentary work which forms the basis of the later Vaibhāṣika works. But it may be said that this commentary, due to its homogeneous contents, could not be regarded as a manual of the Sarvāstivāda school. It served however, the purpose of a reference book.

Contents of the *Mahāvibhāṣā.*

After a century or so, there flourished Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra in the fourth or fifth century A. D. These two scholars became very important writers on the Vaibhāṣika school. It may be, however, pointed

Vasubandhu in fourth or fifth century A.D.

out that though Vasubandhu did a great service to the Vaibhāṣikas and wrote an authoritative and most important work, named, *Abhidharmakośa,* yet as he became the propounder of the Sautrāntika school later on, he is not regarded as a faithful follower of the Vaibhāṣika school. Saṅghabhadra, on the other hand, was true to his faith and was regarded as an orthodox author of the Vaibhāṣika school. It was therefore, that Saṅghabhadra, while commenting upon the *Abhidharmakośa,* had criticised Vasubandhu, in his *Samayapradīpa,* wherever the latter had departed from the orthodox Sarvāstivāda views.

Abhidharmakośa.

After the *Mahāvibhāṣā,* the next most important work on the Sarvāstivāda school is the *Abhidharmakośa* by Vasubandhu. It is for the first time that the philosophical topics of the school have been properly arranged and discussed in detail in a connected form. The book was found so important and full of information that in later periods, it was recognized as the most important basic work of the school.

It is divided into eight chapters— (1) The first chapter deals with the treatment of Dhātus[3a] discussing the nature of substance in 48 verses. (2) Treatment of the Indriyas and of the function of dharmas (things) in 73 kārikās. These two chapters deal with the *sāsrava* (defiled) aspect, that is, the phenomenal world and the *anāsrava* (undefiled), that is, the Nirvāṇa. (3) Treatment of the loka-dhātu, the world considered as the outcome of *sāsrava,* that is, saṁsāra in 102 kārikās. (4) Treatment of karman as the cause of *'sāsrava-saṁsāra'* in 127 kārikās. (5) Treatment of *anuśayas* (latent evils) as the condition of the *sāsrava* or saṁsāra in 70 kārikās. These three chapters deal with the causes and the effects of saṁsāra in great detail. (6) Treatment of *Ārya* and *Mārga* leading to Nirvāṇa in 79 kārikās. (7) Treatment of Jñāna (knowledge) considered as the cause of *anāsrava* (nirvāṇa) in 56 kārikās. (8) Treatment of Dhyāna (meditation) considered as a pratyaya (condition) of *anāsrava* (nirvāṇa) in 40 kārikās. These three chapters deal with the causes and the effects of Nirvāṇa.

This book became so very important that several

[3a] Dhātu' is that which bears its own intrinsic nature—salakkhaṇaṁ dharetīti dhātuḥ.

well-known scholars of the time wrote commentaries on it. In the absence of the *Jnāna-prasthāna* and the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, this was the only most authentic work on the Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhism. Amongst the commentaries the following are most important—(1) *Sphuṭārthā* by Yaśomifra, (2) *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* by Puṇyavardhana, (3) *Aupayikī* by Śāntisthiradeva, (4) *Marmapradīpa* by Diṅnāga and (5) *Tattvārtha* by Sthiramati.

Commentaries on the *Abhidharmakośa*.

Besides, there are some other works belonging to the Sarvāstivāda school which may be mentioned here. (1) *Abhidharmāmṛtaśāstram* by Ghoṣa, (2) *Abhidharmahṛdaya* by Dharmottara, (3) *Abhidharmahṛdaya* by Upaśānta. (4) *Abhidharmahṛdaya* by Dharmatrātā, (5) *Abhidharmapraveśa* by Sugandhara, (6) *Sāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* by Sāriputra and (7) *Lakṣaṇānusāra* by Guṇamati.[4]

Śubhagupta.

Śubhagupta is said to be a Vaibhāṣika teacher. Though no work of his has been yet unearthed, yet his views on Paramāṇu and Cognition are found in the *Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla on the *Tattvasaṅgraha*[5] and also are referred to by Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa in his *Vivṛti* on the *Nyāyabhāṣya*.[6]

Dharmakīrti.

Besides, Dharmakīrti of the seventh century wrote a work on logic, called *Nyāyabindu*, which has been commented upon by Dharmottara of the ninth century. From the treatment of Pratyakṣa given in the book, it seems that Dharmakīrti was a Vaibhāṣika and that his *Nyāyabindu* is a work on logic according to the Vaibhāṣika School.

Saṅghabhadra contemporary of Vasubandhu and his works.

Saṅghabhadra, as has been already said, was also a follower of the Sarvāstivāda school and lived in Ayodhyā. It is said that he found Sautrāntika views explained in the *Abhidharmakośa* and felt that it was his duty as a faithful follower of the Vibhāṣā to defend the Vibhāṣā school against the attack of Vasubandhu. Accordingly, he wrote two works, named *Abhidharma-Nyā-*

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4 *Introduction to the Abhidharmakośa* by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana.

5 *Tattvasaṅgraha* (English translation), pp. 938, 945, 952, 963, 968, 970, 974, 987; Gaekwad's Oriental Series.

6 Vol. I, I, pp. 74, 106.

yānusāra and *Abhidharma-Samayapradīpikā* or *Pradīpa.* In the first work Saṅghabhadra has explained the Vibhāṣā tenets very elaborately. In so doing he has also refuted the Sautrāntika views of Vasubandhu as found in the *Abhidharmakośa,* and has explained those very points according to the Vibhāṣā school. This book had, it is said, previously some other title, but later on, Vasubandhu himself changed it to *Nyāyānusāra.* The other book, *Samayapradīpa,* is only a compendium of the first work and is a short exposition of the tenets of the Vaibhāṣika school.

2. *Doctrines of the School*

(1) *Cosmological speculations*

Nature of the universe.

Like all other systems of thought, the Vaibhāṣika school also deals first with the cosmological speculations, as it is the cosmic world which presents itself first to every thinker and also because, it is in relation to the external world that all our metaphysical thoughts proceed in the first instance.

Of the four main Buddhist schools, it is the Vibhāṣā school alone which believes in the independent and objective reality of cosmos and also in the reality of the corresponding thoughts, both from the highest standpoint and the common-sense view-point though it changes every moment. So some of the main doctrines of the Vaibhāṣika school are given here in order to trace the gradual retirement from the external to the internal and therefrom into the Abyss of the Void which is the consummation sought for in Buddhist philosophy.

Dharmas and their nature.

It has been already made clear that philosophical enquiry starts for the removal of miseries. This is not possible, according to the Buddhists, unless we come to know the true nature of the Dharmas, which include not only material elements of the universe but also mental. In fact, the entire universe is a product of the mutual combinations of these Dharmas.[7] The term Dharma has been used in variety of senses. In Buddhist

[7] *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 3.

philosophy, however, it has been defined as those ultimate entities which possess their own intrinsic nature; so these are quite distinct from skandhas (groups) which come to possess the characteristics of the ultimate elements which constitute them. In other words, Dharmas are the ultimate entities, material and mental, having specific characteristics of their own, out of which, skandhas are formed. These Dharmas collectively produce objects but not singly. These are produced out of conditions and causes (hetupratyayajanitāḥ.). So these are mutually related as causes and effects. Hence, these are non-eternal entities and move towards their own destruction (nāśa). It is therefore, that the Buddhists believe in the *nirodha* of these Dharmas. These Dharmas, including even consciousness (cit), are momentary and are destroyed in the very moment of their production.

Subjective and objective classifications of things.

With these ideas when we proceed to deal with the ultimate elements (dharmas), we find that they can be split up first into Subjective and Objective classifications. In the former case, the nature of an object through the analysis of its component parts is considered; while according to the latter, the nature of things, which are incomposite and composite, is discussed. Thus, it is clear that the subjective and objective classifications are really mutually inclusive and that the difference between them is merely one of stand-point. In other words, in the case of subjective classification component parts are examined in relation to the composite form, while in the objective classification the composite and also the incomposite things form the objects of our examination.

(2) *Subjective Classification*

According to the subjective classification, things (Dharmas) are divided into—(1) (five) *skandhas,* (2) (twelve) *Āyatanas* and (3) (eighteen) *Dhātus.* According to the objective classification, on the other hand, things are classified into (1) *Asaṁskṛta-dharma* and (2) *Saṁskṛta-dharma.*

Treatment of the subjective classification.

It is necessary at this stage to give a clear idea of these classifications in some detail. So we take up the subjective classification first.

(i) *Skandhas*

The five Skandhas—The term *Skandha* means group, collection, heap. The Vaibhāṣika school is of opinion that everything in this world consists of skandhas (aggregates) which are of five kinds—, namely, (1) Rūpa, (2) Vedanā, (3) Saṁjñā, (4) Saṁskāra, and (5) Vijñāna.

Five skandhas.

By *Rūpa,* literally, we mean form or shape and also colour. In fact, it implies physical body. Vasubandhu quotes the following from the sūtras about *rūpa*—'All things possessed of form, whether past, present, or future, whether internal or external, whether coarse or fine, whether mean or great, whether distant or near—all such things constitute one skandha, called the rūpa-skandha'.[8]

The rūpa-skandha is that composite matter out of which a physical organism is produced. It resists or obstructs (pratighāta) sense-organs. This matter consists of the four substances, namely, earth, water, tejas and air, which are themselves the products of their own four ultimate particles, called atoms or Paramāṇus.

When analysed properly, it is found that the five external sense-organs, namely, cakṣus, śrotra, ghrāṇa, rasanā and kāya, the five objects of these five sense-organs, namely, rūpa, śabda, gandha, rasa and sparśa, and the five *avijñaptis* all constitute the *Rūpa-skandha.*[9]

Constituents of Rūpa-skandha

Every material object is made of an aggregate of the fourfold substratum of rūpa (colour and form), rasa, gandha, and sparśa, namely, Tejas, water, earth and air. It does not contain Ākāśa. The smallest particle of rūpa is called *'Paramāṇu'*[10] which has no form (ākāra),[11] is supersensuous and indivisible. But when seven such Paramāṇus come together, six from the six sides and one in the centre, they form what is known as *'Aṇu'*, the first material product. This product, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, is visible and destructible.

Vedanā-skandha—It may be explained as feeling which is pleasant or unpleasant, joyful or sorrowful.[12] *Saṁjñā-skandha*—

Vedanā-skandha.

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8 *Manual of Buddhist Philosophy,* p. 83.
9 *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 9.
10 *Abhidharmakośa,* II. 22.
11 *Abhidharmakośa,* IV. 3.
12 *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 14.

It is of the nature of the retention (udgrahaṇa) of the *nimittas*, namely, the attributes, like, blue and yellow, long and short, male and female, friend and foe, etc.[13] *Saṁskāra-skandha*—it means mental properties. The last of the skandhas is the *Vijñāna-skandha*. It means consciousness. All these five skandhas together constitute a being.

Saṁjñā-skandha.

Saṁskāra-skandha

Vijñāna-skandha.

(ii) *Āyatanas*

The second category of the subjective classification of the universe is *Āyatana*. The term *'Āyatana'* has been explained by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa* as the passage of the production of citta and caitasika dharmas. In other words, no consciousness can be produced independently. There must be a sense-organ and also a sense-object to produce it. For instance, when we see an object, then both the sense-organ of vision and the visual object must form the ground or place wherein the visual consciousness is produced. So both the sense-organ and the sense-object together form what is called *'Āyatana'*, that is, a passage or means (*dvāra*) to produce consciousness. In fact, it is the basis of consciousness, or it is that element which brings about consciousness. It is clear from the above that consciousness is not an eternal element, but is a non-eternal mental factor produced out of certain pre-existent material elements.

Āyatana explained.

It is of twelve kinds—six sense-organs and their six-objects, such as, Organ of sight, Organ of hearing, Organ of smell, Organ of taste, Organ of touch and Organ of mental objects, which is called 'Mana Āyatana'.[14] The objects of these six sense-organs are—Object of sight, Object of hearing, Object of smell, Object of taste, Object of touch, and Object of mental elements.

Divisions of Āyatana.

These twelve Āyatanas have their real existence in the universe and there exists nothing which is not included under any of these . In other words, things of the universe must be either a sense-organ or a sense-object and that which is neither has no existence. It is therefore, that the Bud-

Nature of Āyatana.

13 *Abhidharmakośa*, I. 14.

14 *Abhidharmakośa*, I. 16.

dhists do not believe in the existence of Ātman which is not included in any of the twelve factors mentioned above. It may be also pointed out here that the Buddhists believe that there are 75 dharmas in all in the universe, of which the first eleven Āyatanas mentioned above represent 11 dharmas, while the last, 'Mana Āyatana', includes the rest 64 dharmas. Hence, it is called *'Dharmāyatana'*.

Ātman has no existence.

(iii) *Dhātu*

The last category of the subjective classification is called *'Dhātu'*. It has been defined in Buddhist philosophy, as that which possesses its own intrinsic nature (salakṣaṇam), as opposed to that group which possesses the characteristics of those which constitute it. In other words, it is a factor of consciousness, or an element, which forms the consciousness. As will be clear from the enumeration of the divisions of the Dhātu, it may be said that all that is necessary to produce consciousness is called *'Dhātu'*, so all the twelve Āyatanas, which are the necessary factors of consciousness, are also included under the Dhātus. Besides, the resultants of the functioning of these twelve Āyatanas also are called Dhātus, because it is only then that consciousness becomes manifest and known. So there are eighteen kinds of Dhātu, namely, sense-organ of vision, sense-organ of hearing, sense-organ of smell, sense-organ of taste, sense-organ of touch and inner sense-organ, that is, manas; object of vision, object of hearing, object of smell, object of taste, object of touch and object of inner-sense-organ, called, *'Dharmāyatana'* or *Dharmadhātu'*. These twelve Āyatanas produce the twelve resultants, which are called, in the same order, consciousness produced out of the functioning of the sense-organ and sense-object of vision, consciousness dependent upon the sense-organ and sense-object of hearing, consciousness produced out of the sense-organ and sense-object of smell, consciousness dependent upon the sense-organ and sense-object of taste, consciousness dependent upon the sense-organ and sense-object of touch and lastly, consciousness caused by the inner-sense-organ and inner-sense-object, called, *'Manovijñāna-dhātu'* or *'Dharmadhātu'*.

Dhātu explained.

Dhātus enumerated.

Besides, all the four bhūtas, excluding Ākāśa, are also called *'dhātus'*. So we have Pṛthivī-dhātu, Āpo-dhātu, Tejodhātu and Vāyu-dhātu. These four have respectively, supporting, cohesion (saṅgraha), ripening and expansion as their specialities. Of these, again, pṛthivī possesses solidity, water has moisture, tejas has heat and vāyu has the nature of motion. Again, all these four are nothing but the grouping of the various forms and colours of Rūpa, that is, these belong to the Rūpaskandha.[15]

The four dhātus.

After having dealt with the eighteen dhātus, we now pass on to some other consideration of the universe which is divided by the Buddhists under three divisions according to the nature of their constituents and which also are called *'Dhātus'*. These are—*Rūpa-dhātu, Arūpadhātu* and *Kāma-dhātu*. Under *Rūpa-dhātu* are included all the dhātus mentioned above except the four, namely, gandhadhātu, rasadhātu, ghrāṇa-vijñāna-dhātu and jihvā-vijñāna-dhātu. So the inhabitants of the *Rūpadhātu* possess only fourteen dhātus. The reason is that though the Jīvas, living in the *Rūpadhātu,* do possess the sense-organs of smell and taste, yet as there is the absence of the sense-objects of smell and taste, the four dhātus have no practical existence in *Rūpadhātu*. Really speaking, the *Rūpadhātu* is free from vāsanās and is, more or less, a pure bhautika aspect of the universe. So there is the absence of the four vijñānas also.

The three divisions of Universe called Dhātus.

Rūpadhātu.

Arūpadhātu consists of mano-dhātu, dharma-dhātu and manovijñānadhātu. The rest of the fifteen dhātus have no place in that aspect of the universe which is concerned with Arūpadhātu which is in fact, the *abhautika* aspect of the universe.

Arūpadhātu.

Kāmadhātu, which really represents the bhautika aspect of the universe, is full of vāsanās and hence, all the eighteen dhātus mentioned above find their place in it.[16]

Kāmadhātu.

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15 *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 12-13.

16 *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 30-31. Further details of these divisions of the universe have been given in the *Abhidharmakośa,* chapter III (Lokadhātunirdeśa).

(3) *Objective Classification*

We now take up the consideration of the elements of the universe from the objective point of view. It has been mentioned before that the entire universe is a product of the mutual combinations of dharmas.[17] All these dharmas have been grouped under two broad heads: (1) *Saṁskṛta-dharma* and (2) *Asaṁskṛta-dharma*. By the former, the Buddhists mean those elements which are caused, conditioned (hetupratyayajanita), mundane, non-eternal, changing and active and which mutually combine to form the cosmic world. Vasubandhu holds that the *Saṁskṛta-dharmas* include the five skandhas, namely, Rūpa-skandha, Vedanā-skandha, Saṁjñā-skandha, Saṁskāra-skandha and Vijñāna-skandha. These very Saṁskṛta dharmas have been called in the *Piṭaka,* as *Adhva* or *Lokādhva,* Common Path of the world, that is, a path which has been gone through in the past, is being followed at the present time and will be gone through in future;[18] *Kathāvastu,* that is, the object of word;[19] *Sanissaraṇa* also called *Savimokṣa,* that is, which can become free from the world and achieve Nirvāṇa; and *Savastuka,* that is, which has a cause.[20] In other words, all composite objects are produced out of an aggregate of causes and conditions and not by a single cause (Na tvekapratyayajanitaṁ sarvathālpapratyayatve'pi avaśyam dvau pratyayau staḥ). They are included in the five skandhas, are capaple of being freed from the bondage of saṁsāra and have been in existence from the hoary past and will continue in future.[21]

Saṁskṛta Dharma and Asaṁskṛta Dharma.

Saṁskṛta dharma.

The latter, that is, the *Asaṁskṛta-dharma,* is used for those elements of existence which are uncaused and unconditioned and hence, eternal and unchanging, transcendental and inactive, and which do not combine to produce anything. Each of the three *Asaṁskṛta-dharmas,* namely, Pratisaṅkhyānirodha, Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha and Ākāśa, according to the Sarvāstivādins, is separate and discrete.

Asaṁskṛta dharma.

[17] *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 3.
[18] *Aṅguttara-Nikāya,* III. vii. 7.
[19] *Aṅguttara-Nikāya,* IV. i. 1.
[20] *Aṅguttara-Nikāya,* III. xi. 2.
[21] *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 7.

Thus, they believe in three unconditioned eternal elements.

Divisions of Saṁskṛta Dharmas.

The *Saṁskṛta-dharmas* have been divided into three categories *Rūpa* (matter), *Citta* (mind or consciousness), and *Caitasikas* (mental properties) by the Sthaviravādins. The Sarvāstivādins, however, add one more category to the above, namely, *Citta-viprayukta* (non-mental properties), because, they hold that there are certain dharmas which are really neither associated with *Citta-dharmas,* nor are connected with Rūpa-dharmas. So these are included under *Citta-viprayukta.*

Number of Dharmas included in the Saṁskṛta and Asaṁskṛta dharmas.

As to the exact number of dharmas included under each of the above-mentioned categories, there is no agreement between the two schools, but both of them, however, agree that the *Rūpa-dharmas* possess the component parts of the Rūpa-skandha, the *Citta-dharmas* possess the component parts of the Vijñāna-skandha, while the *Caitasika-dharmas* include the component parts of the Vedanā and Saṁjñā-skandhas along with the component parts of Saṁskāra-skandha. The *Citta-viprayukta dharmas,* however, are included under the Saṁskāra-skandha, according to the Sarvāstivādins.

Again, regarding the exact number of the dharmas constituting each of the above-mentioned groups of the *Saṁskṛta—dharmas,* there is some difference of opinion between the Sthaviravādins and the Sarvāstivādins. Thus, according to the former, *Rūpa* consists of twenty-eight dharmas, *Citta* eighty-nine and Caitasika fifty-two dharmas; while according to the latter, *Rūpa* constitutes eleven dharmas, *Citta* possesses only one dharma and *Caitasika* includes forty-six dharmas and lastly, they attribute fourteen dharmas to *Citta-viprayukta.* Thus, according to the Sthaviravādins, *Saṁskṛta-dharma* constitutes one hundred and sixty-nine dharmas, while there are only seventy-two dharmas according to the Sarvāstivādins.

Nature of sāsrava dharmas.

These *Saṁskṛta-dharmas* are called *Sāsrava,* that is, those dharmas which are devoid of *Mārgasatya,* that is, those which do not concern the Truth relating to the Path leading to the cessation of suffering, are *Sās-*

ravas. These are called *sāsravas,* because, 'mala' or kleśa —rāga, dveṣa, moha, and karman, stick to these. The Sāsrava dharmas relate to the two noble truths, namely, (1) the Truth concerning Suffering (duḥkha-satya) and (2) the Truth concerning the Origin of Suffering (samudaya-satya) and refer to the cause and effect of Saṁsāra. Hence, these are defiled and impure and are produced by mutual combinations[22] out of the *Upādāna-skandha*, that is, kleśa.[23] These Sāsrava-dharmas have been also called *'Saraṇas'* in the Piṭaka, because they produce misery for others and also for themselves. They are also known as Duḥkha, Samudaya, Loka, Dṛṣṭisthāna, and Bhava.[24]

Divisions of Asaṁskṛta dharmas.

The *Asaṁskṛta-dharma,* according to the Sthaviravādins, is only one, called *Nirvāṇa.* This is to be realized through the annihilation of the causes and conditions which lead to births and deaths. In the opinion of the Sarvāstivādins, however, *Asaṁskṛtadharmas* are three in number and these are: (1) *Ākāśa,* (2) *Pratisaṅkhyānirodha* and (3) *Apratisaṅkhyānirodha.* These are anāsravas, that is, free from *malas,* namely, rāga, dveṣa and moha, are pure and unmixed. These exist without depending upon any cause and condition, that is, these are self-existent. These are not subject to any change. Hence, these are called *'Mārgasatya',* that is, these refer to the truth concerning the Path leading to the cessation of sufferings. These are eternal dharmas.[25]

A brief treatment of both the Dharmas is given below:

(i) *Asaṁskṛta-Dharmas*

(a) *Ākāśa*

Nature of Ākāśa.

Of the three Asaṁskṛta and Anāsrava dharmas, *Ākāśa* is of the nature of being free from limitations or obstructions (anāvṛtiḥ, anāvaraṇasvarūpam), that is, neither it is limited by anything, nor does it put limitation to anything. It is eternal and unchanging. Anything may be pro-

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22 *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 4.

23 *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 8.

24 *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 8; *Saṁyutta-Nikāya,* IV. 1. 8. 9; *Aṅguttara-Nikāya,* IV. xix. 5; X. x. 7.

25 *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 5; *Pañjikā* on the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (English translation), pp. 1835-40.

duced or destroyed in it without thereby producing any change in its nature. In other words, it does not offer any resistence. *Rūpa dharma* freely functions in it. It is, therefore, that the activity of material things is uninterrupted in Ākāśa.[26] It is positive (*bhāvarūpa*) in nature and not *abhāvarūpa*, or void, or āvaraṇābhāva as Śaṅkara has interpreted it.[27]

Ākāśa as an Empty space.

It is to be noted in this connection that the Sthaviravādins include Ākāśa amongst those dharmas which are produced out of the four Mahābhūtas, while the Sarvāstivādins hold that it is one of the Asaṁskṛta dharmas, and hence, it is eternal and not produced. It may be pointed out here that the Sarvāstivādins believe in two kinds of Ākāśa—one which is the Asaṁskṛta eternal Ākāśa and the other non-eternal Ākāśa which is identified with the *empty space* around us.

(b) *Pratisaṅkhyānirodha*

Nature of Pratisaṁkhyā-Nirodha.

Vasubandhu defines *Pratisaṅkhyānirodha* as—'*Pratisaṅkhyānirodho yo visaṁyogaḥ pṛthak pṛthak*', that is, *nirodha*—cessation (of births and deaths) through *Pratisaṅkhyā—Prajñā*, transcendental knowledge.[28] In other words, it means the individual cessation of each and every sāsrava-dharma, that is, kleśas, namely, rāga, dveṣa and moha through transcendental knowldge. Vasubandhu explains it and says, "It has for its nature freedom from bondage. . . Pratisaṁkhyā means conscious deliberation and is a type of intelligence since it deliberates upon each of the four Noble Truths. The attainment of cessation (Nirodha), that is, the cessation of taints and passions by means of the power of deliberation is therefore called Pratisaṁkhyānirodha."[29]

Annihilation of Kleśas.

Vasubandhu further says, that the attainment of freedom from one bondage does not imply simultaneous emancipation from all other bondages, for emancipation differs according to the nature of the basis of the bondage, that is to say, the emancipation from bondage is in

26 *Abhidharmakośa*, I. 5.
27 *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra*, II. ii. 24.
28 *Abhidharmakośa*, I. 6.
29 *Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 111.

accord with the extent of the basis of the bondage. If it were not so, then on the annihilation of one kleśa, all other kleśas would also have been annihilated, and consequently, efforts to annihilate others would have been futile. But that efforts are made even after that is a fact which cannot be denied. Again, it is also a fact that once annihilation begins, it ends only after all the kleśas are destroyed.

The term Nirvāṇa explained.

Pratisaṅkhyānirodha has been described as the dharma *par excellence* among all the dharmas. It is the highest of all things and the greatest of all achievements. It has been rightly called *'anuttaram'* (supreme).[30] It has been identified with 'Nirvāṇa' by the Sthaviravādins. The term *'Nirvāṇa'* means cessation of rāga, dveṣa and moha and all the sāsravadharmas and Saṁskāras which are all due to tṛṣṇā. The state of Nirvāṇa is realized after the kleśas have been annihilated. This is achieved even before the physical organism falls as dead, in which case, it is called *'Sopadhiśeṣa—Nirvāṇa'*, because at that stage the Jīva is not yet exclusively free from all that leads to kleśas. But when it is realized just after the fall of the physical organism, then it is called *'Nirupadhi-Nirvāṇa'*, as then the Jīva becomes absolutely free from all the kleśas. It is the highest state which a Jīva can achieve and one never returns therefrom. Hence, it is called 'Acyuta' and 'Anuttara'.[31] It is clear from the above description of Nirvāṇa that it is positive (bhāvarūpa) in nature and not nihilistic (abhāvarūpa) as some have interpreted.

Conception of Nirvāṇa according to Vaibhāṣika.

Summing up the Conception of Nirvāṇa, it may be said that according to Vaibhāṣika, Nirvāṇa is real and eternal. It exists by itself like Rūpa and Aṇu. It does not require any ārammaṇa like knowledge (jñāna) for its origin and is un-connected with Citta, that is, it is acetasika and cittavippayutta. It is, however, distinguished from *Rūpa* and *Aṇu* by the fact that it is uncaused and requires the practice of Magga for its realization.

It is realized only when the right Path is followed

30 *Abhidhammatthasaṅgraha*, VI. 31; *Abhidharmakośa*, IV. 127.
31 *Abhidhammatthasaṅgraha*, VI. 31.

and that too only by the Āryas. It is realized by the Arhats in their very life-time. It is called in the *Abhidharmakośa* the attainment of the *Sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa-dhātu*. That Nirvāṇa is real is also clear from the lines of the *Viśuddhimagga* where the Buddha is said to have preached "atthi bhikkhave ajātam abhūtam." It is, therefore, that the Buddha preached it as one of his four Noble Truths. It is regarded as the basis of all knowledge. All individuality ceases in it and it is one and not different for different individuals.

It is infinite, immeasurable and inexpressible like Ākāśa. It is positive in nature. Kleśas prevent people to realize it. But when Kleśas are removed by the Magga, then it becomes manifest. It is very subtle. Buddhaghoṣa adds to the above the attribute of blissfulness. In the 'Sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa', the Arhats obtain inwardly a vision of it, and actually realize it when they enter into the 'Nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa'. It is a dhātu (substance) with all the above-mentioned qualities.

(c) *Apratisaṅkhyānirodha*

Apratisaṅkhyānirodha explained.

Apratisaṅkhyānirodha is the last of the *Asaṁskṛta dharmas*. It has been explained as cessation of kleśas without the instrumentality of consciousness. The causes and conditions, which would have caused the manifestation of certain dharmas not within the range of the functioning of the mind, the mind being exclusively fixed on some other particular object, being absent, those dharmas remained unknown unconsciously. So says Vasubandhu —"Just as when the mind is intent upon one object, all other objects of sight, sound, smell, taste and touch are lost, because the group of the five vijñānas remains in the not-yet-arisen (or future) state and consequently, never arise at a later moment since they are unable to perceive past-sense-objects. In like manner, because of the incompleteness of sufficing causes, Apratisaṅkhyā-Nirodha is brought about."[32] In this case, both the past and the future ever remain unconnected with the present and hence, unrealized, so it is called 'cessation of kleśas without consciousness'.

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[32] *Abhidharmakośa*, I. 6. along with the *Com.* of Rāhula; *Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 112.

(ii) *Saṁskṛta-Dharmas*

Having discussed the nature of the *Asaṁskṛta-dharmas* we now proceed to take up the consideration of the *Saṁskṛta-dharmas* which combine together to produce the cosmic world. These *Saṁskṛta-dharmas* have been described as mundane, non-eternal, produced out of causes and conditions and also due to kleśas and possess 'malas'.[33] These are connected with the twofold noble truth—Duḥkha and Samudaya.

Detail treatment of Saṁskṛta dharmas.

These dharmas have been broadly classified into *Rūpa, Citta,* and *Caitasika* to which the Sarvāstivādins add *Citta-viprayukta.* It has been already pointed out that *Rūpa* is matter, while the other two, *Citta* and *Caitasik,* represent the cetana aspect of the universe. The last one is neither associated with the material nor with the mental properties, but has its own separate existence.

A brief treatment of all these dharmas is given below:

(a) *Rūpa-dharma*

Rūpa, in Buddhist philosophy, is used in the sense of that which resists or obstructs (pratighāta) the sense-organs. Every material object is made of an aggregate of the fourfold substratum of rūpa, (used both in the sense of colour and form), rasa, (taste) gandha (smell) and sparśa (touch). It should be kept in mind that Ākāśa is excluded from this. The unit, which possesses this fourfold substratum, is called *'Paramāṇu'*[34] which is the smallest form of Rūpa. It is supersensuous and indivisible inaudible, untastable and intangible. Though it is indivisible, yet it is not eternal in the sense that it is everlastng without undergoing any change. It is changing every moment (kṣaṇabhaṅga) due to its constant change in combining. The sense-organs are also regarded as forms of matter produced out of the combinations of the 'Paramāṇus'. When such seven para-

Nature of Rūpa dharma explained.

Nature of Paramāṇu explained.

Sense-organs are forms of matter.

[33] *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 7-8.
[34] *Abhidharmakośa,* II. 22.

māṇus combine together, six from the six sides and one in the centre, then they form what is known as a *saṅghāta* of paramāṇus, called *'Aṇu'*. This is the first material product which becomes visible and is destructible.

Formation of 'Aṇu'.

It is to be kept in mind that amongst the dravya-Paramāṇus, some constitute of eight elements, the four mahābhūtas and the four bhautikas, namely, smell, taste, colour and touch. It is free from *śabda* and śabdāyatana. It is also invisible (anindriyaḥ). The same set of elements along with the tactile sense-organ (kāyendriya) forms a paramāṇu with nine elements, while there is another kind of paramāṇu which is devoid of śabda but has any one of the rest of the sense-organs along with the kāyendriya and the eight elements mentioned above which thus constitutes ten dravyaparamāṇus.[35]

Formation of a dravya-Paramāṇu.

It is clear from the above that the qualities of all the mahābhūtas are present in the paramāṇus. The special characteristics of solidity (which naturally, is associated with earth), viscidity (inherent quality of water), heat (inherent in tejas), and motion (belonging to vāyu) combine together to form each of the elements. Though every element constitutes all the four qualities, yet there is difference between all these four, because of the predominence of one's own specific attributes.

This Rūpa, meaning, that dharma which possesses rūpa, that is, bhūtas, is of eleven types, namely, the five sense-organs—cakṣus (organ of vision), śrotra (organ of hearing), ghrāṇa (organ of smell), rasanā (organ of taste) and kāya (organ of touch); the five sense-objects, namely, rūpa, (colour or form), śabda (sound), gandha (smell), rasa (taste) and spraṣṭavya (touch); and lastly, Avijñapti.

Divisions of Rūpa dharma.

Before going further into the details of the above mentioned divisions of *Rūpa,* it may be pointed out that both the sense-organs and sense-objects are formed out of the paramāṇus of the four mahābhūtas. These paramāṇus themselves are not eternal in

Formation of sense-organs and sense-objects.

35 *Abhidharmakośa*, II. 22.

the Vaiśeṣika sense. No doubt, they continue and come to exit from time to time due to their combinations and are ultimately destroyed. In other words, there are fourteen paramāṇus to group together to form one object, of which the paramāṇus of the four mahābhūtas have the power to sustain the paramāṇus of sense-organs and sense-objects.

Rūpa used as form and colour.

The Buddhists are of opinion that the sense-object of cakṣurindriya, namely, rūpa, possesses the paramāṇus of both form and colour. They go even so far as to say that if the particular form be round in shape then we must assume that there are paramāṇus of roundness in it. These paramāṇus are perceived separately but their individual notions are combined together in our mind. Hence, the unifying function of these separate groups of paramāṇus is purely subjective.

(i) *Sense-organs*

Sense-organ explained.

Proceeding with the consideration of the sense-organs, we may define a sense-organ (indriya) as the substratum of the six types of cognition (vijñāna), such as, cakṣurvijñāna, śrotravijñāna, kāyavijñāna, ghrāṇavijñāna, rasanāvijñāna and manovijñāna. In other words, indriya is that where the cognition (upalabdhi) of the dharmas of citta takes place.[36] The five sense-organs cognize their own respective objects, while the manas cognizes its own objects and also those of the other five sense-organs.[37]

Means of cognition.

There are two means of cognition—perception (grahaṇa) and conception (adhyavasāya). Through the former process, only indefinite presentation takes place, while the latter gives us definite presentation, so these may be said to correspond to, in a way, the nirvikalpaka and the savikalpaka forms of cognition respectively.

Process of cognition.

As regards the process of cognition, it is held that after taking the impression of the external object, the particular sense-organ concerned, arouses the citta and excites consciousness in it after which cognition takes place. As the sense-organs themselves are the substrata of their cogni-

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36 *Abhidharmakośa,* II. 5. 37 *Abhidharmakośa,* II. 2.

tions (āśrayaścakṣurādayaḥ), so with the defects of the sense-organs, there occur differences in their cognitions as well. It is necessary that the objects cognized through the five sense-organs must be present, while in the case of manas, it may be even absent.[38]

Cognition of Rūpa-Āyatana.

Rūpāyatana is cognized by two sense-organs. Thus, along with the cognition of colour through the sense-organ of vision, the length also is cognized. So is the case with the organ of touch. Length, being a form (saṁsthāna-ākāra), is cognized by the sense-organ of vision and also that of touch.[39]

Formation of sense-organs.

It has been said above that the sense-organs are produced due to the combinations of the various paramāṇus. It is not one independent unit. For instance, the organ of vision (cakṣur-indriya) consists of the paramāṇus of the four mahābhūtas, the paramāṇus of the four sense-objects (śabda being excluded), the organ of touch (kāyendriya) and the organ of vision itself. It has to be kept in mind that the eye-ball which we see is not the organ of vision. In fact, it is the substratum of the paramāṇus of the organ of vision which remain scattered over the eye-ball. In the same way, the paramāṇus of other sense-organs remain scattered over their individual substratum. The paramāṇus of the kāyendriya, however, spread over the surface of the whole body and are present along with each and every paramāṇu constituting the body. In like manner, the sense-object of touch is produced by the combination of sense-organ, sense-object and consciousness.[40]

Functions of the sense-organs.

It may be also pointed out here that the Buddhists distinguish between the nature of these sense-organs. Thus, according to them, the sense-organ of vision has the greatest scope for its function. Next, comes the organ of hearing. The rest of the sense-organs are treated on a different basis. They hold that the sense-organs of vision and hearing are able to grasp their objects even if those objects possess larger number of paramāṇus. The three others, on the other hand, at any one parti-

38 *Abhidharmakośa*, I. 41-48. 39 *Abhidharmakośa*, IV. 3.
40 *Abhidharmakośa*, III. 22, 30.

cular moment are able to sense only the same number of paramāṇus as they themselves constitute. Thus, for instance, the organ of smell at one moment grasps only as many paramāṇus of its object as it itself possesses, and then it grasps the remaining number of paramāṇus constituting that sense-object in the subsequent moment. The process is so rapid that one does not realize this difference easily. As regards the organs of vision and hearing, there is no such restriction. The organ of vision is capable of perceiving an object containing much larger number of paramāṇus.[41] They also hold that the organs of vision, manas and hearing receive their respective objects even from distance without actually coming in contact with their respective objects, but the other three sense-organs must come in contact with their respective objects for their cognition.[42]

(ii) *Sense-objects*

The sense-object called *Rūpa* is mainly of two kinds, colour and form. The former, again, is subdivided into twelve types, four main forms and eight derivatives. Thus, the four main forms are—blue (nīla), yellow (pīta), red (lohita), white (avadāta); the eight derivatives are—cloud colour (abhra or megha), smoke colour (dhūma), dust colour (rajas), mist colour (mahikā), shadow (chāyā), dazzling brightness (ātapa), light colour as that of the light of the moon (āloka), and darkness (tamas). The latter, that is, form is of eight kinds—long (dīrgha), short (hrasva), circular (vartula), round (parimaṇḍala), high (unnata), low (avanata), even (śāta) and uneven (viśāta).[43]

Divisions and sub-divisions of the sense-objects.

Śabda (sound) is mainly of two types—(1) *Upātta-mahābhūtahetuka,* that is, sound produced by objects which have the capacity to perceive, that is, sentient agents and (2) *Anupātta-mahābhūtahetuka,* that is, sound which is produced out of objects not having the capacity to perceive, that is, non-sentient agents. Again, each one these is either articulate (sattvākhya—varṇātmaka) or inarticulate (dhyanyātmaka, that is, sound produced by wind, trees, creepers, etc.). Again, all these

[41] *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 44.
[42] *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 43.
[43] *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 10.

four are either pleasant or unpleasant. Thus, śabda is of eight kinds in all.

Rasa, the object of the organ of taste, is of six kinds —sweet (madhura), sour (āmla), saltish (lavaṇa), acid (kaṭu), astringent (kaṣāya) and bitter (tikta).

Gandha, the object of the sense-organ of smell, is of four types—good smell (sugandha), bad smell (durgandha), excessive (utkaṭa) and scanty (anutkaṭa). Some again, have similar smell (samagandha) which renders nourishment to the physical organism and dissimilar smell (viṣamagandha) which does not render nourishment to our body, in place of the last two types.[44]

Spraṣṭavya, that is, the object of the tactile sense-organ is of eleven types—earthy, watery, fiery, airy, smooth, rough, heavy (gurutva), light (laghutva) cold, hunger and thirst.[45] It has to be kept in mind how the Vaibhāṣikas have included the feelings of hunger and thirst under touch. But this is a fact that there is a peculiar feeling or touch within the organism under the states of hunger and thurst. No such treatment of these elements in such minute detail has been found in any other system of thought in India. This is very peculiar to these Buddhists.

Avijñapti is the last subdivision of the *Rūpa dharma.* It has been explained by Vasubandhu as that type of matter or element which is present in the mind of one who is distracted or unconscious, or who is deeply merged in meditation, which is either good or bad and which is a product of the mahābhūtas—

Avijñapti explained.

Vikṣiptācittakasyāpi yo'nubandhaḥ śubhāśubhaḥ /
Mahābhūtānyupādāya sā hyavijñaptirucyate / /[46]

Saṅghabhadra has however, explained it in the following manner—

Kṛte'pi visabhāge'pi citte cittātyaye ca yat /
Vyākṛtā'pratighaṁ rūpaṁ sā hyavijñaptiriṣyate / /[47]

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44 It may be pointed out that according to the orthodox view all good smells render nourishment to our body, as may be easily deduced from the vedic mantra—'Sugandhim puṣṭivardhanam'—*Yajurveda-saṁhitā,* III. 60. So the last two divisions are not reasonable. These may be included under the first two types.

45 *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 10.

46 *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 11.

47 Quoted by Rāhula in the Foot Note of his edition of the *Abhidharmakośa,* I. 11.

That is to say, *avijāpti* is that which does not manifest itself to others and cannot be known by others, is either good or bad, is not obstructed and is found in wakeful and concentrated meditating states of mind. In other words, it is a sort of kārmic energy which is not perceived through any of the sense-organs or is made known to others. Elucidating the same further it may be pointed out that as soon as an act, good or bad, is performed, or an idea, good or bad, is expressed, it is called *vijñapti-rūpa*. This is made known to others. But at the same time prior to its being expressed to others, a latent energy is produced on our mind which remains unknown to others. It remains in the sub-conscious mind of the agent alone. Hence, it is called *avijñapti,* not expressed to others. Same idea is expressed in the *Pañca-skandha—Vijñaptiḥ samādhisambhūtaṁ rūpamanidarśanamapratighātaṁ*. It is something like the *Bhāva* aspect of the Jaina's elements, or the *Dharmādharma Saṁskāra* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, or the *Apūrva* of the Mīmāṁsakas.[48]

(b) *Citta-dharma*

Having considered the nature of matter according to the Vaibhāṣikas, we now proceed to deal with the mind, called citta or vijñāna. It is a known fact that the Buddhists do not believe in any eternal self-existing matter, nor do they ever believe in a substance called mind or consciousness (vijñāna) which is eternal and unchanging. So there is no Ātman in the sense in which it is used in āstika darśanas, according to Buddhists.

Citta explained.

Citta is one of the Saṁskṛta dharmas. Like all other objects, it is also produced by the combination of causes and conditions, or it may be said that it is produced out of the interaction (pratighāta) of indriyas and viṣayas; so that it ceases to exist when sense-object and sense-organ cease to interact. Citta, manas and vijñāna are all synonymous words.[49] But really speaking, these words denote the three different functions of the mind.

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48 For further details of 'Avijñapti' vide the *Abhidharmakośa,* chapter IV.

49 *Abhidharmakośa,* II. 34.

In other words, the word *'Citta'* is used in the sense of the animating principle of life. It is derived from the root *'Citta'*, meaning, *'sañcetana'*, animation and so it is translated as mind. *'Manas'* is derived from the root 'mā' meaning, to measure, according to the Buddhists. So it means that element which reasons, or gives judgement about a thing. It is also translated by the word 'mind' in English. *Vijñāna* is said to be the oldest of the three terms and is used for the experiencing aspect of the mind.

Citta, manas and vijñāna explained.

By the way, it may be pointed out at this place that the above mentioned statement of Vasubandhu, that is, *Cittaṃ mano'-tha vijñānamekārtham*[50] is almost the same as we find in the *Yajurveda-Saṁhitā*[51]—*'Cidasi manosi dhīrasi'*.

Citta, manas and vijñāna used in the *Yajurveda* in the same sense.

As regards the types of vijñāna, it may be said that in reality, it itself is only one but due to the difference of its substratum, it has six aspects. Each of the five sense-organs has one vijñāna of its own and these are known as cakṣurvijñāna, śrotravijñāna, ghrāṇa-vijñāna, rasanā-vijñāna and kāya-vijñāna. The last is called 'manovijñāna' which is active and exercises the functions of all the mental properties.

Types of Vijñāna explained.

(c) *Caitasika—Dharmas*

Now, we come to those dharmas which are, really speaking, the various phases of mind (citta). Apparently these could have been easily included under the various aspects of Citta itself, but as the Buddhists give the Caitasika—dharmas a definite separate place we also follow here the same classification. This makes it clear that the Buddhists like to treat the qualities separately. Hence, just as the Citta-dharmas are produced due to the interaction of the sense-organs and sense-objects, so the Caitasikas also are produced, though separately, from the same interactions of the sense-organs and sense-objects. From the divisions and sub-divisions of these Caitasikas

Caitasika-dharma explained.

50 *Abhidharmakośa*, II. 34. 51 IV. 19.

given below, it will be obvious that the list does not exhaust all the Caitasika-dharmas. In fact, the aspects given below may combine together and produce all sorts of thoughts—high and low. One thing more should be kept in mind that the function of the Citta-dharma is more or less general, while that of the caitasikas is concerned with every detail of the same mental process.

Difference between the functions of citta and caitasika dharmas.

These Caitasika-dharmas are of forty-six types classed under six groups— (1) *Mahābhūmika*—These dharmas are general in nature and are present in every citta or mental function. These are divided into ten—Vedanā (feelings of pleasure or pain, or of neither pleasure nor pain), Cetanā (volition), Saṁjñā (conception or ideation), Chanda (desire), Sparśa (the first contact of the sense-organ and the sense-object, that is, sensation), Mati (intelligence or wisdom), Smṛti (memory), Manaskāra (attention), Adhimukti (determination), and Samādhi (concentration).

Divisions and subdivisions of caitasika-dharmas.

(2) *Kuśala-mahābhūmika* (meritorious mental properties). This is present in every meritorious mental function (sarvakuśala-cittagāḥ). It is of ten kinds, namely, Śraddhā (faith, purification of the citta), Apramāda (carefulness or alertness towards the performance of meritorious deeds), Praśrabdhi (peacefulness of the citta), Upekṣā (indifference), Hrī (shame for doing a bad deed), Apatrapā (shame at the evil action of others), Alobha (absence of covetousness), Adveṣa (absence of hatred), Avihiṁsā (harmlessness), and Vīrya (energy to perform good action).

Divisions of meritorious mental properties.

(3) *Kleśamahābhūmika.* These dharmas of mental activities arise with the kleśas, that is, when any kind of desire to do evil deeds arises. This is of six types—Moha (ignorance), Pramāda (carelessness), Kausīdya (indolence towards the performance of good deeds), Aśrāddhyam (absence of faith), Styānam (sloth), and Uddhati (rashness or recklessness).

Divisions of evil-doing mental properties.

(4) *Akuśalamahābhūmika* (such mental activities which directly or indirectly lead to painful consequences). These are only two—Āhrīkyam (shamelessness on

one's own evil actions) and Anapatrapā (impudence or shamelessness towards the evil deeds done by others).

Divisions of painful mental properties.

(5) *Parīttakleśabhūmika* also called *Upakleśabhūmika.* These dharmas belong to very low type of demeritorious mental properties. These are ten in number—Krodha (anger), Upanāha (enmity), Śāṭhya (trickery), Īrṣyā (jealousy or envy), Pradāsa (gloom or dissatisfaction), Mrakṣa (hypocrisy), Matsara (envy), Māyā (deceit), Mada (arrogance), and Vihiṁsā (injury to others).

Divisions of very low type of demeritorious mental properties.

These Upakleśabhūmika—dharmas have four specialities of their own which are to be removed by wisdom and not by intellectual insight. They are associated only with Mano-vijñāna. They are all associated with ignorance and moha. They may appear even separately.

These are the five Caitasika-dharmas mentioned by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa.*[52] Some add one more called *Aniyatabhūmikadharma* as the sixth. This division of mental activities includes those dharmas which cannot definitely be attributed to any particular division mentioned before. This is of ten types—Kaukṛtya (grief, repentance), Middha (torpor), Vitarka (speculation), Vicāra (investigation or decision), Rāga (affection), Pratigha or Dveṣa (ill-will or anger), Māna (pride) and Vicikitsā (doubt).

Sixth type of caitasika dharma.

The following are the common characteristics of the Citta-dharmas and the Caitasika-dharmas—

Common characteristics of citta and caitasika dharmas.

1. Uniformity as regards time of their functioning, that is, the Citta-dharmas and their inter-related Caitasika-dharmas function exactly at the same time.

2. Both, the inter-related Citta and Caitasika, are related to the same sense-organ.

3. Both, the inter-related Citta and Caitasika, must have the same object to deal with.

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52 II. 23-27.

4. The essential qualities of the inter-related Citta and Caitasika must be the same.

5. Both must function on similar lines.

(d) *Citta-viprayukta-Dharmas*

Nature of citta-viprayukta dharmas.

We have seen before that originally this dharma was not recognized by all the Buddhists, but later on, it was added to the list by the Sarvāstivādins who proved with reasons how the dharmas under this head were as much real as those under the other three heads. Its full name is *Rūpa-citta-viprayukta-saṁskāra-dharma,* which means composite energies not associated either with matter or with mind and are quite independent.[53] But even then it cannot become active without becoming associated with mental or material dharmas. These dharmas are fourteen in number. These are—

Divisions of citta-viprayukta dharma.

Prāpti (attainment), Aprāpti (non-attainment) Sabhāgatā (that dharma which produces uniformity of characteristics among jīvas—sattva-sāmyam), Āsaṅgika (that dharma which stops the citta and caitta dharmas in the state of unconsciousness), Āsaṅgi-samāpatti (mental training leading to the state of unconsciousness, such as samādhi), Nirodha-samāpatti (mental training leading to the cessation of all the citta and caitta dharmas), Jīvitam (vitality), Jāti (birth), Sthiti (continuance of life), Jarā (decay), Anityatā (non-eternity), Nāma-kāya (words), Pada-kāya (sentences), and Vyañjana-kāya (letters).[54]

This is to be kept in mind that it is not these fourteen dharmas which constitute the Citta-viprayukta-dharmas and are named as such, but it is the energy which produces these fourteen dharmas and is called by these names.

This is in brief the treatment of the Saṁskṛta-Sāsrava-dharmas which constitute the cosmic universe according to the Vaibhāṣikas. All the *Saṁskṛta dharmas* are momentary and are destroyed just after they are produced.[55] An attempt has been made here to give an idea

[53] *Abhidharmakośa,* II. 35.
[54] *Abhidharmakośa,* II. 35-48.
[55] *Abhidharmakośa,* IV. 2.

of the conception of the cosmic universe according to the Vaibhāṣikas in this section. But it must be pointed out that it is not at all exhaustive in any way. Each of the elements mentioned in this section has been described in great detail in the *Abhidharmakośa* and other works. Those interested to specialise in the subject must consult the original works.

(3) *Theory of Karman*

The theory of Karman, in Buddhism like all other systems of thought, is very complicated. A complete treatment of this should be reserved for a separate independent attempt. But it is very nesessary to give even a very meagre information about it in this book. So an attempt is made here just to introduce the readers to this topic.

Origin of karman explained.

The Buddhists also believe in the beginninglessness and the ever changing nature of the phenomenal world and it was because of this that the Buddha also taught that every thing is impermanent (sarvamanityam). It has been also made clear before that every event in the universe is subject to the influence of cause and effect. So a question may be asked—what is that which sets the phenomenal world (saṁsāra) into motion in order to come into existence from the unknown and again, to disappear into the unknown to re-appear again, as before, without ever stopping the continuity of coming and disappearing? The only answer to this is that it is due to the Saṁskāra, the resultant of our own day to day actions, that the continuity of the saṁsāra is maintained.[56] From this it may be said that though the Buddhists do not believe in the existence of any eternal and unchanging entity, like Ātman, yet it is a fact which cannot be denied that the Buddhists do believe in the existence of a continuous chain of causes and effects in the form of Saṁskāra. This leads us to say further that all that exists and happens in this phenomenal world, either to any personality or to the world outside, is the outcome of our own deeds. So if the deeds

The Buddhists do believe in the continuity of karman from one birth to another.

[56] *Abhidharmakośa,* III. 21.

are good, the results are also good and if they are bad, the results are also bad.[57] Nothing can escape the functioning of karman. It may be again said that as all our miseries are due to our own karman and as all our happinesses also are due to our own karman, so it is certain that the performance of good karman alone can put an end to all our miseries and bring to us the highest happiness. In other words, we may say, according to the Buddhists also, that a man along with all his characteristics is the product of his own karman of the past birth or births and he alone is responsible for his future birth or births. The stages of his development towards the achievement of the highest aim are also to be acquired by the performance of good deeds. Such is the mystery of the theory of karman.

A Jīva is made of his own karman.

So Vasubandhu says that the peculiarities found in this world are all due to karman. Karman is of two kinds—conscious (cetanā) and produced out of conscious agency (cetanā-kṛtam). All the mental actions are classed under *cetanā-karman,* while the bodily and actions done through speech (kāyika and vācika-karman) are all which are produced through conscious agency (cetanākṛtam).[58]

Peculiarities of saṁsāra are due to karman.

The Vāk and Kāya karmans are either manifest (vijñaptisvarūpa) or unmanifest (avijñaptisvarūpa), hence, there are divisions of Vāg-vijñapti-karman and Vāg-avijñapti-karman and also Kāya-vijñapti-karman and Kāya-avijñapti-karman. Kāya-vijñapti-karman is the very form (ākāra) of the dharmas. It has no motion (gati), because all the Saṁskṛta-dharmas are momentary and hence, perishable just after their production in the same substratum where they are produced. So the produced dharmas do not exist in the second moment in order to have motion, that is, destroying its connection with something and acquiring its connection with new dharma (pūrvadeśa-tyāga and uttara-deśa-prāpti). So the Kāyikī vijñapti is one unit and that is nothing but a form (saṁsthāna).

Divisions and sub-divisions of Vāk and Kāya karmans.

[57] *Abhidharmakośa,* IV. 1.

[58] *Madhyamakāvatāra; Abhidharmakośa,* IV. 1.

Vāg-vijñapti is nothing but articulate sound. Vācika-karman is the same as giving orders (ājñāpradānam). All the Vāk-karmans and Kāya-karmans are defiled (sāsrava). These are the products of the mahābhūtas.[59]

Avijñapti and its divisions explained.

Avijñapti means a form (saṁsthāna) and so it is not manifested either by citta or caitta. This is found in the states of dreaming and Samādhi. This is either kuśala (good) or akuśala (bad). Vijñapti-karman, on the other hand, is kuśala (good, as it yields desired results), akuśala (bad, as it yields undesirable results) and avyākṛta (neither good nor bad, as it does not yield either good or bad results).[60] Akuśala (bad) kinds of Vijñapti-karman are found only in Kāmadhātu where there is Vāsanā. Avijñapti-karman is found in Kāmadhātu and Rūpa-dhātu but they are bad (akuśala). It is never found in the Ārūpyadhātu.[61]

Some karmans yield results simultaneously.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, all the three kinds of karman, namely, pleasant, unpleasant and neither pleasant nor unpleasant, yield their results simultaneously[62]. There are five types of feelings (vedanīyatā) of karman—svabhāva-vedanīyatā (natural), Samprayoga (felt through contact, Vipāka (experienced at the time of yielding the result), Ālambana (felt through the six sense-objects) and Sammukhībhāva-vedanīyatā (felt in the very presence of action).[63]

Divisions of the feelings of karman.

Again, the above mentioned three kinds of karman, pleasant, etc., are either definite, that is, to be definitely experienced in this birth (niyata) or indefinite (aniyata). The former is of three kinds—dṛṣṭa-dharma-vedanīya (experienced in this very life), upapadya-vedanīya (to be experienced in the next birth) and aparaparyāya-vedanīya.

According to some Ācāryas, again, karman is of five types, and they add to the above mentioned three niyata

[59] *Abhidharmakośa,* IV. 2-5.
[60] *Abhidharmakośa,* IV. 45.
[61] *Abhidharmakośa,* IV. 6-7.
[62] *Abhidharmakośa,* IV. 48.
[63] *Abhidharmakośa,* IV. 49.

types, vipākakāla-aniyata (whose time to yield results is not fixed) and aniyata-vipāka (whose vipāka is not certain).[64]

Another type of division of karman.

Again, karman may be divided into four classes—kṛṣṇa (that is, which yields bad results), śukla (which yields good results), kṛṣṇa-śukla (which yields good and bad results), na-kṛṣṇa-na-śukla (which yields neither bad nor good results). In Rūpadhātu all the karmans are good, because they are not associated with bad deeds; in Kāmadhātu good deeds are associated with bad deeds, and hence, those karmans are called bad and good both[65]. Some are of opinion that kṛṣṇa karmans are those which are experienced in hells and śukla-karmans are those which are experienced in Rūpadhātu, while kṛṣṇa-śukla karmans are those which are experienced in Kāmadhātu.[66]

Third type of division of karman.

This is in brief the consideration of some aspects of karman according to the Vaibhāṣika school.

(4) *Notion of Time*

As regards the conception of the divisions of time, the Sarvāstivādins are of opinion that all the three divisions of time, namely, present, past and future have their separate existence. This they support, as Vasubandhu says, from the teachings of the Buddha himself. The Buddha is believed to have said in the *Saṁyuktāgama*[67] that Rūpa is non-eternal. It has its past, future and present existence. He has further said that every vijñāna is produced from two causes—sense-organ and sense-object; for instance, cakṣurvijñāna (cognition produced through the sense-organ of sight) is produced with the help of visual organ and rūpa, śrotravijñāna is produced with the help of the sense-organ of hearing and sound and manovijñāna is produced with the help of manas and a dharma. In all these instances it is found that had there been no past and future times, how could the above-mentioned vijñānas be produced out of two causes?

All the three divisions of time have their existence.

[64] *Abhidharmakośa*, IV. 50.
[65] *Abhidharmakośa*, IV. 59.
[66] *Abhidharmakośa*, IV. 63.
[67] III. 14.

The third argument in favour of believing in past and future is that it is necessary to have a dharma, as an ālambana, for every vijñāna which necessitates in believing in past and future times. Without an object, as its substratum, there can be no vijñāna.

The last argument adduced is that at the time of the result, the cause of its *vipāka* becomes past. Now, if there were no past, then there would have been no production of any result.

On these grounds the Sarvāstivādins hold that all the three divisions of time do exist[68].

Vasubandhu has given the views of four different Ācāryas on this question. These are:

Dharmatrāta's view on the notion of time.

(1) *Bhāva-anyathika*. Dharmatrāta is reputed for holding the view that in all the three divisions of time, there exists difference in form only. Thus, the future, that is, the non-becoming state of an object has its own speciality, which it has to give up when the same object assumes the present form. Again, the becoming state of that object has to give up its own speciality when it becomes past. In all these three states, the essence of the object remains the same throughout. The change found in it is that of the form. As for instance, when milk changes into curd, the substance (milk) continues in both the states, though there is the difference, in taste and other aspects, between the two.

The view of Ghoṣaka on time.

(2) *Lakṣaṇa-anyathika*. Ghoṣaka is the upholder of this view. He says that though the past dharma is characterised by the specialities of past, yet it is not devoid of the specialities of present and future. So is the case with the present, which is also not free from the specialities of past and future. Likewise, the future dharma, no doubt, possesses the specialities of the future, but even then, the specialities of the past and present are not absent in it. As for instance, a person, attached to one lady, is not denied to have attraction towards other ladies.

It is obvious from the above that according to Ghoṣaka, the notions of all the three times are present simultaneously in a dharma which is not at all appealing.

[68] *Abhidharmakośa*, V. 25-26.

(3) *Avasthā-anyathika*. Vasumitra is the great propounder of this theory. He holds that there is a single unit called 'time', which assumes three different forms due to the difference in its states (avasthā), that is, action (karman). That which is connected with 'becoming' is 'present', that which is 'non-becoming' is 'future' and that which has 'past the becoming stage' is called 'past'. The essense during the three states of movement remains the same.

Vasumitra's view.

(4) The fourth view is called *'Anyathā-anyathika'* which is upheld by Buddhadeva. He holds that the dharmas coming in contact with different moments (kṣaṇas) assume different names.

Buddhadeva's view.

Of these four views, the view of Vasumitra alone is accepted as sound by Vasubandhu and consequently, the Vaibhāṣikas have also accepted this view[69].

(5) *Right Knowledge* (*Samyag-Jñāna*)

There is no action, specially of a sentient being, without any definite aim in view. In other words, all sentient beings strive for the achievement of their desired ends. So they are eager to find out that knowledge which leads them to the attainment of objects which they aim at. No man strives for any action and subsequently, obtains correct result, unless he has acquired a correct knowledge of that object. This leads us to believe that all successful human action is preceded by right knowledge (samyag-jñāna)[70] and that cognition is concerned with an object not yet cognized.[71] Such being the importance of right knowledge, it becomes necessary to deal with its nature.

Need for having Right Knowledge.

It has been explained as a knowledge not contradicted by the actual experience. The fact of conformity between cognition and its object is *Pramāṇa* (arthasārūpymasya Pramāṇam)[72]. Knowledge is right only

69 *Abhidharmakośa*, V. 25-26.

70 *Nyāyabindu*, p. 2 chowkhamba, Banaras edition.

71 Ata evānadhigataviṣayam pramāṇam—*Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā* by Dharmottara, p. 6.

72 *Nyāyabindu*, p. 25.

when that knowledge leads us to the actual existence of an object which it denotes. Dharmottara makes it clear that knowledge does not create an object and does not bring it to the knower, but what it does is that it turns our attention direclty to the object. So the ultimate result of an act of cognizing is to have a cognition of the object[73] (Ata eva cārthādhigatireva pramāṇaphalam).[74]

Nature of Right knowledge.

(i) *Pratyakṣa*

Right knowledge as explained above is two-fold, namely, *Pratyakṣa* (direct, perceptive) and *Anumāna* (indirect, inferential). By direct knowledge, the Buddhists mean, knowledge dependent upon the senses (pratigatamāśritamakṣam), that is, having direct knowledge of the object (arthasākṣātkāritvam), and not mere dependence, in which case 'sensation' alone (*indriyajñānameva*) could have been called direct knowledge, but not its three other varieties given below. This alone is the real meaning of the term *'Pratyakṣa'*, as is current in actual usage (pravṛttinimittam) in philosophy. Therefore, any knowledge that makes the object appear before us directly is called *Pratyakṣa* (Tataśca yatkiñcidarthasya sākṣātkārjñānaṁ tatprayakṣamucyate).[75]

Varieties of direct knowlege.

Meaning of direct perception.

Having all the above mentioned facts in view, Dharmakīrti has defined *'Pratyakṣa'*—as that (direct—knowledge) which is free from the nature of being expressed in the form of judgment (kalpanāpoḍham) and is not illusive (abhrāntam)[76]. In other words, *Pratyakṣa* is a kind of cognition which makes us feel that the objects are present before us directly (artheṣu sākṣātkārijñānam) and is free from all doubts.

Definition of Pratyakṣa.

Such a direct knowledge is four-fold:

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73 *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, p. 5.

74 *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, p. 5.

75 *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, p. 11.

76 *Nyāyabindu*, p. 11.

(1) Indriyajñānam.

(1). *Indriyajñānam* (sense-knowledge), that is, the cognition which depends on the activities of the senses alone.

(2) Manovijñānam.

(2) *Manovijñānam* (mental knowledge). It comes to exist after the first moment of every sense-knowledge which is thus, its immediately preceding cause belonging to the same *santāna*. We should not think that *manovijñāna* is not a different variety of *Pratyakṣa,* as it apprehends only what is apprehenced in the previous moment, called *indriyajñāna,* for in the *manovijñāna,* the object of perception is internal, while it is external in the other case (indriyajñānaviṣayādanyo viṣayo manovijñānasya).

Difference between Indriyajñāna and Manovijñāna.

It may be also pointed out here that the process of mental knowledge takes place after the activities of the external sense, the organ of sight, for instance, are stopped, while the cognition which takes place during the activities of the visual-organ is definitely sense-cognition dependent upon the external sense-organ and hence, is different from mental knowledge. There can be no simultaneous function of both the external and the internal senses.

(3) Svasamvedana.

(3) *Svasamvedana* or *Ātmasamvedana* is the next variety of *Pratyakṣa.* Every consciousness (citta) and every mental phenomenon (caitta) are self-conscious (svasamvedana). Consciousness cognizes the presence of an object alone, while mental phenomena apprehend special states of consciousness, such as, pleasure, passions, etc. These states of consciousness alone are distinctly experienced and so are present before the mind (*svasamvidita*). There is no mental phenomenon which can be unconscious of its existence. This feeling of its own existence is direct cognition (*Pratyakṣam*). In other words, we feel our own existence and this aspect of our knowledge which represents a feeling of its own existence, is direct knowledge. We experience the feelings of pleasure etc., at the sight of some object. The object is definitely different from our feelings. The feelings are knowledge. So it is clear that we do experience our own knowledge. This is really a case of self consciousness (*Svasamvedana*) in

which there is the direct knowledge of *'Sva'* (self) (tacca jñānarūpam vedanamātmanaḥ sākṣātkāri nirvikalpakam abhrāntam ca tasmāt pratyakṣam).[77]

(4) The fourth type of direct knowledge is called *'yogi-Pratyakṣam'*. It is that stage of the intuitional knowledge of the reality in which a yogin vividly apprehends the contemplated image. Dharmottara has clearly analysed the three stages involved in this knowledge. (i) The first is that when the image begins to be vivid (sphuṭābhatvārambhāvasthā bhāvanāprakarṣaḥ). Here, contemplation is in progress. (ii) The second stage is when the yogin in the state of his contemplation directly perceives the object which is yet as if veiled by a thin cloud, and (iii) the third stage is when the object is actually perceived as vividly as if it were a *Āmalā* fruit (emblic myrobalan) placed on the palm of one's own hand. This is really the direct knowledge of a yogin. It has the vividness (sphuṭābham) of direct perception and for this very reason it is *'nirvikalpaka'* (free from all imaginations—kalpanā).[78]

(4) Yogi-Pratyakṣam.

The stages involved in Yogi-Pratyakṣam.

By the way, we should also know what is the nature of the object which is directly cognized according to Buddhist philosophy. We know that the Buddhists believe that every object or reality has two aspects—general and particular (sāmānya and viśeṣa). In the latter case, the reality presents itself in its naked form which is the very essence of that reality (*svalakṣaṇam*). It is that unique nature of the reality which is nothing but the object itself and which is not possessed by any other object. It is this unique nature which is the object of direct cognition according to Buddhists.

Nature of the object of Cognition.

The object of cognition, holds Dharmottara, is really twofold—*grāhya* (in which case the form appears—yadākāramutpadyate) and *prāpaṇīya* (in which case the object is definitely cognized — yamadhyavasyati). The first is that aspect which appears directly in the first moment without attributing anything to the object,

Twofold variety of the object of Cognition.

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[77] *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, p. 20.

[78] *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, p. 21.

while the second is the form in which the cognition of the first moment is expressed in the form of a judgment, such as, 'this is a pot'. The directly perceived and the distinctly conceived are two different things. What is directly apprehended in *pratyakṣa* is only one moment. What is distinctly conceived is a group consisting of chain of moments (santāna) cognized, through *kalpanā* based on mere apprehension. So it is really the chain of moments (santāna) which is cognized by direct perception (pratyakṣasya prāpaṇīyaḥ); because the *kṣaṇa* can never be realized in a definite cognition. It is clear from the above that according to Buddhists, the object of direct knowledge is *Svalakṣaṇa* (*nirvikalpaka*) and also *prāpaṇīya* which is nothing but a compact of chain of moments, and which may be called *savikalpaka*. Again, that alone which is *svalakṣaṇa* represents ultimate reality which is determined by efficiency (arthakriyāsāmarthya). This is all about the direct knowledge (*Pratyakṣa*) in which we get the cognition of the unique nature of the reality.

Four factors in a Cognition.

According to Buddhists there are four factors, called *Pratyayas*, in a cognition. To cognize a pot, for instance, through the sense-organ of vision the first factor is the 'pot' itself, which is called '*Ālambanapratyaya*'. The second factor is 'light' (āloka) without the help of which the sense-organ cannot grasp any object. This is called '*Sahakāri-pratyaya*'. The third factor is the 'sense-organ' which is called '*adhipatipratyaya*'. The fourth factor is that faculty which is the most efficient cause of cognition. This is called '*samanantara-pratyaya*'. All these four factors are essential for a cognition.

We have seen above that for *Pramāṇa* Buddhists lay emphasis on 'conformity between cognition and its object'. A cognition takes place out of an object means that the cognition is a fact which is in conformity with the object which is identical with a kṣaṇa. As for example, the cognition produced by blue colour is in conformity with the blue colour itself. Direct cognition of an object in the form of a *pratīti* (self conscious idea) is possible owing to the conformity of the idea with the external reality. Dharmottara makes clear that in a perceptive judgment which is produced on the

basis of a sensation, we judge that we *see* the object and *seeing* is a function of direct cognition of the object (darśanañca—arthasākṣātkaraṇākhyam pratyakṣavyāpāraḥ).[79] From all this it is clear that in direct cognition there is the conformity of the idea with the external reality.

(ii) *Anumāna*

The second variety of right knowledge is Inferential (anumāna) in which case the general characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇam) of the reality is cognized. The universal character of an object is that essence which exists owing to generality, that is, that essence which belongs equally to indefinite number of objects. For instance, the fire existing in imagination refers to every possible fire. So it represents the universal character of the object. This universal characteristic can be cognized by indirect knowledge (inference).

Second variety of Right Knowledge—Inference.

Inference is of two kinds—(1) Inference for one's own sake (svārtha) and for the sake of others (parārtha). The former is an internal process of cognition (jñānātmakam), while the latter consists of propositions (sabdātmakam). When we cognize something internally for ourselves, the process of cognition is internal and it is not expressed in the form of a judgment. Such an inference is *for oneself*. The process of communicating knowledge through propositions is an inference *for others*. Dharmakīrti defines inference *for oneself*, as a cognition which is produced indirectly through a *liṅga* (probans) which has a threefold aspect, and which refers to an object, not perceived directly, but inferred.[80]

Two varieties of inference.

The three aspects of the probans referred to above are: (1) its presence in the object to be cognized through inference (liṅgasya anumeye sattvam), that is, fire, in the inference —hill is fiery, because it is smoky, (2) its presence only in similar cases (sapakṣe eva sattvam)

Three aspects of a probans.

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[79] *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, p. 27.

[80] *Nyāyabindu*, p. 29.

and (3) its absolute absence in dissimilar cases (asapakṣe cāsattvam).[81]

The three aspected probans (trairūpyam) has been explained before, and now, it is necessary to explain its three varieties. These are: (1) Negation (anupalabdhi), (2) Identity (svabhāva) and (3) Causation (kāryam).[82] Dharmottara explains it that the predicate is either denied or affirmed. (1) When it is denied, then *anupalabdhi* (the absence of savikalpaka knowledge, that is, negation) is its probans and it possesses the three aspects. As in the example:—

Three varieties of a probans.

On some particular place there is no pot.

Because, it is not perceived, although the conditions of perception (of the pot) are present.

(2) When it is affirmed, its probans is

either existentially identical (svabhāva) with it, that is, identity is a probans for deducing a property when the subject alone is by itself sufficient for the deduction. As in the example:—

This is a tree.

Because, it is a śiṁśapā.

(3) Or when it is different, it represents an effect (kārya). As in the example:—

Here is fire,

Because, here is smoke.

Inference *'for others'* consists in communicating the three aspects of the probans (liṅga) to others. The three aspects are: (1) direct concomitance wherein there is an assertion of the major premiss directly (anvaya), (2) or where the major premiss is expressed negatively (vyatireka), and (3) the fact of the presence of the probans in the pakṣa (pakṣadharmatva).

Nature of Parārthānumāna.

It is twofold; because, there is difference in the capacity of words in expressing the meaning. These are the method of Agreement and the method of Difference (sādharmyavat and vaidharmyavat).[83] When there is an agreement, produced by the common possession of the probans (middle term), between the *sādhyadharmin*

[81] *Nyāyabindu*, pp. 31-33.

[82] *Nyāyabindu*, p. 35.

[83] *Nyāyabindu*, p. 62.

of the conclusion, and the *dṛṣṭāntadharmin,* from which the positive form of conclusion is drawn, it is called the *Method of Agreement.* As in the example:—

All products are impermanent (major premiss),
just as a pot (example);
Sound is such a product (minor premiss),
Therefore, it is impermanent (conclusion).

But when there is a contrast, produced by the probans between the *sādhyadharmin* and the example, that is, when the example is negative, it is called the *Method of Difference.* As in the example:—

Eternal substance is not a product,
As Ākāśa,
Sound is a product,
Therefore, it is impermanent.[84]

[84] For further details consult the text.

II. Sautrāntika

1. Introductory

After having dealt with the Vaibhāṣika school of the Hīnayāna Buddhism, I now pass on to the second realistic school. It has already been said that the Sarvāstivāda was one of the oldest schools of Buddhism which believed, as its very name suggests, that there was external reality and also the internal reality. We have seen that, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, both these realities have their independent existence. The second school of the Sarvāstivāda is the school of the Sautrāntikas which separated itself from the Vaibhāṣika branch and formed an independent school of its own. According to this school though the external world exists, its existence cannot be directly vouched for by our senses, but that it is inferred from the multiple forms in which our consciousness, which is naturally formless and pure, presents itself. The *'Doctrine of momentariness'* both of external and mental phenomena is accepted by the Sautrāntikas also like the Vaibhāṣikas.

Stand-point

The real difference, however, between the two schools, both of which are equally realistic, consists in the attitude in which each looks at the order of the external reality. The burden of emphasis appears to be shifting from the outer to the inner in the Sautrāntika school.

This school followed rigidly the *Suttapiṭaka* wherefrom the school has derived its name. According to this school of thought, it was in the Piṭaka alone where the most reliable utterances and teachings of the Buddha himself could be found. So the followers of this school did not accept the authority either of the *Vinayapiṭaka*, or that of the *Abhidharmapiṭaka*. The Sautrāntikas further hold that the *Suttapiṭaka* itself contains several sūtras which directly throw sufficient light on the metaphysical problems and serve the purpose of the Abhidhamma.[1]

Sautrāntika school follows the Sutta-Piṭaka.

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[1] Sūtraviśeṣā evārthaviniścayādayo'bhidharmasaṁjñā yeṣu dharmalakṣaṇam varṇyate—*Sphuṭārthā* on the *Abhidharmakośa* by Yaśomitra.

2. *Literature*

Very meagre information about the literature and authors of this school is available even to day. No single book is found to have been independently attributed to this school as yet.[2] So all that is known about this school is from books like *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha* attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya, *Śivajñānasiddhiyāra,* a Tamil treatise on Śaiva philosophy by Aruṇandi Śivācāriyar, probably of the thirteenth century, *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra, *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* of Kāśmīraka Sadānanda Yati and similar other works where Sautrāntika views have been given in the form of *prima face views.*

Very meager information about its literature.

Though we are not in possession of philosophical texts of the Sautrāntikas, yet we should not think that it was very unpopular. We know from various sources that there were as many as eight well-konwn schools under Sautrāntikas. They are: Pūrvaśaila, Aparaśaila, Haimavata, Lokottaravādin, Prajñaptivādin, Mahāvihāra, Jetavanīya and Abhayagirivāsin.

Schools under Sautrāntikas.

According to the Chinese pilgrim Huen Tsang, who visited India in the seventh century A.D., Kumāralāta of Takṣaśilā was the founder of the Sautrān-

[2] It will not be out of place to remark here that the *Nyāyabindu* by Dharmakīrti of the seventh century A.D. is a work which believes in the reality both of the external and mental phenomena (bāhyārthāstitva) which is obvious from the definition of *Pratyakṣa* given by Dharmakīrti and explained by Dharmottara of the ninth century, in his commentary on the *Nyāyabindu.* According to Dharmakīrti, *Perception* is of four types: (1) Perception through the five external sense-organs (indriyajñānam), (2) Perception through manas (manovijñānam), (3) self-consciousness (ātmasamvedanam) and (4) cognition derived by the yogins through yogic process (yogivijñānam). Now, this division of *Perception* very clearly points out that there are objects (viṣaya) in the external world which are cognized through the external sense-organs and there are objects which are cognized through manas.

We know that the existence of the external world or objects is cognized by the Sautrāntikas not through any erternal sense-organ but by *citta* through the instrumentality of which the forms of the external reality, appearing on the manas, are seen; and then the existence of the external reality is proved through *Inference.* Thus, it is obvious that according to the Sautrāntikas direct *perception* (Pratyakṣa) of the external world through external sense-organs has no place in the system. So I feel convinced that the *Nyāyabindu* belongs to the Vaibhāṣika school. Under the circumstances, I do not quite understand how Dr. S. N. Das Gupta has called the *Nyāyabindu* "a Sautrāntika logical and epistemological work", in his work—*A History of Indian Philosophy,* Vol. 1. pp. 151—54 and has given an elaborate treatment of *Perception* under the caption *"Sautrāntika Theory of Perception"* in the same work.

tika school. He is belived to have lived in the second or third century A.D. as a contemporary of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and others. He is said to have written several works on the Sautrāntika school but they are not now available. It is believed by some[3] that a fragment of his book, called *Kalpanāmaṇḍatikā,* has been unearthed by Professor H. Lüders.

Kumāralāta of the 3rd cen. A.D. was the founder of the Sautrāntika school.

Śrīlābha is known as the pupil of Kumāralāta. He had written a book on Sautrāntika Buddhism which he had named *'Vibhāṣāśāstra'*. This book also has not seen the light of the day as yet.

Śrīlābha pupil of Kumāralāta.

Yaśomitra is also known as a follower of the Sautrāntika school. He has commented upon the *Abhidharmakośa* and his commentary, called *Sphuṭārthā,* is very informative and has been published from Leningrad and also from Japan. Besides, Vasubandhu mentions the views of Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva on *'Kāla'* in his *Abhidharmakośa,* and these two authors are also known as belonging to the Sautrāntika school. These are the well-known supporters of the Sautrāntika school. But we are not in possession of any complete work from the pen of any of these scholars on the doctrines of the school. So we have to be satisfied with the various references to the views of the Sautrāntikas found scattered in our philosophical literature.

Yaśomitra.

Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva.

3. *Doctrines of the school*

Coming to the doctrines advocated by the school, we should keep in mind that according to the Sautrāntikas, the external world also has its own reality,[4] but its

[3] Winternitz—*History of Indian Literature,* Vol. II, pp. 267-69; A. B. Keith—*History of Sanskrit Literature*—Preface, pp. viii-ix.

[4] "Different definitions of what is meant by *existence,* or reality, have been current in different periods of Buddhist philosophy. In the Hīnayāna, the Sarvāstivādins and other schools defined *existence* as whatever has a character (*dharma-svabhāva*) of its own (*sva-svabhāva-dharmaḥ*). This involved a pluralistic view of the universe. The Mādhyamikas defined *existence* as non-relative (*anapekṣa*), absloute reality; this involved a monistic view of the universe. The Sautrāntikas and the later Yogācāras, the Buddhist Logicians, defined reality as efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*). This involved the theory that ultimate reality is represented by the focus of efficiency, the point-instant (*kṣaṇa*). Thus, every existence without exception is split in discrete moments. Every stability, every duration is, on the contrary, a construction, an integration of moments (*kṣaṇa-santāna*)" (*Buddhist Logic,* Vol. II. p. 12 Fn.).

existence cannot be directly vouched for by our external sense-organs. As has been already said that it is to be inferred from the multiple forms or images in which our consciousness, which is naturally, formless and pure, presents itself, as there can be no perception without there being an object of *perception*, the object having been destroyed in the moment it was produced. Like the Vaibhāṣikas, these people also believe, no doubt, in the momentariness both of the external and mental phenomena. But the most vital difference, as is clear from the above, between the two schools, consists in the attitude in which each looks at the order of the external reality. In the Sautrāntika school, the burden of emphasis appears to be shifting from the outer to the inner.

Reality of the External world is cognized through Inference.

Vital difference between the two schools.

As regards the conception of Nirvāṇa, the Sautrāntikas are of opinion that it is the result brought about by following the *Magga* (Mārga)—Path which leads to Nirvāṇa. So being a product, it cannot be eternal or asaṁskṛta. It is, therefore, not real in the true sense of the term. Hence, they explain Nirvāṇa as the absence of kleśa. or a stage at which all the passions are destroyed. It is just like the Ākāśa which has been described as nothing but the absence of everything tangible or resistable. So it is also compared to the exstinguished flames of a lamp. They say that in Nirvāṇa a bhikkhu attains a stage (āśraya) wherein neither any passion, nor any existence is possible. It has also been described as a stage of the non-production (anutpāda) of any dharma. It is one of the truths (satya), according to the Sautrāntikas.

Conception of Nirvāṇa.

This being the fact about Nirvāṇa; the Sautrāntikas hold that it is the same as the Pratisaṅkhyānirodha, which is also nothing but the destruction and absence of *anuśayas* (desires) and existence, already produced, and the non-origination of any further *anuśayas*. As the destruction is achieved by means of knowledge (pratisaṅkhyā), it is called '*Pratisaṅkhyānirodha*'.

Meaning of Pratisaṅkhyānirodha according to Sautrāntika.

Similarly, as regards the *'apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha'*, the Sautrāntikas think that it is the "absence, or non-origination of dharmas on account of the complete absence of causes independent of the force of knowledge (*apratisaṅkhyā*). They say that when death before its time, for instance, interrupts the existence, it is said that there has been *'apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha'* of dharmas which would have been born in course of this existence if the existence had continued."[5]

Apratisaṅkhyānirodha explained by the Sautrāntikas.

Thus, Śrīlabdha, a Sautrāntika teacher, holds that *'pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha'* is the future non-origination of passions due to knowledge (pratisaṅkhyā-prajñā), and the *'apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha'* is the future non-origination of dukkha and of passions not directly due to knowledge. Hence, really speaking, there is no difference between them. But this interpretation is not generally accepted by all the Sautrāntikas, who think that the future non-origination of dukkha implies *'pratisaṅkhyā'*, so in fact, *'apratisaṅkhyānirodha'* is incuded in the *'pratisaṅkhyānirodha'*.

Śrīlabdha's view on Pratisaṅkhyānirodha.

Sautrāntikas generally do not agree with Śrīlabdha's view.

Thus, what the Sautrāntikas want to show is that the *'pratisaṅkhyānirodha'* implies an antecedent, viz., *'pratisaṅkhyā'* and hence, it cannot be eternal, because, if the antecedent be wanting, the consequence also becomes wanting.[6]

Sound, according to the Sautrāntikas, has no existence either before it is produced, or after it has died out. So it is non-eternal.

Sound.

They do not admit the existence of any relation of cause and effect between two things existing by themselves.

Causality.

They believe in the present time only, while the other two divisions of times, namely, past and future, are regarded non-existent.[7] Production (utpāda) is 'existence after having not existed'. Neither the past nor the future exists.

Time.

[5] *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 177.

[6] *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 177.

[7] Cf. Sautrāntikamate atītānāgatam śūnyamanyadaśūnyam—Mādhyamikakārīkā-Vṛttī.

According to the Sautrāntikas, *Rūpa* (matter) means only colour (varṇa) and not form (saṁsthāna), as the Vaibhāṣikas interpret.

Again, according to them, all the dharmas lead to sufferings. Even the so-called happiness and Vedanā also produce nothing but pain, so everything is painful.

Everything is painful.

According to the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār*[8] the following are the views of the Sautrāntikas:—

They do not accept the validity of the Vedas and their six Aṅgas, and recite instead the Piṭakas as their scriptures. They practise the five morals, called śīla and put on the dress of a hermit. They worship the Bodhi tree as their God. Along with these views which are common with other schools of Buddhism, the Sautrāntikas hold the following other views exclusively:

Vedas and their Aṅgas are not Pramāṇas.

Jāti is not valid. The Buddha, being omniscient (sarvajña), disliked all bad deeds and, being moved by the sufferings of others, composed the Piṭakas.

Jāti does not exist.

They believe in two kinds of Pramāṇas—Pratyakṣa and Anumāna. Momentary knowledge (jñāna) and knowable (jñeya) are their objects (viṣaya). These objects are, however, of four kinds—Rūpa, Arūpa, Nirvāṇa and Vyavahāra. Each of these four, is again, sub-divided into two. So there are eight varieties of these objects of pramāṇa.

Two kinds of Pramāṇa.

Objects of knowledge divided.

Thus, *Rūpa* is either upādānarūpa or upādeyarūpa. *Arūpa* is divided into Citta and karman. *Nirvāṇa* is divided into Sopādhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa and Nirupādhi-śeṣa-nirvāṇa and likewise, *Vyavahāra* is also divided into Sadvyavahāra and Asadvyavahāra.

Divisions of Rūpa, Arūpa, Nirvāṇa and Vyavahāra.

Upādānarūpa is again, of four types, namely, earth, water, tejas and air. *Upādeyarūpa* is also of four kinds, namely, hardness, attraction, motion, and heat. *Rūpa* is that dharma which is produced from the combination of the above mentioned eight elements. Citta is that which cognizes an object cognizable through the sense-

Divisions of Upādāna and Upādeya Rūpa.

8 *Śivajñānsiddhiyar*, translated by J. M. Nallaswami, Madras, 1919.

organs. Karman is that which discriminates between good and bad deeds.

As regards the classification of the dharmas, the Sautrāntikas deny the reality of the three Asaṁskṛta-dharmas and divide the Saṁskṛta-dharmas into forty-three types only. These again, are divided into five groups—(1) Rūpaskandha which includes 8 dharmas, namely, 4 upādānarūpas and 4 upādeyarūpas; (2) Vedanā-skandha which is of three types, namely, Kuśalā, Akuśalā and Kuśalākuśalā; (3) Saṁjñā-skandha which is of six kinds, namely, five sense-organs and one Citta; (4) Vijñāna-skandha which is of six types, namely, five vijñānas of the five sense-organs and one manovijñāna and (5) Saṁskāra-skandha is of 20 varieties, namely, ten meritorious acts and ten non-meritorious acts. Thus, there are forty-three Saṁskṛta-dharmas in all according to the Sautrāntikas.

Similarly, they subdivide each one of the two kinds of Vyavahāra into three types, namely, Saṅghāta, Santāna and Utpannanāśa.[9]

Process of cognition.

The external world has its reality. It is not perceived directly, as has been already said. Forms are seen on the Citta and mind perceives these forms, and as forms cannot come to exist on the Citta without their corresponding objects in the external world, the Sautrāntikas infer the existence of those external objects. Now, the question is whether the objects have their own forms which appear on the Citta and are visualized there by the mind, or the Citta itself imposes its own forms on the object. Some Sautrāntikas hold the former view, while others maintain the latter view. There is also a third school of the Sautrāntikas which admits a compromise between the two views. It must be kept in mind that the forms enter the Citta through the sense-organs. Hence, they believe in the existence of external sense-organs also.

The *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*[10] however, says that the five external sense-organs exhaust their capacity in apprehending the five sense-objects, namely, colour, taste,

[9] *Proceedings of the ninth All-India Oriental Conference*, Trivandrum, 1937, pp. 618-22.

[10] Sautrāntikamatam, Verses 2-3.

etc. and so there remains no direct means to cognize the objects of the external world. Hence, from the forms, in the form of blue, red etc. appearing on the Citta, the Sautrāntikas believe in the existence of the external reality through inference.

From the above statement it is obvious that the forms, namely, blue, yellow, etc., apprehended by the Citta, do not directly represent external objects. But as those forms cannot exist unless there are their corresponding objects in the external world, they believe that the external reality exists, but it is inferred.

Ākāśa is a notion.

According to the Sautrāntikas, *Ākāśa* is the same as *'Paramāṇu'* which is, again, nothing but a mere notion (prajñaptimātram), and is not anything else.[11]

Everything is momentary.

All the objects are the results of the various forms of Citta and their existence is momentary. Even those objects which are definitely described as such and such, are always inferred from the form of Citta.[12]

External Reality is that which is capable of producing forms of consciousness.

Though everything is momentary, yet they are objects of external reality, because, according to the Sautrāntikas an object of external reality is that which is capable of being a cause to produce forms of consciousness.[13]

Abhidharma works are of human inspiration and hence, liable to error.

The Vaibhāṣikas believed that the Abhidharma books of the Sarvāstivādins *revealed* scriptures, the Sautrāntikas, on the other hand, were of opinion that the Abhidharma books were *simply treatise* (śāstra) of human inspiration and therefore, liable to error.

Self-validity of Knowledge.

They believe in the self-validity of knowledge. Like the light of lamp, knowledge also illumines itself; for its validity and existence, it does not depend upon any other thing. So knowledge is cognized by its very nature (svasaṁvedana or Svasaṁvitti).

As regards the atomic theory also, they think that the paramāṇus do not come into contact with one an-

11 *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha,* Sautrāntikamatam, Verse 5.
12 *Ibid,* Verse 6. 13 *Ibid,* Verse 7.

other; for, they are regarded partless and as such, if they group tuogether they would not touch anuother and the result will be that their collocation or amalgamation would not add to the dimension of the paramāṇu. They will, on the other hand, all form together nothing but a paramāṇu, if they combine together at all.

Atomic theory.

Destruction of a thing is not brought about by any cause, but it is natural. Things are perishable by their very nature. They are not transitory (anitya), but are momentary (kṣaṇika).

Destruction is natural.

MAIN SCHOOLS OF MAHĀYĀNA

I. Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda

1. *Introductory*

The school of Yogācāra though according to some came into prominence perhaps after the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism, yet in order to show the gradual development of their thoughts towards the realization of the highest Truth taught by Buddhism, *viz.*, *śūnyatā*, this school may be placed earlier than the other. So it is proposed to deal with Yogācāra school first.

Having discussed the schools of Hīnayāna, we pass on to the two schools of Mahāyāna, *viz.*, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. As to the terms *'Yogācāra'* and *'Vijñānavāda'* given to this school of Buddhism, it may be pointed out that the term 'Yogācāra' has been used for the system simply because it is centered round the idea of an inner perception of the highest truth through the practices of *yoga*. We have seen above that the Buddha himself laid utmost emphasis on the discipline of body and mind, the only means of achieving the highest aim. The discipline of mind is really to train the *citta* (mind) in order to realize the Absolute Truth and see that the entire universe is nothing apart from the *citta*, and that there is in reality no becoming, such as, birth and death and that no external things really exist.

Justification of the names—'Yogācāra' and 'Vijñāna-vāda'.

This attitude of the school justifies its name 'Yogā-

cāra', and because its reality is nothing but consciousness or Citta, it is called 'Vijñānavāda' also.

In the very beginning, however, it is necessary that the stand-point of the school should be made clear. The school of Yogācāra, also known as Vijñānavāda, denies the objective character of the external world. It posits an infinite number of Ideas (vijñānas), each momentary and self-contained and seeks to account for the phenomena of experience by means of these. It is due to nescience (avidyā), holds Yogācāra, that we differentiate an idea, which is by nature self-luminous and indivisible, into the complex of subject, object and consciousness. This school has done away with the external world altogether and seems to have retired more into the Inner Sanctuary of the Absolute Truth.

Standpoint of the School.

2. *Literature and Authorship*

It has already been said that this school came into prominence with Asaṅga, the elder brother of Vasubandhu, as its founder in the third century A.D., though according to some Maitreyanātha, the teacher of Asaṅga, was the real founder of the school. According to the Tibetan sources six works are ascribed to Maitreyanātha. (1) *Sūtrālaṅkāra,* (2) *Madhyāntavibhaṅga,* (3) *Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga,* (4) *Mahāyāna Uttara-tantra-śāstra,* (5) *Abhisamayālaṅkāra-Kārikā,* also known as the *Prajñā-Pāramitopadeśa-śāstra.*

Asaṅga the first propounder of the School.

Maitreyanātha.

The works attributed to Asaṅga are: *Yogācāra bhūmi-śāstra, Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* with the author's own commentary, *Pañcabhūmi, Abhidharmasamuccaya, Mahāyānasaṅgraha, Mahāyānasamparigraha* (translated by Paramārtha into Chinese in 563 A.D.), *Prakaraṇa-Āryavācā, Mahāyānābhidharmasaṅgītiśāstra,* (translated by Huean-Tsang in 625 A.D.), and a commentary on the *Vajracchedikā* (translated by Dharmagupta 590-616). It is believed by some that through the efforts of Asaṅga, Vasubandhu became a follower of Mahāyānism in his last days and wrote a very important work, named *Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi* on

Works of Asaṅga.

Vijñānavāda, a sanskrit version of which under the title of '*Viṁśatikā*' and '*Triṁśatikā*' was published by the late Dr. S. Lévi. Other important works of this school are the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* and a commentary on the *Triṁśikā* by Sthiramati (fourth century A.D.), a direct pupil of Vasubandhu. The well-known logicians Diṅnāga[1] and Dharmakīrti[2] are also sometimes regarded as belonging to the school of Yogācāra.

3. *Doctrines of the School*

Coming to the doctrines of this school, we find that in Indian philosophy, it is the only Idealistic school in its true sense. According to this school, the only reality is the *Ālaya-Vijñāna*. The Yogācāras think that all objects of the universe are nothing but the forms and manifestations of vijñāna.[3] So says the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*—"All things are nothing but Mind (citta)."

Now, it may be asked: what does this *citta* mean? Does it refer to the *Ālaya-vijñāna*, or to the whole system of the *vijñānas*, or to the interaction of the *Ālaya* and the *Manas*?

Before we proceed with the answer to the above, it is most essential to explain the terms mentioned above.

Ālaya-vijñāna explained.

Thus, the most important term in this school is *Ālaya-vijñāna*. It is also called citta or *tathāgatagarbha*. 'Ālaya' means a storage—house where all kinds of goods are kept in storage, and it is the function of the *Ālaya-viñjāna* to store up all the memories (vāsanās) of one's thoughts, affections, desires and also physical deeds. The seeds (bīja) of these, thus stored, remain in the ālaya perfectly quiescent and neutral. As everything is momentary and as every thought is also nothing but a series of moments, it can be easily said that the *ālayavijñāna* is a series of continuous consciousness. It is always continuously changing. It has got in its store all good and bad seeds.[4]

1—2 These two authors are also claimed by the Sautrāntikas.

3 For a fuller discussion on the extreme Idealism with the Sautrāntikas see *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II. pp. 360—72.

4 This is called *Vāsanābīja*—memory seed. Every act, mental and physical, leaves its seed behind, which is planted in the *Ālaya* for future germination under favourable conditions.

It is interesting to note here what Yamakami has said in this connection trying to find out a gradation and continuity of thoughts between the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras. He says—"The Ālaya phenomenology is really a development of, and supplementary to, the theory of the Sarvāstivādin school. The realistic theory of the Sarvāstivādins could go up to *Karma,* and no further, in search of the mystery of the phenomenon of this universe. The karma phenomenology was the explanation they offered. But what is the source of karma? This, they could not solve or rather did not undertake to solve. Then, the Yogācāras stepped in and tried to fill up the vacuum by their theory of the eighth vijñāna, *viz.,* the Ālaya-vijñāna".[5]

Laṅkāvatārasūtra on Ālaya-Vijñāna.

The following lines from the *studies in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* by Suzuki[6] throw more light on the *Ālaya-vijñāna.* "When the sūtra says that if there is no revulsion (*parāvṛtti*) in the *Ālayavijñāna,* called by the name of *Tathāgatagarbha,* there will be no extinction of the seven functioning *Vijñānas,* or that when the *Tathāgatagarbha* is united with the seven *Vijñānas,* from attachment arises dualism, and that when this is thoroughly perceived the error is removed, we realise that the *Ālaya* is the most important conception on which the whole mechanism of the psychic life hangs. In fact, the *Ālaya* is a depository of all kinds of karma-seeds, good as well as bad (*tathāgatagrbho mahāmate! kuśala-akuśala-hetukaḥ),* and so long as it is not stirred up by viṣaya, the principle of individuation (external world or world of particulars), it will remain tranquil, retaining its original purity (*atyantaprakṛti-pariśuddhi*) or neutrality, inefficiency, aloofness, and the primary quality of not being contaminated by defilements. However, the *Ālaya* is always found in company with the seventh *vijñāna* or *Manas,* and when it is found working, all the other six *vijñānas* are in action".

It should be made clear here that according to Yogācāra, the Ālaya is absolutely pure and has nothing to do with defilements and evil passions, while according to the

5 Systems of Buddhistic thoughts, p. 211.

6 Pages 179—80.

Laṅkāvatāra and Aśvaghoṣa, the *Tathāgatagarbha* or the *Ālaya* is the storage of the pure as well as the impure, and that it is both immanent and transcendental, both relative and absolute.

Conception of *Citta.*

Citta is derived from the root *citī*, which means to observe, to consider, to reflect upon and to perceive, to look for. So the term *Citta* can mean both collection and perception. It is also identified with the *Ālaya*. It is distinct from '*Manas*'. Unless specially used as distinct from *Manas* and *Vijñāna*, *Citta*, when used independently, as in '*cittamātra*', '*svacittadṛśya*', etc., means the whole system of conscious life, that is, mind.

Citta according to the *Laṅkāvatāra.*

According to the *Laṅkāvatāra*, *Citta* is naturally (*svabhāvataḥ*) quiet, pure, and above the discrimination of subject and object. But when there appears any *viṣaya* (external world or world of particulars) in it, it becomes disturbed and then evolves into eight *vijñānas*, *viz.*, (1) *Ālaya*, (2) *Manas*, (3) *Manovijñāna*, and (4—8) those produced by the five organs of sense; and simultaneously with this evolution cerated by the appearance of *viṣaya*, which has been called the 'principle of particularisation, the whole universe comes into existence with its multifarious forms and with its endless entanglements. So says the Sūtra—'The visible world which is mind does not exist (as seen by the sense-organs); but mind is set in motion by being seen (*i.e.*, objectified); the body, the property and the abode are the manifestations of the *Ālaya*, inherent in all mankind'.

As the entire school of Yogācāra is based on the *Citta*, it will not be out of place to deal with other aspects of it as found in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*. Thus, from the Gāthās the following points can be gleaned out:

When things are freed from bondage of mutual dependence, there remains nothing but *Citta* (Mind). It is the measure of all things; it is the abode of their self-nature, and has nothing to do with the world and causation; it is perfect in its nature and is pure. It is not an existence, nor is it a non-existence. It is beyond both. It is suchness (*tathātā*). Suchness, emptiness, the limit, Nirvāṇa, Dharmadhātu, variety of will-bodies (Manomaya-kāyas—mind-made bodies)—are all nothing

but Citta. Out of it conditioned by discrimination and habit-energy (*vāsanā*) the whole external world comes out. But what appears to be external does not really exist. It is indeed Citta alone which is seen in its multiplicity. The three worlds, *viz.*, *Kāmadhātu* (world of desire), *Rūpadhātu* (world of form, that is, material world) and *Arūpadhātu,* is nothing but Citta itself. Nothing is to be seen out-side the *Citta.* All is *Citta.* When it evolves all forms are manifested.

The three worlds are nothing but *Citta.*

As to the relation between Citta and Ālaya, it is to be kept in mind that "the rising of the Ālaya is due to the taking of the manifestations of the *Citta* for a world of objective realities. The *Ālayavijñāna* is its own subject (=cause) and object (=support); and it clings to a world of its own mental presentations, a system of mentality that evolves mutually conditioning. It is like the waves of the ocean, stirred up by the wind; that is, a world made visible by *Citta* itself where the mental waves come and go".

Relation between *Citta* and *Ālaya.*

Citta has been described as the principle of unification by which all the activities are understood as issuing from one centre. Through the agency of Manas, which is a discriminating factor, the homogenous and undifferentiated *Citta* is divided into two parts: one as the seer, and the other as the seen; 'the one as the grasping-ego and the other as an object grasped'. The Citta is rich in content, and it is because of this richness, it is able to evolve the entire universe with all its varieties. It is, indeed, an inexhaustible reservoir of seeds which have been accumulated therein since the time immemorial. Everything that is done by our body and mind becomes accumulated in the Citta. All our actions, physical or mental, leave behind themselves their seeds to be deposited in the *Citta.* So it has been said—*Cittena cīyate karma.*

Citta as the principle of unification.

Now, as long as these seeds remain undisturbed in the self-contented *Citta,* so long the *Citta* is absolutely quiet and no waves are found stirring in it, hence, it has been called *avyākṛtaṁ cittaṁ.* But as soon as the Manas which is also nothing but the creation of the *citta* itself,

comes to the citta from outside, then the various manifestations of the external world begin to appear. It is thus, the Manas which makes the quiet, non-discriminative Citta appear as active with all its dorment seeds of the past. So Manas depends upon Citta for its existence, while Citta depends upon Manas for appearing as forms of objects of the universe. There is a mutual interdependence between the two. The later discrimination in the objective world is, however, the function of the *Manovijñāna* and the five sense-organs. So has been said in the Sūtra—"Depending upon the Ālaya (citta) there evolves the Manas and depending upon Citta (ālaya) and Manas there evolves the Vijñāna". "The Manas is born of the Ālaya and the Vijñāna of the Manas." "From the Ālaya are stirred up all the mental activities like waves; with habit-energy (vāsanā) as cause they are born in accordance with the *Law of Origination*". "Grasping mind as their objects and bound by a chain of successive moments, the Manovijñāna, Cakṣurvijñāna, etc., are evolved to create forms, signs, and figures".

Manas makes the Citta appear as active.

Discrimination in the objective world is due to Manovijñāna and the five sense-organs.

"The Citta, when it is understood in its absolute aspect, is transcendental. It implies more than the sum-total of the citta, manas, manovijñāna, and the vijñānas. The *Laṅkāvatāra* speaks of the 'Mind-only', therefore, its foundation lies much deeper than the ordinary form of idealism. Otherwise, intuition into the truth of Cittamātra cannot result in the spiritual emancipation which is the object of Mahayana discipline."[6a]

From the above now it is quite clear that the function of *Ālayavijñāna* or *Citta* is 'accumulation', of *Vijñāna* 'discrimination' or 'representation', and of *Manas* 'deliberation' or 'reflection'.[7]

It has been said above that there are eight Vijñānas (consciousnesses). Now, the Yogācāra school assigns four stages to the cognitive operation of each of these eight forms of consciousness: (1) *Lakṣaṇatvam*—which

Four stages of the Cognitive operation

[6a] Suzuki, p. 252.

[7] Cittena cīyate karma manasā ca vidhīyate/
Vijñānena vijānāti dṛśyam kalpayati pañcabhiḥ//

implies 'objectiveness', an operation which is brought into action when consciousness comes into contact with a particular object; (2) *Draṣṭṛtvam,* meaning 'perception'. Perception is the process by which Lakṣaṇatva is connected with the stage of the subjective realization of the object. While objectiveness is a passive operation, perception is believed to be active and subjective; (3) *Svasākṣitvam,* meaning, proving by producing a witness. At this stage, consciousness proves to itself whether the result of perception is correct or otherwise; and (4) *Sākṣisvasākṣitvam,* proving the correctness or otherwise of the investigation of the first witness. All this shows that according to Yogācāra, the validity of the pramāṇa depends upon another pramāṇa. So, this system seems to be a *Parataḥ Prāmāṇyavādin.*

Validity of Pramāṇa depends upon another Pramāṇa.

Other peculiarities of the school.

A few other peculiarities of this school are given below:

(1) As regards the 'Right knowledge' (samyagjñāna), the Yogācāra, like the Mādhyamikas, holds that it is a transcendental illusion (ālambane bhrāntam).[8]

Right Knowledge.

(2) As regards the *Yogi-pratyakṣa,* the Buddhists, in general, do not recognize it a pramāṇa. It is regarded as an intuition of a condition uncognizable by logical methods (aprameyavastūnām aviparītadṛṣṭiḥ). However, according to the school of Yogācāra logicians, it is a pramāṇa indirectly, because the relativity of all our conceptions (vikalpa) or judgements (kalpanā), as well as the non-relative, absolute (paramārtha) character of the uncognizable thing in itself (svalakṣaṇa) are established by logical analysis.[8a]

Yogi-Pratyakṣa.

(3) The Yogācāras, like the Sautrāntikas, believe in the two faculties, sensation and conception, also called direct and indirect cognition, or sense-perception and inference (pratyakṣa and anumāna). 'The ālayavijñāna of the old Yogācāras has been rejected. The

Faculties of sensation and Conception.

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[8] *Buddhist Logic,* Vol. II, p. 4n.

[8a] *Ibid,* p. 32n.

functions of our reason belong to indirect cognition; it is variously determined as arrangement (*kalpanā*), imagination (utprekṣā=āropa), dialectical arrangement (vikalpa = atad-vyāvṛtti), judgment (adhyavasāya), etc.[9] (4) The Yogācāras, like the Sautrāntikas, do not favour the recognition of mind as a distinct sense-organ. They maintain that the mind is a stream of thought, and in that stream every preceding moment is the cause, *viz.*, the substrate-cause (upādāna) of the next following one.[10]

Mind is not a distinct sense-organ.

Mind is a stream of thought.

II. Mādhyamika or Śūnyavāda

1. *Introductory*

The school of Mādhyamika is the culmination of Buddhist philosophy. It has shown the true nature of the highest truth which was aimed at by the founder of Buddhism. It has taught to the world what really by Nirvāṇa the Buddha meant. It is here that the Eternal Peace, Complete Deliverance from miseries, births and re-births are finally achieved. It is the philosophy which is evolved out of the third fundamental principle of Buddhism—*Nirvāṇam śāntam.*

It is here at this stage that the finishing touch is given by the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism, which dispenses with the necessity of recognizing *Vijñāna* or Idea as well. Thus, all traces of phenomenal experience, both objective and subjective, are effaced and what is left behind is the Serene Depth of an Infinite Void. It is called *'Śūnya'* in the sense that it is eternally free from everything with which our subjective or objective consciousness is acquainted: it is above the world, beyond the world and even permeating the world, though not defiled by it, as its abiding back-ground. It is neither positive, nor even negative (as the word might seem to imply), nor both

Stand-point.

[9] *Ibid,* p. 293.

[10] *Nyāyakaṇikā* of Vācaspati Mishra I, p. 120, reprint from the *Pandit.*

simultaneously, nor other than both, so that it is indefinable and in a sense has no 'character' (*alakṣaṇaṁ*).[1] The Mādhyamika explains the whole paraphernalia of the cosmic experience from the stand-point of this *Śūnya* with the aid of Nescience (*avidyā*).

Though the Yogācāras teach that the ultimate reality of their school is only Vijñāna and no other object, yet it is a fact that their vijñāna is not one absolute truth. There is a series of vijñānas, an integretion of moments (vijñānasantāna, kṣaṇika-santāna), so after all it is a pluralistic system of Buddhism. Mādhyamikas, on the other hand, have definitely expounded the theory of one absolute reality, *viz.*, a reality which is non-relative (catuṣkoṭi-vinirmukta), so it is the only school of Buddhism which teaches the monistic view of universe. This is the substance of the angle of vision which the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism has before it.

Justification of the name.

Now, as the school is called Mādhyamika or Śūnyavāda, it appears that there does exist some link between the two terms, *viz.*, *'Madhyamā'* and *'Śūnya'*. In order to find out this link when we refer to Nāgārjuna, the first and the greatest reputed propounder of the school, we find that he has very clearly explained all this in a single Kārikā—

Yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām taṁ pracakṣmahe|
sā prajñaptirupādāya pratipatsaiva madhyamā||[2]

Pratītyasamutpāda and Śūnyatā are identical.

That is to say, that which is *dependent-origination* is identical with *'Śūnyatā'*, and it is a conventional term which is called the *Middle-Path.* Thus, from this very verse it is clear that the two terms *'Madhyamā'* and *'Śūnyatā'* are synonymous. It is to be kept in mind here that that which depends upon another, *viz.*, cause, and conditions, for coming into existence, is really non-existent or un-born.[3] Such a thing cannot have any real origination. This non-existence is nothing but *Śūnya.* So Nāgārjuna holds that the realization of the fact, that

1 Na sannāsanna sadasanna cāpyanubhayātmakam/
Catuṣkoṭivinirmuktam tattvam Mādhyamikā viduḥ//
—*Mādhyamika-Kārikā,* I. 7

2 *Mādhyamika-Kārikā,* I. 7.

3 Yaḥ pratyayasirjāyate, sa hyajāto na tasya utpādaḥ svabhāvatosti, Yaḥ pratyayādhīnaḥ sa śūnya uktaḥ—*Mādhamikakārikā,* XXIV,

Śūnyatā is really non-origination or dependent-origination, is the same as the Middle-Path.

That which is really non-originated can neither exist, nor can it non-exist; hence, it is neither existent nor non-existent and as such, it is the Middle-Path which has to be adopted for the cessation of pain. So says Candrakīrti, in one of his benedictory verses of his commentary, called *Prasannapadā,* on the *Mādhyamika-kārikā* of Nāgārjuna:

"No passing away and no origination, no destruction and no ever-lasting continuance, no unity and no multiplicity, no coming and no going; I revere the Completely Enlightened One, the best of the teachers, Him who has thus taught the causally dependent-origination, the salutary cessation of the world of phenomena." The same idea is found in the *Mādhyamika-kārikā* itself.[4]

2. *Literature and authorship*

Coming to the literature of this school, we may say that it is still shrouded in mystery, because of the majority of works is still not available in Sanskrit. So only a very brief account of the more important authors and their works is given here.

Nāgārjuna 2nd cen. A.D.

The earliest and the most famous of the authors of this school who is regarded as the very founder of the school is Nāgārjuna who lived in the 2nd century A.D. He was born in the family of a Brāhmaṇa in Southern India. He was well-versed in several śāstras. His most famous work is the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* consisting of 400 verses divided into 27 chapters. It is believed that he himself wrote a commentary on it, named *Akutobhayā.* A translation of this commentary exists in Tibetan. Likewise, the commentaries of Buddhapālita and Bhāviveka have also come down to us only in Tibetan translations. The only commentary available to us in Sanskrit is the *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti. Nāgārjuna's other works are: *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, Śūnyatā-saptati, Pratītyasamutpādahṛdaya, Mahāyāna-viṁśaka* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī.* There are a few more works which are doubtfully ascribed to him. It is believed that Nāgār-

[4] XXVI. II.

juna also wrote *Prajñā-Pāramitā-śāstra* which was translated by Kumārajīva about 405 A.D.

Next comes Āryadeva who came from Ceylon and became the pupil of Nāgārjuna. Most probably he lived at about the turning point of the second and third centuries A.D.[5]

Āryadava 2nd cen. A.D.

Many works are ascribed to him of which the most famous is the *Catuḥ Śataka,* consisting of 400 kārikās. It has been now completey reconstructed from the Tibetan sources by the late Mm. Haraprasada Śāstri, Mm. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya and Dr. P. L. Vaidya. Candrakīrti has written a very good commentary on it. The book deals with Buddhistic dialectics and defends the view-point of Nāgārjuna against both āstika and nāstika attacks. It has been partly translated into English also by Mm. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. 'Highest truth is prescribed for such as seek deliverance', says Āryadeva, in this very book.

Buddhapālita is another well-known author of this school. His commentary on the *Kārikās* of Nāgārjuna is a well-known work. He lived in the beginning of the 5th century A.D. He is said to be the founder of the *Prāsaṅgika school,* which followed the method of leading an opponent *ad absurdum.* He is referred to in the *Prasannapadā* by Candrakīrti very often. Bhāvaviveka, also known as Bhāviveka or Bhavya, was his contemporary who is known to have founded the *Svātantra school* which proved the correctness of the Mādhyamika doctrines against the attacks of orthodox schools. *Prajñāpradīpa,* a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Kārikā, Madhyamahṛdaya-kārikā, Madhyamārthasaṅgraha* and *Hastaratna* are attributed to Bhāvaviveka.

Buddhapālita 5th Cen. A.D.

Bhāvaviveka also known as Bhāviveka 5th cen. A.D.

Next comes another important Buddhist teacher, named Candrakīrti, who must have lived in the 6th century A.D. He was one of the pupils of Dharmapāla, and had also studied under Kamalabuddhi, the pupil of Buddhapālita and Bhavya. Though belonging to

Candrakīrti 6th cen. A.D.

[5] *History of Indian Literature,* Vol. II. p. 350.

Southern India, as held by Taranatha, he came over to Northern India and lived as a teacher in Nālanda. He wrote several works on the Mādhyamika school of which the *Mādhyamakāvatāra* is a well-known one. Candrakīrti very often refers to the above work in his *Prasannapadā*. He wrote a *Vṛtti* on the *Catuḥśataka* of Āryadeva and also on the *Mādhyamikakārikā* of Nāgārjuna.

Amongst the later teachers of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the name of Śāntideva deserves mention. He probably lived in the 7th century A.D. and wrote several works. He was the pupil of Jayadeva, the successor of Dharmapāla in Nālanda. *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, *Sūtra-samuccaya* and *Bodhicaryāvatāra* are some of his well-known works. Of these, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* deserves more careful study. It is divided into nine chapters (though according to some into ten chapters). The ninth chapter, known as the *Prajñāpāramitā*, is the most important one from the Mādhyamika point of view. "The philosophical doctrine of the unreality of the world of phenomena (śūnyatā) is developed according to the Mādhyamika system, incompatible though the negativism of this system appears to us with the devotion and self-sacrifice of other beings, as taught in the first chapter of the work, yet Śāntideva, too, utilises the doctrine, already familiar to us, of the differentiation between the two truths as a means of bridging the contradiction. Everything in the world is, indeed, vain and transitory, but only delusion concerning the ego (ātmamoha) is harmful, whilst the delusion concerning the duties (kāryamoha) is beneficent."[6] The popularity of this work can well be understood by the fact that there are no less than eleven commentaries on this work, of which the *Pañjikā* by *Prajñākaramati* is one of the best commentaries which we have in Sanskrit.

Śāntideva 7th cen. A.D.

Next we come to another very important author of the 8th century, namely, Śāntirakṣita. His famous work is the *Tattvasaṅgraha* wherein he has criticised the views of both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. It has been commented upon by his own pupil Kamala-

Śāntirakṣita 8th cen. A.D.

[6] *History of Indian Literature,* Vol. II, p. 373.

śīla which is named *Pañjikā*. The *Madhyamakālaṅkāra-kārikās* with his own commentary is another work of his. He lived in Nālanda but left it and went to Tibet where he founded the monestery of Sam-ye in 749 A.D. He lived there for thirteen years and died in 762 A.D.

Advayavajra 11th cen. A.D.

We may also mention the name of Advayavajra who flourished in the 11th century and wrote a large number of short didactic poems on the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna.

3. *Doctrines of the School*

Now coming to the doctrines of this school we know the only reality, which the school believes in, is the '*Śūnyatā*'. The meaning of the term may be explained as that which has no cause and condition (hetupratya-yaśūnya), that which is beyond thought and conception (kalpanārahita), that which is not produced, that which is not born, that which is without measure. It is that which is neither real nor unreal; neither positive, nor negative, leaving aside the two extremes, it takes its stand on the Middle Path (madhyamapratipad). According to the Mādhyamikas, reason and language both deal with the phenomenal world and they fail to give us any idea about the infinite, and particularly, that which is beyond the four alternatives, and is without any character (*alakṣaṇam*) and hence, indescribable (anirvacanīya) and incomprehensible. Therefore, this absolute is being described as nothing (śūnya). This is the highest monistic idea of Śūnyatā which is taught by the Mādhya-mika school of Mahāyānism. Here, its philosophy, like the *Advaitavedānta* of Śaṅkarācārya, has reached its highest and most sublime perfection, the Infinite, Ab-solute.

Reason and language both deal with the phenomenal world.

"While the Absolute is free from all modes of limi-tations and cannot be thought by our finite conscious-ness, still, on account of avidyā in-herent in human mind, it manifests itself in the phenomenal world. Avidyā is the principle of relativity. Of course, the

Avidyā is the principle of relativity.

world reflects the permanent substance, otherwise we cannot attain *'paramārtha'* through *'saṁvṛti'*, which Nāgārjuna admits. The essence of things is *śūnya* in both senses of the term. 'The objects that we perceive now were *śūnya* in the past and will be *śūnya* in the future. All things in their nature have śūnya for their essence'. It is avidyā that makes attribute existence to things which do not exist. The knowledge of the truth is called Mahāvidyā and its opposite is avidyā."[7]

Further, it has been described by Nāgārjuna[8] and Candrakīrti in his *Vṛtti*[9] as—*aparapratyaya,* meaning that it cannot be realized through the teachings of other, it is *svasamvedya;* it is *śānta,* that is, it is undisturbed by production or destruction; *prapañcopaśama,* that is, wherein the phenomenal world has attained cessation; *anirodham,* no passing away, no origination, no destruction and no ever-lasting continuance, no unity and no multiplicity, no coming and no going. It is the same as *pratītyasamutpāda.* It is All Bliss (*śivam*).[10]

It is because of this śūnyatā that everything is possible in the phenomenal world and without it nothing is possible.[11] So says Āryadeva—"It is due to śūnyatā that the activity, in regular order (following the law of regularity, and of the law of causation) of all mundane and supermundane things (dharmas), is possible. If it (noumenon) is otherwise, then such activity would become impossible."

Again, there is nothing which is not-śūnya. So says the *Kārikā*—"There is no dharma which is not produced by causes and conditions. So no dharma exists which can be called aśūnya." In other words, whatever is produced by *pratītyasamutpāda* is śūnyatā, and it is

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[7] S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy,* Vol. I. p. 664.

[8] Pūrvamaparapratyayam śāntam prapañcairaprapañcitam/
Nirvikalpamanānārthametattattvasya lakṣaṇam//
—*Kārikā,* XXIV. 16.

[9] Aparapratyayam śāntaprapañcitānirvikalpamanārthametat tattvasya kakṣaṇamiti—*Vṛtti* on *Kārikā,* XXIV. 12, p. 179.

[10] Anirodhamanutpādamanucchedamaśāśvatam/
Anekārthamanānārthamanāgamamanirgamam/
Yaḥ pratītyasamutpādam prapañcopaśamam śivam//
—*Mādhyamikakārikā,* XXVI. I.

[11] Sarvañca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate/
Sarvam na yujyate tasya śunyatā yasya na yujyate//
—*Mādhyamikakārikā,* XXIV.

limited by the law of causation; so that which is devoid of any particularity or *svabhāva* is also *śūnyatā.* No phenomenon has its own self-essence or individuality, but is based on endless series of causes and effects. In other words, all things are only an absence of their own eternal peculiarities and are in a state of constant change. Nāgārjuna has summed up the meaning of *śūnyatā* in the following words:

Nivṛttamabhidhātavyam nivṛtte cittagocare/
Anutpannā niruddhā hi nirvāṇamiva dharmatā//[12]

The real state of dharma is like Nirvāṇa, indescribable, incomprehensible, without birth or death. It is beyond the reach of thought or language, for it is absolute. This ultimate truth can be achieved through the discipline of body and mind, and if this is achieved, distinction of '*yuṣmat-asmat-pratyaya*' will vanish for ever and 'Perfect Bliss' will be realized.

Meaning of Śūnyatā.

This is all about *śūnyatā* in brief. Now, a question may be asked: if everything is but void, how can the four noble truths of the Buddha remain uncontradicted? There cannot be any duḥkha, if things come into existence without cause and condition? There can be then no dharma and adharma. All the phenomenal dealings will remain unexplained if everything is nothing but *śūnya.* In order to remove all such ignorance, Nāgārjuna says that Buddha's teachings dealt with two sorts of realities: relative or conditional truth, called *Saṁvṛti* and transcendental or absolute truth, called *Paramārthasatya.*[13]

Two sorts of Realities:

By *Saṁvṛti* we understand a screen (āvaraṇa) which envelops the reality (satya), the true nature of the thing. Avidyā, moha, viparyāsa all these are synonymous with saṁvṛti. It is avidyā (ignorance), because it imposes falsely unreality and thus, completely conceals the truth; so says the *Śālistambasūtra,* quoted

(1) Samvṛtisatya explained.

12 *Mādhyamikakārikā,* XVIII. 7.

13 (i) Dve satye samupāśritya buddhānām dharmadeśanā|
Lokasamvṛtisatyañca satyañca paramārthataḥ//
—*Mā. Kārikā,* XXIV. 14,

(ii) Śāntideva also has said—
Saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaśca satyadvayamidaṃ mataṃ—IX, 2,

by Prajñākaramati in his *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*,[14] *avidyā* is that which proclaims that which is unreal (abhūta) and conceals that which is real. It is non-realization (apratipatti), false-knowledge and nescience. Again, *saṁvṛti* is that which depends upon another for its existence (pratītya-samutpanna-vasturūpa); for that which depends upon any cause or condition is really non-existent, that is, only phenomenal.

Whatever was said about the material things, like skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, etc., is conventional and not real; so the existence of these, in reality, is not at all established. Now, if it be held that every object of experience is unreal, how can then the experience of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) of pudgala by the yogins who have realized the truth through meditation upon *pudgalanairātmya* be possible? To this the answer is given that even the experiences of yogins are not above saṁvṛti, for the latter includes everything that comes within the scope of buddhi, hence, it is said—'*buddhiḥ saṁvṛtirucyate*'.[15] while the reality is something beyond that—*buddheragocarastattvam*.[16]

Divisions of Saṁvṛti.

This 'saṁvṛti' is of two kinds: *tathyasaṁvṛti* or *lokasaṁvṛti* and *mithyāsaṁvṛti*. The former refers to objects which come to existence out of a cause, such as, blue colour, etc., and are perceived in the same way by all persons having unimpaired sense-organs. The latter, on the other hand, though produced out of some cause and conditions, yet they are accepted only by a few persons and not universally, because these are like things perceived by a person with a defective sense-organ, like several wrong notions of māyā, marīci, etc. The former is accepted as a truth by people, while the latter is rejected as a truth by people. It is called '*truth*', because of the ignorance of people, that is, it is valid as far as the phenomenal world is concerned, for the dealings of the world are uncontradictorily carried out with such notions.

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14 Page 352.

15 *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, IX. 2.

16 *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, IX. 2.

According to Nāgārjuna *Paramārthasatya* is identical with Nirvāṇa. It is devoid of particularities of everything (sarvadharmāṇām nissvabhāvatā). It is variously called śūnyatā, tathatā (suchness), bhūtakoṭi (true limit) and dharmadhātu (totality of things). The *nissvabhāvatā* of every object produced out of cause and conditions is its *Paramārtharūpa.*[17] It is free from the distinctions of subject and object, name and denotation. It transgresses all the conventions. It is free from all characteristics. It is beyond the grasp of kāya, vāk and manas. It is not to be expressed through words (anabhilāpya); it is *anājñeya, aparijñeya, avijñeya, adeśita, aprakāśita, yāvadakriya, akaraṇa.*[18] It is neither gain nor no–gain, neither happiness nor misery, neither fame nor no–fame, neither colourless nor coloured. It is beyond all these distinctions. It is to be realized within one's own self. So intuition is the only means to prove its existence.[19]

(2) Paramārthasatya explained.

Intuition is the only means to realize it.

It is attainable by giving up all that acts as obstacles in the way of realization, such as, relation (anusandhi), desires (vāsanā), and passion (kleśa). Prajñākaramati goes on saying that how can such a thing, whose existence depends upon cause and condition, have real existence? No real existence can come to exist out of cause and condition; for even cause and condition depend upon something else for their own existence, which again, depends upon something else, so the process of interdependence will lead one to *ad infinitum* and will not be able to prove the *paramārtha–satya.* In fact, that which is produced out of cause and condition is never produced, it is śūnya; and out of śūnya-dharma is produced only śūnyatā.

Prajñākaramati on Pāramārthikasatya.

Now a question may be asked here: if *paramārthasatya* be inexpressible and *saṁvṛtisatya* be non-existing,

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[17] *Pañjikā,* p. 354.

[18] *Pañjikā,* p. 363.

[19] *Pañjikā,* p. 367.

like the creations of a magician, what is the necessity of dealing with the topics, like skandha, dhātu, āyatana, āryasatya, pratītya-samutpāda, etc.? To this the reply given by Nāgārffiuna is—

Paramārthasat cannot be explained without conventional truths.

Vyavahāramanāśritya paramārtho na deśyate/
Paramārthamanāgamya nirvāṇaṁ nādhigamyate//[20]

that the highest truth (Paramārtha) cannot be taught without having recourse to conventional truths; and unless the highest truth is realized, Nirvāṇa cannot be attained. The *Pañjikā* says—"the Paramārthatattva, being actually indescribable, is explained, however, through the help of instances from the external world having taken recourse to the *saṁvṛti-satya.* In fact, it is simply impossible to speak of that indescribable *satya* which is devoid of all conventional truths. So has been said by Nāgārjuna[21] —that what can be heard of and imparted about that which is beyond the scope of words and hence, unutterable? It is only through false imposition that we hear of it and also teach others about it. We should not say that it is *śūnya,* nor should we say that it is *aśūnya,* nor is it both, nor not-both. So whatever is said of it, is only for its true understanding. Hence, one has to take recourse to the conventional truths, before he speaks on the *Paramārtha-satya.*[22]

It is a fact that in order to know what is good, one should know distinctly what is not-good; it is only then that one can extricate the *Paramārtha-satya,* which is good, from the *Saṁvṛti—satya,* which is decidedly, not-good, that is, mundane. So it is most essential to know both these two *satyas* in order to be able to distinguish one from the other. One who does not know both these two cannot understand the deep Buddhistic thought.[23]

20 *Mā. Kārikā,* XXIV. 18.

21 Anakṣarasya dharmasya śrutiḥ kā deśanā ca kā/
Śrūyate deśyate cārthaḥ samāropādanakṣaraḥ//
Śūnyamiti na vaktavyamaśūnyamiti vā bhavet/
Ubhayam nobhayañceti prajñaptyartham tu kathyate//
—*Mā. Kārikā,* XV. 5–6.

22 *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā,* p. 365.

23 *Mādhyamikakārikā,* XXIV, 17.

The Highest Truth can be realized through Prajñā which again, is possible through Śamatha.

This is the highest truth which the Mādhyamika school has taught. This can be realized only through Prajñā (perfect knowledge regarding the reality as it is), which can be attained, in its turn, only through *Śamatha,* that is, the concentration of pointed attention of the *citta* (*cittaikāgratālakṣaṇa-samādhi*). In other words, in order to attain perfection of knowledge characterised by the nature of knowing the truth as it is, one should practise meditation and become *samāhita* (settled) in that. Then there being no external activity of any sort, his *citta* remains firm. For this, again, it is essential to get rid of attachment towards the phenomenal world including his relations and even his own self. Besides the *vairāgya,* the well-known six *pāramitās* or virtues of perfection, which represent the positive side of Buddhist ethics, should be practised for attaining the highest perfection of knowledge (*prajñā*). These are: Dāna (charity), Śīla (purity of conduct, that is, morality or the moral rules and precepts as formulated by Buddhism), Kṣānti (patience or humility), Vīrya (strenuosity), Dhyāna (meditation) and lastly, Prajñā (spiritual enlightenment). Besides these six pāramitās, there are four more which also are to be practised and acquired. These are—Upāya (employment of right means), Praṇidhāna (resoluteness), Bala (strength) and Jñāna (knowledge). Of the six Pāramitās, the first three, namely, dāna, śīla, and kṣānti, when practised constantly for a long time, produce what is known as *Puṇyasambhāra.* Thereby, the Bodhisattva offers, gives up and remains indifferent to his body (dāna), he extends universal love towards all beings and does not feel pain even when his own body is dismembered (śīla), he shows forbearance towards and forgives him who has injured his body (kṣānti). Through all these he acquires virtues. By the constant practice of the next two, *viz.,* vīrya and dhyāna, he acquires what is called *Jñānasambhāra.* And with the help of both these two *sambhāras,* a Bodhisattva attains Prajñā.

For this Vairāgya is essential.

Six virtues of perfection should be practised. Positve side of Buddhist Ethics.

Puṇyasambhāra.

Jñānasambhāra.

Kinds of Prajñā:

This Prajñā is of two kinds: *hetubhūta* and *phala-bhūta*. At the attainment of the first, the Bodhisattva is called '*Adhimukta-carita*', and when the second is achieved, the Bodhisattva is called '*Bhūmipraviṣṭa*', that is, he has achieved the Bodhisattva-bhūmi. The highest stage which Prajñā can achieve is the Buddhahood.

Highest stage of Prajñā is Buddhahood.

All this shows very clearly that for the attainment of the highest truth according to Buddhism, *viz.*, *Nirvāṇa*, the practice of discipline of body and mind, that is, the stage of Action, is most indispensable. No perfect knowledge can be ever achieved without *śamatha* (Action). Through *śamatha* one attains *vipaśyanā* after which comes the Final Deliverance from afflictions. So says Śāntideva in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*—

No perfect knowledge can be attained without Action.

Śamathena vipaśyanāsuyuktaḥ
Kurute kleśavināśamityavetya/
Śamathaḥ prathamam gaveṣaṇīyaḥ
Sa ca loke nirapekṣayābhiratyā//[24]

4. *Conclusion*

This is just what the combined instrumentality of Jñāna and Karma teaches according to the theory of *Jñāna-Karma-samuccaya-vāda* for the realization of the highest truth from Veda down to the systematized schools of thought. It is to be kept in mind that by Philosophy in India we must take into account both , of course, in successive order, Karma (Action) and Jñāna (Knowledge).

Karma and Jñāna both combined constitute Indian Philosophy.

Thus, studying the four different schools of Buddhism in the order in which each school has been dealt with above, it is found that there is a conscious attempt at gradual retirement from the external to the internal and from there again, into the Abyss of the Void which is the consummation sought for. The Doctrine of Momentariness is only a stepping stone to that of Universal Vacuity. Hence, the conception of Nirvāṇa has received a fresh purging at every stage until it has reached its

24 I. VIII. 4.

true significance in the Mādhyamika school, which is meant only for the student of the highest *adhikāra.*

No main difference between Buddhist and Hindu thoughts in Philosophy.

Now, taking an all comprehensive view of the doctrines and teachings of Buddhism, a critical uninterested enquirer does not find much difference between the so-called two currents of Indian thought, *viz.*, Buddhistic and non-Buddhistic. In details, there are, no doubt, differences, but in the main outlook no such difference is found. Again, why should there be any difference when the cause which leads into philosophical enquiries, namely, feeling of pain, and the realization of the highest aim, where the enquiry finally comes to an end, *viz.*, final cessation of pain, being common to both the currents of thought, are the same in every respect? When we look at these systems of thought, both Buddhistic and non-Buddhistic, we do not find any essential difference due to which one may be called anti-Hindu thought or anti-Buddhistic thought. Like all other systems of Indian thought, Buddhism is also one of them with its own individual angle of vision. Except for certain technical words and phraseology it is very difficult, if not impossible, to find out any vital difference between the Advaitavāda of Śaṅkarācārya and the Śūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna. Both believe in the *Vyāvahārikī-sattā* and the *Pāramārthikī-sattā.* The Highest Truth is indescribable, inconceivable and beyond the reach of kāya, vāk and manas, that is, *avāṅmanasagocara*, in both the systems. Both admit the operations of avidyā for the manifestation of the phenomenal world. Both assert the Absolute Monistic view. It is also not very correct to say that the Absolute truth of the Mādhyamikas is Negative, while that of Śaṅkara is positive. It has been made clear above that neither Positive nor Negative assertion can be made about Śūnya, or about Brahman.

Advaitavāda and Śūnyavāda—their common characteristics.

I may be allowed to say that, in fact, the Absolute *Śūnya* of Buddhism belongs to a higher plain, while Śaṅkara's Advaitaism is not absolutely free from Māyā, as has been made clear before and so their difference is due to their difference of stand-point.

About the theory of *kṣaṇikavāda,* as advocated by

Kṣaṇikavāda and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya-yoga.

the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras, can we not say that even the Sāṅkhya system preaches the Law of Momentary Flux as far as the material world is concerned? We know that there are only two ultimate realities in Sāṅhkya, *viz.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Now, let us examine the nature of Prakṛti. We know that it constitutes of sattva, rajas and tamas. The nature of rajas is that it must be in motion all the time and should never remain without it even for a moment. Now, moment is the last and the ultimate division of time. So we can easily say that according to Sāṅkhya, Prakṛti, which is never free from rajas, is changing every moment. So Sāṅkhya also deals, in a way, with the theory of Momentary Flux. The same thing may be said about the first evolute of Prakṛti, *viz.*, Citta or Buddhi. It is also, like the Citta of Mādhyamika, changing every moment. The same thing may be said about the Vaiśeṣikas. They believe in the Pīlupāka Theory of Chemical Action which is going on in the world constantly; and consequently, every moment the Paramāṇus and subsequently, every object constituting those Paramāṇus, do undergo change. From the common-sense-view, which the Naiyāyikas advocate, they may not easily believe in this constant change in the Paramāṇus constituting objects of the material world, but the reality is that, if critically examined, no one can deny it, as has been made clear by the Vaiśeṣikas. The same thing can be said about the *avasthā-pariṇāma* of the Yoga System. Of course, the fact is that according to the Buddhists, the change is for destruction leaving a *saṁskāra* behind it, while in other case, the change is of the form, though in Vaiśeṣika, change means destruction. In this way, we can see that in spite of the various obvious differences between the systems of Buddhism and those of Non-Buddhism on certain vital problems, not much can be found by way of differentiation on main problems of darśana. Lastly, both Śaṅkara and Nāgārjuna hold that the highest aim of philosophy is Blissful.[25]

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25 Prapañcopaśamanaṁ śivam—*Mādhyamikakārikā*.

CHAPTER IX

CONTRIBUTION OF BUDDHISTS TO THE SCIENCE OF REASONING

1. *Pre-Buddhistic history*

BEFORE we come to the treatment of the original contribution of the Buddhists to the Science of Reasoning, it will not be improper if a very brief reference is made to the past history of the Science, which will enable us to know what actually existed before the Buddhists could contribute anything.

History of the Science of Reasoning (Tarka-śāstra) can be easily traced to the earliest records of Indian literature. We find in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*,[1] Nārada mentioning the names of various sciences studied by him, wherein *'Vākovākya'* is also mentioned as one of the sciences studied by him. The term *'Vākovākya'* has been explained by Śaṅkarācārya and others as *'Tarka-śāstram'*, meaning, the science of reasoning. The mention of this science in that context shows definitely that this science was also as fully developed at that time as any other science, such as, Astronomy, Science of Treasures, Science of War, Science of Grammar, etc., etc. It is a fact that no book of that period is yet unearthed, but that cannot take away the importance and the status of the Science. That no book is available is not its fault. Again, when we come to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, we find that the mantra—*Ātmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaśca*[2]—mentions *'manana'* (process of reasoning) as one of the three methods of arriving at the truth, which the later writers have explained as 'arguing through reason'. Again, it may be said that the whole of the 'Yājñavalkya-Kāṇḍa' of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is, in fact, mainly devoted to argu-

Reference in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad.*

References in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka.*

[1] VII. i. 2.

[2] II. iv. 5.

mentation.[3] Then when the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*[4] says—'Naiṣā tarkeṇa matirāpaneyā' it does refer to the science of reasoning. Besides, there are several controvertial problems mentioned in the Upaniṣads[5] where full-fledged reasoning has been used from both the sides. '*Tarka*' has been regarded as authoritative, as ṛṣis by Yāska.[6]

References in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad.*

'Tarka' has been also regarded by Manu as the most essential means to know 'dharma' and an expert in the science of reasoning has been recommended as one of the ten members of the *Pariṣad* by Manu.[7] In the Mahābhārata, there are several instances where reasoning has been used at great length. Then in the *Artha-śāstra* of Kauṭilya (327 B.C.) mention has been made of Ānvīkṣikī,[8] meaning, science of reasoning, as an independent science, like Trayī, Vārtā (Commerce and Agriculture), and Daṇḍanīti (Polity), for study. Besides, there are references in the *Rāmāyaṇā,*[9] *Mahābhārata*[10] of *Ānvīkṣikī* in the sense of the science of reasoning. Even the words '*Hetu-śāstra*' or '*Hetu-vidya*', or '*Tarka-vidyā*' in the sense of logical science, are found in the above mentioned works.[11]

References in *Nirukta* and *Manu-smṛti.*

References in the *Mahābhārata,* Vālmikīya – *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Arthaśāstra.*

Then again, we find that there are references to the Materialists and their doctrines in the *Ṛgveda,*[12] *Upaniṣads,*[13] *Rāmāyaṇa,*[14] etc. and to meet these views reasoning must have been used by the other party.

References to the Materialists in the *Ṛgveda,* Upaniṣads and *Rāmāyāṇa.*

From all these various references found in the pre-Buddhistic works, we conclude that the Science of Reasoning—'*Tarkaśāstra*' had fully developed in India prior to the appearance of Buddhism.

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3 Vide-Saṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on IV. v. 1. 4 I. ii. 9.
5 *Kaṭha,* I. i. 20; *Chāndogya,* II. iv. 12.
6 *Nirukta,* p. 878 (Durgaprasāda's edition). 7 XII. III.
8 P.1–2, 7. 9 Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 100. 36. 10 Śāntiparva, 180, 47.
11 *Mahā.* Ādi. I. 67; Śānti, 210, 22; Aśva, 85. 27; *Rāmāyaṇa,* 1–13–23, VII, 53. 15.
12 X. 38. 3; VIII. 70. 7; VIII. 71. 8.
13 *Bṛha.* IV. v. 13. 14 Ayodhyā, 108. 17.

Now, a question may be raised: If there was already a fully developed science of reasoning and people were freely using that science for their study and practical use when they needed, what led them to form another independent branch during the Buddhistic period? If there flourished good thinkers who wrote standard works on the science and even made original contributions to it, there is no sufficient reason to prove why such an independent branch of the science be separately formed? We know from our later studies of the science that scholars, like Vācaspati Miśra I and II, Pakṣadhara Miśra, Udayanācārya, and several others even including Gangeśa and Vardhamāna, did make good original contributions to the science, but never those contributions led to the formation of an independent school associated with the name of some particular current of thought. The New School of Nyāya cannot be quoted as an instance in support of the Buddhists; for though it is altogether a new method introduced in the science and is limited to the treatment of one *Sūtra* of Gautama alone, yet it did not cut off its connection from the main science and became associated with its original writer's name. If Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti were great contributors of original thoughts to the science, their views would have found their independent mention, like the views of Udayanācārya, Pakṣadhara Miśra, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and others. But this cannot justify the separation of Buddhist logic as an independent science of reasoning as the modern scholars think. Nor did the Buddhists come from outside India which may be the reason for naming their contribution independently as 'Buddhist logic', like European logic. So what we should understand by 'Buddhist Logic' is the contribution of Buddhist scholars to the Nyāya-śāstra, Science of Reasoning, and not a separate branch of the Science. So we can only say that a fresh approach to the science of reasoning might have been made about this period by the Buddhists.

Origin of dialectics amongst the Buddhists.

It may be however, suggested in answer to the above that after hearing the charming message of the Buddha, the Emotionalists left their home and became recluses. But when their enthusiasm faded away, as their becoming recluses was not due to their natural disgust with

the worldly life, they became idle towards maintaining the rigid rules of discipline of body and mind. The life of a mendicant became a sort of burden to them. But due to their being afraid of their being laughed at and be ridiculed by others, they could not return to their old fold and profession. They might have passed their days in idle talking and arguing with people in support of their activities and trying to find out loop-holes and weak-points in the old social and religious order of the society.

Chaotic life of the followers of the Buddha.

As they had left, their family life without having done their duty towards their relations who needed their help badly and were left in utter helplessness, there might have been a good deal of chaos in those families as well. Thus, there might have been confusion and serious disorder in the society all round. Those invalids, who were left at home were crying for help, while most of them, who had turned recluses simply due to emotion and sentiment without being really disgusted with the old life they used to live before, could not be true to their new creed after the force of sentiment had faded away, and became idle and talkative wanderers.

After that those who were left at home must have tried to bring those so-called recluses back with the help of persons who commanded respects and were regarded wise in the society. But as it is natural in such cases, those recluses, or the emotional followers of the Buddha, did not like, for reasons given above, to return to the householders life. Instead they might have tried to enter into discussions and argumentations in support of their own new creed and also might have tried to defeat the arguments of other party by finding faults through right or wrong reasons. Not only did those followers of the Buddha enter into argumentation with the non-Buddhists, but even amongst themselves they carried on reasonings unabated, every one trying to assert his own views and thereby claiming his superiority. Under the circumstances, it was but natural that the non-Buddhists also might have taken recourse to reasonings and argumentations in support of their views.

It might have been just possible that the first step

towards the composition of the new Nyāya-darśana in sūtra form might have been taken at this very period by Gautama, with all the means of combating the fallacious arguments of the opposite party and also to protect the correct argumetns of his own, namely, disputation (jalpa), wrangling (vitaṇḍā) fallacious reason (hetvābhāsa), casuistry (chala), futile rejoinder (jāti), and clinchers (nigrahasthāna).

This is just the period when the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama might have been composed (483–247 B.C.).

The state of argumentation and reasonings began from the days of the Buddha as has been made clear above, but the struggle must have become much more acute after the Nibbāna of the Buddha when his disciples enjoyed full freedom. This was the time when the clash between the Buddhists and the non-Buddhists in the field of dialectics must have assumed some sort of organized form. This seems to have given an opportunity to the Non-Buddhists to get themselves armed with some sort of systematized ways and means of combating the growing tide of the dialectics amongst the Buddhists as is clear from the discussions found recorded in the *Kathāvatthu,* a work attributed to Moggaliputta Tissa, the President of the third Buddhist Council in 247 B.C. This dialectic combat between the followers of the Buddha and the non-Buddhists must have been quelled to a certain extent during the reign of Aśoka after he had established his sway over the country. Thus, it seems that the systematization or the composition of the *Nyāya-sūtra* by Gautama might have been done during 483–247 B.C. Again, as Nāgārjuna of the 2nd century A.D. quotes the first Sūtra of Nyāya, *Pramāṇa-prameya,* etc. in his work–'*Vaidalya-sūtra* and *Prakaraṇa*',[15] also known as '*Pramāṇa-viheṭana*', or *Pramāṇa-vidhvaṁsana,*[16] *Nyāya-sūtra* cannot be later than that. And again, during the period 272 B.C. and 232 B.C. when Aśoka ruled and up to the time of Bṛhadratha, 191–184 B.C. the influence of Buddhism might have been great or during the period 184 B.C. to 148 B.C. there being

Nyāyasūtra quoted by Nāgārjuna in the 2nd cen. A.D.

15 Th. Stcherbatsky—*Buddhist Logic,* p. 28.

16 Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *Indian Logic,* p. 257.

the Brahmanic sway over the country, or again, there being the Buddhistic influence during the time of Kuṣāṇas and consequently, there might not have been much acute clash between the Buddhists and the non-Buddhists. So the systematization must have been prior to this when the clash between the various parties was at its zenith.

Earliest period of Buddhist Logic.

As made clear before, the art of argumentation began even during the very life-time of the Buddha himself, but the magnetic personality of the Master did not give it any chance to flourish. But no sooner than he passed away, the followers came out with all their arguments and reasonings to assert their individual views which ultimately, led to the formation of 20 or 18 independent schools. They must have become fully familiar, by that time, with the methods of carrying on debates on public platforms as recorded in the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama. From the recent discoveries of Buddhist Sanskrit works in Tibet, we can easily say that there did exist several works on Buddhist Logic or dialectics running almost parallel to orthodox works. The theory of Causality, one of the vital problems of the Science of Reasoning in Indian thought, is found in the *Pratītya-samutpāda* which is one of the most important problems of Buddhism. Various kinds of knowledge are the topics of Pramāṇa.[17] Then coming to the *Brahmajālasutta* which forms part of the Sutta-Piṭaka, we find the Buddha addressing as follows:—"There are, brethren, some recluses and Brāhmaṇas who are eternalists......who proclaim that both the soul and the world are eternal... They are addicted to logic and reasoning (argumentation and casuistry), and utterance to the following conclusion of their own, beaten out by their argumentations and based on their sophistry.......[18]

Earlier References.

Brahmajāla-sutta.

Udāna.

Again, in the *Udāna* of the khuddaka-Nikāya of the Sutta-Piṭaka we find, "As long as the perfect Buddhas do not appear, the *Takkikas* (sophists) are not corrected nor are the Sāvakas;

Udāna.

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[17] *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, III. 61. 8.

[18] *Indian Logic*, pp. 228–229.

owing to their evil views they are not released from misery" (Yāva sammā sambuddhā loke n'uppajjanti, na takkikā sujjhanti na c'āpi sāvakā, duddiṭṭhī na dukkhā pamuccare'ti)[19].

Then in the *Parivāra*,[20] a work of the Vinaya-Piṭaka, there is a mention of four kinds of adhikaraṇas, cases for settlement, *viz.*, (i) *vivādādhikaraṇa*, a case pertaining to differences of opinion, (ii) *anuvādādhikaraṇa*, a case in which one party accuses another party of the violation of a rule of good conduct, (iii) *āpattādhikaraṇa*, a case in which a monk has actually transgressed an established rule of good conduct; and (iv) *kiccādhikaraṇa*, a case relating to the formal procedure of an ecclesiastical act.[21]

Parivāra.

Next, we come to a more important work, the *Kathāvatthu*, a work of the Abhidhammapiṭaka composed by Moggaliputta Tissa in 247 B.C. during the time of the third Buddhist Council. It mentions terms like, *anuyoga* (inquiry), *āharaṇa* (illustration), *paṭiññā* (pratijñā—proposition), *upanaya* (application of reason), *niggaha* (nigraha-clinchers), which are found to have been used in the same sense as in the Nyāya system. Besides these, the method of reasoning and argumentation found in the *Kathāvatthu* clearly shows the nature of advanced dialectics in the 3rd century B.C. It will not be improper to quote here a case representing the form of argumentation from the book:

Kathāvatthu.

A case presented by a disputant in a regular form:

Form of argumentation in the *Kathāvatthu.*

Theravādin: Is the soul (puggala) known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the soul known in the same way as a genuinely real thing?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot be said.

Theravādin: Acknowledge your defeat.

(*i*) If the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, then, good sir, you should also say that the soul is known in the same way as any other genuinely real thing is known.

[19] vi. 10. [20] Chapters IX–XIII. [21] *Ibid*, p. 230.

(*ii*) That which you say here is wrong, *viz.* (*a*) the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but not (*b*) known in the same way as any other genuinely real thing is known.

(*iii*) If the statement (*b*) is not admitted, then indeed the statement (*a*) cannot be admitted either.

(*iv*) In admitting the statement (*a*) but in denying the statement (*b*), you are wrong.

A rejoinder by the respondent (*paṭikamma*):

Puggalavādin: Is the soul not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?

Theravādin: No, it is not known.

Puggalavādin: Is it unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known?

Theravādin: No, that cannot be said.

Puggalavādin: Acknowledge the rejoinder.

(*i*) If the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, then, good sir, you should also say that the soul is unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.

(*ii*) That which you say here is wrong, *viz.*, (*a*) the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but not (*b*) unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.

(*iii*) If the statement (*b*) is denied, then the statement (*a*) cannot be admitted either.

(*iv*) In admitting the statement (*a*) but in denying the statement (*b*), you are wrong.

The rejoinder causing entanglement or defeat on the disputant (*niggaha*).

Puggalavādin: If in your opinion we should say that the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing but not unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known, then, you have, by your own proposition, assented to the truth of our statement and have acknowledged defeat.

(*i*) Your statement—that the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but not unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known—is wrong.

(*ii*) You should not say that the statement (*a*) is to be admitted, but the statement (*b*) is not to be admitted.

(*iii*) If the statement (*b*) is not admitted, then the statement (*a*) cannot be admitted either.

(*iv*) In admitting the statement (*a*) but in denying the statement (*b*), you are wrong.

Application of the reasoning of the disputant to his own case (*upanaya*).

Puggalavādin: If the defeat we have inflicted on you is considered unfair, do you apply your reasoning to your own case.

We said: "(a) the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but (b) unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known".

You observed: "if the statement (b) is not admitted, then the statement (a) cannot be admitted either".

Now, you say: "(a) the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but not (b) unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known".

Following you we observe: "if you do not admit the statement (b), you cannot admit the statement (a) either."

Conclusion (*niggamana*)

Puggalavādin: As for ourselves we do not deserve any defeat. The following assumptions which you made are wrong:—

(i) If the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, it must also be known in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.

(ii) It is wrong to couple the statement (a), *viz.*, the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, with the statement (b), *viz.*, the soul is not known in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.

(iii) If the statement (b) is denied, then the statement (a) must also be denied.

(iv) If the statement (a) is admitted, then the statement (b) must also be admitted.

The defeat you propose to inflict on us in unfair. But our rejoinder is fair and demonstration well done.

Milindapañha.

Coming to the *Milinda-pañha* of the first century A.D.,[22] we find that the term Nyāya as a system of thought is mentioned along with Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, etc. Though from the context it is not clear whether it refers to the Buddhist Logic or to the Non-Buddhist Logić, most probably to the latter, yet in this non-canonical Pali book, we find a dialogue between Milinda and Nāgasena which gives us an idea of the proper mode of carrying debate in those early days.

Nāgārjuna and his works.

Next, we come to Nāgārjuna of the second century A.D. who is regarded as the author of (1) *Vigrahavyāvartinī* (Repudiation of contests) and (2) *Vaidalya-sūtra* and *Prakaraṇa* (Dialectical splitting of every topic). The first work criticises the Nyāya theory of Pramāṇa, as given by Gautama. The original Sanskrit text, which is now lost, was translated into Tibetan by Jñānagarbha and the Tibetan interpreter Ka-wa-dpal-brtsegs. The Chinese version of the *Vigrahavyāvartinīkārikā* is noticed by Bunyiu Nanjio under the name of *Vivādaśamanaśāstra.* It was translated into Chinese by Vimokṣaprajña and others in 541 A.D. The second work, which is also known as *Pramāṇavihetana* or *Pramāṇavidhvaṃsana*, was written as a review of the first sūtra of the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama. There is a commentary on this in Tibetan. The work deals with the treatment of syllogism which is said to consist of three factors only, namely (1) Proposition (pratijñā), (2) reason (hetu) and (3) example (udāharaṇa). It may be put either in positive (anvaya), or in negative (vyatireka) form.

The third work, which is attributed to Nāgārjuna, is the *Upāyakauśalya-hṛdaya-śāstra,* essence of skill in the accomplishment of action. It is stated to be a work on the art of debate. The book is divided into four chapters: (1) Vādaviśadīkaraṇa (an elucidation of debate), (2) Nigrahasthāna (an explanation of the points of defeat), (3) Tattvavyākhyāna (an explanation of the truth), and (4) Jāti (far-fetched analogy). The first

22 Winternitz—*Indian Literature,* Vol II. p. 175.

chapter consists of eight sections: (i) udāharaṇa, (ii) siddhānta (conclusion), (iii) vākyapraśaṁsā (excellence of speech), (iv) Vākyadoṣa (defect of speech), (v) anumāna or hetujñāna (the knowledge of inference), (vi) samayocitavākya (appropriate speech), (vii) hetvābhāsa (fallacy), and (viii) duṣṭavākyānusaraṇa (the adoption of a fallacious reason).

The *nigrahasthāna* is of nine kinds: (i) avijñātārtha (unintelligible), (ii) apratibhā (non-ingenuity), (iii) maunabhāṣaṇa (silence), (iv) nyūna (saying too little), (v) adhika (saying too much), (vi) nirarthaka (meaningless), (vii) aprāptakāla (inopportune), (viii) apārthaka (incoherent), and (ix) pratijñāhāni (hurting the proposition).

The Tattvavyākhyāna section deals with the admission of an opinion (matānujñā). The last chapter deals, however, with another nine varieties: (1) utkarṣa-sama (parity per augmentation), (2) apakarṣasama (parity per subtraction), (3) varṇyasama (parity per uncertainty), (4) avarṇyasama (parity per certainty), (5) ahetusama (parity per non-probativeness), (6) prāptisama (parity per convergence), (7) aprāptisama (parity per non-convergence), (8) saṁśayasama (parity per doubt), (9) pratidṛṣṭāntasama (parity per counter-instance).[23]

Dr. Th. Stcherbatsky in his *Buddhist Logic* writes about the first two works of Nāgārjuna, "Both contain the exposition and the vindication of that unique method of conducting a debate which consists in proving nothing positive, but in applying the test of relativity to every positive thesis of the opponent and thus destroying it dialectically. There is indeed absolutely nothing which would not be relative in some respect, and therefore everything can be denied ultimate reality when its dialectical nature is disclosed. The first of these tracts mentions the four methods of proof current in the Nyāya school and the second quotes the initial aphorism of Gotama in which the 16 topics to be examined in the treatise are enumerated. These facts allow us to assume that the fundamental treatise of the Nyāya school probably existed in some form or other at the time of Nāgārjuna."[24]

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23 Vidyābhūsaṇa—*Indian Logic,* pp. 256–61.

24 Vol. I, p. 28.

Besides, "they also encourage the hypothesis that similar tracts might have been in existence already among the early schools of the Hīnayāna, and that Nāgārjuna was probably not the first Buddhist to have composed them. Be that as the case may be, Nāgārjuna at any rate either introduced or followed the habit of Buddhist writers to treat dialectics in special, separate manuals. From that time we see that every author of some renown composes his own manual of dialectics containing instructions for carrying on public disputations."[25]

Next, though it is just possible that all the later writers on Buddhism might have written some manual on logic, yet we do not know much about it except in the case of Maitreyanātha of the 4th century A.D. who has written in the 15th volume of his *Saptadaśa-bhūmi-śāstra-yogācārya*, a treatise on the art of debate. It consists of seven chapters dealing with the following topics: the subject of debate, the place of debate, the means of debate, the qualifications of debate, points of defeat (nigrahasthāna), attending a place of debate, and confidence of a debater.[26]

"It is evident from the titles of the chapters just mentioned that Maitreya mainly discussed the practical questions of Logic. But occasionally there was mixed with the discussions some pure logic also. A thesis (pratijñā), according to Maitreya, is to be supported by a reason (hetu) and two examples (dṛṣṭānta). Validity of the reason and two examples require that they be based either (1) on fact or perception (pratyakṣa), (2) on inference (anumāna), or (3) on holy saying (āgama). Analogy or comparison (upamāna) is omitted. The form of reasoning is illustrated as follows:—

(1) Sound is non-eternal,
(2) Because it is a product,
(3) Like a pot, but not like Ākāśa,
(4) A product like a pot is non-eternal,
(5) Whereas, an eternal thing like Ākāśa is not a product."[27]

25 *Ibid.*

26 Vidyābhusana—*Indian Logic*, p. 263—265.

27 *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan*, p. 30. Vidyābhusana—*Indian Logic*, p. 265.

After Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the two brothers, were the most prominent scholars amongst the Buddhists. They lived in the 4th century A.D. The contribution of Asaṅga to Logic is found in the 11th volume of the *Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra* and the 7th and 16th volumes of the *Mahāyānābhidharmasaṁyuktasaṅgītiśāstra*. He follows the line of Maitreya except in respect of the theory of proof (sādhaka). A proof, according to Asaṅga, is subdivided into (1) pratijñā (proposition), (2) hetu (reason), (3) udāharaṇa (instance), (4) upanaya (application), (5) nigamana (conclusion), (6) pratyakṣa (perception), (7) upamāna (comparison), and (8) āgama (authority of scripture).

Asaṅga and Vasubandhu 4th cen. A.D.

All these clearly show that Asaṅga believed in four kinds of pramāṇa like the Naiyāyikas. Of the above mentioned subdivisions, the first five are exactly what we find in Nyāya and it is said that Asaṅga was the first to introduce the five-factored syllogism in Buddhist Logic. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa holds that the form of reasoning which Asaṅga followed was somewhat different from that of Maitreya. The form of Asaṅga is given below:—

(1) Sound is non-eternal,

(2) Because it is a product.

(3) Like a pot (but not like Ākāśa);

(4) Because a pot is a product, it is non-eternal; so is sound, as it is a product;

(5) Therefore, we know sound is non-eternal.

From all this it is clear that there was hardly any originality in Asaṅga's logic. It was all on the lines of the *Gautama-sūtra*.

The other brother was, on the other hand, a far superior logician and he wrote at least three works on dialectics known to us. They are: (1) Vādavidhi, (2) Vāda-mārga, and (3) Vāda-kauśala.

Vasubandhu.

The last two works are also known as *Vādavidhāna* and *Vādahṛdaya* respectively.[28] There is a reference to the *Vādavidhi* and a commentary on the *Vāda-vidhāna*

28 *Buddhist Logic*, p. 30 fn.

in the *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara[29] from which we learn that according to the *Vādavidhi*, proposition (Pratijñā) is defined as—'*Sādhyābhidhānam pratijñā*', meaning, a proposition is the assertion of the sādhya. Again, we find that Uddyotakara refutes the definition of Pakṣa as found in Vasubandhu's work, and also the explanation of the term *svayam* added to it as found in the commentary on the *Vādavidhāna*.[30] Uddyotakara also refutes the definition of percetion as given in the *Vādavidhi* "—*Tato'rthādvijñānam pratyakṣam*" meaning, Perception is the cognition proceeding from the same object, that is, Perception is the cognition which proceeds from that object after which it is named and from no other object. This definition serves to exclude the inferential and other forms of cognition, as all these do not proceed only from the object cognized, proceeding, as they do, from that and many other things."[31] It is also to be noted here that Diṅnāga, referring to this very definition of Perception in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, holds that as the above cannot be the view of Vasubandhu, it is not certain if the *Vādavidhi* is the work of Vasubandhu at all. This definition has puzzled several subsequent writers on Buddhist logic and various explanations have been given.[32]

Beside these three works on debate, he also wrote one work on pure logic, named *Tarka-śāstra*. It is said that Paramārtha prepared a Chinese version of it in 550 A.D. It consists of three chapters dealing respectively with the five factors of a syllogism, the analogous rejoinder (jāti) and clinchers (nigrahasthāna). Though Vasubandhu deals with the five factors of a syllogism, yet he thinks that really a conclusion can be drawn only with the help of two factors, namely, a proposition (pratijñā) and a reason (hetu), and therefore, the necessary terms in a syllogistic inference are only three, namely, Pakṣa (minor term), Sādhya (major term) and Hetu (middle term). This shows that Vasubandhu used the five-factored syllogism in debates and discussions when he had to deal with others, mostly

29 I. i. 33.

30 *Svayam Sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthanirākṛtaḥ. Ibid.*

31 *Nyāya-vārttika*, I. i. 4.

32 *Buddhist Logic*, p. 30.

of the opposite party, while for ordinary purposes, he used the other form of syllogism with two factors only.[33]

The varieties of Jāti (futile rejoinder) and of Nigrahasthāna (clinchers) are the same as are mentioned in the *Nyāya-sūtra*.

Sanskrit version of these works on logic are not available, nor are the Chinese or Tibetan versions of all the works available in complete form, so it is not possible to give all the details of these works here. But this much can be said with some certainty that there were no systematic works exclusively devoted to pure logic in earlier days. Most of these works were mixed with metaphysics and religion and the treatment of logic was only incidental. Besides, these works mostly dealt with the ways and means of carrying debates and controversies amongst themselves and also with the non-Buddhists. In other aspects we have seen that these works were influenced by the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama.

"The three aspects of the logical reason, method of formulating invariable concomitance, appear already in the treatise of Vasubandhu. The classification of reasons and fallacies is different from the one accepted in the Nyāya school and agrees in principle with the one introduced by Diṅnāga and developed by Dharmakīrti. If we add that the definition of sense-perception as pure sensation which is so characteristic a feature of Diṅnāga's system is already found in a work of Asaṅga,[34] we cannot escape the conclusion that the great logical reform of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti was prepared by an adaptatory work of the realistic and formal Nyāya logic to the requirements of an idealistic system, this adaptatory work being begun in the schools of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, perhaps even much earlier".[35]

2. *Mediaeval School of Buddhist Logic*

Next, we come to Diṅnāga who is regarded as the Father of the Mediaeval school of Buddhist Logic. He

33 Dr. Stcherbatsky, however, holds that the abridged syllogism of Vasubandhu consisted of three factors—*Buddhist Logic*, p. 31.

34 Tuccsi, in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol, IV, p, 550,

35 *Buddhist Logic*, p, 31,

was born in a Brāhmaṇa family living in Siṁhavaktra, near Kāñcī, in the Madras Presidency. He was converted into Buuddhism by Nāgadatta, a Paṇḍita of the Vātsīputrīya sect. This sect believed in the existence of a real personality as something different from the elements of which it is composed. Diṅnāga differed from his teacher on this point, and consequently, left the monastery. He came to the North and became a disciple of Vasubandhu who had earned a great name and fame for his erudition. Diṅnāga studied all the branches of Buddhistic thought under him. As is clear from his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya,* he did not agree with Vasubandhu's logical views, for instance, he did not accept the definition of sense-perception of Vasubandhu.

Diṅnāga 5th Cen. A.D.

As Vasubandhu is said to have lived towards the close of the 4th century A.D., Diṅnāga may be easily put in the beginning of the 5th century A.D. He wrote two small works on general philosophy first and then devoted his entire life to Logic. His earlier works are: (1) a condensed summary of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośamarmapradīpa* and (2) a brief summary (piṇḍārtha) in a mnemonic verse of all the topics contained in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikaprajñāpāramitāsūtra.*[36] He wrote small booklets some of which are still preserved in Tibetan and Chinese translations. They are:—*Ālambana-parīkṣā,* (2) *Trikāla-parīkṣā,* (3) *Hetucakrasamarthana* (*Hetucakra-hamaru?*), and (4) *Nyāyamukha,* (=Nyāyadvāra). The most important of his works is the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* with his own commentary, called *Vṛtti.* Another important work of his is the *Nyāyapraveśa.*

The *Pramāṇasamuccaya* contains 247 verses and is divided into the following six chapters: Pratyakṣaparīkṣā, Svārthānumāna, Parārthānumāna, Dṛṣṭāntaparīkṣā, Apohaparīkṣā, and Jātiparīkṣā.

The first chapter of this has been published from Mysore. As it is one of the most important works contributed by a Buddhist scholar to the science, it is proper to deal briefly with its contents here. The treatment of the views of Diṅnāga on logic is partly based on the Ti-

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36 *Buddhist Logic,* p. 33.

betan version and partly on the fragments quoted in the works of Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra I, and others.

Diṅnāga believes only in two Pramāṇas—Perception and Inference.

Diṅnāga states in the first chapter of this book that there are only two means of right cognition, *viz.*, Perception (pratyakṣa) and Inference (anumāna). As all objects of knowledge are known through these two only, there is no need of any other Pramāṇa. So runs the verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*—

Pratyakṣamanumānañca pramāṇam hi dvilakṣaṇam/
Prameyam tatra siddham hi na pramāṇāntaram bhavet//

'Perception' has been defined by Diṅnāga, as found quoted by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, as—

Pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham nāmajātyādyasaṁyutam—

Perception according to Diṅnāga.

that is, perception is that cognition which is non-constructive (kalpanāpoḍha). It is direct and presents the true picture of the object without the imposition of any notion of whatsoever kind upon the reality. This direct knowledge is unconnected with name and genus, etc. All that can be said of the object will only be the pre-conceived notion of the speaker or the perceiver which will be quite different from the reality of the object. It is the same as the nirvikalpaka knowldege of the Naiyāyikas. The savikalpaka form of cognition gives the idea of something other than the object perceived. It was, therefore, that Diṅnāga and other Buddhists thought that the definition should be confined to the object alone and should distinguish that source of knowledge from other means of cognition, which are all indirect, and not direct. The Buddhists also hold that the sense-perception itself is non-constructive though it is followed by the construction of the image in the subsequent moment. In other words, the nirvikalpaka form of the source of knowledge is itself free from the notions of images though it is followed by the savikalpaka form of knowledge which consists of images imposed upon the objective reality in the subsequent moment. So in fact, there is no difference between what the Naiyāyikas hold

and that which the Buddhists think about the notion of sense-perception. But however, there is a difference in the awareness of the cognition. The Naiyāyikas hold that the awareness of every cognition has to be cognized through anuvyavasāya, that is, mental recognition, while Dharmakīrti makes it clear that a sense-perception is cognized through sense-perception itself—Pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣeṇaiva siddhyati.[37] Dharmakīrti in the same context says that it is *Pratyātmavedya* (that is, it is to be cognized within one's own self without any other agency). Does it mean that Dharmakīrti believed in the *svataḥ prāmāṇya* of sense-perception?

Sense-perception is cognized within one's own self, says Dharmakīrti.

About the correct idea of sense-perception, Diṅnāga quotes from the *Abhidharmasūtra* a passage—"A man who is absorbed in the contemplation of a patch of blue, perceives the blue, but he does not know that it is the blue; of the object he then knows only that it is an object, but he does not know what kind of object it is." The above passage shows that Diṅnāga was indebted to the *Abhidharmasūtra* for his idea of sense-perception.[38]

Manas is not recognized as a sense-organ by Diṅnāga.

Regarding '*Manas*' as an organ of sense, Diṅnāga says, in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*:[39]

> Na sukhādiprameyam vā mano vāstīndriyāntaram/
> Aniṣedhādupāttañcedanyendriyarutam vṛthā//

that is, either pleasure, etc., are not objects of knowledge, or else Manas must be an additional sense-organ. If Manas is accepted as a sense-organ on the ground that it is not denied, then why does the Sūtrakāra put himself to the trouble of mentioning the other sense-organs? In virtue of the *tantrayukti* to which Vātsyāyana appeals, other sense-organs, like the sense-organ of Manas, would have been taken for granted even in the Nyāya-śāstra, because, all these have been mentioned in the sister system, viz., Vaiśeṣika. Thus, Diṅnāga denies that Manas

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37 *Pramāṇavārttika*, III. 125.

38 *Buddhist Logic*, p. 153.

39 Quoted by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tātparyaṭīkā*, I. i, 4,

is a sense-organ and consequently, pleasure, etc., are objects of knowledge.

As regards the contact of sense-organ, particularly the visual sense-organ, with the object, Vācaspati Miśra quotes from Diṅnāga in his *Tātparyaṭīkā*[40]—

Sāntaragrahaṇam na syāt prāptau jñāne'dhikasya ca/
Adhiṣṭhānādbahirnākṣam taccikitsādiyogataḥ//

Satyapyakṣabahirbhāve na śaktirviṣayekṣaṇe/
Yadi ca syāttadā paśyedapyunmīlya nimīlanāt//

which means—"There would not be apprehension of the object together with intervening space if the visual organ were in contact with its object; and, if there is apprehension of what exceeds (the eye in size), (such apprehension is not to be explained by a distinction between the 'visual organ' and the 'eye', for) the 'visual organ' does not go forth from its place (the 'eye')—since it is to this (definite part of the body called, 'eye') that medical treatment, and so on, are directed (on the assumption that the eye is the visual organ). And even if we grant that the 'visual organ' might exist outside its bodily site 'the eye', it would not have the power to get the perception of objects.[41] And if it could, then a man who had opened his eyes and had shut them should see even when his eyes were shut.

No sense-organ and object contact is required for direct Perception—holds Diṅnāga.

So it is clear from the above that Diṅnāga did not believe in the sense-organ and object contact for having direct perception.

Coming to the second means of right cognition, namely, *'Inference'* (anumānaṁ), we learn from the *Nyāyavārttika*[42] that according to Diṅnāga, the definition of 'Inference' is —the perception of the thing which is invariably concomitant; this is held to be 'anumāna' for one who knows the said concomitance.' (*Nāntarīyakārthadarśanaṁ tadvido'numānamiti*).

Inference.

40 I. i. 4.

14 I do not see any reason why Dr. H. Randle should think that the term *'Viṣayekṣaṇe'* cannot be taken to mean 'perception of objects'. His splitting of the term into *'Viṣaye'* and *'Kṣaṇe'* does not appeal and is also not suited to the context.—*Fragments from Diṅnāga*, pp. 16—17.

42 I. i. 5.

This definition is thus explained by the *Vārttika*—When one thing is never present apart from another, it is said to be 'invariably concomitant' (nāntarīyaka) with the other; the thing that is so concomitant is called '*nāntarīyakārtha*' and the cognition of that thing is '*anumāna*', for the man who knows it, that is, who knows that the thing cognized is invariably concomitant. This is an indirect source of knowledge.

Divisions of Inference.

Such an Inference is of two kinds: (1) Inference for one's own sake (svārthānumāna) and (2) Inference for the sake of others (parārthānumāna). The former is a means of knowledge of a thing derived through its probans which should be either of the following three types: (a) *Effect*—the hetu may be an effect of the thing to be inferred; as for instance, in the case of 'smoke and fire' in the form of syllogism—*Parvato vahnimān, dhūmāt*—smoke is an effect of fire: (b) *Identity* (svabhāva)—the hetu may be in essence identical with the thing to be inferred; as in the case of—*ayaṁ vṛkṣaḥ, śiṁśapātvāt*—where the reason '*śiṁśapā*' is identical with the thing to be inferred, that is, the tree; (c) *Non-perception* (anupalabdhi)—that is, the non-perception of the hetu may be due to the non-existence of the thing to be inferred; as for example, the non-perception of a pot is the reason for the non-existence of the pot.

Svārthānumānam.

It should be mentioned here that Diṅnāga criticises the view of those logicians who hold that through the probans, which is the middle term and which is an attribute of the minor term (pakṣa), the major term is inferred; as in the example,—Hill possesses fire, because, it has smoke—where smoke is used as a probans, or the middle term, to infer the presence of another attribute, namely, fire—the major term,—in the minor term; for, holds Diṅnāga, no fresh knowledge is gained from this inference, as fire, in general, is already known to be inseparably connected with smoke. Again, he criticises the view of others who hold that from smoke is inferred the connection between fire (the major term) and the hill (the minor term); for holds Diṅnāga, the connection implies two things, while there is only one thing which is visible here, namely, hill and *not fire.*

What Dinnāga holds as an object of anumāna, is the *fiery hill*, the place having fire as an attribute.[43]

The latter, that is, *inference for the sake of others*, takes place when a person wants to demonstrate the conclusion of his own inference to others. This contains three terms: (1) Subject (minor term or pakṣa), (2) Predicate (major term or sādhya) which is to be attributed to the Subject, and (3) Reason (hetu) which unites the Predicate with the Subject. So says Dinnāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* about the *sādhya* (or major term) that it should be attributed to the minor term (pakṣa) and it should not be opposed to direct perception, inference, or verbal testimony.[44]

Parārthānumānam.

Now coming to the *Nyāyapraveśa,* also known as the *Nyāyapraveśakasūtraṁ,* another important work on Logic, we find that Dinnāga begins this with a verse which explains the substance of the topics discussed in the book. He says that "Demonstration and refutation together with their fallacies are useful in arguing with others; Perception and Inference together with their fallacies are useful for one's own illumination."[45]

He believes that with the help of three factors only a reasoning can be carried on. The three factors of a syllogism are the three propositions containing the three terms, namely, Pakṣa (minor term), Hetu (middle term), and Dṛṣṭānta (instance). These three propositions are formally used in the form of a syllogistic reasoning when one wants to convince another person by reasoning.

Dinnāga believes in the three factored syllogism.

43 Keciddharmāntaram meyam liṅgasyāvyabhicāratah/
Sambandham kecidicchanti siddhatvāddharmadharmiṇoḥ//
Liṅgaṁ dharme prasiddhaṁ cet kimanyattena mīyate/
Atha dharmiṇi tasyaiva kimarthaṁ nānumeyatā|
Sambandhe'pi dvayaṁ nāsti ṣaṣṭhī śrūyeta tadvati|
Avācyo'nugṛhītatvānna cāsau liṅgasaṅgatah//
Nahi sambandhadharmatayā liṅgam pramīyate, api tu deśasaṅgatamityarthaḥ.
Liṅgasyāvyabhicārastu dharmeṇānyatra dṛśyate|
Tatra prasiddham tadyuktam dharmiṇam gamayiṣyati//
—*Pramāṇasamuccaya,* Chapt. II., Quoted by Vācaspati Mishra in his *Tātparyaṭīkā,* I. 1. 5.

44 Svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayamiṣṭaḥ stvadharmiṇi/
Pratyakṣārthānumānena cāptavācā'nirākṛtaḥ//

45 Sādhanaṁ dūṣaṇaṁ caiva sābhāsam parasamvide/
Pratyakṣamanumānañca sābhāsaṁ tvātmasamvide//

A concrete form of syllogism is as follows:—

(1) *Pakṣavacanam* (statement of the minor term)— Sound is non-eternal,

(2) *Pakṣadharmavacanam* (statement of the attribute of the minor term, that is, Probans)—

Because, it is a product;

(3) *Sapakṣānugamavacanam* (statement of the concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum in the Sapakṣa, that is, instance)—

All things produced are found to be non-eternal, as for instance, a pot, etc.,

and *Vyatirekavacanam* (statement of the contrary)—

That which is eternal is found not to be a product, as for instance, Ākāśam.[46]

Fallacies.

Next, the book deals with the nine types of fallacies of Pakṣa, three main kinds of fallacies (with their fourteen sub-divisions) of the Middle term and two main fallacies (and their ten sub-divisions) of the Instance (dṛṣṭānta). It also deals briefly with the two sources of right knowledge along with their fallacies.

Minor writers on Logic.

After Diṅnāga there were some minor writers on logic, such as, Paramārtha, Dharmapāla, Śaṅkara Svāmin, Śīlabhadra and others. Of these, Śīlabhadra was much more prominent. He was the head of the Nālanda University. He lived in the beginning of the seventh century A.D.

Dharmakīrti, 7th cen. A.D.

The next most important logician of the seventh century is Dharmakīrti. He was born in the South in a Brāhmaṇa family. He was the son of Parivrājaka Korunanda. Dharmakīrti learnt various śāstras and also studied Buddhist philosophy and logic. He came to Northern India and became the disciple of Dharmapāla of the Nālanda University. Interested in logic Dharmakīrti went to Īśvarasena, the direct pupil of Diṅnāga.

Dharmakīrti became a very great logician. Almost all the great scholars of the later period, such as, Vācaspati Miśra I, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Śrīharṣa, the author of the

46 *Nyāyapraveśakasūtram*, p. 2.

Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, Śālikanātha Miśra, Pārthasārathi Miśra, etc., have referred to Dharmakīrti.

Works of Dharmakīrti.

He is the author of several works, seven original and two commentaries on his own works. These are all works on logic. Of these, the most important is his *Pramāṇavārttika.* Though it is said to be a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Diṅnāga, yet looking at the treatment of the subject it is regarded as if it were an independent original work on logic. Dharmakīrti seems to have in his mind the *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara and the *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila at the time of his writing and has naturally criticised their views in it. Popularity of the work can be gathered from the number of commentaries and sub-commentaries written on it, eight of which are still preserved in Tibetan translations. Besides, there are other commentaries by Manorathanandin and Karṇagomin. That the writing of this *Vārttika* was influenced by Uddyotakara is clear from the second verse of the *Pramāṇavārttika* which explains the aim of his writing: "Ordinary person of weak intelligence not only shows his indifference to the good work (of Diṅnāga) but is malicious, envious, and jealous towards it. Therefore, it was not of great use. Thinking it so with my aptitude developed with the long and continuous study of the good work, I undertake the present one." This is very much similar to the first verse of Uddyotakara's *Vārttika.*

It is a very difficult text. It is divided into four chapters: (1) Svārthānumānam, (2) Pramāṇasiddhi, (3) Pratyakṣam, and (4) Parārthānumānam. It consists of about 1457 verses. It has been for the first time published in Sanskrit in *the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.*[47] Other works of Dharmakīrti are: *Pramāṇaviniścaya, Nyāyabindu, Hetubindu, Sambandhaparīkṣā, Codanāprakaraṇa,* and *Santānāntarasiddhi.* The *Pramāṇaviniścaya* is an abridgement of his Vārttika. The *Nyāyabindu* deals with the three main topics, namely, Perception, Inference and Syllogism. This has been translated into English by Dr. Th. Stcherbatsky and is published in the *Bibliotheca Buddhica,*[48]

47 Vol. XXIV. Pts. 1–2, 1938.

48 No. XXVI.

and in Hindi by Pandit Chandrashekhara Shastri and published in the *Kashi Sanskrit Series* (*Haridasa Sanskrit Series*), Benares. Dharmottara has written a commentary on this work. The *Hetubindu* is a short classification of logical reasons. *Sambandha-parīkṣā* deals with an examination of the problem of relations. It has been commented upon by the author himself. *Codanā-prakaraṇa* is a treatise on the art of carrying on disputations, while the *Santānāntara-siddhi* deals with the reality of other minds, 'directed against Solipsism'[49] *Vādanyāya* is another very important work of Dharmakīrti published in the *Bihar and Orissa Research Society Journal.*[50]

The *Pramāṇavārttika* has following commentaries: *Vṛtti* by the author himself; *Pañjikā* by Devendramati (650 A.D.); *Ṭīkā* by Śākyamati (675); *Vārttikālaṅkāra* by Prajñākaragupta which has been published now in the Journal of the *Bihar and Orissa Research Society*,[51] other commentaries are by Jayānanta (950 A.D.), Ravigupta (725 A.D.), Manorathanandin and Śaṅkarānanda (800).[52] *Pramāṇaviniścaya* has been commented upon by Dharmottara (725 A.D.) and Jñānaśrībhadra (1076 A.D.). *Nyāyabindu* has been commented upon by Dharmottara, Vinītadeva (775 A.D.), Kamalaśīla (840), and Jinamitra (862 A.D.). *Hetubindu* has been commented upon by Vinītadeva and Ārcaṭa (825 A.D.). *Sambandhaparīkṣā* has been commented upon by the author himself, Vinītadeva and Śaṅkarānanda (800). *Vādanyāya* has been commented upon by Śāntarakṣita and Vinītadeva. *Santānāntarasiddhi* has been commented upon by Vinītadeva.

Though a great expounder of the logic of Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti criticised several of his views. For instance, amongst the fallacies of Viruddha (contrary reasons), there is the third variety called *iṣṭavighātakṛt*. This variety of a self-contradictory argument has been established by Diṅnāga, but Dharmakīrti does not accept it.[53]

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49 *Buddhist Logic*, Page 37.

50 Vol. XXII. Pt. I. 1936.

51 Vol. XXI. Parts 2–3, 1935.

52 *Vide–JBORS*, Vol. XXII. Pt. 1, Appendix, E.

53 *Nyāyabindu*, III. 91–93; Banaras edition.

Diṅnāga mentions another variety of an uncertain logical reason, viz., 'the counter-balanced reason, the reason which falls in line with its own contradiction (viruddhāvyabhicārī). Dharmakīrti does not accept it, because a reason, simultaneously right and wrong, cannot occur in the process of (natural) inference.[54]

Again, in opposition to Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti maintains that example (dṛṣṭānta) is not a part of a syllogism, as it is included in the middle term, *e.g.* The hill is fiery, because it is smoky, like a kitchen. In this reasoning, the term 'smoky' includes the term 'kitchen' as well as other similar things, hence, it is not necessary to cite the example—'kitchen'. Nevertheless, says Dharmakīrti, the example has this much value that it points out in a particular way what has been expressed in a general form by the middle term; thus, the general expression "all smoky things are fiery" is made more impressive by the particular example 'kitchen' which is smoky as well as fiery.[55]

Dharmakīrti was undoubtedly, a very great logician amongst the Buddhists and has been referred to or quoted by several important authors on logic, later on. But it appears from his own assertions that his merits were not very much recognized even during his very life time as is clear from the following lines. This may be due to the fact that the influence of Buddhism had begun to fade away from India by the revival of the orthodox Hindu ideals under the influence of Kumārila, Uddyotakara, Śaṅkarācārya, and others.

A verse attributed to Dharmakīrti in the *Sadūktikarṇāmṛta* of Maithila Śrīdharadāsa[56] says:—

Translation.—"No body blames Vālmīki for having gone beyond his limits by describing that the ocean was bridged by rocks and stones brought by monkeys, nor did people blame Vyāsa for the same through the arrows of Pārtha. But people open their mouth to criticise my composition wherein every word and its implication have been weighed carefully. I do bow to thee, O Recognition!"

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54 Ibid., III. pp.—113.

55 *Indian Logic,* pp. 317—18; *Nyāyabindu,* III. Page 117, Banaras edition.

56 Page 327.

Again, he himself says in the last verse of his *Pramāṇavārttika* the *Translation* of which is.—

"My view whose depth has not been reached by the capacity of mighty intelligent brains, whose correct sense has not been grasped even with great efforts, and which has not found in this world an appreciator befiting it, will, like water (which is absorbed and lost) in the ocean, attain old age and will perish in my own person."

Another stanza is found in anthologies and is hypothetically ascribed to Dharmakīrti, because it is to the same effect. The poet compares his work with a beauty which can find no adequate bridegroom.

"What was the creator thinking about when he created the bodily frame of this beauty! He has lavishly spent the beauty-stuff! He has not spared the labour. He has engendered a mental fire in the hearts of people who (theretofore) were living placidly! And she herself is also wretchedly unhappy, since she never will find a fiance to match her!"[57]

From the above quoted lines it seems that though Dharmakīrti was a great scholar, he was not at all happy, because he could not find a real appreciator of his writings. By this time the revival of the Hindu ideals had received great encouragement and support and people had begun to look with contempt upon the achievements of Buddhist scholars. That the time for the downfall of Buddhism had come is clear from the following lines:

"Notwithstanding the great scope and success of his (Dharmakīrti's) propaganda he could only retard, but not stop the process of decay which befell Buddhism on its native soil. Buddhism in India was doomed. The most talented propagandist could not change the run of history. The time of Kumārila and Śaṅkarācārya, the great champions of brahmanical revival and opponents of Buddhism, was approaching..... What might have been the deeper causes of the decline of Buddhism in India proper and its survival in the border lands, we never perhaps will sufficiently know, but historians are unanimous in telling us that Buddhism at the time of Dharmakīrti was not on the ascendency, it was not flourishing in the same degree as at the time of the brothers —Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. The popular masses began

[57] *Buddhist Logic*, p. 36.

to deturn their face from that philosophic, critical and pessimistic religion, and reverted to the worship of the great Brahmin gods. Buddhism was beginning its migration to the north where it found a new home in Tibet, Mongolia and other countries.''[58]

After Dharmakīrti, there were a host of logicians but they were not so great as the previous writers on logic. They were as mentioned by Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyabhushan in his Indian Logic and by Dr. Th. Stcherbatsky in his *Buddhist Logic*,[59]– Devendramati

Devendramati 650 A.D.

or Devendrabodhi (650) who was a contemporary of Dharmakīrti. He wrote his *Pañjikā* on the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Śākyabuddhi, or-bodhi or-mati (675) and Prabhābuddhi both of whom commented upon the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Vinītadeva[60] wrote commentaries on the *Nyāya-*

Vinītadeva 700 A.D.

bindu, Santānāntarasiddhi, Hetubindu, Vādanyāya, Sambandhaparīkṣā of Dharmakīrti and on the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* of Diṅnāga. He is said to be 'a lion of speakers confounding the brains of the Tīrthika elephants'.

Prajñākaragupta 700 A.D.

Prajñākaragupta has been quoted by Udayanācārya in his *Pariśuddhi*.[61] He flourished about 700 A.D. and wrote *Sahālambanirṇaya*. Ravigupta and Jinendrabodhi lived about 725

Ravigupta and Jinendrabodhi 725 A.D.

A.D. The former wrote a *Vṛtti* on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, while the latter wrote a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. of Diṅnāga. Kalyāṇarakṣita was the teacher of Dharmottara and lived about the beginning of the 8th century. He wrote several

Kalyāṇarakṣita 8th cen. A.D.

works: *Anyāpohavicāra, Īśvarabhaṅgakārikā, Sarvajñasiddhi-kārikā, Bāhyārthasiddhi* and *Śrutiparīkṣā*. He was regarded as a great dialectician amongst the Buddhists.

Dharmottara flourished in the beginning of the 8th century and wrote *Pramāṇparīkṣā, Apohaprakaraṇa,*

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58 *Buddhist Logic*, p. 35.

59 Vol. I:

60 700 A.D. according to Dr. Vidyabhushan, while 775 A.D. according to Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana.

61 Page 730. Ms. with the author.

Paralokasiddhi, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* and a commentary on the *Nyāyabindu* and also on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.

Dharmottara 8th cen.

Śāntarakṣita (740–840) is a well-known author of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*. It is a voluminous work divided into 31 chapters. It has been published in the *Gaekwad's Sanskrit Series* and has been translated into English, along with its commentary, called *Pañjikā*, by Kamalaśīla, by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Sir Gaṅgānātha Jha. It is one of the most important works on Buddhist dialectics dealing with the views of almost all the important systems of Indian philosophy. Śāntarakṣita is also the author of a commentary on the *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti, called *Vipañcitārtha*.

Śāntarakṣita (740–840).

Kamalaśīla 8th cen. A.D.

Kamalaśīla, besides the *Pañjikā* mentioned above, wrote a commentary on the *Nyāyabindu*. He is placed about the middle of the 8th century. Muktākumbha (after 900 A.D.) wrote *Kṣaṇābhaṅgasiddhi-vyākhyā* on the work of Dharmottara. Ārcaṭa has criticised the views of Dharmottara and lived about 900 A.D. He is mentioned even by the later Jaina writers, such as, Guṇaratnasūri. and Ratnaprabhasūri. He wrote a commentary on the *Hetubindu* of Dharmakīrti.

Muktākumbha after 900 A.D.

Ārcaṭa 900 A.D.

Aśoka Paṇḍita (900 A.D.) wrote small treatises on *Avayavinirākaraṇa* and *Sāmānyadūṣaṇa*. Ācārya Jetāri (940–980) wrote *Hetutattvopadeśa*, *Dharmadharmiviniścaya*, and *Bālāvatāratarka*. Jina (940) wrote a commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*. Mahāpaṇḍita Ratnakīrti flourished in the middle of the tenth century and wrote two works—*Apohasiddhi* and *Kaṣṇabhaṅgasiddhi*. Jina Mitra (about 1025 A.D.) wrote a commentary on the *Nyāyabindu*, called *Piṇḍārtha*. Jñānaśrī Mitra of the middle of the 11th century wrote a work named *Kārya-kāraṇabhāvasiddhi*. Jñānaśrī Bhadra of the 11th century wrote a commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. Ratnākara Śānti of the 11th century wrote a small treatise called *Antarvyāpti*. It

Aśoka Paṇḍita 900 A.D.

Jetāri and Jina 940 A.D.

Ratnakīrti 10th cen. A.D.

Jina Mitra after 1025 A.D.

Jñānaśrī Mitra 11th cen. A.D.

proves that the inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term can be conceived without the aid of an example in which the things signified by the two terms co-abide, nay, without the aid even of a minor term in which we are to prove the co-presence of the things, *e.g.*, fiery, because smoky.[62] The book is published as a portion of the *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts* in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series.*

Ratnākara Śānti 11th cen. A.D.

Yamāri of the 11th century wrote a commentary on the *Vārttikālaṅkāra* of Prajñākaragupta. He was connected with the Buddhist Institution of Vikramaśīlā. Śaṅkarānanda of the middle of the 11th century wrote a commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika, Apohasiddhi* (which is published in the *Six Buddhists Nyāya Tracts*), *Pratibandhasiddhi* and *Sambandhaparīkṣānusāra.* Śubhakaragupta (1080 A.D.) and Mokṣākaragupta (about 1100 A.D.) also were logicians of minor importance.

Yamāri 11th cen. A.D.

Śankarānanda 11th cen. A.D.

Śubhakaragupta 1080 A.D.

3. *Conclusion*

Buddhists were, undoubtedly, great thinkers and have made from time to time remarkable original contributions to the various sciences. As regards their contribution to the science of reasoning, it has been pointed out in the very beginning that the Buddhists began taking interest in dialectics and logical reasonings for the sake of defending their behaviour. Though in the very beginning their attitude was merely defensive, yet in course of time after coming in contact with the arguments of the non-Buddhists, they began to make direct attacks on non-Buddhists who also became much more interested in their controversies.

These controversies gradually encouraged scholars of both the parties who thought it was their bounden duty to criticise and refute the arguments of their rivals through all possible right or wrong methods of dialectics and logical reasonings. This led to the growth of a sort

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62 *Indian Logic,* p. 343.

of rivalry between the Buddhists and the non-Buddhists. The former began to attack the various aspects of the social, scholarly and cultural traditions of the non-Buddhists and created mutual malice, hatred and jealousy. The Buddhists tried to become more and more popular by spreading their teachings amongst the people on all sides. The non-Buddhists, who had not opposed the teachings of the founder of the school, rather had welcomed him and his teachings, came to oppose the views of his followers. As the Buddhists mainly took help of logical reasonings to combat with their opponents, the science of reasoning began to flourish more and more. The non-Buddhists equipped themselves with reasons and met these Buddhists in debates and controversies and tried to defeat them with their reasonings.

Mithilā and Buddhism.

It will not be out of place to mention at this stage that Buddhism flourished on the very border of Mithilā, the country of the Videha Janaka, Yājñavalkya, Maitreyī, Vaśiṣṭha, Viśvāmitra, Gautama, and several other vedic ṛṣis about whom we hear so much in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. We know from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[63] and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* that Mithilā was renowned for her spiritual (ādhyātmika) scholarship and that thousands of seekers after truth from far off places used to throng in Mithilā for acquiring spiritual knowledge.

Maithilas checked the advance of Buddhism on the soil of Mithilā.

Now, when the followers of Buddhism began to spread their influence over Mithilā and due to their jealousy and hatred caused by their ignorance, began to attack the ancient vedic traditions of the country with their arguments, Maithila scholars, renowned for their great scholarship in traditional learning, could not tolerate the interference caused by Buddhism. They gave up their Ādhyātmika pursuits for which they were so well-known and concentrated their entire attention on the preservation of the ancient traditions and culture against the Buddhist attacks. They checked the advance of Buddhism on the soil of Mithilā with the help of scholarly disputations. They

63 Kāṇḍa, I.

wrote books in criticism of Buddhism, and as has been said before, the systematization of Nyāya in the Sūtra form by Gautama must have been done during this period. It is because of this that the Sūtra work has given prominence to categories, like Discussion, Disputation, Wrangling, Fallacies, Casuistry, Futile rejoinder, and Clinchers. In fact, from the 16 categories dealt with in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama,[64] it seems, as if, the entire system was aimed at meeting the opponents in controversies for refuting their (rivals') arguments and asserting their own view-points through logical methods and also to guard their views against the wrong reasonings of the rivals.

Though just after the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama, contributions made to the science of reasoning by the non-Buddhists is still in dark and we are not yet in a position to say much about it, nor do we know what actual contributions were made by the Buddhist scholars to the science, yet it seems certain that the religio-literary quarrel between the two schools—the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist—must have continued. The contributions of Udayanācārya, his bold stand against the Buddhists, can never be forgotten. It was he who is said to have challenged even the Lord Jagannātha, who is regarded as the incarnation of the Buddha.[65] It is therefore, that mutual references are found in the works of both the parties in later period. All this has been made clear above. Though we do not know much about the contributions on logic by non-Buddhists after the *Nyāyasūtra* till we come to the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and again, from that time till the time of Uddyotakara, yet it is also very difficult to deny their existence. It is just possible that the non-Buddhist Naiyāyikas, in those days, were not strong enough to put up any hard fight against the Buddhist logicians; had there been any of that type, it would not have been left for Uddyotakara to say—"This treatise is being written by me for the purpose of removing the blemish of error cast by inferior logicians (namely, Diṅnāga and others) upon those doctrines which the chief of sages, Akṣapāda, propounded for the

64 I. i. 1.

65 Aiśvaryamadamatto'si māmavajñāya vartase/
Punarbauddhe samāyāte madadhīnā tava sthitiḥ//

peace and welfare of the world."[66] Thereafter, it is needless to say that there did appear great scholars one after another who stopped the progress of Buddhism with their strong and irresistible arguments.

4. *Summary of the Influence of the Teachings of the Buddha and the causes of the Decline of Buddhism in India*

It is a fact of everyday experience of every conscious being that the world is full of miseries and that no one can escape them. So it is natural that everyone should be eager to hear and follow the Path of Remedy. The Message of Deliverance becomes much more attractive if it comes from one who has himself successfully followed it. Hence, when Gautama Buddha, after attaining the Buddhahood, came to preach his experiences to the people at large, they, irrespective of caste and creed, age and sex, gathered round about him in thousands to hear his charming, sublime and most welcomed Message of Deliverance with rapt attention. The Buddha, it appears, did not care to make any selection in his audience. Everyone needed his teachings for the remedy of his or her miseries. People, credulous as they naturally were, became very much impressed with the magnetic personality of the Teacher and his sublime teachings. They were carried away by his peaceful Message of Deliverance with hopes within themselves of becoming freed from the tortures of sufferings in case they followed his Path. But it seems to me, that all this was due to their being overpowered by sentiment and emotion. They do not seem at all to have thought of the grave consequences which would result if the Message were followed merely out of sentiment and not after actually acquiring the *adhikāra* to receive it.

It is to be kept in mind that those men and women who became fascinated with the wonderful result which Gautama Buddha had himself achieved, namely, the Enlightenment and subsequently, the final cessation of pain, did not care much for the means which had helped the Buddha to achieve that success. In other words, they

[66] *Nyāyavārttika*, beginning verse,

overlooked, under the influence of the spell cast over them by the magnetic personality of the Master and his sublime teachings, the importance of *Sādhanā* (austere penance accompanied by the rigid discipline of body and mind) which alone had helped the Buddha to succeed, and ran away from society to lead the life of a recluse after the allurement of getting the Enlightenment alone, without the least idea of the fact that the latter exclusively depended upon the former. It is perhaps, therefore, that no importance was ever attached to the *Karmakṣetra* of Uruwelā where the Buddha had performed austere penances before the attainment of the Buddhahood.

It may be admitted that all those who listened to the teachings were not equally qualified for the sort of life which the Buddha preached to lead. Naturally, the effect produced on them also widely differed. No doubt, a few of them might have been really qualified, but it may be said with certain confidence that a large majority of them was certainly not at all qualified. So when they listened to the solacing message of freedom, they did not pause for a while to think of their worldly duties and responsibilities towards their relations in the family as well as in the society, but in their emotional mood without being really disgusted with the world they left their homes immediately and became mendicants. The family or the society which needed their assistance very badly must have consequently suffered a good deal in various ways by such thoughtless mass renunciation. The result of the hasty step of the people was that though they became mendicants, yet they could not observe the rigid rules laid down for that sort of life, and consequently, they might have done many things which they should not have done otherwise. The vigour of emotion could not last for long. Gradually, it began to diminish. They failed to maintain the balance of mind and body and retain the spirit of the teachings of the Master for a long time. This led them to lead an idle and aimless life. Such persons might not have even liked to return to society for fear of being ridiculed and laughed at. People in the society also might have tried their best to persuade them directly and indirectly to return to their old society, but all in vain. The mendicants claimed to

justify their position through reasonings for which the non-Buddhists also became prepared. This was the time when Gautama, the reputed logician of Mithilā, wrote his *Nyāyasūtra* with all the methods of disputation. But all this did not improve the situation. Differences grew wider and wider. Mutual hatred and jealousy continued with greater force.

The Buddha and his prominent disciples seem to have formed an association of these recluses. Rigid rules and ways of discipline were framed for them. They were, it may be said, free from worldly anxieties and were certainly happy for some time. Admission to the Order (Saṅgha) was limited to a certain extent, yet the conditions for joining it were external and not internal. In the beginning perhaps, the qualifications needed might have been only verbal promises. But it seems that no effort was made at the time of the Buddha, by the authorities to find out whether the members of the Order were really fit to observe those rules and also whether all the rules were really capable of being followed by them. Besides the exact number of these recluses who formed the Order, there were many more who lived like them and remained in their company. It was because of this that at one time their number grew beyond computation and Dharmāśoka had to ask Moggaliputta Tissa to turn them out and yet their number was in thousands. Another so-called advantage which these recluses got was that the rules framed for them were not recorded in writing anywhere. These idle wanderers therefore, could easily interpret them to their own advantage and convenience whenever they liked, as is clear from a study of the *Kathāvatthu*.

Let us now turn for a while to the teachings of the Vedas. No doubt, they had also taught to take to the life of a recluse to seek after the highest aim of life. The final aim of both the Vedic and the Buddhistic teachings being the same, there was perhaps no difference in the method of maintaining discipline of body and mind. But the Vedic teachings were reserved and not meant for all on equal basis. Their teachings were quite different for different types of people and were based on the individual fitness of the persons to be admitted to such teachings. Consideration of their fitness (adhikāritva) was

foremost in the mind of the Vedic teachers, as a result of which only such persons could enter into the life of a mendicant and subsequently, to the highest teachings as had passed through the vicissitudes of life and had really become disgusted with the world and had thus, qualified themselves for that sort of life. Such persons had felt a natural longing for retirement from the active life of the world to the peaceful state of a recluse, thinking and meditating upon the means of realizing the highest truth. Of course, those who were not found so qualified, had other types of teachings in accordance with their spiritual fitness. So there was no clash of any kind amongst the people. Hence, while leading that sort of new life they were quite convinced that they had done all their duties towards their relations in the society and that there was left practically nothing in the world to be done by them. Thus, they had a sort of natural retirement for the realization of the highest aim of life. So, once a person entered into that retired life, neither had he any repentance for what he did, nor did his relations ever feel that he had not done anything for them and that he had left his family in utter disappointment and chaos.

It is needless to point out here that these people also were, like the followers of the Buddha, tortured by worldly afflictions and were eager to follow the Message of Deliverance. So, when they approached their Vedic teachers they had qualified themselves to receive such teachings. They had become really disgusted with the ways of the world and were very eager to be freed from the active life of the world. The Vedic teachers were very much reserved and they did not invite people at large to all their teachings. When they were approached by the enquirers after truth, the teachers did their best to test the merits of the enquirers and admitted them to their teachings only after they were convinced of their fitness. The result of such a test was that the teachings were never given to unqualified persons, nor did the teachings were ever misinterpreted or misused. They made the best use of the teachings and though they had also in a way, left their society, yet they were regarded much more helpful to the society. Again, though the teachings were oral, yet as they were given to such safe and really qualified persons that they proved to be very

useful both to them and to the society at large. The enquirers were also very happy and contented; they could have never any ill feeling towards their teachers.

But when we look to the disciples of the Buddha we find that most of them were confused and quite ignorant as to the exact nature of the teachings. There being no test of the fitness of the disciples, the teachings were very much misunderstood and also misinterpreted by them. They also did not like them, that is, the teachings, to their full satisfaction. All this led them to form different opinions and behave accordingly. But they did not express their resentment during the life-time of their Master. That there were many who were dissatisfied with the teachings of the Master and did not like Him is evident from the instance of Subhadda as given in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*. Again, that all such feelings of the disciples were not concealed from the Master is obvious from His last words addressed to Ānanda. "When I am gone, Ānanda! let the Order, if it should so desire, abolish all the lesser and minor precepts". Again, the Master says, "When I am gone, Ānanda! let the higher penalty (*brahmadaṇḍo*) be imposed upon Sanna (a Bhikkhu)"; "Let Sanna say whatever he may like, Ānanda! the Bhikkhus should neither speak to him, nor exhort him, nor advise him."[67]

From all this we gather that there was enough cause for schism in the Order even during the life-time of the Master. But while he was alive not much trouble could arise. So writes Yamakami Sogen, "As is well known to most of you, in Buddha's life-time his disciples were saved from the curse of a schism, thanks to the magnetic personality of the teacher. But tradition relates that when 116 years had elapsed after the death of the Great Teacher, there arose amongst his followers a violent controversy regarding the theory and practice of the Vinaya or the rules of the Order, which divided them, at last into two bitterly antagonastic camps."[68]

Again, we find that at the time of the third Council, there was so much corruption in the Order that several thousands of the disciples had to be turned out of the

67 *Mahāparinibbānasutta,* VI. 228–30.

68 *Systems of Buddhistic Thoughts,* p. 99.

Order. So writes R. S. Hardy, "They continued the practice of many things that were contrary to the Vinaya. When these abuses came to the knowledge of Dharmāśoka, he commanded Moggaliputta Tissa to expel from the priesthood 60,000 tīrthakas who had transgressed the ordinances. . . ."[69] So says Dr. Winternitz also, "About hundred years after the passing of the Buddha, a schism occurred which stirred up so much controversy, that a great assembly of monks had to be summoned, to decide what should be regarded as right, with reference to the debatable points."[70]

From all these reports we gather that there was a good deal of confusion and dissatisfaction amongst the disciples of the Buddha regarding the teachings. As they were not recorded, the disciples, particularly those who wanted change in the rules according to their own interest, had enough opportunity to assert their own individual interpretations to suit their conveniences. This was mainly discussed amongst those disciples who were not sincere and were leading the life of idle wanderers. It was not possible to put any check over the spread of these ideas which subsequently, led to the grouping of the disciples into several independent schools. No doubt, thoughts of dissatisfaction were brewing in the very life time of the Buddha, but his personality did not give them any chance to burst up. But no sooner the Master had passed away than every one began to insist on one's own interpretation as is quite clear from the utterances of Subhadda.[71] Though the schism appeared in its full form after some time, yet it should be kept in mind that it could not have been the work of a year or so. All this most likely, began during the very life time of the Great Master as has been indicated above from various references. So it seems that the ultimate result of the earlier teachings of Buddhism was disappointment in society and chaos in the Order. Those persons who failed to observe the discipline of the Order did not like to return to their old society for fear of being ridiculed and laughed at. So they preferred to remain aimless idle wanderers. Peo-

69 *Eastern Monarchism,* p. 183.

70 *History of Indian Literature,* Vol. II, p. 5.

71 Vide—*Cullavagga,* II. 7.

ple in society tried their best, in vain, to persuade them to return to their old fold.

Such an idle life led by these people might have become the chief cause of their corruption in many ways. They began to feel as if they belonged to an entirely different group of people, so much so that they hated non-Buddhists and kept themselves, as far as possible, aloof from them. This attitude of the followers of the Buddha could not at all be relished by others.

Buddhism had its birth and existence in India with Buddha's sublime Message of Deliverance and was honoured because of the magnanimous character of the Teacher and his teachings. It seems that these teachings were delivered in the language of the people, namely Pāli, and not in Sanskrit. Soon his teachings became very popular and attracted a very large number of followers. As long as the personal influence of the Buddha could command, no one could openly create any trouble in the Order. Non-interference with the extremists was one of the main causes of the success of the Buddha.

But when we turn to the other aspect of his teachings namely, the effect produced on the followers of the Order and also on society, as has been pointed out above, we find that the immature mental equipment of these followers, their hurried decision to become recluses without having a natural longing for that sort of disciplined life, the hard and rigid rules of the Order and above all, the deliverance of the Message of peace to all without any consideration of their fitness and also their peculiar attitude of keeping themselves aloof and thinking of themselves as belonging to an exclusively different culture, as they think themselves even these days, all combined together and proved fatal to the very aim of the Order. The unqualified followers must have begun to take part in activities not meant for the life of a recluse. The slackness in the performance of their duty towards the Order brought split amongst them and several schools and sub-schools appeared soon after the passing away of the Teacher. These splits continued to multiply in large number. Every school claimed its own authenticity and superiority. Discontent spread all round both within and outside the Order. All this carried them away far from the original ideals of the Order.

It is obvious from the above that both the rise and the decline of Buddhism began almost simultaneously. The new religion could not keep its followers bound together with mutual love and tolerance. On one side, we find the preaching of the highest ideal of peaceful Nirvāṇa, while on the other, there was dissatisfaction and non-tolerance amongst the followers of the Order. Decline continued and further disintegration entered into the fold through various channels and passed through several vicissitudes. It seems at times it gained strength with the appearance of some really talented supporters and scholars which stopped the downward flow for some time. But then again, its fall came with greater acceleration after the disappearance of that support. In course of this gradual decline, the followers of Buddhism, due to various misunderstandings, grew more and more jealous of those who preached against Buddhism and naturally provoked their rivals who, in their turn, did not spare them and tried to take revenge whenever possible. Various methods were adopted by both the parties to do injury to each other. They met on public platforms for disputations with an understanding of converting the defeated party into the religion of the winner and sometimes the defeated party had to become slave of the other party. Sometimes this led to disastrous results. So there was a sort of Socio-Religio-Scholarly struggle between the two parties.

An instance of their decline can be found in the *Mālatīmādhava* of Bhavabhūti. The Buddhists lost their courage and scholarly strength and could not stand the criticisms of Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Vācaspati Mishra I, Maṇḍana Mishra, Bhavabhūti, the great Udayanācārya and several others in the North and those of the great Śaṅkarācārya in the South. These veteran savants refuted the *Tarkas* of the Buddhists and finally re-established the supremacy of *Varṇāśramadharma* and Bhāratīya thoughts.

The Buddhists from the very beginning tried to live as a separate and independent class with reactionary sectarian ideas attacking *Varṇāśramadharma*, Vedic ideals and thoughts. They always cherished the idea of belonging to a separate culture and even separate civilization. They did not like those who followed the *Varṇā-*

śramadharma. So the Bhāratīyas, who had tolerated all sorts of people, even with their natural tolerance, could not allow the sectarian and reactionary group of Buddhism to flourish in the country.

Besides, on the political side, there was the Brāhmanic revival. There were the Śuṅgas headed by Puṣyamitra, Kāṇvas and even the Śātavāhaṇas under whom the Vedic traditions again, came to be revived with greater vigour. The Huṇa king Mihirakula of the 5th century A. C. helped the Brāhmaṇic culture and traditions in various ways against the Bddhists.

The Buddhists openly denied and also criticised the existence of God.[72] It was because of this that the great Maithila scholar Udayanācārya wrote his famous work, the *Nyāya-Kusumāñjali,* proving the existence of God and criticised vigorously the views of the Buddhists in his *Ātmatattvaviveka,* also known as *Bauddhādhikkāra* or *Bauddhādhikāra*. The famous lines of Udayanācārya addressed to Lord Jagannātha—

> Aiśvaryamadamatto'si māmavajñāya vartase/
> Punarbauddhe samāyāte madadhīnā tava sthitiḥ//

also support the above.

The Buddhists encouraged the Tāntric cult and under its garb spread various types of corruptions amongst people. This was realized by the non-Buddhists who turned against them and tried to drive away Buddhism from the country.

It is a fact that Buddhism flourished on the very borders of Mithilā. It is a well-known fact that the Maithilas were great Vedic scholars who followed the Vedic culture and traditions very rigidly. When the Buddhists entered into the land of Mithilā and began to take anti-Vedic steps, attacking Veda, Vedic culture and also preaching their teachings through a non-Sanskritic language, the Maithilas could not tolerate their behaviour and met them on public platforms to refute the Buddhist arguments and re-establish Vedic traditions. It was the time when Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā came into the field. The land of Mithilā, the home of Janaka and Yājñavalkya and many other Vedic ṛṣis, which was once renowned

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72 Vide *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and *Pañjikā* on it, pp. 549—59.

for Ādhyātmic pursuits was shocked at the non-Vedic attitude of these people. Maithila scholars first tried to persuade them to be faithful to their old fold, but when they found that the Buddhists were deadly against the Vedic traditions and teachings, then they left all their own Ādhyātmic pursuits and tried to drive the Buddhistic thoughts away not only from Mithilā and her borders but even from India through reasoning and writing books after books and criticising their views.

It is also an admitted fact that the Buddhist monasteries and vihāras became very rich through donations in various forms from different sources. This led the Buddhists to love riches more than their own old sublime teachings and discipline of body and mind. They could not check themselves against worldly temptations which ultimately resulted in their own downfall and also in their being attacked by foreigners.

Lastly, the Muslims, who were very eager to collect all the wealth of India by all possible means, did not spare these vihāras and monasteries. They burnt the vihāras and carried away wealth which made the Buddhists homeless. All this combined together to drive away the anti-Vedic traditions from the country, which led to the final decline of Buddhism in India.

It was a very serious blunder on the part of the Buddhists to think of themselves as followers of an independent culture, religion and philosophy. In fact, there is only one religion, only one culture and only one philosophy in India. Great saints and scholars with their independent views have flourished from time to time and have contributed to the thoughts of India. They may be the Buddha, or Śaṅkara, or Kumarila, or Vācaspati, or Udayana, or Caitanya, or any one else, all were Indian savants and scholars and reformers. They have together enriched Indian thought and culture.

Now, to sum up the above I wish to repeat that (1) teachings delivered to non-qualified persons, (2) admission to the Order not being restricted, (3) non-recording of the teachings, (4) dissatisfaction and split amongst the members of the Order, (5) false impression of their belonging to an independent culture and thus, keeping

[73] Vide *Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa.*

themselves aloof from the society, (6) reactionary attitude of the members of the Order, (7) their hatred towards the three main pillars of the Bhāratīya culture and civilization, namely, Veda, Varṇāśramadharma and Sanskrit language, (8) introduction of Pāli in place of Sanskrit, (9) directly denying and criticising the existence of God, (10) love for the possession of power and worldly riches, (11) spreading of corruption and doing mischief under the garb of Tāntric Siddhis, and above all (12) doing these acts on the very borders of Mithilā, an ancient centre of Vedic culture and civilization and traditional scholarship and lastly, (13) the mischief of the invaders, are some of the main features which led to the decline of Buddhism in India.

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